Vipin Narang
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159829
- eISBN:
- 9781400850402
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter lays out the volume's main arguments in brief. Contrary to the usual focus on superpowers and Cold War nuclear competition, the chapter proposes a different dynamic. It asks what ...
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This chapter lays out the volume's main arguments in brief. Contrary to the usual focus on superpowers and Cold War nuclear competition, the chapter proposes a different dynamic. It asks what strategies and choices certain states will make about their nuclear weapons and how those decisions about nuclear strategy can affect international relations and conflict. Examining the decisions that regional nuclear powers—such as China, India, Pakistan, Israel, France, and South Africa—have made about their arsenals thus far, and their resulting behavior, helps address these questions. Regional nuclear powers, for systematic and predictable reasons, choose clearly identifiable nuclear postures and these postures matter to a regional power's ability to deter conflict. These countries' nuclear choices, therefore, provide valuable insight into the crucial challenges of contemporary nuclear proliferation and international stability.Less
This chapter lays out the volume's main arguments in brief. Contrary to the usual focus on superpowers and Cold War nuclear competition, the chapter proposes a different dynamic. It asks what strategies and choices certain states will make about their nuclear weapons and how those decisions about nuclear strategy can affect international relations and conflict. Examining the decisions that regional nuclear powers—such as China, India, Pakistan, Israel, France, and South Africa—have made about their arsenals thus far, and their resulting behavior, helps address these questions. Regional nuclear powers, for systematic and predictable reasons, choose clearly identifiable nuclear postures and these postures matter to a regional power's ability to deter conflict. These countries' nuclear choices, therefore, provide valuable insight into the crucial challenges of contemporary nuclear proliferation and international stability.
John Baylis
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198280125
- eISBN:
- 9780191684357
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198280125.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book emphasizes the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategies between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, the British approach to ...
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This book emphasizes the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategies between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy. These conflicts are centred on six main issues: whether deterrence was best achieved through ‘punishment’ or ‘denial’; whether deterrence necessitated nuclear superiority; whether preparations had to be made for a long war or a short war; what strategic implications followed the nuclear stalemate; whether limited nuclear wars could be fought without escalation to all-out nuclear war; and whether pre-emption was politically acceptable and militarily necessary. Indeed, the failure of successive governments to provide clear political direction on these issues meant that British nuclear strategy was more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.Less
This book emphasizes the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategies between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy. These conflicts are centred on six main issues: whether deterrence was best achieved through ‘punishment’ or ‘denial’; whether deterrence necessitated nuclear superiority; whether preparations had to be made for a long war or a short war; what strategic implications followed the nuclear stalemate; whether limited nuclear wars could be fought without escalation to all-out nuclear war; and whether pre-emption was politically acceptable and militarily necessary. Indeed, the failure of successive governments to provide clear political direction on these issues meant that British nuclear strategy was more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.
Ian Clark
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198273707
- eISBN:
- 9780191684067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273707.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter shows that towards the end of the 1950s, Britain's nuclear strategy was to be influenced not merely by access to American delivery systems and warhead designs, but also by a much freer ...
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This chapter shows that towards the end of the 1950s, Britain's nuclear strategy was to be influenced not merely by access to American delivery systems and warhead designs, but also by a much freer exchange between the two countries on strategic planning and nuclear targeting. In operational terms, the nuclear preparations of the two partners became much more closely co-ordinated. However, this drawing together itself coincided with a rhetorical emphasis on independence in British Governmental statements. It also occurred at a time when there were ostensibly widening fissures in British and American strategic conceptions — the former laying more stress on the implications of the nuclear deterrent for strategy precisely at the moment when the United States was diluting its earlier notions of massive retaliation.Less
This chapter shows that towards the end of the 1950s, Britain's nuclear strategy was to be influenced not merely by access to American delivery systems and warhead designs, but also by a much freer exchange between the two countries on strategic planning and nuclear targeting. In operational terms, the nuclear preparations of the two partners became much more closely co-ordinated. However, this drawing together itself coincided with a rhetorical emphasis on independence in British Governmental statements. It also occurred at a time when there were ostensibly widening fissures in British and American strategic conceptions — the former laying more stress on the implications of the nuclear deterrent for strategy precisely at the moment when the United States was diluting its earlier notions of massive retaliation.
