Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198077336
- eISBN:
- 9780199081530
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198077336.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the concept of free will and the idea of causa noumenon, which is an individual with free will. It notes that it is the concept of the free self that makes up the basis of ...
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This chapter discusses the concept of free will and the idea of causa noumenon, which is an individual with free will. It notes that it is the concept of the free self that makes up the basis of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's interpretation of Kant. The first sections of the chapter focus on the concept of ‘action’, which is defined as the result of a notion of doing. It identifies two kinds of knowledge on actions, and then examines the mutual dependency that exists between the certainty of autonomous action and the certainty about the ought. The rest of the chapter discusses other concepts of willing and duty, including autonomous willing, the three certainties - autonomous agency of the self, immortality of the self and existence of God, and the transnatural reality - and contemplative certainty. The chapter also discusses the concept of aesthetic contemplation.Less
This chapter discusses the concept of free will and the idea of causa noumenon, which is an individual with free will. It notes that it is the concept of the free self that makes up the basis of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's interpretation of Kant. The first sections of the chapter focus on the concept of ‘action’, which is defined as the result of a notion of doing. It identifies two kinds of knowledge on actions, and then examines the mutual dependency that exists between the certainty of autonomous action and the certainty about the ought. The rest of the chapter discusses other concepts of willing and duty, including autonomous willing, the three certainties - autonomous agency of the self, immortality of the self and existence of God, and the transnatural reality - and contemplative certainty. The chapter also discusses the concept of aesthetic contemplation.
J. N. Findlay
- Published in print:
- 1981
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246381
- eISBN:
- 9780191680960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246381.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the following: (i) The Kantian concept of the Transcendental Object, and of its relation to that of the Noumenon and the Thing-in-itself; (ii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot ...
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This chapter discusses the following: (i) The Kantian concept of the Transcendental Object, and of its relation to that of the Noumenon and the Thing-in-itself; (ii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot be positivistically interpreted, but requires underlying unities that hold appearances together, and which, by their identity, give the latter constancy of character; (iii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot be idealistically interpreted, since it accepts the reality of a Transcendental Subject and of transcendental acts that exist beyond experience and knowledge, and are constitutive of it. It also accepts the reality of many Transcendental Objects that affect our subjectivity and which have characters and relations not given to the latter, at best corresponding to phenomenal characters and relations; (iv) Kant's phenomenalism is more radical than other phenomenalisms in that it accepts space and time only as ordering forms for phenomena. But it advances important arguments, based mainly on ontological criteria, for restricting them to what is thus phenomenal; (v) The regular connection among the appearances of objects is the necessary empirical surrogate for the unity of the objects from which they spring. Kant therefore makes use of his metempirical presuppositions to illuminate phenomenal data.Less
This chapter discusses the following: (i) The Kantian concept of the Transcendental Object, and of its relation to that of the Noumenon and the Thing-in-itself; (ii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot be positivistically interpreted, but requires underlying unities that hold appearances together, and which, by their identity, give the latter constancy of character; (iii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot be idealistically interpreted, since it accepts the reality of a Transcendental Subject and of transcendental acts that exist beyond experience and knowledge, and are constitutive of it. It also accepts the reality of many Transcendental Objects that affect our subjectivity and which have characters and relations not given to the latter, at best corresponding to phenomenal characters and relations; (iv) Kant's phenomenalism is more radical than other phenomenalisms in that it accepts space and time only as ordering forms for phenomena. But it advances important arguments, based mainly on ontological criteria, for restricting them to what is thus phenomenal; (v) The regular connection among the appearances of objects is the necessary empirical surrogate for the unity of the objects from which they spring. Kant therefore makes use of his metempirical presuppositions to illuminate phenomenal data.
Bryan Magee
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237228
- eISBN:
- 9780191706233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237227.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The general forms through which the always‐hidden noumenal manifests itself in detailed phenomena were accurately identified by Plato, and we can retain the name ‘Platonic Forms of Platonic Ideas’. ...
