Andrew P. N. Eardmann
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any ...
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For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.Less
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.
Philip Nash
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Kennedy's reliance on non‐nuclear assets and flexible response overshadowed his reliance on nuclear weapons, just as his nuclear restraint eclipsed recklessness. This is not surprising in view of the ...
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Kennedy's reliance on non‐nuclear assets and flexible response overshadowed his reliance on nuclear weapons, just as his nuclear restraint eclipsed recklessness. This is not surprising in view of the national security strategy Kennedy chose and the concerns about nuclear weapons he had. It is surprising, however, in light of the profound alarm with which Kennedy and most Americans viewed the Soviet threat; the frequency and intensity of the international crises Kennedy faced; and the widely acknowledged superiority of the US nuclear arsenal. Against this backdrop of threat, crisis, and strategic superiority, it is striking how small an active role nuclear weapons played in Kennedy's foreign policy.Less
Kennedy's reliance on non‐nuclear assets and flexible response overshadowed his reliance on nuclear weapons, just as his nuclear restraint eclipsed recklessness. This is not surprising in view of the national security strategy Kennedy chose and the concerns about nuclear weapons he had. It is surprising, however, in light of the profound alarm with which Kennedy and most Americans viewed the Soviet threat; the frequency and intensity of the international crises Kennedy faced; and the widely acknowledged superiority of the US nuclear arsenal. Against this backdrop of threat, crisis, and strategic superiority, it is striking how small an active role nuclear weapons played in Kennedy's foreign policy.
Annette Messemer
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
For Konrad Adenauer, post‐war international system centred around two revolutionary developments: the decline of Europe and the rise of the US and the Soviet Union to superpower status. For the ...
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For Konrad Adenauer, post‐war international system centred around two revolutionary developments: the decline of Europe and the rise of the US and the Soviet Union to superpower status. For the survival of the ’European cultural supremacy’, Adenauer believed it was necessary to resist dependency on the US, and protect from a Soviet threat. Considering Germany's policy constraints on nuclear armament and its position as the possible nuclear battlefield in a military conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, Adenauer saw the solution in Western European unification as the only way to make West Germany an equal member of the post‐war international order.Less
For Konrad Adenauer, post‐war international system centred around two revolutionary developments: the decline of Europe and the rise of the US and the Soviet Union to superpower status. For the survival of the ’European cultural supremacy’, Adenauer believed it was necessary to resist dependency on the US, and protect from a Soviet threat. Considering Germany's policy constraints on nuclear armament and its position as the possible nuclear battlefield in a military conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, Adenauer saw the solution in Western European unification as the only way to make West Germany an equal member of the post‐war international order.
Neal Rosendorf
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
John Foster Dulles’ thinking over the issue of nuclear weapons was inconsistent. He registered strong disapproval on moral grounds of the atomic bombing of Japan and warned of the dangerous precedent ...
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John Foster Dulles’ thinking over the issue of nuclear weapons was inconsistent. He registered strong disapproval on moral grounds of the atomic bombing of Japan and warned of the dangerous precedent the US was setting in using nuclear weapons. Yet, for some years he was an ardent proponent of massive retaliation, which threatened a possible thermonuclear strike in response to conventional aggression. Dulles strove to break down the false distinction between the atom bomb and conventional weapons that was working, he believed, to the Soviets’ military and propaganda advantage. Dulles’ initial legalistic‐moralistic thinking on nuclear weapons clashed sharply with the more bellicose, pessimistic, amoral perspectives he developed in the wake of the Korean invasion. The result was an unwieldy grafting together of the two that contributed significantly to his public and private policy oscillations.Less
John Foster Dulles’ thinking over the issue of nuclear weapons was inconsistent. He registered strong disapproval on moral grounds of the atomic bombing of Japan and warned of the dangerous precedent the US was setting in using nuclear weapons. Yet, for some years he was an ardent proponent of massive retaliation, which threatened a possible thermonuclear strike in response to conventional aggression. Dulles strove to break down the false distinction between the atom bomb and conventional weapons that was working, he believed, to the Soviets’ military and propaganda advantage. Dulles’ initial legalistic‐moralistic thinking on nuclear weapons clashed sharply with the more bellicose, pessimistic, amoral perspectives he developed in the wake of the Korean invasion. The result was an unwieldy grafting together of the two that contributed significantly to his public and private policy oscillations.