CHRISTOPH BLUTH
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198280040
- eISBN:
- 9780191684340
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198280040.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter describes the process whereby the Federal Republic of Germany formally gained its sovereignty and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance. This provides a framework ...
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This chapter describes the process whereby the Federal Republic of Germany formally gained its sovereignty and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance. This provides a framework of debate about nuclear weapons policy. This chapter also gives a discussion of early history of NATO nuclear strategy, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (including West Germany), and Britain's search for an independent nuclear deterrent. These years were the influential years of the NATO Alliance. Moreover, Britain exerted a lot of effort to include United States and Canada in a Western defence pact and the United States only signed the treaty establishing NATO on 4 April 1949.Less
This chapter describes the process whereby the Federal Republic of Germany formally gained its sovereignty and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance. This provides a framework of debate about nuclear weapons policy. This chapter also gives a discussion of early history of NATO nuclear strategy, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (including West Germany), and Britain's search for an independent nuclear deterrent. These years were the influential years of the NATO Alliance. Moreover, Britain exerted a lot of effort to include United States and Canada in a Western defence pact and the United States only signed the treaty establishing NATO on 4 April 1949.
Vipin Narang
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159829
- eISBN:
- 9781400850402
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have ...
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The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. The book identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, the book offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. It then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the book shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. This book considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.Less
The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. The book identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, the book offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. It then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the book shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. This book considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.
Clark Ian
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198273257
- eISBN:
- 9780191684012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273257.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter analyses the prospect of nuclear war and the place of such a prospect in nuclear strategies of deterrence. It examines nuclear targeting, nuclear war-fighting doctrines, and problems ...
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This chapter analyses the prospect of nuclear war and the place of such a prospect in nuclear strategies of deterrence. It examines nuclear targeting, nuclear war-fighting doctrines, and problems associated with the attempt to make judgments about war purely on the basis of individual weapon systems, such as nuclear arms. The chapter focuses on the principles of discrimination and proportionality in warfare and examines whether the justice of war can reside in the very nature of the weapons by means of which it is fought.Less
This chapter analyses the prospect of nuclear war and the place of such a prospect in nuclear strategies of deterrence. It examines nuclear targeting, nuclear war-fighting doctrines, and problems associated with the attempt to make judgments about war purely on the basis of individual weapon systems, such as nuclear arms. The chapter focuses on the principles of discrimination and proportionality in warfare and examines whether the justice of war can reside in the very nature of the weapons by means of which it is fought.
Ian Clark
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198273707
- eISBN:
- 9780191684067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273707.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The issues generated by Skybolt's demise spilt over into the subsequent Nassau meeting and the agreement, in principle, to sell Polaris missiles to Britain. Again, questions must be faced as to the ...
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The issues generated by Skybolt's demise spilt over into the subsequent Nassau meeting and the agreement, in principle, to sell Polaris missiles to Britain. Again, questions must be faced as to the nature of British objectives at this meeting, such as whether rescuing Skybolt remained a goal of some sections of the British policy apparatus, or whether there lobbies within the British side which were happy to use the situation to bring about a reordering of British priorities in the shape of a Polaris purchase From the American point of view, the outcome of the meeting was hostage to wider policy issues. In particular, there was concern about the impact of Nassau upon the two elements of European strategy, namely Britain's application for membership of the Common Market, and also the projected MLF Before exploring the background to the Nassau meeting. This chapter takes stock of developments in British nuclear strategy. It is only in the context of these changes that the significance of the switch to a Polaris system can be fully addressed.Less
The issues generated by Skybolt's demise spilt over into the subsequent Nassau meeting and the agreement, in principle, to sell Polaris missiles to Britain. Again, questions must be faced as to the nature of British objectives at this meeting, such as whether rescuing Skybolt remained a goal of some sections of the British policy apparatus, or whether there lobbies within the British side which were happy to use the situation to bring about a reordering of British priorities in the shape of a Polaris purchase From the American point of view, the outcome of the meeting was hostage to wider policy issues. In particular, there was concern about the impact of Nassau upon the two elements of European strategy, namely Britain's application for membership of the Common Market, and also the projected MLF Before exploring the background to the Nassau meeting. This chapter takes stock of developments in British nuclear strategy. It is only in the context of these changes that the significance of the switch to a Polaris system can be fully addressed.
