Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best ...
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This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best statements of such reasons will not employ moral concepts. The book investigates and explains the nature of reasons themselves; its account of how we come to know them combines an intuitionist epistemology with elements of Pyrrhonist scepticism. It defends a hedonistic theory of well-being and an account of practical reason according to which we can give some, though not overriding, priority to our own good over that of others. The book develops original lines of argument within a framework of some traditional but currently less popular views.Less
This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best statements of such reasons will not employ moral concepts. The book investigates and explains the nature of reasons themselves; its account of how we come to know them combines an intuitionist epistemology with elements of Pyrrhonist scepticism. It defends a hedonistic theory of well-being and an account of practical reason according to which we can give some, though not overriding, priority to our own good over that of others. The book develops original lines of argument within a framework of some traditional but currently less popular views.
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly ...
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In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into a dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. Their mutual dependence, claims Darwall, is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the centre of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics. In making his case, Darwall examines Moore's doctrine that an irreducible notion of intrinsic value is fundamental in ethics, and argues that although Moore was correct in thinking that ethical notions are irreducible, he was incorrect in thinking that this is because they have a notion of intrinsic value at their core. Rather, according to Darwall, the notion of a normative reason is ethically fundamental, and a proper philosophical ethics that fully accommodates the normativity involved in ethical thought and discourse will require that metaethical issues and normative issues bearing on normativity be ‘pursued interdependently as complementary aspects of a comprehensive philosophical ethics’. He illustrates this claim by explaining how certain debates within normative ethics over consequentialism and over virtue depend upon metaethical issues about the nature of normativity.Less
In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into a dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. Their mutual dependence, claims Darwall, is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the centre of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics. In making his case, Darwall examines Moore's doctrine that an irreducible notion of intrinsic value is fundamental in ethics, and argues that although Moore was correct in thinking that ethical notions are irreducible, he was incorrect in thinking that this is because they have a notion of intrinsic value at their core. Rather, according to Darwall, the notion of a normative reason is ethically fundamental, and a proper philosophical ethics that fully accommodates the normativity involved in ethical thought and discourse will require that metaethical issues and normative issues bearing on normativity be ‘pursued interdependently as complementary aspects of a comprehensive philosophical ethics’. He illustrates this claim by explaining how certain debates within normative ethics over consequentialism and over virtue depend upon metaethical issues about the nature of normativity.
Stephen Darwall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
In the first chapter of Principia Ethica, ‘The Subject-Matter of Ethics’, Moore spends the first four sections explaining his conception of the field of ethics. In these passages, he refers to an ...
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In the first chapter of Principia Ethica, ‘The Subject-Matter of Ethics’, Moore spends the first four sections explaining his conception of the field of ethics. In these passages, he refers to an ‘ideal of ethical science’ (56) which he divides into two main parts. First, there are semantic and related metaphysical questions about the meanings of moral terms (and the concepts they express) and, second, there are questions about what sorts of items possess the properties which moral terms denote. Two theses emerge from Moore's discussion of the subject matter of ethics. First is the independence thesis, according to which semantic and related metaphysical questions — questions of metaethics — can be pursued independently of and are properly prior to enquiry into substantive matters about the kinds of items that are good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious. Second, Moore holds a certain primacy thesis, according to which the concept of goodness (and badness) is more fundamental than and can be used to define the concepts of rightness (and wrongness) and virtue (and vice). Thus, for Moore, the study of ethics, properly conducted, should begin with an enquiry focused on the concept of goodness. This chapter challenges both the claims of independence and priority. It argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. This mutual dependence is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the center of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics.Less
In the first chapter of Principia Ethica, ‘The Subject-Matter of Ethics’, Moore spends the first four sections explaining his conception of the field of ethics. In these passages, he refers to an ‘ideal of ethical science’ (56) which he divides into two main parts. First, there are semantic and related metaphysical questions about the meanings of moral terms (and the concepts they express) and, second, there are questions about what sorts of items possess the properties which moral terms denote. Two theses emerge from Moore's discussion of the subject matter of ethics. First is the independence thesis, according to which semantic and related metaphysical questions — questions of metaethics — can be pursued independently of and are properly prior to enquiry into substantive matters about the kinds of items that are good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious. Second, Moore holds a certain primacy thesis, according to which the concept of goodness (and badness) is more fundamental than and can be used to define the concepts of rightness (and wrongness) and virtue (and vice). Thus, for Moore, the study of ethics, properly conducted, should begin with an enquiry focused on the concept of goodness. This chapter challenges both the claims of independence and priority. It argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. This mutual dependence is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the center of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics.
