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The Two Deepest Mysteries in Moral Philosophy

William J. Talbott

in Human Rights and Human Well-Being

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780195173482
eISBN:
9780199872176
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Political Philosophy

This chapter shows how the main principle points the way to a solution to the two deepest mysteries in moral philosophy, one metaphysical and one epistemological. The metaphysical mystery is to ... More


Truth

Michael Ridge

in Impassioned Belief

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199682669
eISBN:
9780191774454
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter examines the concept of normative truth. It first addresses a recurring worry about quasi-realist forms of expressivism — namely, that any such theory must collapse into a crude ... More


Epistemology and Determinateness

T. M. Scanlon

in Being Realistic about Reasons

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199678488
eISBN:
9780191757976
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678488.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

There is no problem about knowledge of normative truths, or mathematical truths, arising from a difficulty about how we could be in touch with facts about these subjects. Ideally, the possibility of ... More


Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter resolves the disagreements which arose in the previous chapter. Metaphysical naturalists believe that there are no ontologically weighty non-natural normative properties and truths. But ... More


Another Triple Theory

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter provides some further insights into normative thinking and reconciles a few meta-ethical disagreements. It builds on an earlier assumption that all non-naturalists make ontological ... More


Agreement

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0022
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of agreement. It is often argued that we cannot rationally believe that there are moral truths, given the facts of deep and widespread moral ... More


Normative and Natural Truths

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter considers arguments for and against normative naturalism. According to the normativity objection, irreducibly normative, reason-implying claims could not, if they were true, state ... More


Normativity and Truth

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter looks at the philosophical dimensions of normativity and truth. It first considers Allan Gibbard's Expressivist account of rationality. According to Gibbard, his aim is to explain ‘what ... More


Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter presents some arguments on non-empirical normative truths. It considers the assumption that, if there were any non-natural normative truths, these truths would be about ontologically ... More


Normative Truths

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0018
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter looks in detail at normative truths. It first considers disagreements; when we disagree with other people, we cannot rationally keep our beliefs unless we can justifiably assume that ... More


Ecumenical Cognitivism

Michael Ridge

in Impassioned Belief

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199682669
eISBN:
9780191774454
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter begins by defining ‘Ecumenical Cognitivism’ and situating it in a broader taxonomy. It then distinguishes two importantly different species of Ecumenical Cognitivism and argues that none ... More


Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses the claim that, if it were true that we ought to do something just when this act would maximize net pleasure, the concepts ought and would maximize net pleasure would refer to ... More


Metaphysics

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0019
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter relates metaphysics and ontology with Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism. If some things matter, then there are some irreducibly normative truths. This notion is denied by Allan Gibbard and ... More


Does Anything Really Matter?: Essays on Parfit on Objectivity

Peter Singer (ed.)

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780199653836
eISBN:
9780191823916
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Ethical subjectivism or skepticism, in one form or another, has dominated moral philosophy for the past eighty years. In On What Matters Derek Parfit rejects all forms of subjectivism in ethics, as ... More


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