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The general forms through which the always‐hidden noumenal manifests itself in detailed phenomena were accurately identified by Plato, and we can retain the name ‘Platonic Forms of Platonic Ideas’. Cognition of these is made possible by works of art, which reveal to us the universal in the particular. Thus, the primary function of art is the expression not of emotion but of cognitive insight into the inner nature of things, expressible in art but unstatable in language. Music alone among the arts does not represent phenomena, and therefore does not unveil Platonic Forms, but is a direct experience of the noumenon. This makes it a super‐art, radically different in kind from the rest, and superior.Less
The general forms through which the always‐hidden noumenal manifests itself in detailed phenomena were accurately identified by Plato, and we can retain the name ‘Platonic Forms of Platonic Ideas’. Cognition of these is made possible by works of art, which reveal to us the universal in the particular. Thus, the primary function of art is the expression not of emotion but of cognitive insight into the inner nature of things, expressible in art but unstatable in language. Music alone among the arts does not represent phenomena, and therefore does not unveil Platonic Forms, but is a direct experience of the noumenon. This makes it a super‐art, radically different in kind from the rest, and superior.
Bryan Magee
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237228
- eISBN:
- 9780191706233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237227.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Schopenhauer believes that differentiation is possible only where there is time or space, and therefore only in the phenomenal world: the noumenon must be one and undifferentiable. This inner ...
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Schopenhauer believes that differentiation is possible only where there is time or space, and therefore only in the phenomenal world: the noumenon must be one and undifferentiable. This inner one‐less of all being explains our feeling for others, the compassion on which morality is based. Thus, Schopenhauer's ethics are a practical inference from his metaphysics. At our death in the empirical world, we cease to exist as individuals, but our noumenal nature remains unaltered. Being noumenal, it is outside time, and indestructible.Less
Schopenhauer believes that differentiation is possible only where there is time or space, and therefore only in the phenomenal world: the noumenon must be one and undifferentiable. This inner one‐less of all being explains our feeling for others, the compassion on which morality is based. Thus, Schopenhauer's ethics are a practical inference from his metaphysics. At our death in the empirical world, we cease to exist as individuals, but our noumenal nature remains unaltered. Being noumenal, it is outside time, and indestructible.
Bryan Magee
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237228
- eISBN:
- 9780191706233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237227.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The commonest misunderstanding of Schopenhauer is that he taught, contradicting Kant, that we can have direct knowledge of the noumenon. Then there is the mistake that this noumenon is the will ...
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The commonest misunderstanding of Schopenhauer is that he taught, contradicting Kant, that we can have direct knowledge of the noumenon. Then there is the mistake that this noumenon is the will understood in a conative sense, the will as we experience it in agency, or the will to live, or the will to power. A careful reading of Schopenhauer's work is able to show that these are misinterpretations. He does not believe we can know the noumenon; and by ‘will’ he means a blind force that is as present in inorganic nature as elsewhere. It was an error on Schopenhauer's part to use the term ‘will’ in a way that invites these misunderstandings; but the damage has been done.Less
The commonest misunderstanding of Schopenhauer is that he taught, contradicting Kant, that we can have direct knowledge of the noumenon. Then there is the mistake that this noumenon is the will understood in a conative sense, the will as we experience it in agency, or the will to live, or the will to power. A careful reading of Schopenhauer's work is able to show that these are misinterpretations. He does not believe we can know the noumenon; and by ‘will’ he means a blind force that is as present in inorganic nature as elsewhere. It was an error on Schopenhauer's part to use the term ‘will’ in a way that invites these misunderstandings; but the damage has been done.
John Mccumber
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785457
- eISBN:
- 9780804788533
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785457.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
With the understanding that Hegel’s critique of Kant provides substantial insight into Hegel’s own philosophical project, this chapter disentangles Hegel’s criticisms of Kant’s theoretical philosophy ...