Thomas E. Hill Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199692002
- eISBN:
- 9780191741241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692002.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? This chapter first reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical ...
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What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? This chapter first reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical distinction, general features of constructivism, and earlier versions of Kantian constructivism described by Rawls, O’Neill, and Hill. The chapter then highlights features of the normative ethical theory that Kant developed in his late work, the Doctrine of Virtue (The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II), proposing that this can be viewed as a normative ethical theory with constructivist features separable from the more ambitious metaethical claims in the prominent Kantian constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill. When interpreted in this way the Doctrine of Virtue fits well with the constructivist normative theory suggested by Kant’s later formulations of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork. Finally, the chapter responds to some of Onora O’Neill’s objections to partially similar constructivisms proposed by Rawls.Less
What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? This chapter first reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical distinction, general features of constructivism, and earlier versions of Kantian constructivism described by Rawls, O’Neill, and Hill. The chapter then highlights features of the normative ethical theory that Kant developed in his late work, the Doctrine of Virtue (The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II), proposing that this can be viewed as a normative ethical theory with constructivist features separable from the more ambitious metaethical claims in the prominent Kantian constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill. When interpreted in this way the Doctrine of Virtue fits well with the constructivist normative theory suggested by Kant’s later formulations of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork. Finally, the chapter responds to some of Onora O’Neill’s objections to partially similar constructivisms proposed by Rawls.
David Cummiskey
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195094534
- eISBN:
- 9780199833146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195094530.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or ...
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Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.Less
Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.
Ian Ravenscroft (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267989
- eISBN:
- 9780191708268
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A line-up of seventeen philosophers from the USA, the UK, and Australia present new essays on themes from the work of Frank Jackson, which bridges mind, language, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. ...
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A line-up of seventeen philosophers from the USA, the UK, and Australia present new essays on themes from the work of Frank Jackson, which bridges mind, language, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Central to Jackson's work is an approach to metaphysical issues built on the twin foundations of supervenience and conceptual analysis. In the first part of the book, six essays examine this approach and its application to philosophy of mind and philosophy of colour. The second part focuses on Jackson's highly influential work on phenomenal consciousness. The third part is devoted to Jackson's work in ethics, both normative ethics and metaethics. The last three papers discuss Jackson's ground-breaking work on conditionals. The final section of the book comprises a substantial essay by Jackson in reply to his critics: this offers some of the clearest expressions of the ideas which Jackson has brought to the fore in philosophy.Less
A line-up of seventeen philosophers from the USA, the UK, and Australia present new essays on themes from the work of Frank Jackson, which bridges mind, language, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Central to Jackson's work is an approach to metaphysical issues built on the twin foundations of supervenience and conceptual analysis. In the first part of the book, six essays examine this approach and its application to philosophy of mind and philosophy of colour. The second part focuses on Jackson's highly influential work on phenomenal consciousness. The third part is devoted to Jackson's work in ethics, both normative ethics and metaethics. The last three papers discuss Jackson's ground-breaking work on conditionals. The final section of the book comprises a substantial essay by Jackson in reply to his critics: this offers some of the clearest expressions of the ideas which Jackson has brought to the fore in philosophy.
David Copp
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in ...
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This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections.Less
This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections.
Rosalind Hursthouse
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752349
- eISBN:
- 9780191597251
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752342.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Shows that virtue ethics can specify right action and defends the view that the sort of practical guidance it provides accommodates several conditions of adequacy that any normative ethics should ...
