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This chapter discusses the origins of the nuclear Nnon-proliferation regime. The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 at Washington, London, and Moscow. It was signed that first day by the three depository governments and by more than fifty other states. The treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970. In 2007, the membership of the NPT stands at 187 states, and the treaty continues to serve as the cornerstone legal instrument of the nuclear non-proliferation system. Articles I, II, III, and VI of the NPT are discussed.

Chapter 2 begins by outlining the origins and history of nuclear technology. It goes on to show how claims that nuclear fission is a low-carbon technology are false. Such claims rely on a variety of flaws, the first of which is the fact that most nuclear-emissions studies count greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions only at point of electricity use, rather than from the entire, 14-stage nuclear-fuel cycle. By thus “trimming the data” on nuclear-related GHG emissions, proponents falsely portray fission as a “green,” low-carbon technology. In reality, once one counts GHG emissions from all nuclear-fuel-cycle stages, fission has roughly the same GHG emissions as natural gas. Another flaw with the claim that nuclear GHG emissions are low is that it fails to take into account the much higher emissions that arise from using low-grade uranium ore to create reactor fuel. Third, those who claim that nuclear GHG emissions are low are inconsistent in that they fail to apply their own logic (that we should implement energy technologies with low GHG emissions) to electricity sources (such as wind and solar photovoltaic) that are much better GHG-emissions avoiders than is nuclear power. A fourth problem is the fact that reactors generate only about 25 percent more energy, in their lifetime, than is required, as input, to the 14 stages of their fuel cycle. A fifth flaw of those who propose using nuclear energy to address CC is their failure to take account of the fact that reactors massively increase risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Using atomic energy to help combat CC worsens another, and equally catastrophic, energy problem: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. A sixth flaw of using fission to address CC is failure to take account of the practical difficulties of tripling the number of global reactors. For all these reasons, the chapter shows that commercial atomic energy cannot address CC.

This chapter examines the nuclear policy and interpretations of the NPT by nuclear weapons states (NWS) during the target decade of this study. It offers as primary evidence a review of the statements made by states parties to the various formal meetings held under the banner of the NPT — i.e., the NPT Review Conferences (or ‘RevCons’) which occur once every five years, and the NPT Preparatory Committee meetings (or ‘PrepComs’), which typically occur for three consecutive years preceding a Review Conference. These statements provide solid source material for analysis and evaluation of trends in states' policies toward the NPT, and legal interpretations of the NPT, as they are single subject documents (i.e., on the subject of the NPT) and are given on a recurring basis by the same governments.

This introductory chapter analyzes how the legal framework intended to ensure nonproliferation—the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), adopted in 1970—is failing to contain the evolution and exponential growth of nuclear risk. It explains why the Grand Bargain of the NPT is not succeeding as conceived, and why counterproliferation will continue to fall short in achieving nuclear security unless reinforced and eventually supplanted by a different legal and institutional framework. The task of creating a new legal and institutional framework requires, first, understanding why the current legal and institutional infrastructure is failing, and how contemporary nuclear risk defies containment. This in turn requires examination of nuclear risk in greater detail, to understand its components and its dynamics, at every principal stage, from source to detonation, to identify where in the process we can work a new regime to construct security.

Negotiating the nuclear pact between India and the United States proved problematic because of the two competing imperatives of the latter's foreign policy: great power politics versus nuclear weapons non-proliferation. President George W. Bush's administration considered the agreement primarily as an instrument to develop a strategic alliance with India, but many members of Congress would support it only if it contributed to the objectives of non-proliferation. In India, political critics viewed the agreement as a ploy by the US to stifle India's nuclear options. Aside from nuclear technicalities, the US-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement is also about the emergence of a new configuration in global balance of power. This chapter discusses the long-standing debate in the international relations literature about the effectiveness of international institutions in global politics, as well as the civilian nuclear energy pacts signed by India with other nations following that with the US.

After more than three years of diplomatic negotiations, India and the United States signed a nuclear pact in October 2008. The agreement, which allows civilian nuclear trade between the two countries, symbolized a turning point in US-India relations after a disagreement on the latter's nuclear weapons programme. This book examines the factors involved in the US-India nuclear agreement, focusing on actors, influences, and processes in international politics. It employs a Levels of Analysis approach to analyse issues and events in international relations at the international, state, and individual levels. It also discusses the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the debate in India over the liability bill, and President Barack Obama's priorities regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The history of the attitude of the United States towards the spread of nuclear weapons has been one of continuous opposition, tempered now and then by the judgement of the government of the day as to whether in particular instances the exigencies of the moment outweighed the force of the general principle. The starting point or the rough first draft for the U.S. policy of hostility towards the spread of nuclear weapons is the Baruch Plan, presented in 1946 to the newly created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission by the U.S. representative on the Commission, Bernard M. Baruch. The Baruch Plan aimed to harmonise an anticipated widespread international interest in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. President Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted a new anti-proliferation initiative at the end of 1953 in the form of Atoms for Peace. This chapter discusses U.S. policy on non-proliferation and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, counter-proliferation and U.S. President George W. Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative.

This chapter reviews existing theories of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation policy and proposes two theories to explain how US nonproliferation policy has evolved over time and how effective it has been in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It argues that tests by new nuclear states can spur stronger nonproliferation policies by increasing expectations of nuclear domino effects, causing greater government attention to nonproliferation, and providing a political opening for nonproliferation advocates. In terms of the effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy, it emphasizes the importance of a credible threat of sanctions, which can deter states from seeking or acquiring nuclear weapons if they are highly dependent on the United States. For states with low dependence on the United States, multilateral sanctions are crucial to ending ongoing nuclear weapons programs.

