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This chapter assesses whether focusing on rules of engagement for fruitful discussions about competing scientific views provides a good strategy for reliably identifying normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). It discusses some of the rules for effective criticism dominant in the philosophy of science literature: shared standards, uptake, and expertise. It shows that although all these criteria appear eminently reasonable as requirements for transformative criticism, what they actually involve is not straightforward. Some of the interpretations of these criteria are likely to identify as inappropriate dissent that is actually epistemically valuable, while other interpretations of these criteria would fail to pinpoint the very cases of dissent that some consider paradigm cases of NID.

This introductory chapter presents the philosophical approach used in this book to deal with the problematic epistemic and social consequences of some scientific dissent. It challenges approaches to this problem that focus on finding criteria to identify what the authors have termed normatively inappropriate dissent (NID), and it calls for a reframing of the problem that highlights some of the epistemic and social conditions actually contributing to making NID more damaging: scientific institutions and practices that undermine warranted public trust in science and a misunderstanding of the role of science in policy making. It also offers an overview of the book and specifically describes each of the chapters.

This chapters evaluates whether inductive risks judgments can serve as a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Dissent that calls for rejecting certain consensus views related to public policy can be risky. When consensus views are mistakenly rejected, it can have serious consequences for public health and well-being. These risks may not be worth taking when the risks disproportionately fall on the public, or when the dissent in question fails to conform to widely shared standards of good science. It concludes that this account also fails to offer a criterion to reliably identify NID. In part this is because of the difficulties presented by the criterion of shared standards in science. Also, the ambiguities present in judgments about inductive risks lead to serious problems in practice.

This chapter considers whether the reliable identification of normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) would be helpful in addressing many of the adverse epistemic and social impacts that can result from it. It considers a variety of ways in which such identification could be used to minimize the epistemic and social damages that NID can inflict, including prohibiting the dissent in question, targeting it for special scrutiny, placing limits on scientists’ epistemic obligations, guiding public beliefs, emphasizing the existence of a consensus, and discrediting dissenters. It shows that although some of these strategies could be useful, others are unhelpful in limiting the negative impacts of NID, and may even exacerbate them or generate other equally serious problems.

This chapter explores whether the presence of bad-faith motive is a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Rather than appropriate epistemic motives to help advance scientific knowledge, bad-faith motives involve some other objectionable goal: to confuse the public, stall policies that the dissenters dislike, promote particular ideological views, or safeguard profits. This chapter evaluates various ways to explain why bad-faith motives could result in dissent that fails to promote or that impedes scientific progress and it assesses their plausibility. It concludes that in spite of the intuitive appeal of attending to motivations, they cannot serve as a criterion to reliably identify NID.

This concluding chapter revisits the main topics of the book and emphasizes the need to reframe the problem of normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). It contends that limiting attention to the role that problematic dissent plays in undermining support for particular policies and actions is both misguided and dangerous. It calls for a reframing of the problem in ways that are likely to be more fruitful in trying to address the problems that can stem from NID, such as developing scientific and institutional practices that promote warranted public trust in science and encouraging better ways to engage in discussions with all relevant parties about the values at stake in various policy decisions.

This chapter offers a brief overview of the importance of epistemic trust and the relevance that scientific institutions and practices have in promoting or undermining warranted public trust. Epistemic trust is crucial for the production of scientific knowledge, the ability of the public to make sense of scientific phenomena, and the development of public policy. Normatively inappropriate dissent is more likely to take hold and erroneously affect people’s beliefs and actions in a context where the trustworthiness of scientists is called into question and where there is an excessive reliance on scientific information when it comes to assessing policy decisions. Thus, finding ways to facilitate and sustain warranted epistemic trust, as well as increasing understanding of the proper role of science in public policy decisions can help mitigate the negative impact of dissenting views.

Chapter 10 proposes a second recommendation to deal with the negative adverse effects that normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) can have: it calls for a recognition of the limits of scientific evidence when it comes to public policymaking and for an increased focus on potential differences in the values that underlie policy decisions. It contends that while confusion and doubt about the existing empirical evidence or about its strength can contribute to stalled policies, disagreements about values can also play a significant role. Such disagreements can involve what people take to be valuable, how to interpret shared values, how to weigh conflicting values, and what policies are better for promoting certain valuable goals.

This chapter discusses some social and institutional factors related to the practice of science that cast doubt on the trustworthiness of scientists and thus contribute to undermining the trust that people place in the scientific community and its claims. Specifically, it explores the roles played by the increasing commercialization of science, with its effect on the common good and on conflicts of interests, and by scientific misconduct in eroding public trust. It explains why this occurs and provides evidence to support the claim that trust has, in fact, been undermined as the result of these factors. It also suggests strategies for changing these trust-undermining practices so as to better facilitate and maintain warranted public trust in scientific communities.