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This chapter examines the so-called nudge ideas based on libertarian paternalism and asymmetric paternalism, both of which seek to provide a practical approach to the trade-off between well-being and autonomy. Nudge policies are government interventions that seek to change the context in which people make choices—the “choice architecture”—so as to nudge them to make decisions in the direction that the government wants. “Libertarian” paternalism is paternalism because the policies involve government intervention in individual decision making with the intention of promoting the individual's own good, but libertarian because the individual maintains a range of choices similar to those that he/she had without the intervention. After considering the relevant definitions, the chapter considers the case for and against libertarian paternalism and concludes by highlighting the principal defense of libertarian paternalist policies: their effectiveness in terms of their impact on well-being and autonomy when compared to alternative paternalistic policies.

Human behavior and development if actively responsive to certain kinds of environmental features, and this suggests that some kinds of substantial social change could be feasible given the right kind of triggering change or "nudge." Recent work in social psychology offers results that support this view, and that indicate what some key triggers might be--work on stereotypes and stereotype threat, responses to social inequality, implicit bias, and learning mindsets are especially promising.

Amidst the growing enthusiasm for the application of behavioural insights from behavioural economics, psychology and the neurosciences in social policy, there has been a shift in emphasis from structural, through individuated and towards neuromolecular scales of explanation for social problems. This chapter explores the role of these trends in carving out new spatialities of social policy. The chapter considers the scale at which government intervention is deemed necessary, effective and efficient; and who should be responsible for health, productivity and wellbeing in liberal societies. It traces continuities between behavioural and neuroscientifically-informed public policy through analysis of international and supra-national policy documentation within societies in which neoliberalism is increasingly recognised as a source of social harm and economic instability. The chapter develops an approach to ‘critical neuro- geography’ which sheds new light on the strategic importance of scalar claims and other spatialities to forms of governance targeted at the mind, body and soul.

As travel planning’s theoretical underpinnings have broadened from engineering and economics to embrace psychology and sociology, an emphasis has been placed on social marketing and nudge theory. It is argued that this is consistent with a neo-liberal trend towards governing from a distance. Using two case studies, one a qualitative study of reducing short-haul air travel, the other a quantitative study of attempts to reduce local car travel, it is found that actual behaviour change is limited. This seems to arise because behavioural change has been too narrowly defined and overly identified with personal choice.

This chapter examines three health determinants that lie inside of individuals’ own control: diet, physical activity, and substance use. The choices exhibited over these three classes of goods (or bads) have fundamental impacts on the health of the individual. Under each of them, three types of policy interventions are discussed: prices, regulations, and ‘nudges’. Generally, price interventions such as indirect taxation and subsidies are useful when demand is responsive to price changes, that is, on price-elastic goods. Regulations are required when consumers do not respond much to price changes, that is, for price-inelastic goods. The use of ‘nudges’ is based on the insight from behavioural economics that consumers are sensitive to how their choice sets are being presented. Through ‘choice architecture’ policymakers can help individuals make healthy choices rather than being victims of a short-sighted weak will.

Interventions that modify a person’s motivations through chemically or physically influencing the brain seem morally objectionable, at least when they are performed nonconsensually. This chapter raises a puzzle for attempts to explain their objectionability. It first seeks to show that the objectionability of such interventions must be explained at least in part by reference to the sort of mental interference that they involve. It then argues that it is difficult to furnish an explanation of this sort. The difficulty is that these interventions seem no more objectionable, in terms of the kind of mental interference that they involve, than certain forms of environmental influence that many would regard as morally innocuous. The argument proceeds by comparing a particular neurointervention with a comparable environmental intervention. The author argues, first, that the two dominant explanations for the objectionability of the neurointervention apply equally to the environmental intervention, and second, that the descriptive difference between the environmental intervention and the neurointervention that most plausibly grounds the putative moral difference in fact fails to do so. The author concludes by presenting a trilemma that falls out of the argument.

The pseudoscientific notion that humans are machines or computing robots has led to the spread of a manipulative way of being in both personal life and politics. This manipulative ethic is a “management ethos.” On the personal level, modern people increasingly try to gain control of their lives using a panoply of supposedly scientifically validated self-help methods and techniques. This chapter examines the influence of scientism on practices such as dating and efforts to enhance personal charisma. Many of these methods unwittingly turn courtship into a form of mass consumer shopping, replacing alternative ways of perceiving one’s deepest attachments. In political life, there has been a tremendous spread of technocratic forms of authority. Technocracy is a form of rule that replaces democratic rule by ordinary people with government by experts. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s popular book Nudge is criticized as an example of technocracy and the management ethos usurping democratic life.

A dichotomy that has influenced much theoretical and applied research on reasoning is the distinction between System I and System II reasoning. System I is intuitive, fast, based on associations, and subject to biases. System II is analytic, slow, based on rules, and more competent. It should be kept in mind, however, that these distinctions do not always apply. A fast, correct response occurs when an expert automatically responds quickly, and a slow, incorrect response occurs when the answer is unknown. One tactic to improve reasoning is the use of nudges to steer people’s choices in a direction to improve their lives. Another tactic is the use of boosts to educate people to make better decisions. Action-based decision-making, such as firefighting and military engagement, requires making a series of decisions as the situation changes. Situation awareness is critical for making good decisions.