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Shows that virtue ethics can specify right action and defends the view that the sort of practical guidance it provides accommodates several conditions of adequacy that any normative ethics should meet. It is argued that (1) it generates an account of moral education, (2) it incorporates the view that moral wisdom cannot simply be acquired from textbooks, and (3) it can resolve resolvable dilemmas or moral conflicts but is not committed in advance to there being no such things as irresolvable dilemmas.Less
Shows that virtue ethics can specify right action and defends the view that the sort of practical guidance it provides accommodates several conditions of adequacy that any normative ethics should meet. It is argued that (1) it generates an account of moral education, (2) it incorporates the view that moral wisdom cannot simply be acquired from textbooks, and (3) it can resolve resolvable dilemmas or moral conflicts but is not committed in advance to there being no such things as irresolvable dilemmas.
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory is a major new reference work in ethical theory, consisting of commissioned essays by leading moral philosophers. The handbook is divided into two parts, ...
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The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory is a major new reference work in ethical theory, consisting of commissioned essays by leading moral philosophers. The handbook is divided into two parts, mirroring the field. The first part treats meta-ethical theory, which deals with theoretical questions about morality and moral judgment, including questions about moral language, the epistemology of moral belief, the truth aptness of moral claims, and so forth. The second part addresses normative theory, which deals with general moral issues, including the plausibility of various ethical theories and abstract principles of behavior. Examples of such theories are consequentialism and virtue theory. The introduction and twenty-two chapters cover the field in a comprehensive and highly accessible way, while achieving three goals: exposition of central ideas, criticism of other approaches, and putting forth a distinct viewpoint.Less
The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory is a major new reference work in ethical theory, consisting of commissioned essays by leading moral philosophers. The handbook is divided into two parts, mirroring the field. The first part treats meta-ethical theory, which deals with theoretical questions about morality and moral judgment, including questions about moral language, the epistemology of moral belief, the truth aptness of moral claims, and so forth. The second part addresses normative theory, which deals with general moral issues, including the plausibility of various ethical theories and abstract principles of behavior. Examples of such theories are consequentialism and virtue theory. The introduction and twenty-two chapters cover the field in a comprehensive and highly accessible way, while achieving three goals: exposition of central ideas, criticism of other approaches, and putting forth a distinct viewpoint.
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693269
- eISBN:
- 9780191732058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? First this paper reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical ...
More
What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? First this paper reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical distinction, general features of constructivism, and the versions of Kantian constructivism described by Rawls, O’Neill, and Hill. It then highlights features of the normative ethical theory that Kant developed in his late work, the Doctrine of Virtue (The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II), proposing that this can be viewed as a normative ethical theory with constructivist features separable from the more ambitious metaethical claims in the prominent Kantian constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill. When interpreted in this way the Doctrine of Virtue fits well with the constructivist normative theory that earlier the author drew from Kant’s later formulations of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork. Finally, the paper responds to some of O’Neill’s objections to Rawls’ constructivisms that would apply as well to the author’s project.Less
What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? First this paper reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical distinction, general features of constructivism, and the versions of Kantian constructivism described by Rawls, O’Neill, and Hill. It then highlights features of the normative ethical theory that Kant developed in his late work, the Doctrine of Virtue (The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II), proposing that this can be viewed as a normative ethical theory with constructivist features separable from the more ambitious metaethical claims in the prominent Kantian constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill. When interpreted in this way the Doctrine of Virtue fits well with the constructivist normative theory that earlier the author drew from Kant’s later formulations of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork. Finally, the paper responds to some of O’Neill’s objections to Rawls’ constructivisms that would apply as well to the author’s project.
David Cummiskey
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195094534
- eISBN:
- 9780199833146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195094530.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Kant's moral theory is focused primarily on the justification of normative principles and the nature of moral motivation, reasons, and principles. Kant's own normative ethics, of course, is not ...