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With the understanding that Hegel’s critique of Kant provides substantial insight into Hegel’s own philosophical project, this chapter disentangles Hegel’s criticisms of Kant’s theoretical philosophy regarding the limit Kant places on cognition. This raises two interrelated issues in Kant: that of the things we cannot know and that of the power of knowing them, which we do not possess. This chapter discusses Hegel’s views on things in themselves and on the enigmatic faculty of intellectual intuition, which for Kant would be how we would know things in themselves if we were able know them at all. The chapter begins by outlining Hegel’s particular criticisms of Kant’s epistemological and ontological premises in order to better understand what Hegel thinks of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, and where between those two spheres, knowledge is situated.Less
With the understanding that Hegel’s critique of Kant provides substantial insight into Hegel’s own philosophical project, this chapter disentangles Hegel’s criticisms of Kant’s theoretical philosophy regarding the limit Kant places on cognition. This raises two interrelated issues in Kant: that of the things we cannot know and that of the power of knowing them, which we do not possess. This chapter discusses Hegel’s views on things in themselves and on the enigmatic faculty of intellectual intuition, which for Kant would be how we would know things in themselves if we were able know them at all. The chapter begins by outlining Hegel’s particular criticisms of Kant’s epistemological and ontological premises in order to better understand what Hegel thinks of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, and where between those two spheres, knowledge is situated.
Tom Rockmore
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226349909
- eISBN:
- 9780226350073
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226350073.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Chapter 3, “Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, the subject and circularity,” focuses on Fichte’s rethinking of the conception of the subject, and, as a result, ontology and cognition from a fully ...
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Chapter 3, “Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, the subject and circularity,” focuses on Fichte’s rethinking of the conception of the subject, and, as a result, ontology and cognition from a fully subject-centered perspective. The result is to remove the ambiguity in the critical philosophy about the status of the noumenon, or mind-independent real, which Kant inconsistently describes as uncognizable but as also indispensable for cognition. The chapter also treats the Fichtean link to the two-aspects thesis in his Deduction of representation. I show that Fichte states this representational approach to knowledge while denying its validity in a constructivist approach to cognition.Less
Chapter 3, “Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, the subject and circularity,” focuses on Fichte’s rethinking of the conception of the subject, and, as a result, ontology and cognition from a fully subject-centered perspective. The result is to remove the ambiguity in the critical philosophy about the status of the noumenon, or mind-independent real, which Kant inconsistently describes as uncognizable but as also indispensable for cognition. The chapter also treats the Fichtean link to the two-aspects thesis in his Deduction of representation. I show that Fichte states this representational approach to knowledge while denying its validity in a constructivist approach to cognition.
Gabriela Basterra
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780823265145
- eISBN:
- 9780823266883
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823265145.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
How does reason create objects of knowledge and ideas that imagine a relationship with the objective world? In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant attributes this role to the synthetic activity of the ...
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How does reason create objects of knowledge and ideas that imagine a relationship with the objective world? In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant attributes this role to the synthetic activity of the imagination and the understanding, whereas reason produces ideas of things that cannot be experienced, only thought. This chapter explores reason's attempt to create the idea of the world, an object unavailable to experience, precisely where it fails: in the mathematical antinomy. Through a study of the productivity of negation inspired in David-Ménard's La folie dans la raison pure, it examines reason's failure to form all-encompassing, self-contained totalities. There is only one type of negative idea Kant considers legitimate, negative noumenon. By opening an empty space beyond experience, negative noumena bound the realm of objectivity and provide thinking with a sense of completion. The most productive instance of these boundary concepts is freedom.Less
How does reason create objects of knowledge and ideas that imagine a relationship with the objective world? In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant attributes this role to the synthetic activity of the imagination and the understanding, whereas reason produces ideas of things that cannot be experienced, only thought. This chapter explores reason's attempt to create the idea of the world, an object unavailable to experience, precisely where it fails: in the mathematical antinomy. Through a study of the productivity of negation inspired in David-Ménard's La folie dans la raison pure, it examines reason's failure to form all-encompassing, self-contained totalities. There is only one type of negative idea Kant considers legitimate, negative noumenon. By opening an empty space beyond experience, negative noumena bound the realm of objectivity and provide thinking with a sense of completion. The most productive instance of these boundary concepts is freedom.