Guang Zhang Shu
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Mao Zedong originally saw a new China's struggle for security in terms of conventional warfare and in 1946 satirized the atomic bomb as a ’paper tiger’. Mao found it difficult to understand why the ...
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Mao Zedong originally saw a new China's struggle for security in terms of conventional warfare and in 1946 satirized the atomic bomb as a ’paper tiger’. Mao found it difficult to understand why the imperialists would venture to use nuclear weapons in a war if they wanted to dominate other nations, because a massively destructive weapon would not serve the purpose of acquiring political control, but would instead destroy that which was to be controlled. However, he gradually changed his position, as he understood the deterrent value of the bomb. Frequent US nuclear threats against China, Soviet pressures, and pressures from other Chinese leaders who kept pushing Mao to pay more attention to nuclear‐weapon programmes are the important factors that contributed to his ’nuclear revolution’. Consequently, his thinking on the atomic bomb came to dominate China's defence policy and brought about the policy changes that turned China into a major nuclear power.Less
Mao Zedong originally saw a new China's struggle for security in terms of conventional warfare and in 1946 satirized the atomic bomb as a ’paper tiger’. Mao found it difficult to understand why the imperialists would venture to use nuclear weapons in a war if they wanted to dominate other nations, because a massively destructive weapon would not serve the purpose of acquiring political control, but would instead destroy that which was to be controlled. However, he gradually changed his position, as he understood the deterrent value of the bomb. Frequent US nuclear threats against China, Soviet pressures, and pressures from other Chinese leaders who kept pushing Mao to pay more attention to nuclear‐weapon programmes are the important factors that contributed to his ’nuclear revolution’. Consequently, his thinking on the atomic bomb came to dominate China's defence policy and brought about the policy changes that turned China into a major nuclear power.
Philip H. Gordon
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Charles de Gaulle recognized from the beginning that nuclear bomb would have immense consequences although he continued to believe in the continuation of past patterns of great‐power conflict, war, ...
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Charles de Gaulle recognized from the beginning that nuclear bomb would have immense consequences although he continued to believe in the continuation of past patterns of great‐power conflict, war, and behaviour. By the end of his two‐decade ’nuclear learning process’, he was convinced that the bomb would have profound effects on how statesmen would use military force. Furthermore, de Gaulle believed that nuclear weapons strengthened the most basic features of the international system by reinforcing the fundamental role of the nation‐state, and by freezing the world into a bipolar order. In short, for de Gaulle, France had to develop its own nuclear weapons in order to ensure French national security, provide great‐power status, respect, national independence, and political influence.Less
Charles de Gaulle recognized from the beginning that nuclear bomb would have immense consequences although he continued to believe in the continuation of past patterns of great‐power conflict, war, and behaviour. By the end of his two‐decade ’nuclear learning process’, he was convinced that the bomb would have profound effects on how statesmen would use military force. Furthermore, de Gaulle believed that nuclear weapons strengthened the most basic features of the international system by reinforcing the fundamental role of the nation‐state, and by freezing the world into a bipolar order. In short, for de Gaulle, France had to develop its own nuclear weapons in order to ensure French national security, provide great‐power status, respect, national independence, and political influence.
Vladislav M. Zubok and Hope M. Harrison
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of ...
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Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of the usability of nuclear weapons, he regarded them primarily as a positive force and was eager to use them in his gamble for peace – an attempt to negotiate a permanent truce with the US, which would have liberated Soviet resources for the construction of communism and the assistance of ’progressive’ movements and regimes around the world. Khrushchev had little doubt that behind the nuclear shield, the Soviet Union would win a peaceful economic competition with the capitalist camp.Less
Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of the usability of nuclear weapons, he regarded them primarily as a positive force and was eager to use them in his gamble for peace – an attempt to negotiate a permanent truce with the US, which would have liberated Soviet resources for the construction of communism and the assistance of ’progressive’ movements and regimes around the world. Khrushchev had little doubt that behind the nuclear shield, the Soviet Union would win a peaceful economic competition with the capitalist camp.
