Patrice M. Sutton and Robert M. Gould
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195325256
- eISBN:
- 9780199864409
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325256.003.0012
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
This chapter describes nuclear, radiological, and related weapons; their use, their proliferation, and adverse consequences of production and use. It describes international measures to control ...
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This chapter describes nuclear, radiological, and related weapons; their use, their proliferation, and adverse consequences of production and use. It describes international measures to control nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear terrorism, safeguarding nuclear power facilities and nuclear weapon stockpiles, ending proliferation of fissile materials and nuclear weapons while promoting disarmament, and nuclear abolition.Less
This chapter describes nuclear, radiological, and related weapons; their use, their proliferation, and adverse consequences of production and use. It describes international measures to control nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear terrorism, safeguarding nuclear power facilities and nuclear weapon stockpiles, ending proliferation of fissile materials and nuclear weapons while promoting disarmament, and nuclear abolition.
Jack I. Garvey
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199841271
- eISBN:
- 9780199332649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199841271.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
The present capabilities and limitations of counterproliferation are dependent on the voluntary adherence of governments to the different agreements and structures that are its components. These ...
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The present capabilities and limitations of counterproliferation are dependent on the voluntary adherence of governments to the different agreements and structures that are its components. These include the safeguards and inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a collection of international agreements, both formal and informal. This chapter argues that improving the counterproliferation regime requires understanding, first, why this consent-based architecture is not working well enough for the management and containment of contemporary nuclear weapons risk. It analyzes nuclear terrorism, state-to-state nuclear weapons risk, and risk reduction by consent.Less
The present capabilities and limitations of counterproliferation are dependent on the voluntary adherence of governments to the different agreements and structures that are its components. These include the safeguards and inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a collection of international agreements, both formal and informal. This chapter argues that improving the counterproliferation regime requires understanding, first, why this consent-based architecture is not working well enough for the management and containment of contemporary nuclear weapons risk. It analyzes nuclear terrorism, state-to-state nuclear weapons risk, and risk reduction by consent.
Michael Krepon
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804760638
- eISBN:
- 9780804770989
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804760638.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
In 2008, the iconic doomsday clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientistswas set at five minutes to midnight—two minutes closer to Armageddon than in 1962, when John F. Kennedy and Nikita ...
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In 2008, the iconic doomsday clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientistswas set at five minutes to midnight—two minutes closer to Armageddon than in 1962, when John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev went eyeball to eyeball over missiles in Cuba. We still live in an echo chamber of fear, after eight years in which the Bush administration and its harshest critics reinforced each other's worst fears about the Bomb. And yet, there have been no mushroom clouds or acts of nuclear terrorism since the Soviet Union dissolved, let alone since 9/11. The worst fears still could be realized at any time, but this book argues that the United States has never possessed more tools and capacity to reduce nuclear dangers than it does today—from containment and deterrence to diplomacy, military strength, and arms control. The bloated nuclear arsenals of the Cold War years have been greatly reduced, nuclear weapon testing has almost ended, and all but eight countries have pledged not to acquire the Bomb. Thus, despite wars, crises, and Murphy's Law, the dark shadows cast by nuclear weapons can continue to recede. The book believes that positive trends can continue, even in the face of the twin threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation that have been exacerbated by the Bush administration's pursuit of a war of choice in Iraq based on false assumptions. It advocates a “back to basics” approach to reducing nuclear dangers, reversing the Bush administration's denigration of diplomacy, deterrence, containment, and arms control.Less
In 2008, the iconic doomsday clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientistswas set at five minutes to midnight—two minutes closer to Armageddon than in 1962, when John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev went eyeball to eyeball over missiles in Cuba. We still live in an echo chamber of fear, after eight years in which the Bush administration and its harshest critics reinforced each other's worst fears about the Bomb. And yet, there have been no mushroom clouds or acts of nuclear terrorism since the Soviet Union dissolved, let alone since 9/11. The worst fears still could be realized at any time, but this book argues that the United States has never possessed more tools and capacity to reduce nuclear dangers than it does today—from containment and deterrence to diplomacy, military strength, and arms control. The bloated nuclear arsenals of the Cold War years have been greatly reduced, nuclear weapon testing has almost ended, and all but eight countries have pledged not to acquire the Bomb. Thus, despite wars, crises, and Murphy's Law, the dark shadows cast by nuclear weapons can continue to recede. The book believes that positive trends can continue, even in the face of the twin threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation that have been exacerbated by the Bush administration's pursuit of a war of choice in Iraq based on false assumptions. It advocates a “back to basics” approach to reducing nuclear dangers, reversing the Bush administration's denigration of diplomacy, deterrence, containment, and arms control.