John Baylis
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198280125
- eISBN:
- 9780191684357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198280125.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Due to the uncertain security in the employment of the British nuclear strategy, Britain engaged in the Nassau affairs. The Nassau conference signifies a treaty wherein the United States (at the time ...
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Due to the uncertain security in the employment of the British nuclear strategy, Britain engaged in the Nassau affairs. The Nassau conference signifies a treaty wherein the United States (at the time of US President John Kennedy) agreed to provide Polaris missiles to the United Kingdom (during the rule of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan). Britain's involvement in this assembly caused both constructive (which refers to the provision of the smartest nuclear pool) and unfriendly aftermaths (that is, Anglo–American affinity struggles and failure to address the necessities of the nuclear deterrent force). The summit held in Nassau was not able to disjoint Britain's deterrent or nuclear dilemmas from the suggestions of the Multilateral Force (MLF). Consequently, traditional thinkers in the government (those that were resistant to change) maintained full-blown British independence from the United States in terms of nuclear associations.Less
Due to the uncertain security in the employment of the British nuclear strategy, Britain engaged in the Nassau affairs. The Nassau conference signifies a treaty wherein the United States (at the time of US President John Kennedy) agreed to provide Polaris missiles to the United Kingdom (during the rule of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan). Britain's involvement in this assembly caused both constructive (which refers to the provision of the smartest nuclear pool) and unfriendly aftermaths (that is, Anglo–American affinity struggles and failure to address the necessities of the nuclear deterrent force). The summit held in Nassau was not able to disjoint Britain's deterrent or nuclear dilemmas from the suggestions of the Multilateral Force (MLF). Consequently, traditional thinkers in the government (those that were resistant to change) maintained full-blown British independence from the United States in terms of nuclear associations.
Ashok Kapur
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195667547
- eISBN:
- 9780199081790
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195667547.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Indian Politics
This chapter identifies several of the major dynamics in India's nuclear policy and politics that emerged during the Shastri-Gandhi years. It discusses the growing strength of the nuclear debate ...
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This chapter identifies several of the major dynamics in India's nuclear policy and politics that emerged during the Shastri-Gandhi years. It discusses the growing strength of the nuclear debate within the government, and studies the changes that affected the orientation and context of the country's atomic and disarmament policies. It then demonstrates the structure of India's nuclear posture and domestic nuclear constituencies during the period, along with an overview of its nuclear activities. The next section discusses the regional and international aspects of the changes in Indian nuclear dynamics. The final part of the chapter takes a look at the events involving the creation of a new nuclear strategy and the development of India's attitude towards the US-USSR efforts to form a non-proliferation regime.Less
This chapter identifies several of the major dynamics in India's nuclear policy and politics that emerged during the Shastri-Gandhi years. It discusses the growing strength of the nuclear debate within the government, and studies the changes that affected the orientation and context of the country's atomic and disarmament policies. It then demonstrates the structure of India's nuclear posture and domestic nuclear constituencies during the period, along with an overview of its nuclear activities. The next section discusses the regional and international aspects of the changes in Indian nuclear dynamics. The final part of the chapter takes a look at the events involving the creation of a new nuclear strategy and the development of India's attitude towards the US-USSR efforts to form a non-proliferation regime.
Ian Clark
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198273707
- eISBN:
- 9780191684067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273707.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the British nuclear strategy during the period 1957–62. The one single theme which brings unity to the subject of British nuclear strategy during the period is the troublesome ...
