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The Nuclear-Haunted Era

Robert Wuthnow

in Be Very Afraid: The Cultural Response to Terror, Pandemics, Environmental Devastation, Nuclear Annihilation, and Other Threats

This chapter focuses on people's responses to the nuclear era. The ebb and flow of public concern has been noted by nearly all historians of the nuclear era. What is more interesting is how the ... More

This chapter focuses on people's responses to the nuclear era. The ebb and flow of public concern has been noted by nearly all historians of the nuclear era. What is more interesting is how the public came to view nuclear weapons as a problem — not only in the negative sense, but often as a positive opportunity to be exploited — and how rolling up its collective sleeves to work on this problem became the accepted way of coexisting with the threat of nuclear annihilation. Unlike the prospect of one's own death and the death of a loved one, and even unlike the occasional airplane crash or earthquake that takes dozens or hundreds of lives, the possibility of a nuclear conflagration — a holocaust from having unlocked the basic power of the universe and creating weaponry capable of putting the world in danger of sudden destruction — was anything but normal. Yet it became normal. After the initial emotional shock, when Americans inescapably experienced bewilderment, uncertainty, and some level of grief for those who had died, attention turned to more practical concerns. The nuclear era became one of problem solving. People decided that whatever it had taken to produce such powerful weapons could surely be harnessed for other commendable purposes. They looked to government officials to protect them and occasionally searched for better measures to protect themselves.Less

The British Army of the Rhine's Doctrine for Nuclear War

David French

in Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945-1971

This chapter analyses the evolution of the army's doctrine for nuclear war fighting, from the moment when it first began to consider the possible impact of nuclear weapons on an army in the field in ... More

This chapter analyses the evolution of the army's doctrine for nuclear war fighting, from the moment when it first began to consider the possible impact of nuclear weapons on an army in the field in the late 1940s, to the point at which it had evolved a mature doctrine for such operations, in the late 1960s. It is a topic that has largely been ignored by historians of nuclear strategy, who have focused their attention on the adoption of the far more destructive strategic nuclear weapons. Such references as they have made to the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons have examined their impact on NATO's overall strategy, but little has been written about how the army considered they might be used, or the impact that their introduction had on how the army was configured and prepared for war.Less

Prologue The H-Bomb Changes Everything

Dee Garrison

in Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked

This prologue outlines how the advent of hydrogen weapons transformed the practice of war. It explains why modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It ... More

This prologue outlines how the advent of hydrogen weapons transformed the practice of war. It explains why modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It then discusses the effects of a nuclear explosion and life after a nuclear war.Less

From Nuclear Winter to the Anthropocene

Eglė Rindzevičiūtė

in The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War World

This chapter looks at the nuclear winter project, an outcome of global modeling. The idea that the Earth could be plunged into a “nuclear winter” as the catastrophic outcome of a nuclear war was ... More

This chapter looks at the nuclear winter project, an outcome of global modeling. The idea that the Earth could be plunged into a “nuclear winter” as the catastrophic outcome of a nuclear war was announced by a group of leading climate and environment scientists from the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union shortly after Ronald Reagan delivered his “Star Wars” speech in March 1983. Drawing on experiments with data-based computer models, these scholars claimed that a nuclear war, unlike the two world wars, would be not simply a regional, but a truly global disaster. Nuclear missiles, detonated over urban areas, would ignite massive fire storms, which in turn would propel soot particles and aerosols into high levels of the atmosphere. As a result, the computer models predicted, a dust shield would emerge that would be transported by air currents to both the Northern and Southern hemispheres.Less

Teaching the Just War Tradition

William French

in Teaching Religion and Violence

This essay describes strategies developed by the author for teaching a course on the Just War theory. The most prominent of the western religious traditions to articulate the conditions necessary for ... More

This essay describes strategies developed by the author for teaching a course on the Just War theory. The most prominent of the western religious traditions to articulate the conditions necessary for the moral use of armed force, the Just War tradition, with its roots in the medieval Catholic theology of Augustine and Aquinas, stipulates two sets of criteria, jus ad bellum (the discernment of the moral reasons for going to war), and jus in bello (the morality of the execution of the war itself). His course trains students in critical thinking about violence by emphasizing the careful analysis of wartime logic and the restraint of violence that this theological tradition has demanded. Students become empowered to exercise creative moral reasoning by exploring the possible expansion of the theory’s criteria, on the basis of the planet’s accumulated experience of 100 years of modern and nuclear warfare, to include a consideration of jus post bellum, the justice of a post-war circumstances, as part of the assessment of an action’s moral status.Less

From Nuclear to ‘Degenerate’ War

Ross McGarry and Sandra Walklate

in A Criminology of War?

