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Correct Belief

Allan Gibbard

in Meaning and Normativity

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199646074
eISBN:
9780191741968
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy

The chapter addresses a puzzle. In an objective sense, one ought to believe all and only what’s true. This loses the normative/natural distinction, making objective oughts conceptually equivalent to ... More


Why I Am Not a Utilitarian

Douglas W. Portmore

in Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199794539
eISBN:
9780199919260
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794539.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The chapter explains the motivation for the book, which is to find a moral theory that accommodates what's compelling about act-utilitarianism while avoiding most, if not all, of its counterintuitive ... More


Objective and Subjective ‘Ought’

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Value of Rationality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198802693
eISBN:
9780191841972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving terms like ‘ought’. These truth conditions involve a function from worlds of evaluation to domains of worlds, and an ... More


The Beginnings of an Answer

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Value of Rationality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198802693
eISBN:
9780191841972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter answers the first two of the four objections from the end of Chapter 1. (1) When thinking rationally has disastrous consequences, in one sense (reflecting the ‘wrong kind of reasons’) ... More


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