Stephen Finlay
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199347490
- eISBN:
- 9780199347513
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347490.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Can normative words like ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’ be defined in entirely non-normative terms? This book argues that they can, advancing an end-relational theory of the meaning of this language ...
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Can normative words like ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’ be defined in entirely non-normative terms? This book argues that they can, advancing an end-relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is ordinarily used. Whereas it is widely maintained that relational theories cannot account for the special features of moral and deliberative uses of these words, this book argues that the end-relational theory accommodates these features systematically on the basis of a single fundamental principle of conversational pragmatics. These challenges comprise the central problems of metaethics, including the connection between normative judgment and motivation, the categorical character of morality, the nature of intrinsic value, and the possibility of normative disagreement. This linguistic analysis has far-reaching implications for the metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology of morality, as well as for the nature and possibility of normative ethical theory. Most significantly it supplies a nuanced answer to the ancient Euthyphro Question of whether things are desired because they are judged to be good, or vice versa. Normative speech and thought may ultimately be just a manifestation of our nature as intelligent animals motivated by contingent desires for various conflicting ends.Less
Can normative words like ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’ be defined in entirely non-normative terms? This book argues that they can, advancing an end-relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is ordinarily used. Whereas it is widely maintained that relational theories cannot account for the special features of moral and deliberative uses of these words, this book argues that the end-relational theory accommodates these features systematically on the basis of a single fundamental principle of conversational pragmatics. These challenges comprise the central problems of metaethics, including the connection between normative judgment and motivation, the categorical character of morality, the nature of intrinsic value, and the possibility of normative disagreement. This linguistic analysis has far-reaching implications for the metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology of morality, as well as for the nature and possibility of normative ethical theory. Most significantly it supplies a nuanced answer to the ancient Euthyphro Question of whether things are desired because they are judged to be good, or vice versa. Normative speech and thought may ultimately be just a manifestation of our nature as intelligent animals motivated by contingent desires for various conflicting ends.
Janice L. Dowell
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199653492
- eISBN:
- 9780191741661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses three puzzles about practical conditionals and inferences and shows how the flexible, contextualist semantic framework for “ought”. The chapter develops elsewhere resolves all ...
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This chapter discusses three puzzles about practical conditionals and inferences and shows how the flexible, contextualist semantic framework for “ought”. The chapter develops elsewhere resolves all three puzzles more satisfactorily than any of its three most prominent rivals, the relativist account of Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane (2010), the wide-scoping account of John Broome (2004), and the “trying on” account of James Dreier (2009). The chapter first introduces the puzzle cases and six desiderata for their solutions, and then shows how only flexible contextualism about “ought” is able to resolve each while satisfying all six desiderata.Less
This chapter discusses three puzzles about practical conditionals and inferences and shows how the flexible, contextualist semantic framework for “ought”. The chapter develops elsewhere resolves all three puzzles more satisfactorily than any of its three most prominent rivals, the relativist account of Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane (2010), the wide-scoping account of John Broome (2004), and the “trying on” account of James Dreier (2009). The chapter first introduces the puzzle cases and six desiderata for their solutions, and then shows how only flexible contextualism about “ought” is able to resolve each while satisfying all six desiderata.
Alex Silk
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198805076
- eISBN:
- 9780191843174
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops a contextualist account of normative language, focusing on broadly normative readings of modal verbs. The account draws on a more general framework for implementing a ...
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This chapter develops a contextualist account of normative language, focusing on broadly normative readings of modal verbs. The account draws on a more general framework for implementing a contextualist semantics and pragmatics, Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the discourse properties of normative language from a contextualist interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with principles of interpretation and conversation. In using normative language, interlocutors can exploit their grammatical and world knowledge, and general pragmatic reasoning skills, to manage an evolving system of norms. Discourse Contextualism provides a perspicuous framework for further philosophical theorizing about the nature of normativity, normative language, and normative judgment. Delineating these issues can help refine our understanding of the space of overall theories and motivate more fruitful ways the dialectics may proceed. Discourse Contextualism provides a linguistic basis for a more comprehensive theory of normativity and normative discourse and practice.Less
This chapter develops a contextualist account of normative language, focusing on broadly normative readings of modal verbs. The account draws on a more general framework for implementing a contextualist semantics and pragmatics, Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the discourse properties of normative language from a contextualist interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with principles of interpretation and conversation. In using normative language, interlocutors can exploit their grammatical and world knowledge, and general pragmatic reasoning skills, to manage an evolving system of norms. Discourse Contextualism provides a perspicuous framework for further philosophical theorizing about the nature of normativity, normative language, and normative judgment. Delineating these issues can help refine our understanding of the space of overall theories and motivate more fruitful ways the dialectics may proceed. Discourse Contextualism provides a linguistic basis for a more comprehensive theory of normativity and normative discourse and practice.