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Kant's moral theory is focused primarily on the justification of normative principles and the nature of moral motivation, reasons, and principles. Kant's own normative ethics, of course, is not consequentialist, and indeed Kant argues at length against empiricist, utilitarian approaches to ethics. The question, however, is whether he actually provides a nonconsequentialist justification of deontological intuitions or individual rights. I argue that, contrary to widespread philosophical opinion, Kant simply does not consider, and thus does not reject, a consequentialist interpretation of the moral law or categorical imperative. Furthermore, once we distinguish the justification of normative principle from the principle itself, Kant's rationalist, internalist approach to justification seems to be compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, we see that the key to the rejection of consequentialism is the justification of basic agent‐centered constraints. The introductory chapter also provides a comment on rational reconstruction as a form of textual interpretation and an overview and summary of the book's argument.Less
Kant's moral theory is focused primarily on the justification of normative principles and the nature of moral motivation, reasons, and principles. Kant's own normative ethics, of course, is not consequentialist, and indeed Kant argues at length against empiricist, utilitarian approaches to ethics. The question, however, is whether he actually provides a nonconsequentialist justification of deontological intuitions or individual rights. I argue that, contrary to widespread philosophical opinion, Kant simply does not consider, and thus does not reject, a consequentialist interpretation of the moral law or categorical imperative. Furthermore, once we distinguish the justification of normative principle from the principle itself, Kant's rationalist, internalist approach to justification seems to be compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, we see that the key to the rejection of consequentialism is the justification of basic agent‐centered constraints. The introductory chapter also provides a comment on rational reconstruction as a form of textual interpretation and an overview and summary of the book's argument.
Thomas E. Hill Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199692002
- eISBN:
- 9780191741241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692002.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative express basic requirements to universalize our maxims, respect humanity as an end in itself, and conform to the more specific moral principles that ...
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Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative express basic requirements to universalize our maxims, respect humanity as an end in itself, and conform to the more specific moral principles that we do or would will as rational persons with autonomy. Kantians disagree about the interpretation and relative importance of these various formulations, but most now agree that, although they provide no algorithms, the formulations can be helpful in guiding moral deliberation and judgment. This chapter explains the basic features of the formulations, reviews different interpretations, and notes various problems that each formulation raises. Views of Alan Donagan, Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, H.J. Paton, Thomas Pogge, John Rawls, and Allen Wood are reviewed briefly A primary aim is to call attention to the different ways in which contemporary Kantians have attempted to develop Kant’s normative ethics. A secondary aim is to show how Kantian ethics, under different interpretations, addresses the question when and why we are morally required to help others. Kant’s theory is justly famous for its insistence that pursuit of happiness, for oneself and others, is constrained by moral requirements of justice and respect for human dignity. Kant also argues, however, that it is categorically imperative for us to make it our maxim to promote the happiness of others. It is currently a matter of controversy how much latitude this requirement is supposed to leave us to pursue non-obligatory projects of our own. Focusing on beneficence to illustrate various contemporary developments in Kantian ethical theory helps to bring out similarities and differences among them and may reveal some relative strengths and weaknesses.Less
Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative express basic requirements to universalize our maxims, respect humanity as an end in itself, and conform to the more specific moral principles that we do or would will as rational persons with autonomy. Kantians disagree about the interpretation and relative importance of these various formulations, but most now agree that, although they provide no algorithms, the formulations can be helpful in guiding moral deliberation and judgment. This chapter explains the basic features of the formulations, reviews different interpretations, and notes various problems that each formulation raises. Views of Alan Donagan, Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, H.J. Paton, Thomas Pogge, John Rawls, and Allen Wood are reviewed briefly A primary aim is to call attention to the different ways in which contemporary Kantians have attempted to develop Kant’s normative ethics. A secondary aim is to show how Kantian ethics, under different interpretations, addresses the question when and why we are morally required to help others. Kant’s theory is justly famous for its insistence that pursuit of happiness, for oneself and others, is constrained by moral requirements of justice and respect for human dignity. Kant also argues, however, that it is categorically imperative for us to make it our maxim to promote the happiness of others. It is currently a matter of controversy how much latitude this requirement is supposed to leave us to pursue non-obligatory projects of our own. Focusing on beneficence to illustrate various contemporary developments in Kantian ethical theory helps to bring out similarities and differences among them and may reveal some relative strengths and weaknesses.
Andrew Mein
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199291397
- eISBN:
- 9780191700620
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291397.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
There is substantial disagreement between scholars about what the proper focus for the study of ‘Hebrew Bible Ethics’ or ‘Old Testament Ethics’ should be. The subject of ethics in ancient Israel and ...
