A. W. Price
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199534791
- eISBN:
- 9780191715877
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534791.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hypothetical imperatives are problematic: does ‘If you want to get drunk every evening, you ought to work in a bar’ entail, given ‘You want to get drunk every evening’, ‘You ought to work in a bar’? ...
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Hypothetical imperatives are problematic: does ‘If you want to get drunk every evening, you ought to work in a bar’ entail, given ‘You want to get drunk every evening’, ‘You ought to work in a bar’? What of the inference from ‘Given that you are going to stab him, you ought to stab him with the shorter knife’, and ‘You are going to stab him’, to ‘You ought to stab him with the shorter knife’? One might cite Broome's ‘normative requirements’ supposedly governing thinking, which are not subject to such detachment. Doubts may be entertained about both the content, and the role, of these requirements. Their logic needs scrutiny, in respect of detachment and contraposition. So long as the concluding ‘ought’ is relative to the circumstance stated in the second premise, it may be allowed to follow, even if one has no reason to act upon it.Less
Hypothetical imperatives are problematic: does ‘If you want to get drunk every evening, you ought to work in a bar’ entail, given ‘You want to get drunk every evening’, ‘You ought to work in a bar’? What of the inference from ‘Given that you are going to stab him, you ought to stab him with the shorter knife’, and ‘You are going to stab him’, to ‘You ought to stab him with the shorter knife’? One might cite Broome's ‘normative requirements’ supposedly governing thinking, which are not subject to such detachment. Doubts may be entertained about both the content, and the role, of these requirements. Their logic needs scrutiny, in respect of detachment and contraposition. So long as the concluding ‘ought’ is relative to the circumstance stated in the second premise, it may be allowed to follow, even if one has no reason to act upon it.
Nils Melzer
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199533169
- eISBN:
- 9780191714511
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199533169.003.0016
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
This chapter discusses the three requirements that must be met to ensure that that the resort by States to the method of targeted killing remains subject to the rule of law. First, it must be ...
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This chapter discusses the three requirements that must be met to ensure that that the resort by States to the method of targeted killing remains subject to the rule of law. First, it must be ascertained that international law provides clear and binding normative standards allowing the objective determination of the lawfulness of concrete targeted killings (normative requirement). Second, the rule of law requires that the observance of such normative standards be effectively ensured in practice (procedural requirement). Third, in order for the applicable normative standards to be perceived as legitimate, it must be ensured that they accurately reflect the values prevailing in the societies which they are designed to govern (moral basis).Less
This chapter discusses the three requirements that must be met to ensure that that the resort by States to the method of targeted killing remains subject to the rule of law. First, it must be ascertained that international law provides clear and binding normative standards allowing the objective determination of the lawfulness of concrete targeted killings (normative requirement). Second, the rule of law requires that the observance of such normative standards be effectively ensured in practice (procedural requirement). Third, in order for the applicable normative standards to be perceived as legitimate, it must be ensured that they accurately reflect the values prevailing in the societies which they are designed to govern (moral basis).
Angus Dawson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199231461
- eISBN:
- 9780191723858
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231461.003.0006
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
This chapter re-orientates research ethics through an exploration of the exact nature and status of the normative requirement to gain an informed consent in the context of randomized clinical trials. ...
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This chapter re-orientates research ethics through an exploration of the exact nature and status of the normative requirement to gain an informed consent in the context of randomized clinical trials. It first focuses on this requirement in its own terms. It argues that our normative commitments need to be shaped within the framework of what is possible: where we have relevant empirical evidence that a moral requirement is impossible to attain, we are obligated to revise our moral commitments. The chapter then explores the status of the requirement to gain an informed consent from a different direction, through a discussion of the relationship between respect for autonomy and other moral values. It concludes that we need to situate any commitment to gaining consent to participation in research within a wider framework of plural and equal values.Less
This chapter re-orientates research ethics through an exploration of the exact nature and status of the normative requirement to gain an informed consent in the context of randomized clinical trials. It first focuses on this requirement in its own terms. It argues that our normative commitments need to be shaped within the framework of what is possible: where we have relevant empirical evidence that a moral requirement is impossible to attain, we are obligated to revise our moral commitments. The chapter then explores the status of the requirement to gain an informed consent from a different direction, through a discussion of the relationship between respect for autonomy and other moral values. It concludes that we need to situate any commitment to gaining consent to participation in research within a wider framework of plural and equal values.
Garrett Wallace Brown
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748638819
- eISBN:
- 9780748652822
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748638819.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book explores Kant's cosmopolitanism and the normative requirements consistent with a Kantian-based cosmopolitan constitution. Topics such as cosmopolitan law, cosmopolitan right, the laws of ...