Alex Silk
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198783923
- eISBN:
- 9780191826573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783923.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Chapter 5 begins to develop an improved contextualist account of normative language by applying the Discourse Contextualist framework to deontic modals. Though epistemic modals and deontic modals ...
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Chapter 5 begins to develop an improved contextualist account of normative language by applying the Discourse Contextualist framework to deontic modals. Though epistemic modals and deontic modals share many of the distinctive features that make them apt for a Discourse Contextualist treatment, they also differ in important respects. Discourse Contextualism illuminates crucial roles for normative language in discourse and deliberation. A Discourse Contextualist semantics and pragmatics provides a perspicuous framework for further theorizing about the nature of normativity and the distinctive practical character of normative language and judgment, as investigated in debates over realism, relativism, and noncognitivism in ethics/metaethics. The chapter concludes by briefly examining a second dimension of context-sensitivity with deontic modals: their information-sensitivity.Less
Chapter 5 begins to develop an improved contextualist account of normative language by applying the Discourse Contextualist framework to deontic modals. Though epistemic modals and deontic modals share many of the distinctive features that make them apt for a Discourse Contextualist treatment, they also differ in important respects. Discourse Contextualism illuminates crucial roles for normative language in discourse and deliberation. A Discourse Contextualist semantics and pragmatics provides a perspicuous framework for further theorizing about the nature of normativity and the distinctive practical character of normative language and judgment, as investigated in debates over realism, relativism, and noncognitivism in ethics/metaethics. The chapter concludes by briefly examining a second dimension of context-sensitivity with deontic modals: their information-sensitivity.
Alex Silk
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- February 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190640408
- eISBN:
- 9780190640439
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190640408.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter develops an account of the meaning and use of various types of legal claims, and uses this account to inform debates about the nature and normativity of law. The account draws on a ...
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This chapter develops an account of the meaning and use of various types of legal claims, and uses this account to inform debates about the nature and normativity of law. The account draws on a general framework for implementing a contextualist theory, called Discourse Contextualism (Silk 2015a, 2016, 2017). The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the apparent normativity of claims of law from a particular contextualist interpretation of a standard semantics for modals, along with general principles of interpretation and conversation. Though the semantics is descriptivist, it avoids Dworkin’s influential criticism of so-called “semantic theories of law,” and elucidates the nature of “theoretical disagreements” about the criteria of legal validity. The account sheds light on the social, interpersonal function of normative uses of language in legal discourse. It also gives precise expression to Hart’s and Raz’s intuitive distinctions among types of legal claims (internal/external, committed/detached). The proposed semantics and pragmatics of legal claims provides a fruitful framework for further theorizing about the nature and metaphysics of law, the relation between law and morality, and the apparent practical character of legal language and judgment. Discourse Contextualism provides a solid linguistic basis for a broader account of legal discourse and practice.Less
This chapter develops an account of the meaning and use of various types of legal claims, and uses this account to inform debates about the nature and normativity of law. The account draws on a general framework for implementing a contextualist theory, called Discourse Contextualism (Silk 2015a, 2016, 2017). The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the apparent normativity of claims of law from a particular contextualist interpretation of a standard semantics for modals, along with general principles of interpretation and conversation. Though the semantics is descriptivist, it avoids Dworkin’s influential criticism of so-called “semantic theories of law,” and elucidates the nature of “theoretical disagreements” about the criteria of legal validity. The account sheds light on the social, interpersonal function of normative uses of language in legal discourse. It also gives precise expression to Hart’s and Raz’s intuitive distinctions among types of legal claims (internal/external, committed/detached). The proposed semantics and pragmatics of legal claims provides a fruitful framework for further theorizing about the nature and metaphysics of law, the relation between law and morality, and the apparent practical character of legal language and judgment. Discourse Contextualism provides a solid linguistic basis for a broader account of legal discourse and practice.