S. David Broscious
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Although Harry Truman embraced the idea of a ’nuclear revolution’, he also remained convinced that, despite this revolution, other environmental factors still held force – namely, international ...
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Although Harry Truman embraced the idea of a ’nuclear revolution’, he also remained convinced that, despite this revolution, other environmental factors still held force – namely, international anarchy, aggression, and the need to defend against aggression. In short, there was a clash within Truman's mind between the imperatives of the nuclear age and of the anarchic international system within which the nuclear revolution evolved. While hoping that an international control system could eliminate the prospect of nuclear war and foster the peaceful use of the atom, he was also ready and willing to rely on US lead in the field of nuclear energy to contain the horrors inherent in nuclear war. Having defined the Soviet Union as a non‐cooperative partner and as a threat, Truman accepted the need for American nuclear superiority in order to deter Soviet aggression and prevent nuclear war.Less
Although Harry Truman embraced the idea of a ’nuclear revolution’, he also remained convinced that, despite this revolution, other environmental factors still held force – namely, international anarchy, aggression, and the need to defend against aggression. In short, there was a clash within Truman's mind between the imperatives of the nuclear age and of the anarchic international system within which the nuclear revolution evolved. While hoping that an international control system could eliminate the prospect of nuclear war and foster the peaceful use of the atom, he was also ready and willing to rely on US lead in the field of nuclear energy to contain the horrors inherent in nuclear war. Having defined the Soviet Union as a non‐cooperative partner and as a threat, Truman accepted the need for American nuclear superiority in order to deter Soviet aggression and prevent nuclear war.
John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold ...
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This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.Less
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.
Vaclav Smil
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195168754
- eISBN:
- 9780199783601
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195168755.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
Our civilization is based on massive consumption of fossil fuels. This chapter begins by examining technical advances of energy industries, before turning to energy transitions and the process of ...
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Our civilization is based on massive consumption of fossil fuels. This chapter begins by examining technical advances of energy industries, before turning to energy transitions and the process of decarbonization of global energy supply. The second section deals with electricity production in general, and with nuclear generation (as well as nuclear weapons) in particular. The last section traces the invention and deployment of the only two new prime movers introduced during the 20th century: gas turbines and rocket engines.Less
Our civilization is based on massive consumption of fossil fuels. This chapter begins by examining technical advances of energy industries, before turning to energy transitions and the process of decarbonization of global energy supply. The second section deals with electricity production in general, and with nuclear generation (as well as nuclear weapons) in particular. The last section traces the invention and deployment of the only two new prime movers introduced during the 20th century: gas turbines and rocket engines.
Vipin Narang
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159829
- eISBN:
- 9781400850402
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter explores India's nuclear posture. Like China's, India's nuclear posture is classified as one of assured retaliation. There have been various dramatic moments in India's nuclear weapons ...
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This chapter explores India's nuclear posture. Like China's, India's nuclear posture is classified as one of assured retaliation. There have been various dramatic moments in India's nuclear weapons history that were often driven by domestic political considerations, most notably its nuclear tests in May of 1974 and 1998. Nonetheless, the capabilities, envisioned use, and command-and-control apparatus that Delhi has erected for its nuclear forces have been persistent and consistent with an assured retaliation posture since 1974. The reason for this, as illustrated by optimization theory, is that India is in a relatively secure position but with highly assertive civil–military relations, driving it toward an assured retaliation nuclear posture that emphasizes firm civilian control over the arsenal.Less
This chapter explores India's nuclear posture. Like China's, India's nuclear posture is classified as one of assured retaliation. There have been various dramatic moments in India's nuclear weapons history that were often driven by domestic political considerations, most notably its nuclear tests in May of 1974 and 1998. Nonetheless, the capabilities, envisioned use, and command-and-control apparatus that Delhi has erected for its nuclear forces have been persistent and consistent with an assured retaliation posture since 1974. The reason for this, as illustrated by optimization theory, is that India is in a relatively secure position but with highly assertive civil–military relations, driving it toward an assured retaliation nuclear posture that emphasizes firm civilian control over the arsenal.
Vipin Narang
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159829
- eISBN:
- 9781400850402
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter considers how one might treat Israel's nuclear posture, given that it is a posture comprising capabilities that have never been confirmed. Israel is the world's oldest closet nuclear ...