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This chapter focuses on the British nuclear strategy during the period 1957–62. The one single theme which brings unity to the subject of British nuclear strategy during the period is the troublesome search for a viable delivery system which would retain credibility as a deterrent from the early 1960s onwards. The quest for an effective nuclear carrier, in turn, highlights all of the principal preoccupations of British strategy at the time: the burdens of producing high-technology missile systems; the dilemmas of relying upon an indigenous programme or opting instead for a purchase from the United States; the parochial interests of the various services and their determination to present a version of strategy that best corresponded with their own particular needs.Less
This chapter focuses on the British nuclear strategy during the period 1957–62. The one single theme which brings unity to the subject of British nuclear strategy during the period is the troublesome search for a viable delivery system which would retain credibility as a deterrent from the early 1960s onwards. The quest for an effective nuclear carrier, in turn, highlights all of the principal preoccupations of British strategy at the time: the burdens of producing high-technology missile systems; the dilemmas of relying upon an indigenous programme or opting instead for a purchase from the United States; the parochial interests of the various services and their determination to present a version of strategy that best corresponded with their own particular needs.
Edward Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452482
- eISBN:
- 9780801455506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines the evolution of nuclear strategy, with an emphasis on multiple options and civilian control of the execution of war plans. Truman and Eisenhower held different beliefs on the ...
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This chapter examines the evolution of nuclear strategy, with an emphasis on multiple options and civilian control of the execution of war plans. Truman and Eisenhower held different beliefs on the role of atomic weapons in national security. Still, Truman's NSC-20 and NSC-68 left comfortable niches for air-atomic strategy, while Eisenhower's NSC-162/2 created an environment in which it flourished. Each administration entered office with distinct views on the role of nuclear weapons and gave the Air Force support ranging from tepid to overwhelming. In 1961, this situation changed. The Kennedy administration brought new personalities to power whose ideas about nuclear warfare threatened air-atomic strategy. The final stage of evolution, Assured Destruction, transformed the goal of nuclear strategy from victory to stalemate, and superiority to sufficiency.Less
This chapter examines the evolution of nuclear strategy, with an emphasis on multiple options and civilian control of the execution of war plans. Truman and Eisenhower held different beliefs on the role of atomic weapons in national security. Still, Truman's NSC-20 and NSC-68 left comfortable niches for air-atomic strategy, while Eisenhower's NSC-162/2 created an environment in which it flourished. Each administration entered office with distinct views on the role of nuclear weapons and gave the Air Force support ranging from tepid to overwhelming. In 1961, this situation changed. The Kennedy administration brought new personalities to power whose ideas about nuclear warfare threatened air-atomic strategy. The final stage of evolution, Assured Destruction, transformed the goal of nuclear strategy from victory to stalemate, and superiority to sufficiency.
Christian de Perthuis and Pierre-André Jouvet
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231171403
- eISBN:
- 9780231540360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231171403.003.0017
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
All other things being equal, a CO2 price thus tends to decrease the cost of nuclear power compared to fossil fuel energy. Would the widespread introduction of carbon pricing then justify the use of ...
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All other things being equal, a CO2 price thus tends to decrease the cost of nuclear power compared to fossil fuel energy. Would the widespread introduction of carbon pricing then justify the use of nuclear power, in the name of the transition to a low-carbon energy system? The authors argue that the externalities of nuclear power also need to be priced in: though a non-CO2-emitting primary energy source, it nonetheless gives rise to many other questions, as is shown by the French example. Less
All other things being equal, a CO2 price thus tends to decrease the cost of nuclear power compared to fossil fuel energy. Would the widespread introduction of carbon pricing then justify the use of nuclear power, in the name of the transition to a low-carbon energy system? The authors argue that the externalities of nuclear power also need to be priced in: though a non-CO2-emitting primary energy source, it nonetheless gives rise to many other questions, as is shown by the French example.
George Perkovich and Toby Dalton
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199467495
- eISBN:
- 9780199087112
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199467495.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter addresses possible innovations India could undertake in nuclear doctrine and capabilities to complement an army-centric strategy, a precision-strike strategy, or a covert operations ...