Seth Yalcin
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198738831
- eISBN:
- 9780191802058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198738831.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
There is on the one hand the traditional speech act-theoretic notion of illocutionary force, and there is on the other hand the kind of notion of force we have in mind when we are theorizing in ...
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There is on the one hand the traditional speech act-theoretic notion of illocutionary force, and there is on the other hand the kind of notion of force we have in mind when we are theorizing in formal pragmatics about conversational states and their characteristic modes of update. These notions are different, and occur at different levels of abstraction.They are not helpfully viewed as in competition.The expressivist idea that normative language is distinctive in force can be developed in two sorts of directions, depending on which of the two senses of ’force’ is emphasized. I suggest expressivists do better to take the path stressing conversational update: they do better to start with the idea that normative discourse is distinctive in respect of its dynamic effect on the state of the conversation.Less
There is on the one hand the traditional speech act-theoretic notion of illocutionary force, and there is on the other hand the kind of notion of force we have in mind when we are theorizing in formal pragmatics about conversational states and their characteristic modes of update. These notions are different, and occur at different levels of abstraction.They are not helpfully viewed as in competition.The expressivist idea that normative language is distinctive in force can be developed in two sorts of directions, depending on which of the two senses of ’force’ is emphasized. I suggest expressivists do better to take the path stressing conversational update: they do better to start with the idea that normative discourse is distinctive in respect of its dynamic effect on the state of the conversation.
Ralph Wedgwood
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198802693
- eISBN:
- 9780191841972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Many philosophers working on normative issues follow the ‘Reasons First’ program. According to this program, the concept of a ‘normative reason’ for an action or an attitude is the most fundamental ...
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Many philosophers working on normative issues follow the ‘Reasons First’ program. According to this program, the concept of a ‘normative reason’ for an action or an attitude is the most fundamental normative concept, and all other normative and evaluative concepts can be defined in terms of this fundamental concept. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term ‘reason’ in English. The best explanation of the data relating to these concepts is that they can all be defined in terms of explanatory concepts and other normative or evaluative notions: for example, in one sense, a ‘reason’ for you to go is a fact that helps to explain why you ought to go, or why it is good for you to go. This implies that none of the concepts expressed by ‘reason’ is fundamental.Less
Many philosophers working on normative issues follow the ‘Reasons First’ program. According to this program, the concept of a ‘normative reason’ for an action or an attitude is the most fundamental normative concept, and all other normative and evaluative concepts can be defined in terms of this fundamental concept. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term ‘reason’ in English. The best explanation of the data relating to these concepts is that they can all be defined in terms of explanatory concepts and other normative or evaluative notions: for example, in one sense, a ‘reason’ for you to go is a fact that helps to explain why you ought to go, or why it is good for you to go. This implies that none of the concepts expressed by ‘reason’ is fundamental.
Matti Eklund
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672349
- eISBN:
- 9780191751325
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Moral Philosophy
This paper addresses the following two questions: (1) What it is for a linguistic expression or a concept to be evaluative (or normative)? (2) What it is for a property or a fact to be evaluative (or ...
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This paper addresses the following two questions: (1) What it is for a linguistic expression or a concept to be evaluative (or normative)? (2) What it is for a property or a fact to be evaluative (or normative)? The most natural answers to these two questions are discussed, and serious problems with these answers are stressed. Important in the discussion is consideration of different kinds of evaluative concepts – thin concepts, thick concepts and epithets. No particular positive view is defended. Instead two rather different positive views are highlighted: a view suggested by Ralph Wedgwood's recent work, and presentationalism, according to which evaluativeness is properly seen as a feature of our representations of reality and not reality itself.Less
This paper addresses the following two questions: (1) What it is for a linguistic expression or a concept to be evaluative (or normative)? (2) What it is for a property or a fact to be evaluative (or normative)? The most natural answers to these two questions are discussed, and serious problems with these answers are stressed. Important in the discussion is consideration of different kinds of evaluative concepts – thin concepts, thick concepts and epithets. No particular positive view is defended. Instead two rather different positive views are highlighted: a view suggested by Ralph Wedgwood's recent work, and presentationalism, according to which evaluativeness is properly seen as a feature of our representations of reality and not reality itself.
Stephen Finlay
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199347582
- eISBN:
- 9780199347605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Relational theories of normative language allegedly face special problems in accounting for the extent of disagreement, but this is everybody’s problem, because normative sentences are relativized to ...