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This book explores Kant's cosmopolitanism and the normative requirements consistent with a Kantian-based cosmopolitan constitution. Topics such as cosmopolitan law, cosmopolitan right, the laws of hospitality, a Kantian federation of states, a cosmopolitan epistemology of culture and a possible normative basis for a Kantian form of global distributive justice are explored and defended. Contrary to many contemporary interpretations, the book considers Kant's cosmopolitan thought as a form of international constitutional jurisprudence that requires minimal legal demands versus the extreme condition of establishing a world state. Viewing Kant's cosmopolitan theory as a minimal form of global jurisprudence allows it to satisfy communitarian, realist and pluralist concerns without surrendering cosmopolitan principles of human worth and cosmopolitan law. In this regard, the book provides a comprehensive understanding of Kantian cosmopolitanism and what normative implications this vision has for contemporary international political theory.Less
This book explores Kant's cosmopolitanism and the normative requirements consistent with a Kantian-based cosmopolitan constitution. Topics such as cosmopolitan law, cosmopolitan right, the laws of hospitality, a Kantian federation of states, a cosmopolitan epistemology of culture and a possible normative basis for a Kantian form of global distributive justice are explored and defended. Contrary to many contemporary interpretations, the book considers Kant's cosmopolitan thought as a form of international constitutional jurisprudence that requires minimal legal demands versus the extreme condition of establishing a world state. Viewing Kant's cosmopolitan theory as a minimal form of global jurisprudence allows it to satisfy communitarian, realist and pluralist concerns without surrendering cosmopolitan principles of human worth and cosmopolitan law. In this regard, the book provides a comprehensive understanding of Kantian cosmopolitanism and what normative implications this vision has for contemporary international political theory.
Joëlle Proust
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199746996
- eISBN:
- 9780199332502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746996.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot ...
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This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have prespecified intentional contents, for this would jeopardize the normative requirements attached to epistemic states. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental action. A careful analysis of the role of normative requirements allows us to clarify the distinction between mental and bodily forms of action. Two kinds of motives must be present for a mental act to develop – one instrumental and one normative. These two motives actually correspond to different phases of a single mental act. It is shown that, conceived in this way, a characterization of mental acts avoids the three difficulties mentioned above.Less
This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have prespecified intentional contents, for this would jeopardize the normative requirements attached to epistemic states. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental action. A careful analysis of the role of normative requirements allows us to clarify the distinction between mental and bodily forms of action. Two kinds of motives must be present for a mental act to develop – one instrumental and one normative. These two motives actually correspond to different phases of a single mental act. It is shown that, conceived in this way, a characterization of mental acts avoids the three difficulties mentioned above.
Juan Comesaña
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- April 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198847717
- eISBN:
- 9780191882388
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198847717.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The previous chapter argued that our evidence is constituted by those beliefs that are ultima facie justified by our experiences—but what about our unjustified beliefs? Do they have any justificatory ...
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The previous chapter argued that our evidence is constituted by those beliefs that are ultima facie justified by our experiences—but what about our unjustified beliefs? Do they have any justificatory power of their own? This chapter discusses a puzzle that arises regarding that question, and argues that we should take to heart the lessons learned from an older puzzle: the puzzle of contrary-to-duty obligations. It is argued that these obligations, as well as what Broome has called “normative requirements,” can be understood in the model of the restrictor view of conditionals.Less
The previous chapter argued that our evidence is constituted by those beliefs that are ultima facie justified by our experiences—but what about our unjustified beliefs? Do they have any justificatory power of their own? This chapter discusses a puzzle that arises regarding that question, and argues that we should take to heart the lessons learned from an older puzzle: the puzzle of contrary-to-duty obligations. It is argued that these obligations, as well as what Broome has called “normative requirements,” can be understood in the model of the restrictor view of conditionals.
Jennifer Lackey
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- December 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780199656608
- eISBN:
- 9780191904455
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199656608.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible ...
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Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible for the U.S.’s inept and deceptive handling of COVID-19 and the harms that American citizens have suffered as a result. But are groups subject to normative assessment simply in virtue of their individual members being so, or are they somehow agents in their own right? Answering this question depends on understanding key concepts in the epistemology of groups, as we cannot hold the Trump Administration responsible without first determining what it believed, knew, and said. Deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. Inflationary theorists maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that neither approach is satisfactory. Groups are more than their members, but not because they have “minds of their own,” as the inflationists hold. Instead, this book shows how group phenomena—like belief, justification, and knowledge—depend on what the individual group members do or are capable of doing while being subject to group-level normative requirements. This framework, it is argued, allows for the correct distribution of responsibility across groups and their individual members.Less
Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible for the U.S.’s inept and deceptive handling of COVID-19 and the harms that American citizens have suffered as a result. But are groups subject to normative assessment simply in virtue of their individual members being so, or are they somehow agents in their own right? Answering this question depends on understanding key concepts in the epistemology of groups, as we cannot hold the Trump Administration responsible without first determining what it believed, knew, and said. Deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. Inflationary theorists maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that neither approach is satisfactory. Groups are more than their members, but not because they have “minds of their own,” as the inflationists hold. Instead, this book shows how group phenomena—like belief, justification, and knowledge—depend on what the individual group members do or are capable of doing while being subject to group-level normative requirements. This framework, it is argued, allows for the correct distribution of responsibility across groups and their individual members.