Both India and the United States encountered stiff resistance to their civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement. For President George W. Bush, the challenge was to reconcile conflicting viewpoints and convincing the nation's various constituencies that the nuclear pact was in America's interest. Most of the negative reactions against the deal had to do with its potential impact on other states with plans of pursuing nuclear weapons. Some members of Congress were initially hostile to the agreement. The pact also drew criticism from non-proliferation advocates because of India's rejection of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This chapter examines how President George W. Bush dealt with the critics of his administration's nuclear agreement with India.

This chapter begins with a brief review of the principal materials and technologies which are the subject of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). It then presents an account of the pre-NPT history of efforts to regulate these technologies through the sources of international law and international institutions. It argues that the diplomatic history of the NPT, when taken as a whole, establishes clearly that the NPT is not fundamentally about regulating nuclear weapons proliferation, as it is often summarily described to be. It is in fact fundamentally about regulating nuclear energy in its full dual-use nature and range of applications. Again, taken as a whole, this diplomatic history makes clear that the NPT is underpinned by three inherently linked, and presumptively equal, principled pillars — peaceful use of nuclear energy, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and disarmament of nuclear weapons stockpiles — and not only one.

Having reviewed nuclear policies of nuclear weapons states (NWS) and legal interpretations of the NPT during the target decade of this study, this chapter provides a legal analysis of these interpretations and the policies which have been justified by reference thereto. It undertakes this analysis by reference to the guiding principles of interpretation of the NPT, produced through the consideration in Chapter 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rules of treaty interpretation, and in particular the concepts of context and object and purpose. It is argued that many of the interpretations of the NPT by NWS during the target decade were legally incorrect by reference to these guiding principles of interpretation. Essentially, these are cases of NWS officials failing to interpret the provisions of the NPT in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. These misinterpretations have in turn formed the legal basis for policies and actions which have prejudiced the legitimate legal interests of NNWS pursuant to the NPT's grand bargain.

This chapter discusses the political aspects of European security. It focuses on the implications of different interests of Alliance partners for efforts to achieve détente and arms control regimes. It shows how West German policy adapted internationally. The chapter also discusses the ‘Gaullist’ and ‘Atlanticist’ tendencies in West German politics and discusses the consequences of the termination of the ‘Gaullist’ alternative. This chapter also focuses on the efforts of the British in achieving a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the expense of its relation with the Federal Republic.

This chapter discusses Anglo-German relations in the context of the negotiations leading to the agreement reached between the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, and ultimately by Germany, on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The negotiations were complex, in that they spilled over into other issues of concern to members of the Atlantic Alliance. Principally, these included the MLF/ANF project and whether moves within the Alliance to create opportunities for greater nuclear weapons sharing would prove acceptable to the Soviet Union. Multilateral negotiations were influenced by the changes of government in Bonn in 1966 and 1969, and the Soviet-inspired invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They also occurred at a time when the British government was anxious to strengthen relations with Germany in support for Britain's commitment to Europe.

In 2000, almost every state in the world (all except Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) publicly subscribed once again to the principle that the spread of nuclear weapons to states not already possessing them is dangerous to international security and that it should therefore be energetically discouraged. The occasion was the latest review conference of the 30-year-old Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the chief international instrument for restricting nuclear proliferation, and for reversing such proliferation as has occurred, if its Article 6 is taken seriously. But the correctness of this principle is not self-evident. An important intellectual challenge comes from Kenneth Waltz, writing most recently in 2003. The basis of his challenge is a generalisation of what he regards as a significant lesson of the Cold War years. This chapter deals with nuclear weapons and international security, starting with Barry Buzan's concept of a ‘security complex’. It concludes by looking at two broad approaches to securing the mutually beneficial outcome of non-proliferation: the centralised approach and the decentralised approach.

This chapter examines the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. It reviews relevant literature and proposes a theoretical model which suggests several socioeconomic, political, and security incentives for both nuclear acquisition and nuclear rollback. It investigates in detail the nuclear issue in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Saudi Arabia and explores the political and economic forces that shape the process of nuclear ambition or nuclear restraint. It also speculates on the possibility of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

This introductory chapter presents an overview of the book. This book is a thesis driven text which applies the rules of treaty interpretation in international law to produce a so-called ‘holistic interpretation’ of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The unifying thesis of this book is that the original balance of principles underlying the NPT, which can be distilled through an application of the principles of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, has for over a decade been distorted particularly by nuclear-weapon-possessing governments, led by the United States, in favour of a disproportionate prioritization of non-proliferation principles, and an unwarranted under-prioritization of peaceful use and disarmament principles. It is argued that this distortion of principled balance by nuclear-weapon states has resulted in a number of erroneous legal interpretations of the NPT's provisions.

This chapter addresses the supply-side of the nuclear renaissance. Why do nuclear supplier countries assist other states in developing nuclear energy programs? It argues that supplier states enter the marketplace to enhance their political influence. A quantitative analysis of the behavior of suppliers in the nuclear marketplace from 1953 to 2000 supports this argument. The findings also show normative concerns and a desire to sustain domestic nuclear industries are less decisive for explaining civilian nuclear assistance than is commonly assumed. The chapter concludes that the supply-side will influence the nuclear renaissance mostly by affecting where -- not if -- countries are able to obtain nuclear assistance.