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Nuclear, radiological, and related weapons

Patrice M. Sutton and Robert M. Gould

in Terrorism and Public Health: A balanced approach to strengthening systems and protecting people

This chapter describes nuclear, radiological, and related weapons; their use, their proliferation, and adverse consequences of production and use. It describes international measures to control ... More

This chapter describes nuclear, radiological, and related weapons; their use, their proliferation, and adverse consequences of production and use. It describes international measures to control nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear terrorism, safeguarding nuclear power facilities and nuclear weapon stockpiles, ending proliferation of fissile materials and nuclear weapons while promoting disarmament, and nuclear abolition.Less

Futility of Nuclear Weapons Risk Management in a Consensual Regime

Jack I. Garvey

in Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain

The present capabilities and limitations of counterproliferation are dependent on the voluntary adherence of governments to the different agreements and structures that are its components. These ... More

The present capabilities and limitations of counterproliferation are dependent on the voluntary adherence of governments to the different agreements and structures that are its components. These include the safeguards and inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a collection of international agreements, both formal and informal. This chapter argues that improving the counterproliferation regime requires understanding, first, why this consent-based architecture is not working well enough for the management and containment of contemporary nuclear weapons risk. It analyzes nuclear terrorism, state-to-state nuclear weapons risk, and risk reduction by consent.Less

Political Will

Jack I. Garvey

in Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain

The proliferation of nuclear weapons-related material and technology threatens to disrupt the nuclear weapons status quo. There is clear perception of clear and present nuclear danger, at least among ... More

The proliferation of nuclear weapons-related material and technology threatens to disrupt the nuclear weapons status quo. There is clear perception of clear and present nuclear danger, at least among most governments, despite contention about global access to nuclear energy for peaceful use, or the goal of nuclear disarmament. This chapter argues that the differences in political support for the various elements of the counterproliferation regime legitimated by Security Council resolution would have to be resolved to meet the challenges of implementation. All must be accomplished by developing global uniform standards while resisting the temptation to classify states for extraneous political purposes that run counter to counterproliferation. If accomplished, there would be fundamental improvement of global nuclear security.Less

Why Climate-Change Skeptics Are Wrong

Kristin Shrader-Frechette

in What Will Work: Fighting Climate Change with Renewable Energy, Not Nuclear Power

Chapter 1 begins by stressing the severity of climate change (CC) and showing how, contrary to popular belief, atomic energy is not a viable solution to ... More

Chapter 1 begins by stressing the severity of climate change (CC) and showing how, contrary to popular belief, atomic energy is not a viable solution to CC. Many scientists and most market proponents agree that renewable energy and energy efficiencies are better options. The chapter also shows that government subsidies for oil and nuclear power are the result of flawed science, poor ethics, short-term thinking, and special-interest influence. The chapter has 7 sections, the first of which surveys four major components of the energy crisis. These are oil addiction, non-CC-related deaths from fossil-fuel pollution, nuclear-weapons proliferation, and catastrophic CC. The second section summarizes some of the powerful evidence for global CC. The third section uses historical, ahistorical, Rawlsian, and utilitarian ethical principles to show how developed nations, especially the US, are most responsible for human-caused CC. The fourth section shows why climate-change skeptics, such as “deniers” who doubt CC is real, and “delayers” who say that it should not yet be addressed, have no valid objections. Instead, they all err scientifically and ethically. The fifth section illustrates that all modern scientific methods—and scientific consensus since at least 1995—confirm the reality of global CC. Essentially all expert-scientific analyses published in refereed, scientific-professional journals confirm the reality of global CC. The sixth section of the chapter shows how fossil-fuel special interests have contributed to the continued CC debate largely by paying non-experts to deny or challenge CC. The seventh section of the chapter provides an outline of each chapter in the book, noting that this book makes use of both scientific and ethical analyses to show why nuclear proponents’ arguments err, why CC deniers are wrong, and how scientific-methodological understanding can advance sound energy policy—including conservation, renewable energy, and energy efficiencies.Less