In chapter five, From nuclear to “degenerate” war, we turn attention to criminological work produced in the aftermath of the Cold War, specifically related to nuclear warfare. In doing so, seminal ... More

In chapter five, From nuclear to “degenerate” war, we turn attention to criminological work produced in the aftermath of the Cold War, specifically related to nuclear warfare. In doing so, seminal work within criminology is used to provide an account of the ways in which the detonation, production, and proliferation of nuclear weapons can be considered as forms of extortion, deviance, and international state criminality. An intervention is then made in this work to suggest that if alternatively understood as a form of “degenerate war”, then analytic attention would draw not only state criminality into view but, importantly, state victimisation.Less

Toward a New Theory of Nuclear Deterrence: The Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory

Matthew Kroenig

in The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

This chapter develops a new theory of nuclear deterrence, the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory. The theory brings together traditional arguments in the nuclear strategy literature about the ... More

This chapter develops a new theory of nuclear deterrence, the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory. The theory brings together traditional arguments in the nuclear strategy literature about the advantages of nuclear superiority and combines them with nuclear brinkmanship theory to provide the first coherent theoretical explanation for why nuclear superiority provides states with geopolitical advantages. It argues that military nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its effective resolve, and enhancing its bargaining position. On the other hand, states in an inferior strategic position face a relatively higher cost of nuclear war, are less willing to run risks in a crisis, and are more likely to back down early in a dispute. This chapter serves, therefore, as the theoretical and conceptual core for the first half of the bookLess

Deterrence under Stalemate: Conventional War and Nuclear Escalation

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press

in The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age

This chapter explores the ability of nuclear weapons to deter conventional war. For nuclear weapons to mitigate traditional security competition, they must not only render nuclear war unwinnable but ... More

This chapter explores the ability of nuclear weapons to deter conventional war. For nuclear weapons to mitigate traditional security competition, they must not only render nuclear war unwinnable but also serve as a robust deterrent to major conventional attacks. It explains how a potential victim of conventional attack can make credible threats to escalate to nuclear war if the attacker can retaliate in kind. The chapter also discusses about countries facing threats of overwhelming conventional attack that have almost always opted to develop nuclear forces that are flexible enough to be used in limited ways. It shows that nuclear-armed countries that face dire prospects in conventional war are the same ones that tend to develop nuclear postures tailored to coercive nuclear escalation.Less

‘The nuclear arms race is psychological at its roots’:1 physicians and their therapies for the Cold War

Claudia Kemper

in Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90

How did physicians feed the imagination of the Cold War? The example of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) clearly illustrates how medical expertise drew attention on ... More

How did physicians feed the imagination of the Cold War? The example of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) clearly illustrates how medical expertise drew attention on the fact that a nuclear war did not begin with the firing of a missile, but with the psychological effects of the nuclear threat. Within the debate about the deployment of nuclear arms, physicians tried both to be neutral doctors and political stakeholders. But defining the Cold War as a disease and providing therapies remained a difficult balancing act between professional practice and political partisanship. More generally, IPPNW took part in creating a special perception of the Cold War, in order to transpose simulated future destructions into the societal and political present.Less

Introduction

in Race, Ethnicity and Nuclear War: Representations of Nuclear Weapons and Post-Apocalyptic Worlds

This introductory chapter presents an overview of the main themes covered in this study, which is anchored by the assertion that nuclear weapons are white weapons, and that the virtues and vices of ... More

This introductory chapter presents an overview of the main themes covered in this study, which is anchored by the assertion that nuclear weapons are white weapons, and that the virtues and vices of white people and nations are condensed in the figure of nuclear weapons. The study outlines two broad ways in which nuclear weapons have been seen as white: first, because the weapons themselves symbolize the achievements, atrocities and attitudes of European and American modernity; and second, because the post-nuclear-war future that such weapons could make possible is deemed to reproduce a (European) colonial or (American) frontier dynamic in which white Europeans and their descendents defend and enlarge their societies at the expense of non-white peoples.Less

A Frenzy of Research

Lawrence Badash

in A Nuclear Winter's Tale: Science and Politics in the 1980s

The fact that some of the computer models used in nuclear winter research were derived from others raised concern that many scientists were reaching the same conclusions. Those who studied the ... More

The fact that some of the computer models used in nuclear winter research were derived from others raised concern that many scientists were reaching the same conclusions. Those who studied the nuclear war scenarios, the physical and chemical effects, and the climatic consequences generally viewed their research as independent and were thus confident of its direction. Aside from the independence of models used in the research, another issue was their intrinsic value—that is, whether they were worth believing. In early 1985, better results were obtained from interactive models, which supplanted the one-dimensional representation used by the TTAPS team of Richard Turco, Owen Brian Toon, Thomas Ackerman, James Pollack, and Carl Sagan and the two- and three-dimensional models, which were unable to move smoke around. A number of fire studies were conducted to verify or challenge the TTAPS findings. New research on the biological and ecological implications of nuclear war also appeared.Less

Politics and Policy

Lawrence Badash

in A Nuclear Winter's Tale: Science and Politics in the 1980s

In March 1986, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress detailing the technical uncertainties surrounding the long-term effects of nuclear war. Titled “Nuclear winter: ... More