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This chapter considers how one might treat Israel's nuclear posture, given that it is a posture comprising capabilities that have never been confirmed. Israel is the world's oldest closet nuclear state. For more than forty years it has neither confirmed nor denied its possession of nuclear weapons, and has vowed not to be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons into the Middle East. But it has circulated enough credible rumors and hints that it does possess a nuclear weapons capability to lead most of the world to believe that Israel was the world's sixth nuclear power. Based on incredible access to Israeli officials and declassified U.S. documents, this chapter reveals the most authoritative history of Israel's nuclear program. Drawing on previous works on the subject, this chapter fits Israel's nuclear posture into the broader comparative typology.Less
This chapter considers how one might treat Israel's nuclear posture, given that it is a posture comprising capabilities that have never been confirmed. Israel is the world's oldest closet nuclear state. For more than forty years it has neither confirmed nor denied its possession of nuclear weapons, and has vowed not to be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons into the Middle East. But it has circulated enough credible rumors and hints that it does possess a nuclear weapons capability to lead most of the world to believe that Israel was the world's sixth nuclear power. Based on incredible access to Israeli officials and declassified U.S. documents, this chapter reveals the most authoritative history of Israel's nuclear program. Drawing on previous works on the subject, this chapter fits Israel's nuclear posture into the broader comparative typology.
Vipin Narang
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159829
- eISBN:
- 9781400850402
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter lays out the volume's main arguments in brief. Contrary to the usual focus on superpowers and Cold War nuclear competition, the chapter proposes a different dynamic. It asks what ...
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This chapter lays out the volume's main arguments in brief. Contrary to the usual focus on superpowers and Cold War nuclear competition, the chapter proposes a different dynamic. It asks what strategies and choices certain states will make about their nuclear weapons and how those decisions about nuclear strategy can affect international relations and conflict. Examining the decisions that regional nuclear powers—such as China, India, Pakistan, Israel, France, and South Africa—have made about their arsenals thus far, and their resulting behavior, helps address these questions. Regional nuclear powers, for systematic and predictable reasons, choose clearly identifiable nuclear postures and these postures matter to a regional power's ability to deter conflict. These countries' nuclear choices, therefore, provide valuable insight into the crucial challenges of contemporary nuclear proliferation and international stability.Less
This chapter lays out the volume's main arguments in brief. Contrary to the usual focus on superpowers and Cold War nuclear competition, the chapter proposes a different dynamic. It asks what strategies and choices certain states will make about their nuclear weapons and how those decisions about nuclear strategy can affect international relations and conflict. Examining the decisions that regional nuclear powers—such as China, India, Pakistan, Israel, France, and South Africa—have made about their arsenals thus far, and their resulting behavior, helps address these questions. Regional nuclear powers, for systematic and predictable reasons, choose clearly identifiable nuclear postures and these postures matter to a regional power's ability to deter conflict. These countries' nuclear choices, therefore, provide valuable insight into the crucial challenges of contemporary nuclear proliferation and international stability.
Robert Wuthnow
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199730872
- eISBN:
- 9780199777389
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730872.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Be Very Afraid examines the human response to existential threats; once a matter for theology, but now looming before us in multiple forms. Nuclear weapons, pandemics, global warming; ...