Introduction

Harold A. Feiveson

in Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

The world has struggled for over six decades with the dangers posed by huge quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the chain reacting fissile materials that are the key ingredients of ... More

The world has struggled for over six decades with the dangers posed by huge quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the chain reacting fissile materials that are the key ingredients of nuclear weapons and that were described by the eminent physicist Niels Bohr in 1944 as possibly posing a “perpetual menace” to humankind. Since the failure of the post-World War II efforts to ban nuclear weapons and control fissile materials, nine other states have followed the United States and produced fissile materials and nuclear weapons. This chapter provides an overview of the book and an introduction to the fissile material problem and the proposals to cap, reduce, and eventually eliminate fissile materials. It explains why such initiatives are critical to support deep reductions and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, to make such nuclear disarmament more difficult to reverse, to raise the barriers to nuclear weapon proliferation, and to prevent nuclear terrorism.Less

Japan–India Relations from the Perspectives of Global Governance and International Institutions

Shinichi Kitaoka and Naoko Kumagai

in Poised for Partnership: Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century

This article examines Japan’s cooperation with India from the perspectives of Japan’s national interests, bilateral cooperation, and regional and global governance. We focus on four areas of ... More

This article examines Japan’s cooperation with India from the perspectives of Japan’s national interests, bilateral cooperation, and regional and global governance. We focus on four areas of potential bilateral cooperation. First, in the UN Security Council, Japan and India can propose the option of establishing semi-permanent seats, in order to create a more democratic and effective Council that is capable of more substantial deliberation. Second, Japan and India should see beyond the existing governance framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent nuclear terrorism. Third, Japan and India can cooperate for freer trade in regional arenas and cooperate bilaterally on India’s food security, which would eventually lead to further trade liberalization in the sensitive issue area of agriculture. Finally, Japan and India should seek complementarity of the new China-led financial institutions with the existing International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.Less

Master Builders and Deconstructionists

in Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb

The global system was developed to forbid any form of nuclear proliferation which could be connected to a construction project. The building's load-bearing walls consist of agreements, rules, and ... More

The global system was developed to forbid any form of nuclear proliferation which could be connected to a construction project. The building's load-bearing walls consist of agreements, rules, and norms designed to prevent proliferation. The development of this global system was one of the great accomplishments of the Cold War. The structure built to preclude proliferation during the first nuclear age did not consider the new members of the nuclear club or the threat of nuclear terrorism. The jaundiced views about the efficiency of global nonproliferation norms and the utility of treaties were defined by the inner circle of the George W. Bush administration. The administration also expanded the geographic scope of programs to offer training and equipment to prevent proliferation. It concluded that the Nonproliferation Treaty needed to be propped up and that a more proactive approach was important in light of the new threats of proliferation and nuclear terrorism.Less

Ending the Use of HEU as a Reactor Fuel

Harold A. Feiveson

in Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) was used in the Hiroshima bomb, a gun-type device the design of which is well within the capabilities of terrorist groups. This chapter explores the Use of HEU as fuel ... More

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) was used in the Hiroshima bomb, a gun-type device the design of which is well within the capabilities of terrorist groups. This chapter explores the Use of HEU as fuel in research reactors and in naval propulsion reactors and efforts to end such use. Beginning in the 1950s, HEU began being used to fuel research reactors that the United States and Soviet Union exported to about 40 countries. Proliferation concerns led the United States and Soviet Union to launch programs to these reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Russia, however, has been slow to convert or shut down its own HEU-fueled research reactors which now constitute about half of the global total of about 100. The United States, United Kingdom, Russia and India also use HEU fuel in about 200 naval propulsion reactors, with the United States responsible for over half of the world’s nuclear-powered submarines and ships. Discussion has just begun of a norm that would require future naval reactors to be LEU fuelled, like those already used by France and China.Less