Jack I. Garvey
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199841271
- eISBN:
- 9780199332649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199841271.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
The proliferation of nuclear weapons-related material and technology threatens to disrupt the nuclear weapons status quo. There is clear perception of clear and present nuclear danger, at least among ...
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The proliferation of nuclear weapons-related material and technology threatens to disrupt the nuclear weapons status quo. There is clear perception of clear and present nuclear danger, at least among most governments, despite contention about global access to nuclear energy for peaceful use, or the goal of nuclear disarmament. This chapter argues that the differences in political support for the various elements of the counterproliferation regime legitimated by Security Council resolution would have to be resolved to meet the challenges of implementation. All must be accomplished by developing global uniform standards while resisting the temptation to classify states for extraneous political purposes that run counter to counterproliferation. If accomplished, there would be fundamental improvement of global nuclear security.Less
The proliferation of nuclear weapons-related material and technology threatens to disrupt the nuclear weapons status quo. There is clear perception of clear and present nuclear danger, at least among most governments, despite contention about global access to nuclear energy for peaceful use, or the goal of nuclear disarmament. This chapter argues that the differences in political support for the various elements of the counterproliferation regime legitimated by Security Council resolution would have to be resolved to meet the challenges of implementation. All must be accomplished by developing global uniform standards while resisting the temptation to classify states for extraneous political purposes that run counter to counterproliferation. If accomplished, there would be fundamental improvement of global nuclear security.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794638
- eISBN:
- 9780199919277
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794638.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 1 begins by stressing the severity of climate change (CC) and showing how, contrary to popular belief, atomic energy is not a viable solution to ...
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Chapter 1 begins by stressing the severity of climate change (CC) and showing how, contrary to popular belief, atomic energy is not a viable solution to CC. Many scientists and most market proponents agree that renewable energy and energy efficiencies are better options. The chapter also shows that government subsidies for oil and nuclear power are the result of flawed science, poor ethics, short-term thinking, and special-interest influence. The chapter has 7 sections, the first of which surveys four major components of the energy crisis. These are oil addiction, non-CC-related deaths from fossil-fuel pollution, nuclear-weapons proliferation, and catastrophic CC. The second section summarizes some of the powerful evidence for global CC. The third section uses historical, ahistorical, Rawlsian, and utilitarian ethical principles to show how developed nations, especially the US, are most responsible for human-caused CC. The fourth section shows why climate-change skeptics, such as “deniers” who doubt CC is real, and “delayers” who say that it should not yet be addressed, have no valid objections. Instead, they all err scientifically and ethically. The fifth section illustrates that all modern scientific methods—and scientific consensus since at least 1995—confirm the reality of global CC. Essentially all expert-scientific analyses published in refereed, scientific-professional journals confirm the reality of global CC. The sixth section of the chapter shows how fossil-fuel special interests have contributed to the continued CC debate largely by paying non-experts to deny or challenge CC. The seventh section of the chapter provides an outline of each chapter in the book, noting that this book makes use of both scientific and ethical analyses to show why nuclear proponents’ arguments err, why CC deniers are wrong, and how scientific-methodological understanding can advance sound energy policy—including conservation, renewable energy, and energy efficiencies.Less
Chapter 1 begins by stressing the severity of climate change (CC) and showing how, contrary to popular belief, atomic energy is not a viable solution to CC. Many scientists and most market proponents agree that renewable energy and energy efficiencies are better options. The chapter also shows that government subsidies for oil and nuclear power are the result of flawed science, poor ethics, short-term thinking, and special-interest influence. The chapter has 7 sections, the first of which surveys four major components of the energy crisis. These are oil addiction, non-CC-related deaths from fossil-fuel pollution, nuclear-weapons proliferation, and catastrophic CC. The second section summarizes some of the powerful evidence for global CC. The third section uses historical, ahistorical, Rawlsian, and utilitarian ethical principles to show how developed nations, especially the US, are most responsible for human-caused CC. The fourth section shows why climate-change skeptics, such as “deniers” who doubt CC is real, and “delayers” who say that it should not yet be addressed, have no valid objections. Instead, they all err scientifically and ethically. The fifth section illustrates that all modern scientific methods—and scientific consensus since at least 1995—confirm the reality of global CC. Essentially all expert-scientific analyses published in refereed, scientific-professional journals confirm the reality of global CC. The sixth section of the chapter shows how fossil-fuel special interests have contributed to the continued CC debate largely by paying non-experts to deny or challenge CC. The seventh section of the chapter provides an outline of each chapter in the book, noting that this book makes use of both scientific and ethical analyses to show why nuclear proponents’ arguments err, why CC deniers are wrong, and how scientific-methodological understanding can advance sound energy policy—including conservation, renewable energy, and energy efficiencies.