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This chapter addresses possible innovations India could undertake in nuclear doctrine and capabilities to complement an army-centric strategy, a precision-strike strategy, or a covert operations strategy in order to manage the risk of Pakistani counter-escalation through nuclear threats. This chapter assesses arguments for and against revising India’s adherence to no first use, its rejection of battlefield nuclear weapons, and its reliance on massive retaliation. Beyond these theoretical questions, the chapter considers the capabilities that India will need to operationalize any changes in its nuclear doctrine, particularly regarding counter-force nuclear operations.Less
This chapter addresses possible innovations India could undertake in nuclear doctrine and capabilities to complement an army-centric strategy, a precision-strike strategy, or a covert operations strategy in order to manage the risk of Pakistani counter-escalation through nuclear threats. This chapter assesses arguments for and against revising India’s adherence to no first use, its rejection of battlefield nuclear weapons, and its reliance on massive retaliation. Beyond these theoretical questions, the chapter considers the capabilities that India will need to operationalize any changes in its nuclear doctrine, particularly regarding counter-force nuclear operations.
Nicola Horsburgh
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198706113
- eISBN:
- 9780191775277
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198706113.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book explores China’s engagement with global nuclear order since 1949. Engagement refers to the process of creating, consolidating, and maintaining nuclear order by assessing the methods China ...
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This book explores China’s engagement with global nuclear order since 1949. Engagement refers to the process of creating, consolidating, and maintaining nuclear order by assessing the methods China adopts, as well as the motivations behind its policy and the implications of its actions for global nuclear politics. Overall, it is argued that in the 1950s and 1960s, even before nuclear order existed, China had an inadvertent hand in its creation, contributing to American and Soviet thinking about how best to build an order, as well as offering its own ideas based on socialist proliferation. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, China engaged in the process of consolidating nuclear order by developing alternative thinking on nuclear deterrence that challenged mainstream strategies such as mutual assured destruction; and by joining important nuclear institutions, for instance the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. In addition, during this period China began to promote a new vision for nuclear order: that of a more representative order. China’s current engagement, at a time when global nuclear order is perceived by many to be under significant strain, is less clear: while China remains committed to key nuclear institutions and a minimal nuclear strategy, Beijing is also wary of deeper commitments, in particular multilateral arms control processes that might unfairly constrain its nuclear force capabilities relative to other nuclear weapons states.Less
This book explores China’s engagement with global nuclear order since 1949. Engagement refers to the process of creating, consolidating, and maintaining nuclear order by assessing the methods China adopts, as well as the motivations behind its policy and the implications of its actions for global nuclear politics. Overall, it is argued that in the 1950s and 1960s, even before nuclear order existed, China had an inadvertent hand in its creation, contributing to American and Soviet thinking about how best to build an order, as well as offering its own ideas based on socialist proliferation. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, China engaged in the process of consolidating nuclear order by developing alternative thinking on nuclear deterrence that challenged mainstream strategies such as mutual assured destruction; and by joining important nuclear institutions, for instance the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. In addition, during this period China began to promote a new vision for nuclear order: that of a more representative order. China’s current engagement, at a time when global nuclear order is perceived by many to be under significant strain, is less clear: while China remains committed to key nuclear institutions and a minimal nuclear strategy, Beijing is also wary of deeper commitments, in particular multilateral arms control processes that might unfairly constrain its nuclear force capabilities relative to other nuclear weapons states.
Matthew Kroenig
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- February 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190849184
- eISBN:
- 9780190870591
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190849184.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter develops a new theory of nuclear deterrence, the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory. The theory brings together traditional arguments in the nuclear strategy literature about the ...
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This chapter develops a new theory of nuclear deterrence, the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory. The theory brings together traditional arguments in the nuclear strategy literature about the advantages of nuclear superiority and combines them with nuclear brinkmanship theory to provide the first coherent theoretical explanation for why nuclear superiority provides states with geopolitical advantages. It argues that military nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its effective resolve, and enhancing its bargaining position. On the other hand, states in an inferior strategic position face a relatively higher cost of nuclear war, are less willing to run risks in a crisis, and are more likely to back down early in a dispute. This chapter serves, therefore, as the theoretical and conceptual core for the first half of the bookLess
This chapter develops a new theory of nuclear deterrence, the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory. The theory brings together traditional arguments in the nuclear strategy literature about the advantages of nuclear superiority and combines them with nuclear brinkmanship theory to provide the first coherent theoretical explanation for why nuclear superiority provides states with geopolitical advantages. It argues that military nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its effective resolve, and enhancing its bargaining position. On the other hand, states in an inferior strategic position face a relatively higher cost of nuclear war, are less willing to run risks in a crisis, and are more likely to back down early in a dispute. This chapter serves, therefore, as the theoretical and conceptual core for the first half of the book
Nicola Horsburgh
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198706113
- eISBN:
- 9780191775277
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198706113.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Chapter 3 examines China’s engagement with global nuclear order during the period of opening up and reform, between 1976 and 1989. In particular, it explores China’s decision to join the Conference ...