In March 1986, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress detailing the technical uncertainties surrounding the long-term effects of nuclear war. Titled “Nuclear winter: Uncertainties surround the long-term effects of nuclear war,” the report was drafted by a committee headed by Alan Hecht of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and comprised of several scientists. The GAO report was reviewed by other government agencies involved with nuclear winter, including the Defense Nuclear Agency. In May 1986, the Department of Defense issued its own report to Congress. Five years later, nuclear winter theory gave way to experiment when most of Kuwait’s 1,250 oil wells were torched in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. This chapter examines the politics and policy issues surrounding the nuclear winter debate.Less

Nuclear Peril

Lawrence Badash

in A Nuclear Winter's Tale: Science and Politics in the 1980s

In 1983, Carl Sagan, a planetary astronomer and a renowned science popularizer, coined the phrase “nuclear winter” to describe the effects on Earth’s climate of the explosion of nuclear weapons. This ... More

In 1983, Carl Sagan, a planetary astronomer and a renowned science popularizer, coined the phrase “nuclear winter” to describe the effects on Earth’s climate of the explosion of nuclear weapons. This book examines one of the effects of nuclear explosions: decreased temperature and illumination caused by reduced sunlight. As an introduction, this chapter looks at attempts to predict certain climatic consequences of nuclear war and considers the obscuration of sunlight as the main mechanism, with ozone depletion and the altered reflection of sunlight as additional paths. It also examines some of the effects of nuclear weapons, from electromagnetic pulse and ozone depletion to radioactive fallout, global incineration, and climate change. These effects appear to be disparate, but are nevertheless linked by the geographical extent of their consequences.Less

Strategic Stability

Matthew Kroenig

in The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

This chapter examines the relationship between nuclear superiority and strategic stability. Many nuclear deterrence theorists and policy advocates have argued for decades that nuclear superiority has ... More

This chapter examines the relationship between nuclear superiority and strategic stability. Many nuclear deterrence theorists and policy advocates have argued for decades that nuclear superiority has a glaring downside: it increases the risk of nuclear war. This chapter analyzes this question in detail and finds that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. It argues that nuclear superiority likely contributes to greater levels of strategic stability. Moreover, it maintains that traditional arguments about strategic stability fail to differentiate between good instability, that which favors US interests, and bad instability, which works to the disadvantage of Washington and its allies. When this distinction is taken into account, we see that US superiority enhances positive instability and dampens negative instability. In short, strategic stability should be listed among the benefits, not the possible costs, of an American nuclear advantage.Less

Fear of a Black Planet

in Race, Ethnicity and Nuclear War: Representations of Nuclear Weapons and Post-Apocalyptic Worlds

This chapter comments on several American films and novels from the 1950s, early 1960s and the 1980s, focusing on a major theme structuring interracial relations in the post-nuclear-war world: who is ... More

This chapter comments on several American films and novels from the 1950s, early 1960s and the 1980s, focusing on a major theme structuring interracial relations in the post-nuclear-war world: who is to have sex, and with whom? This is a crucial issue because the reproduction of the survivors will determine who will repopulate the United States (in some instances, the world). The narratives dramatize the conflict that ensues when some of the characters disagree with the racial ingredients out of which the Americans of the future will emerge. The chapter emphasizes the decisions made by survivors in choosing a mate for procreation; it uses Werner Sollors' model of how American identities are held in tension between descent and consent relations to discuss the strategies used to explain characters' decisions to reproduce ‘with their own kind’ — or not.Less

White Rain and the Black Atlantic

in Race, Ethnicity and Nuclear War: Representations of Nuclear Weapons and Post-Apocalyptic Worlds

This chapter explores the image of nuclear war in the context of the black Atlantic as a counterculture of modernity. It asks how racial oppression and nuclear weapons have been considered ... More

This chapter explores the image of nuclear war in the context of the black Atlantic as a counterculture of modernity. It asks how racial oppression and nuclear weapons have been considered concurrently by black Atlantic thinkers, writers and performers to emphasize the structures of racial oppression within Western societies, and the questionable morality and desirability of the West's technological progress. It argues that confronting contemporary racial injustice on an international scale must be connected to nuclear disarmament programmes.Less

Introduction

Stanley Wolpert

in India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?

The only way in which India and Pakistan have remained virtually unchanged after sixty-three years is in their persistent conflict over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the final tragic legacy of ... More

The only way in which India and Pakistan have remained virtually unchanged after sixty-three years is in their persistent conflict over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the final tragic legacy of British India's 1947 Partition. More than ten million terrified Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs fled their ancestral homes that August, one million of whom died before reaching safe havens. In May 1998, India and Pakistan each successfully exploded five underground atomic bombs, joining the world's nuclear club. With their capitals and major cities less than ten ballistic missile-minutes from each other, the two countries have become the world's most dangerous match for the potential ignition of a nuclear war that could decimate South Asia and poison every region on Earth. Many proposals and plans have been made to expedite the draft of a road map to peace on which India and Pakistan could finally agree. The UN Security Council's call for a plebiscite was perhaps the best and fairest self-determination solution. That remains Pakistan's preferred solution, but since 1954, it has been completely rejected by India.Less