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Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation

Alan Millar

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199254408
eISBN:
9780191719721
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254408.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This book shows that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions are normative in that they have normative implications. Since there is no more to believing something and intending something than meeting ... More


Reasons

Roger Crisp

in Reasons and the Good

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199290338
eISBN:
9780191710476
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses the notion of a reason for action. It begins by distinguishing epistemic from practical reasons, and suggests that all practical reasons must be grounded in well-being. It ... More


Reasons for Belief and for Action

Alan Millar

in Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199254408
eISBN:
9780191719721
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254408.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter argues that all belief calls for justification and that, accordingly, a normative reason for a belief must justify or be positively relevant to the justification of that belief. This is ... More


Modules of the Human Mind

Peter Carruthers

in The Architecture of the Mind

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199207077
eISBN:
9780191708909
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207077.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter outlines some of the key modules that are likely to be unique to the human mind. These include a sophisticated mind-reading system, a language faculty, a variety of adaptations that ... More


Practical Reality

Jonathan Dancy

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199253050
eISBN:
9780191597282
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253056.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Practical Reality is about the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. It claims that, in order to understand this relation, we have to abandon ... More


Moral Action: Motivation, Normativity, and Autonomous Willing

Katerina Deligiorgi

in The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199646159
eISBN:
9780191741142
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Chapter 3 focuses on moral action and its conditions. It fulfils both a negative and a positive task. The negative task consists in contextualizing the questions of moral psychology, which have ... More


A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons

Jennifer Hornsby

in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199231546
eISBN:
9780191716126
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces a disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons by showing that an account of acting for reasons should give a place to knowledge. This disjunctive conception is claimed to ... More


Reasons for Action

Jonathan Dancy

in Practical Reality

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199253050
eISBN:
9780191597282
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253056.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Introduces various distinctions: between the reasons why we should act (normative reasons), those for which we act (motivating reasons), and (more generally) the reasons why we act. It also ... More


One Reason Dichotomy Less?

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

in Personal Value

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199603787
eISBN:
9780191729294
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603787.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It would come in handy if we could understand the distinction between personal and impersonal values in terms of the much‐discussed agent‐relative/neutral dichotomy. This chapter examines the latter ... More


The normativity of deliberative contractualism

Nicholas Southwood

in Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199539659
eISBN:
9780191594908
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539659.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy

This chapter addresses the task of explicating the normativity of deliberative contractualist principles – how and why deliberative contractualist agreements are supposed to be capable of providing ... More


Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons

Alfred R. Mele

in Motivation and Agency

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195156171
eISBN:
9780199833467
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515617X.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Investigates the connection between motivation and reasons for action. It begins with a sketch of Donald Davidson's influential version of the view that reasons for action are states of mind. It then ... More


The Nature of Motives

Steven Sverdlik

in Motive and Rightness

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199594948
eISBN:
9780191725401
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594948.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The nature of motives is investigated. The formal definition that is defended is this: the motive of an action is the ultimate desire of the agent that explains its occurrence, or some feature of it. ... More


Reasons and Desires

Jonathan Dancy

in Practical Reality

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199253050
eISBN:
9780191597282
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253056.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Argues that normative reasons are value‐based rather than desire‐based, following and hopefully improving on the work of Raz, Quinn, and Scanlon.


Achievements and Intelligibility: For Disjunctivism about Reacting for Reasons

Errol Lord

in The Importance of Being Rational

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198815099
eISBN:
9780191852916
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815099.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The type of view defended about correctly responding to normative reasons doesn’t fit nicely into the landscape of views in the philosophy of mind and action about reacting for reasons. This is ... More


Are Reasons for Action Beliefs?

BRUNO CELANO

in Rights, Culture and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2010
ISBN:
9780199248254
eISBN:
9780191714849
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248254.003.0003
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

Suppose John takes his umbrella because he (rightly, as it turns out) believes that it will rain. Is the reason for him to take his umbrella his belief that it will rain, or is it the fact that it ... More


What it is to Correctly Respond to Reasons

Errol Lord

in The Importance of Being Rational

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198815099
eISBN:
9780191852916
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815099.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter defends an account of what it is to correctly respond to possessed normative reasons. This view is intimately connected to my account of possession. When one possesses a reason r to X, ... More


Guidance

John Gibbons

in The Norm of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199673391
eISBN:
9780191751684
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673391.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Part III is about the natural reaction. This is the idea that the alleged objective requirements are not genuine requirements because they can’t get a grip on us in a serious way. This is a bundle of ... More


Nothing “Really” Matters, but That’s Not What Matters

Sharon Street

in Does Anything Really Matter?: Essays on Parfit on Objectivity

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780199653836
eISBN:
9780191823916
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Parfit’s attempt to supply an adequate epistemology for his objectivist theory of normative reasons rests on a conflation of the thesis that there are normative reasons with the thesis that there are ... More


The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Value of Rationality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198802693
eISBN:
9780191841972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Many philosophers working on normative issues follow the ‘Reasons First’ program. According to this program, the concept of a ‘normative reason’ for an action or an attitude is the most fundamental ... More


Justified Belief, Reasons, and Evidence

Alan Millar

in Knowing by Perceiving

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
March 2019
ISBN:
9780198755692
eISBN:
9780191816840
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Normative reasons for belief—reasons to believe something—are constituted by truths or facts. Such reasons are distinguished from motivating reasons for belief, that is, reasons for which a subject ... More


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