Shinichi Kitaoka and Naoko Kumagai
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199466481
- eISBN:
- 9780199087044
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199466481.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics
This article examines Japan’s cooperation with India from the perspectives of Japan’s national interests, bilateral cooperation, and regional and global governance. We focus on four areas of ...
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This article examines Japan’s cooperation with India from the perspectives of Japan’s national interests, bilateral cooperation, and regional and global governance. We focus on four areas of potential bilateral cooperation. First, in the UN Security Council, Japan and India can propose the option of establishing semi-permanent seats, in order to create a more democratic and effective Council that is capable of more substantial deliberation. Second, Japan and India should see beyond the existing governance framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent nuclear terrorism. Third, Japan and India can cooperate for freer trade in regional arenas and cooperate bilaterally on India’s food security, which would eventually lead to further trade liberalization in the sensitive issue area of agriculture. Finally, Japan and India should seek complementarity of the new China-led financial institutions with the existing International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.Less
This article examines Japan’s cooperation with India from the perspectives of Japan’s national interests, bilateral cooperation, and regional and global governance. We focus on four areas of potential bilateral cooperation. First, in the UN Security Council, Japan and India can propose the option of establishing semi-permanent seats, in order to create a more democratic and effective Council that is capable of more substantial deliberation. Second, Japan and India should see beyond the existing governance framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent nuclear terrorism. Third, Japan and India can cooperate for freer trade in regional arenas and cooperate bilaterally on India’s food security, which would eventually lead to further trade liberalization in the sensitive issue area of agriculture. Finally, Japan and India should seek complementarity of the new China-led financial institutions with the existing International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804760638
- eISBN:
- 9780804770989
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804760638.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
The global system was developed to forbid any form of nuclear proliferation which could be connected to a construction project. The building's load-bearing walls consist of agreements, rules, and ...
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The global system was developed to forbid any form of nuclear proliferation which could be connected to a construction project. The building's load-bearing walls consist of agreements, rules, and norms designed to prevent proliferation. The development of this global system was one of the great accomplishments of the Cold War. The structure built to preclude proliferation during the first nuclear age did not consider the new members of the nuclear club or the threat of nuclear terrorism. The jaundiced views about the efficiency of global nonproliferation norms and the utility of treaties were defined by the inner circle of the George W. Bush administration. The administration also expanded the geographic scope of programs to offer training and equipment to prevent proliferation. It concluded that the Nonproliferation Treaty needed to be propped up and that a more proactive approach was important in light of the new threats of proliferation and nuclear terrorism.Less
The global system was developed to forbid any form of nuclear proliferation which could be connected to a construction project. The building's load-bearing walls consist of agreements, rules, and norms designed to prevent proliferation. The development of this global system was one of the great accomplishments of the Cold War. The structure built to preclude proliferation during the first nuclear age did not consider the new members of the nuclear club or the threat of nuclear terrorism. The jaundiced views about the efficiency of global nonproliferation norms and the utility of treaties were defined by the inner circle of the George W. Bush administration. The administration also expanded the geographic scope of programs to offer training and equipment to prevent proliferation. It concluded that the Nonproliferation Treaty needed to be propped up and that a more proactive approach was important in light of the new threats of proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
Harold A. Feiveson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027748
- eISBN:
- 9780262319188
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027748.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
The world has struggled for over six decades with the dangers posed by huge quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the chain reacting fissile materials that are the key ingredients of ...