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There is substantial disagreement between scholars about what the proper focus for the study of ‘Hebrew Bible Ethics’ or ‘Old Testament Ethics’ should be. The subject of ethics in ancient Israel and the Hebrew Bible is a difficult one to enter for a number of reasons. For example, there is considerable uncertainty about what we mean when we use an expression like ‘the ethics of the Hebrew Bible’. Are we interested in the beliefs of all or most ancient Israelites, the views of certain biblical authors, or indeed the ethical outlook of the whole Hebrew Bible? This chapter discusses ancient Israelite ethics in a social context, descriptive ethics and normative ethics, moral horizons and social groups, social stratification and moral worlds, and the social location of biblical literature.Less
There is substantial disagreement between scholars about what the proper focus for the study of ‘Hebrew Bible Ethics’ or ‘Old Testament Ethics’ should be. The subject of ethics in ancient Israel and the Hebrew Bible is a difficult one to enter for a number of reasons. For example, there is considerable uncertainty about what we mean when we use an expression like ‘the ethics of the Hebrew Bible’. Are we interested in the beliefs of all or most ancient Israelites, the views of certain biblical authors, or indeed the ethical outlook of the whole Hebrew Bible? This chapter discusses ancient Israelite ethics in a social context, descriptive ethics and normative ethics, moral horizons and social groups, social stratification and moral worlds, and the social location of biblical literature.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195312942
- eISBN:
- 9780199851188
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195312942.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Normative ethics has traditionally considered chiefly three related questions. First, the character question: what is a morally good person? More specifically, what character traits are moral ...
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Normative ethics has traditionally considered chiefly three related questions. First, the character question: what is a morally good person? More specifically, what character traits are moral virtues? Second, the conduct question: What do people need to do, especially in distributing benefits and burdens and in regulating conduct? Third, the value question: What things in life are good as ends, worth seeking for their own sake and not just as means to something else? One's view of these goods largely determines the kind and content of the education one supports. This chapter examines four kinds of normative view that derive, respectively, from stress on these three practical questions: the questions of the kind of character people should have, of what deeds they should do, and of what in human life is good.Less
Normative ethics has traditionally considered chiefly three related questions. First, the character question: what is a morally good person? More specifically, what character traits are moral virtues? Second, the conduct question: What do people need to do, especially in distributing benefits and burdens and in regulating conduct? Third, the value question: What things in life are good as ends, worth seeking for their own sake and not just as means to something else? One's view of these goods largely determines the kind and content of the education one supports. This chapter examines four kinds of normative view that derive, respectively, from stress on these three practical questions: the questions of the kind of character people should have, of what deeds they should do, and of what in human life is good.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391442
- eISBN:
- 9780199866250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter focuses on the notion/phenomenon of empathy. It clarifies what we nowadays mean when we talk about empathy, but it also explains how the recent literature of psychology bears on moral ...
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This chapter focuses on the notion/phenomenon of empathy. It clarifies what we nowadays mean when we talk about empathy, but it also explains how the recent literature of psychology bears on moral sentimentalism. In particular, it shows how that literature supports the conclusion that empathy plays a crucial role in developing and sustaining genuinely altruistic, caring motivation. This chapter also points out the ways in which the moral distinctions we commonsensically make generally correspond to normal differences in empathic responsiveness. This moves us in the direction of the central idea that empathy plays a role in our understanding, and in the semantics, of moral claims.Less
This chapter focuses on the notion/phenomenon of empathy. It clarifies what we nowadays mean when we talk about empathy, but it also explains how the recent literature of psychology bears on moral sentimentalism. In particular, it shows how that literature supports the conclusion that empathy plays a crucial role in developing and sustaining genuinely altruistic, caring motivation. This chapter also points out the ways in which the moral distinctions we commonsensically make generally correspond to normal differences in empathic responsiveness. This moves us in the direction of the central idea that empathy plays a role in our understanding, and in the semantics, of moral claims.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391442
- eISBN:
- 9780199866250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter moves into normative ethics and focuses in particular on issues and concepts that relate to larger social issues. It talks about the moral issues that surround paternalism and patriarchy ...