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Relational theories of normative language allegedly face special problems in accounting for the extent of disagreement, but this is everybody’s problem, because normative sentences are relativized to different information in contexts of deliberation and advice. This chapter argues that a relational theory provides a pragmatic solution that accounts for some disagreements as involving inconsistent preferences rather than beliefs. This is shown to be superior to the semantic solution offered by expressivists like Allan Gibbard, as it accounts for a wider range of disagreements, explains a puzzling asymmetry, and avoids the expressivist’s problem with negation. This pragmatic account extends to fundamental disagreements involving preferences for different ends. Three different kinds of normative disagreement are distinguished: instrumental, rational, and outright.Less
Relational theories of normative language allegedly face special problems in accounting for the extent of disagreement, but this is everybody’s problem, because normative sentences are relativized to different information in contexts of deliberation and advice. This chapter argues that a relational theory provides a pragmatic solution that accounts for some disagreements as involving inconsistent preferences rather than beliefs. This is shown to be superior to the semantic solution offered by expressivists like Allan Gibbard, as it accounts for a wider range of disagreements, explains a puzzling asymmetry, and avoids the expressivist’s problem with negation. This pragmatic account extends to fundamental disagreements involving preferences for different ends. Three different kinds of normative disagreement are distinguished: instrumental, rational, and outright.
Alex Silk
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198783923
- eISBN:
- 9780191826573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783923.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book investigates context-sensitivity in natural language by examining the meaning and use of a target class of theoretically recalcitrant expressions. These expressions—including epistemic ...
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This book investigates context-sensitivity in natural language by examining the meaning and use of a target class of theoretically recalcitrant expressions. These expressions—including epistemic vocabulary, normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague language (“CR-expressions”)—exhibit systematic differences from paradigm context-sensitive expressions in their discourse dynamics and embedding properties. Many researchers have responded by rethinking the nature of linguistic meaning and communication. Drawing on general insights about the role of context in interpretation and collaborative action, this book develops an improved contextualist theory of CR-expressions within the classical truth-conditional paradigm: Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the distinctive linguistic behavior of a CR-expression from a particular contextualist interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with general principles of interpretation and conversation. It is shown how in using CR-expressions, speakers can exploit their mutual grammatical and world knowledge, and general pragmatic reasoning skills, to coordinate their attitudes and negotiate about how the context should evolve. The book focuses primarily on developing a Discourse Contextualist semantics and pragmatics for epistemic modals. The Discourse Contextualist framework is also applied to other categories of epistemic vocabulary, normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague adjectives. The similarities/differences among these expressions, and among context-sensitive expressions more generally, have been underexplored. The development of Discourse Contextualism in this book sheds light on general features of meaning and communication, and the variety of ways in which context affects and is affected by uses of language. Discourse Contextualism provides a fruitful framework for theorizing about various broader issues in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science.Less
This book investigates context-sensitivity in natural language by examining the meaning and use of a target class of theoretically recalcitrant expressions. These expressions—including epistemic vocabulary, normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague language (“CR-expressions”)—exhibit systematic differences from paradigm context-sensitive expressions in their discourse dynamics and embedding properties. Many researchers have responded by rethinking the nature of linguistic meaning and communication. Drawing on general insights about the role of context in interpretation and collaborative action, this book develops an improved contextualist theory of CR-expressions within the classical truth-conditional paradigm: Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the distinctive linguistic behavior of a CR-expression from a particular contextualist interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with general principles of interpretation and conversation. It is shown how in using CR-expressions, speakers can exploit their mutual grammatical and world knowledge, and general pragmatic reasoning skills, to coordinate their attitudes and negotiate about how the context should evolve. The book focuses primarily on developing a Discourse Contextualist semantics and pragmatics for epistemic modals. The Discourse Contextualist framework is also applied to other categories of epistemic vocabulary, normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague adjectives. The similarities/differences among these expressions, and among context-sensitive expressions more generally, have been underexplored. The development of Discourse Contextualism in this book sheds light on general features of meaning and communication, and the variety of ways in which context affects and is affected by uses of language. Discourse Contextualism provides a fruitful framework for theorizing about various broader issues in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science.
Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198805076
- eISBN:
- 9780191843174
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805076.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview ...