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The world has struggled for over six decades with the dangers posed by huge quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the chain reacting fissile materials that are the key ingredients of nuclear weapons and that were described by the eminent physicist Niels Bohr in 1944 as possibly posing a “perpetual menace” to humankind. Since the failure of the post-World War II efforts to ban nuclear weapons and control fissile materials, nine other states have followed the United States and produced fissile materials and nuclear weapons. This chapter provides an overview of the book and an introduction to the fissile material problem and the proposals to cap, reduce, and eventually eliminate fissile materials. It explains why such initiatives are critical to support deep reductions and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, to make such nuclear disarmament more difficult to reverse, to raise the barriers to nuclear weapon proliferation, and to prevent nuclear terrorism.Less
The world has struggled for over six decades with the dangers posed by huge quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the chain reacting fissile materials that are the key ingredients of nuclear weapons and that were described by the eminent physicist Niels Bohr in 1944 as possibly posing a “perpetual menace” to humankind. Since the failure of the post-World War II efforts to ban nuclear weapons and control fissile materials, nine other states have followed the United States and produced fissile materials and nuclear weapons. This chapter provides an overview of the book and an introduction to the fissile material problem and the proposals to cap, reduce, and eventually eliminate fissile materials. It explains why such initiatives are critical to support deep reductions and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, to make such nuclear disarmament more difficult to reverse, to raise the barriers to nuclear weapon proliferation, and to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Harold A. Feiveson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027748
- eISBN:
- 9780262319188
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027748.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) was used in the Hiroshima bomb, a gun-type device the design of which is well within the capabilities of terrorist groups. This chapter explores the Use of HEU as fuel ...
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Highly enriched uranium (HEU) was used in the Hiroshima bomb, a gun-type device the design of which is well within the capabilities of terrorist groups. This chapter explores the Use of HEU as fuel in research reactors and in naval propulsion reactors and efforts to end such use. Beginning in the 1950s, HEU began being used to fuel research reactors that the United States and Soviet Union exported to about 40 countries. Proliferation concerns led the United States and Soviet Union to launch programs to these reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Russia, however, has been slow to convert or shut down its own HEU-fueled research reactors which now constitute about half of the global total of about 100. The United States, United Kingdom, Russia and India also use HEU fuel in about 200 naval propulsion reactors, with the United States responsible for over half of the world’s nuclear-powered submarines and ships. Discussion has just begun of a norm that would require future naval reactors to be LEU fuelled, like those already used by France and China.Less
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) was used in the Hiroshima bomb, a gun-type device the design of which is well within the capabilities of terrorist groups. This chapter explores the Use of HEU as fuel in research reactors and in naval propulsion reactors and efforts to end such use. Beginning in the 1950s, HEU began being used to fuel research reactors that the United States and Soviet Union exported to about 40 countries. Proliferation concerns led the United States and Soviet Union to launch programs to these reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Russia, however, has been slow to convert or shut down its own HEU-fueled research reactors which now constitute about half of the global total of about 100. The United States, United Kingdom, Russia and India also use HEU fuel in about 200 naval propulsion reactors, with the United States responsible for over half of the world’s nuclear-powered submarines and ships. Discussion has just begun of a norm that would require future naval reactors to be LEU fuelled, like those already used by France and China.