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Be Very Afraid examines the human response to existential threats; once a matter for theology, but now looming before us in multiple forms. Nuclear weapons, pandemics, global warming; each threatens to destroy the planet, or at least to annihilate our species. Freud, the author notes, famously taught that the standard psychological response to an overwhelming danger is denial. In fact, the author writes, the opposite is true: we seek ways of positively meeting the threat, of doing something — anything — even if it is wasteful and time-consuming. The atomic era that began with the bombing of Hiroshima sparked a flurry of activity, ranging from duck-and-cover drills, basement bomb shelters, and marches for a nuclear freeze. All were arguably ineffectual, yet each sprang from an innate desire to take action. It would be one thing if our responses were merely pointless, the book observes, but they can actually be harmful. Both the public and policymakers tend to model reactions to grave threats on how we met previous ones. The response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, for example, echoed the Cold War: citizens went out to buy duct tape, mimicking 1950s-era civil defense measures, and the administration launched two costly conflicts overseas.Less
Be Very Afraid examines the human response to existential threats; once a matter for theology, but now looming before us in multiple forms. Nuclear weapons, pandemics, global warming; each threatens to destroy the planet, or at least to annihilate our species. Freud, the author notes, famously taught that the standard psychological response to an overwhelming danger is denial. In fact, the author writes, the opposite is true: we seek ways of positively meeting the threat, of doing something — anything — even if it is wasteful and time-consuming. The atomic era that began with the bombing of Hiroshima sparked a flurry of activity, ranging from duck-and-cover drills, basement bomb shelters, and marches for a nuclear freeze. All were arguably ineffectual, yet each sprang from an innate desire to take action. It would be one thing if our responses were merely pointless, the book observes, but they can actually be harmful. Both the public and policymakers tend to model reactions to grave threats on how we met previous ones. The response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, for example, echoed the Cold War: citizens went out to buy duct tape, mimicking 1950s-era civil defense measures, and the administration launched two costly conflicts overseas.
David French
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199548231
- eISBN:
- 9780191739224
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548231.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
This chapter analyses the evolution of the army's doctrine for nuclear war fighting, from the moment when it first began to consider the possible impact of nuclear weapons on an army in the field in ...
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This chapter analyses the evolution of the army's doctrine for nuclear war fighting, from the moment when it first began to consider the possible impact of nuclear weapons on an army in the field in the late 1940s, to the point at which it had evolved a mature doctrine for such operations, in the late 1960s. It is a topic that has largely been ignored by historians of nuclear strategy, who have focused their attention on the adoption of the far more destructive strategic nuclear weapons. Such references as they have made to the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons have examined their impact on NATO's overall strategy, but little has been written about how the army considered they might be used, or the impact that their introduction had on how the army was configured and prepared for war.Less
This chapter analyses the evolution of the army's doctrine for nuclear war fighting, from the moment when it first began to consider the possible impact of nuclear weapons on an army in the field in the late 1940s, to the point at which it had evolved a mature doctrine for such operations, in the late 1960s. It is a topic that has largely been ignored by historians of nuclear strategy, who have focused their attention on the adoption of the far more destructive strategic nuclear weapons. Such references as they have made to the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons have examined their impact on NATO's overall strategy, but little has been written about how the army considered they might be used, or the impact that their introduction had on how the army was configured and prepared for war.
Vladislav M. Zubok
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Stalin understood the military and political significance of atomic weapons and directed all available Soviet resources to obtaining this weapon. However, he remained largely a statesman operating on ...
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Stalin understood the military and political significance of atomic weapons and directed all available Soviet resources to obtaining this weapon. However, he remained largely a statesman operating on the premises and experience of the pre‐nuclear age. For him, the emergence of atomic weapons made the prospect of a future war more terrifying, but no less likely. America's atomic monopoly in the first phase of the Cold War did not play a substantial role in deterring Stalin. He was determined to defend his spheres of influence and to dispel any sign of possible Soviet weakness in the face of America's atomic saber rattling. Stalin, a genius of state terror, power broking, and war diplomacy, was different from statesmen in the democratic countries, but his outlook on world politics was consistent with the realpolitik of the pre‐nuclear age. He had as much inclination as some of his ’liberal’ Western counterparts to regard nuclear power as a means of augmenting military power and, in larger terms, the power of the state.Less
Stalin understood the military and political significance of atomic weapons and directed all available Soviet resources to obtaining this weapon. However, he remained largely a statesman operating on the premises and experience of the pre‐nuclear age. For him, the emergence of atomic weapons made the prospect of a future war more terrifying, but no less likely. America's atomic monopoly in the first phase of the Cold War did not play a substantial role in deterring Stalin. He was determined to defend his spheres of influence and to dispel any sign of possible Soviet weakness in the face of America's atomic saber rattling. Stalin, a genius of state terror, power broking, and war diplomacy, was different from statesmen in the democratic countries, but his outlook on world politics was consistent with the realpolitik of the pre‐nuclear age. He had as much inclination as some of his ’liberal’ Western counterparts to regard nuclear power as a means of augmenting military power and, in larger terms, the power of the state.
Jonathan Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent ...
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Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.Less
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.