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Chapter 3 examines China’s engagement with global nuclear order during the period of opening up and reform, between 1976 and 1989. In particular, it explores China’s decision to join the Conference on Disarmament in 1980 and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984, as well as Beijing’s reaction to superpower arms control treaties like the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987. In this period, China engaged with global nuclear order on two fronts: by developing its first nuclear strategy; then by reversing positions on arms control and non-proliferation, leading to its engagement with major nuclear institutions. This was a dramatic departure from past behaviour under Mao Zedong, during which China had challenged the superpowers’ ideas for global nuclear order.Less
Chapter 3 examines China’s engagement with global nuclear order during the period of opening up and reform, between 1976 and 1989. In particular, it explores China’s decision to join the Conference on Disarmament in 1980 and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984, as well as Beijing’s reaction to superpower arms control treaties like the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987. In this period, China engaged with global nuclear order on two fronts: by developing its first nuclear strategy; then by reversing positions on arms control and non-proliferation, leading to its engagement with major nuclear institutions. This was a dramatic departure from past behaviour under Mao Zedong, during which China had challenged the superpowers’ ideas for global nuclear order.
Edward Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452482
- eISBN:
- 9780801455506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter addresses the impact of new ideas on the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, plans for nuclear warfare, weapons for future war, and the US Air Force. During the one thousand days of the ...
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This chapter addresses the impact of new ideas on the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, plans for nuclear warfare, weapons for future war, and the US Air Force. During the one thousand days of the Kennedy administration, the Air Force and administration not only clashed in the realm of strategic concepts, they also interacted with the real world. The collision played out in contemporary crises and future plans. For the first time since 1945, ideas at the national level directly opposed those at the service level. The new administration's ideas about discriminate nuclear weapon use, no-cities, and Assured Destruction radically changed crisis management and procurement. The distance between concepts produced chasms between air-atomic advocates and their opponents. The most direct collision between these ideas and reality occurred during the intense crises of the early 1960s. The limits of abstract strategy became plain when real issues were at stake. These crises also reflected other changes in the national security structure, most importantly, a shift from seeking the counsel of uniformed advisors and toward detached civilian analysis; and they also show how hard it was to apply the ideas generated by academics to the real world.Less
This chapter addresses the impact of new ideas on the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, plans for nuclear warfare, weapons for future war, and the US Air Force. During the one thousand days of the Kennedy administration, the Air Force and administration not only clashed in the realm of strategic concepts, they also interacted with the real world. The collision played out in contemporary crises and future plans. For the first time since 1945, ideas at the national level directly opposed those at the service level. The new administration's ideas about discriminate nuclear weapon use, no-cities, and Assured Destruction radically changed crisis management and procurement. The distance between concepts produced chasms between air-atomic advocates and their opponents. The most direct collision between these ideas and reality occurred during the intense crises of the early 1960s. The limits of abstract strategy became plain when real issues were at stake. These crises also reflected other changes in the national security structure, most importantly, a shift from seeking the counsel of uniformed advisors and toward detached civilian analysis; and they also show how hard it was to apply the ideas generated by academics to the real world.
Michael C. Desch
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780691181219
- eISBN:
- 9780691184906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691181219.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter assesses whether academic social science had any influence on nuclear strategy. Social science did have important effects on strategy. At times this was direct. More often it was ...