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This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this 12th volume cover moral imperatives as bodily imperatives; difficult cases and the epistemic justification of moral belief; moral testimony; non-naturalism and supervenience; the grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism; moral law; the puzzle of moral science; disagreement; normative language in context; using Frege–Geach to illuminate expressivism; expressivism and varieties of normality; and the predicament of choice.Less
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this 12th volume cover moral imperatives as bodily imperatives; difficult cases and the epistemic justification of moral belief; moral testimony; non-naturalism and supervenience; the grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism; moral law; the puzzle of moral science; disagreement; normative language in context; using Frege–Geach to illuminate expressivism; expressivism and varieties of normality; and the predicament of choice.
Ulrich Eigler
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198810810
- eISBN:
- 9780191847950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198810810.003.0025
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval, Poetry and Poets: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter argues that German translations of Virgil are the result of a complicated process, in which history of reception and history of translations move alongside one another. It explores the ...
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This chapter argues that German translations of Virgil are the result of a complicated process, in which history of reception and history of translations move alongside one another. It explores the interaction between translations of Virgil and translations of Homer, giving particular attention to the role of the authoritative translation of Homer by Johann Heinrich Voß. It demonstrates that the discourse on translations of Virgil since the eighteenth century is deeply entwined with literary, aesthetic, and political questions, which are closely entangled with the German struggle for unity and cultural identity. The chapter tries to show this by looking briefly at translations of the Aeneid beginning with Friedrich Schiller’s experimental work, focusing particularly on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.Less
This chapter argues that German translations of Virgil are the result of a complicated process, in which history of reception and history of translations move alongside one another. It explores the interaction between translations of Virgil and translations of Homer, giving particular attention to the role of the authoritative translation of Homer by Johann Heinrich Voß. It demonstrates that the discourse on translations of Virgil since the eighteenth century is deeply entwined with literary, aesthetic, and political questions, which are closely entangled with the German struggle for unity and cultural identity. The chapter tries to show this by looking briefly at translations of the Aeneid beginning with Friedrich Schiller’s experimental work, focusing particularly on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Robert C. Koons and Alexander Pruss
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198796572
- eISBN:
- 9780191837838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198796572.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Functionalism in the theory of mind requires an account of function that has a normative component—mere conditional connection (whether indicative or sub-junctive) is not enough. For instance, a ...
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Functionalism in the theory of mind requires an account of function that has a normative component—mere conditional connection (whether indicative or sub-junctive) is not enough. For instance, a component of a computing system isn’t an adder just in case its output is always or would always be the sum of the inputs, since any computing system in a world with as much indeterminism as ours can err or malfunction. Two general reductions of normative language have been proposed that one might wish to apply to the problem of defining proper function: the evolutionary reduction (Wright, Millikan) and the agential reduction (Plantinga). We argue that whatever the merits of the reductions in other contexts, a functionalist theory of mind that defines proper function in either of these ways must fail. The argument proceeds by first showing the agential reduction is viciously circular in the context of a functionalist theory of agency. Second, if functionalism about mind is true and proper function is reducible evolutionarily, then it is possible to have a situation in which the presence or absence of mental properties depends in an implausibly spooky, acausal way on remote facts. It is plausible that the only currently avail-able way for the functionalist to meet these challenges is to accept irreducible end-directed causal powers of minds and/or their functional parts, in accordance with a broadly Aristotelian tradition.Less
Functionalism in the theory of mind requires an account of function that has a normative component—mere conditional connection (whether indicative or sub-junctive) is not enough. For instance, a component of a computing system isn’t an adder just in case its output is always or would always be the sum of the inputs, since any computing system in a world with as much indeterminism as ours can err or malfunction. Two general reductions of normative language have been proposed that one might wish to apply to the problem of defining proper function: the evolutionary reduction (Wright, Millikan) and the agential reduction (Plantinga). We argue that whatever the merits of the reductions in other contexts, a functionalist theory of mind that defines proper function in either of these ways must fail. The argument proceeds by first showing the agential reduction is viciously circular in the context of a functionalist theory of agency. Second, if functionalism about mind is true and proper function is reducible evolutionarily, then it is possible to have a situation in which the presence or absence of mental properties depends in an implausibly spooky, acausal way on remote facts. It is plausible that the only currently avail-able way for the functionalist to meet these challenges is to accept irreducible end-directed causal powers of minds and/or their functional parts, in accordance with a broadly Aristotelian tradition.