Martins S. Navias
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198277545
- eISBN:
- 9780191684180
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198277545.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The announcement of the 1957 White Paper took place against a background of attempts to shift the course of the Anglo-American relationship away from the dangerous path it was taking during and ...
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The announcement of the 1957 White Paper took place against a background of attempts to shift the course of the Anglo-American relationship away from the dangerous path it was taking during and immediately following the Suez crisis. Of central concern to British policy-makers was to create a more favourable perception of British actions within Washington and the securing of an agreement with President Eisenhower and Congress to allow for the amendment of the McMahon Act such that Britain could lay her hands on US nuclear technological know-how. This chapter explores the progress of the Atlantic relationship from the meeting at Bermuda to the changes made to the McMahon Act in 1958. An analysis of British nuclear targeting during this period, Britain’s attitude to improving Soviet capabilities, the ongoing negotiations over Thor missile deployments, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Navy nuclear ambitions are used as indications that nuclear interdependence was still receiving priority over nuclear independence.Less
The announcement of the 1957 White Paper took place against a background of attempts to shift the course of the Anglo-American relationship away from the dangerous path it was taking during and immediately following the Suez crisis. Of central concern to British policy-makers was to create a more favourable perception of British actions within Washington and the securing of an agreement with President Eisenhower and Congress to allow for the amendment of the McMahon Act such that Britain could lay her hands on US nuclear technological know-how. This chapter explores the progress of the Atlantic relationship from the meeting at Bermuda to the changes made to the McMahon Act in 1958. An analysis of British nuclear targeting during this period, Britain’s attitude to improving Soviet capabilities, the ongoing negotiations over Thor missile deployments, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Navy nuclear ambitions are used as indications that nuclear interdependence was still receiving priority over nuclear independence.
Dinah Shelton, David S Gualtieri, Barry Kellman, Richard L. Jr. Williamson, Dinah Shelton, and Abram Chayes
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199270989
- eISBN:
- 9780191707704
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199270989.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter presents three case studies that analyze the interplay between hard and soft law in the area of multilateral arms control, from nuclear weapons to land mines. The first study looks at ...
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This chapter presents three case studies that analyze the interplay between hard and soft law in the area of multilateral arms control, from nuclear weapons to land mines. The first study looks at the various key decisions taken by weapons control supplier groups to restrict transfers of specific technology. The second study analyzes the complex interweaving of hard and soft law for the protection of nuclear materials to ensure responsible control over nuclear materials and prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. The third study traces the development of the norm against anti-personnel land mines from soft law to hard law.Less
This chapter presents three case studies that analyze the interplay between hard and soft law in the area of multilateral arms control, from nuclear weapons to land mines. The first study looks at the various key decisions taken by weapons control supplier groups to restrict transfers of specific technology. The second study analyzes the complex interweaving of hard and soft law for the protection of nuclear materials to ensure responsible control over nuclear materials and prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. The third study traces the development of the norm against anti-personnel land mines from soft law to hard law.
CHRISTOPH BLUTH
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198280040
- eISBN:
- 9780191684340
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198280040.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the developments in American strategic thinking and European responses to the US strategy of ‘flexible response’. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of West German ...
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This chapter focuses on the developments in American strategic thinking and European responses to the US strategy of ‘flexible response’. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of West German thinking on the role of nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe. This chapter also explains how Britain and Germany reached a common outlook and were helpful in determining the right formulation of the NATO strategy of ‘flexible response’. The principal feature of flexible response is its flexibility and that it makes it possible for different countries in Europe to agree to it as the foundation of the defence structure in Europe. Aside from the ‘flexible response’, NATO also approved MC 14/3, which visualizes three different forms of military responses to aggression — direct defence, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response.Less
This chapter focuses on the developments in American strategic thinking and European responses to the US strategy of ‘flexible response’. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of West German thinking on the role of nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe. This chapter also explains how Britain and Germany reached a common outlook and were helpful in determining the right formulation of the NATO strategy of ‘flexible response’. The principal feature of flexible response is its flexibility and that it makes it possible for different countries in Europe to agree to it as the foundation of the defence structure in Europe. Aside from the ‘flexible response’, NATO also approved MC 14/3, which visualizes three different forms of military responses to aggression — direct defence, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response.