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This chapter assesses whether academic social science had any influence on nuclear strategy. Social science did have important effects on strategy. At times this was direct. More often it was indirect, working not through the formulation of doctrine or the drafting of operational plans, but rather by providing the intellectual frameworks and mental road maps that shaped senior policymakers' and presidents' thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons during confrontations with other nuclear states. Academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling reputedly exercised such influence that the period between 1945 and 1961 is regarded as the “golden age” of academic national security studies. However, scientific strategists reached a dead end by privileging internal disciplinary concerns like logical rigor and the use of sophisticated methods over addressing concrete policy problems.Less
This chapter assesses whether academic social science had any influence on nuclear strategy. Social science did have important effects on strategy. At times this was direct. More often it was indirect, working not through the formulation of doctrine or the drafting of operational plans, but rather by providing the intellectual frameworks and mental road maps that shaped senior policymakers' and presidents' thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons during confrontations with other nuclear states. Academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling reputedly exercised such influence that the period between 1945 and 1961 is regarded as the “golden age” of academic national security studies. However, scientific strategists reached a dead end by privileging internal disciplinary concerns like logical rigor and the use of sophisticated methods over addressing concrete policy problems.
ROBERT V. DODGE
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199857203
- eISBN:
- 9780199932597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter presents a brief summary of Schelling's career with tributes, taking him from NATO, to Washington and then the beginning of his academic career at Yale. From Yale he headed to the RAND ...
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This chapter presents a brief summary of Schelling's career with tributes, taking him from NATO, to Washington and then the beginning of his academic career at Yale. From Yale he headed to the RAND Corporation, where he became involved with military strategy and game theory. In 1960 he moved to Harvard and completed The Strategy of Conflict, developed the strategy of MAD, advised President Kennedy during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and developed war games to train government officials in crisis management, including Henry Kissinger and Bobby Kennedy. When he began teaching he created a course based on his experiences with bargaining and strategy, calling it “Conflict, Cooperation, and Strategy.” The course involved mixing strategic analysis with game theory and rational choice, and forms the basis of this book. Steven Levitt, co-author of Freakonomics and Superfreakonomics writes about his memories as a student on this course, years ago, as a supplement.Less
This chapter presents a brief summary of Schelling's career with tributes, taking him from NATO, to Washington and then the beginning of his academic career at Yale. From Yale he headed to the RAND Corporation, where he became involved with military strategy and game theory. In 1960 he moved to Harvard and completed The Strategy of Conflict, developed the strategy of MAD, advised President Kennedy during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and developed war games to train government officials in crisis management, including Henry Kissinger and Bobby Kennedy. When he began teaching he created a course based on his experiences with bargaining and strategy, calling it “Conflict, Cooperation, and Strategy.” The course involved mixing strategic analysis with game theory and rational choice, and forms the basis of this book. Steven Levitt, co-author of Freakonomics and Superfreakonomics writes about his memories as a student on this course, years ago, as a supplement.
Edward Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452482
- eISBN:
- 9780801455506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This introductory chapter reviews existing schools of scholarship that describe airpower's evolving role in conflict and informs the book's discussion of the origins of air-atomic theory. It argues ...
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This introductory chapter reviews existing schools of scholarship that describe airpower's evolving role in conflict and informs the book's discussion of the origins of air-atomic theory. It argues that these schools all miss a matter that is important to each of them: the rise and fall of air-atomic power in the early Cold War. It emerged in 1945, was transformed by the growth of US and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and finally was superseded by a new strategic approach that substituted stability for victory. It is argued that the evolution of nuclear strategy and the evidence about it cannot be presented as a chronicle, because events and people intersect in important ways on many paths that would be tangled in a simple narrative. The evolution of air-atomic ideas is best understood in its own terms and its own words, taking great caution to avoid anachronistic judgments. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter reviews existing schools of scholarship that describe airpower's evolving role in conflict and informs the book's discussion of the origins of air-atomic theory. It argues that these schools all miss a matter that is important to each of them: the rise and fall of air-atomic power in the early Cold War. It emerged in 1945, was transformed by the growth of US and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and finally was superseded by a new strategic approach that substituted stability for victory. It is argued that the evolution of nuclear strategy and the evidence about it cannot be presented as a chronicle, because events and people intersect in important ways on many paths that would be tangled in a simple narrative. The evolution of air-atomic ideas is best understood in its own terms and its own words, taking great caution to avoid anachronistic judgments. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