A control signal is an act of social control conveying a message to a wider social audience. Starting with a story about the execution of a group of smugglers in the eighteenth century, that fades into an extensive discussion of the performative acts of policing, a number of types of control signal are mapped out. It is shown that control signals can be deliberately manufactured or emerge more organically out of social control acts and interventions. Furthermore a differentiation can be made between positive and negative signal effects. In the second half of the chapter the focus is upon how accenting the communicative properties and qualities of control acts has repercussions for our understandings of social control processes more broadly. A distinction between ‘signals of control’ and ‘signals to control’ is identified.

The toolbox of governments increasingly resembles a set of informational cues and prompts. Governments and other public sector organisations realise that the traditional tools of government, such as law and finance, need a supportive informational context to be effective. Recent developments in British government show that the distinction between nudge-like interventions and the traditional policy instruments cannot be sustained. These informational resources have increased the capacity of government and they can help alleviate the problems of top-down forms of intervention. In short, an informational focus to the tools of government can enhance more traditional forms of intervention.

This chapter shows how place-based initiative was often the driving force behind the creation of new public services – from public parks, libraries, and museums, to social care, education and social housing. The chapter examines the changing nature of public service reform in the last thirty years or so, and distinguishes three broad approaches: 1) Consumerism (relying on market or quasi-market models and the power of ‘exit’), 2) Customer orientation (relying on self-improvement by public servants), and 3) Citizen empowerment (relying on strengthening the role of citizens in the co-creation of public services and the power of ‘voice’). The discussion offers a robust critique of ‘New Public Management’ and the notion of ‘Nudge in public policy’. In place of these flawed models the chapter suggests a democratic way forward for public service reform described as ‘New Civic Leadership’. This approach envisages a creative interplay between civil society, markets and the state.

This chapter analyses predominant forms of political rationalities, expert knowledge, and governing technologies employed in the attempt to govern obesity in England. First, we look into some of the historical antecedents to contemporary health promotion by briefly accounting for the preventive measures addressing obesity in the early twentieth century. We then turn to the re-casting of obesity as a question of lifestyle conduct during the 1980s. This is followed by an examination of the mobilisation of the community by the recent British governments and the attempt to apply behavioural knowledge and techniques (nudging) to governing obesity. Finally, we zoom in on the governing of child obesity and the role that the so-called fat camps play in obesity management.

This chapter examines how the psychology of cognition, decision making, and deception affects buyers and sellers in real estate transactions. The chapter describes how some aspects of property law, such as standardized forms of property (e.g., fee simple ownership, leasing) may reduce information-processing costs and enhance understanding of transactions. Yet other laws, such as property defect disclosure, fail to respond to buyers who struggle to process, update, and price complex, late-coming information and sellers who are subject to motivated reasoning and tendencies toward deception. The chapter also considers emerging psychological evidence on conflicts of interest that calls into question the prevailing approach of allowing dual agency by brokers (i.e., representing both buyer and seller).

New insights from psychology and behavioural economics have encouraged a paradigm shift in policy debates towards a focus on ‘nudge’ strategies that are influenced by an understanding of the cognitive and social factors driving human decision-making. However, translating behavioural insights into viable policy interventions is far from straightforward. Moreover, nudge strategies are normatively contested and far from certain to deliver behaviour change on their own. Sustainable consumption strategies pursued using nudge are more likely to be effective if: firstly, they were freed from their current neo-liberal framing, if normative doubts about their manipulative nature were addressed, and nudge strategies were seen to complement, rather than replace, traditional mechanisms of government intervention; and secondly, if the range of delivery partners, supporters, and backers were extended, lessening the threat to legitimacy created by ‘top-down’ approaches.

Dialogues that respectfully communicate stewardship goals can build trust and shape the social norms and behavior of others. Communicating effectively, as described in this chapter, is the second element in this book’s four-tiered stewardship strategy. Trust and effective dialogue occur most easily when people share worldviews or are open to the opinions of others. Many attitudes and behaviors are, however, socially constructed and may not be responsive to new information. When information campaigns and hazard warnings conflict with the opinions and worldviews of others, they are likely to elicit negative responses or denial, as in many climate-information campaigns. Even in this situation, progress can be made by looking for points of agreement, such as concern for the future of children or care for Creation. In general, positive conversations that focus on common ground and opportunities for solutions rather than blame for problems are most likely to elicit action.

This chapter addresses the question of the wrong-making features of manipulation and the circumstances under which it is ethically justified. It argues that it is not the case that any of the practices traditionally labeled as “manipulation” are ipso facto morally wrong, nor is it even the case that any of these practices have a single wrong-making feature (e.g., infringement on autonomy that is always present but may be outweighed by other morally relevant factors). The moral status depends on the extent to which an instance of influence (1) threatens or promotes autonomy, (2) has good aims and virtuous overtones or bad ones, and (3) fulfills or fails to fulfill duties, obligations, and expectations that arise out of the relationship between the influencer and influenced. The chapter analyzes these domains in depth and discusses the challenges arising from the application of a pluralistic framework such as this.

Governments can contribute more effectively and efficiently to societal progress. The traditional government machinery is however inadequate, underfunded and wrongly funded, and still overly focused on economic output rather than societal outcomes. New approaches need to deal better with multidimensional problems, some massive (such as migration), and better integrate behavioral insights and big data. This chapter highlights: (1) outcome-conditional taxes and transfers (such as a sugar tax aimed at obesity, and cash for school attendance family transfers); (2) corrective rather than just preventive regulation (as exemplified by Germany’s paternal leave policy which aims to correct demographic decline); (3) nudge policies (such as opt-out rather than opt-in voluntary pension savings); (4) innovative financing (such as government matching of foreign remittance by expats to finance infrastructure in Mexico); and (5) greater use of big data to compare interventions and outcomes (as attempted by the US Department of Education).