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This chapter moves into normative ethics and focuses in particular on issues and concepts that relate to larger social issues. It talks about the moral issues that surround paternalism and patriarchy and argues that respect and autonomy can both be understood in purely sentimentalist terms.Less
This chapter moves into normative ethics and focuses in particular on issues and concepts that relate to larger social issues. It talks about the moral issues that surround paternalism and patriarchy and argues that respect and autonomy can both be understood in purely sentimentalist terms.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238775
- eISBN:
- 9780191598005
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238770.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
McGinn argues that there are important ethical questions, such as the moral psychology of evil, which are unsuited to study according to the bipartite division of contemporary analytic moral ...
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McGinn argues that there are important ethical questions, such as the moral psychology of evil, which are unsuited to study according to the bipartite division of contemporary analytic moral philosophy into metaethics and normative ethics. McGinn's thesis is that the best way to approach such problems is by appealing to literature, which presents ideal conditions for the study of moral character. McGinn is also interested in the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, and in whether ethical questions might be explicable in terms of aesthetics. However, before turning to these topics, McGinn presents, in chapters 2 and 3, an analytical discussion of ethical knowledge in which he defends an objectivist or ‘cognitivist’ view of moral truth.Less
McGinn argues that there are important ethical questions, such as the moral psychology of evil, which are unsuited to study according to the bipartite division of contemporary analytic moral philosophy into metaethics and normative ethics. McGinn's thesis is that the best way to approach such problems is by appealing to literature, which presents ideal conditions for the study of moral character. McGinn is also interested in the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, and in whether ethical questions might be explicable in terms of aesthetics. However, before turning to these topics, McGinn presents, in chapters 2 and 3, an analytical discussion of ethical knowledge in which he defends an objectivist or ‘cognitivist’ view of moral truth.
Daniel Star
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693269
- eISBN:
- 9780191732058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This paper introduces a two level account of moral thinking that, unlike the alternatives, is able to do justice to three very plausible propositions that seem to form an inconsistent triad: (1) ...
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This paper introduces a two level account of moral thinking that, unlike the alternatives, is able to do justice to three very plausible propositions that seem to form an inconsistent triad: (1) people can be morally virtuous without the aid of philosophy; (2) morally virtuous people non-accidentally act for good reasons, and work out what it is that they ought to do on the basis of considering such reasons; and (3) philosophers engaged in the project of normative ethics are not wasting their time when they search after highly general moral principles which could not be discovered through non-philosophical thinking, and which specify the good reasons that virtuous people act on, as well as provide a criterion or criteria for determining what it is that people ought to do. In order to reconcile all three of these claims it is arguably necessary to adopt a particular way of thinking about virtue, as well as a particular two-level account of reasons (reasons as evidence).Less
This paper introduces a two level account of moral thinking that, unlike the alternatives, is able to do justice to three very plausible propositions that seem to form an inconsistent triad: (1) people can be morally virtuous without the aid of philosophy; (2) morally virtuous people non-accidentally act for good reasons, and work out what it is that they ought to do on the basis of considering such reasons; and (3) philosophers engaged in the project of normative ethics are not wasting their time when they search after highly general moral principles which could not be discovered through non-philosophical thinking, and which specify the good reasons that virtuous people act on, as well as provide a criterion or criteria for determining what it is that people ought to do. In order to reconcile all three of these claims it is arguably necessary to adopt a particular way of thinking about virtue, as well as a particular two-level account of reasons (reasons as evidence).
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391442
- eISBN:
- 9780199866250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter goes on to discuss justice. It shows how an ethics of care based on our understanding of how empathy operates can deal plausibly with issues of basic rights and liberties and issues of ...
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This chapter goes on to discuss justice. It shows how an ethics of care based on our understanding of how empathy operates can deal plausibly with issues of basic rights and liberties and issues of economic distribution (both within society and internationally). Such sentimentalism founds its ideas about justice on a different basis from that which any form of rationalism would appeal to, but on such a differing and sentimentalist basis, it can in fact deal with the entire range of issues that any systematic approach to social/moral issues will want to discuss.Less
This chapter goes on to discuss justice. It shows how an ethics of care based on our understanding of how empathy operates can deal plausibly with issues of basic rights and liberties and issues of economic distribution (both within society and internationally). Such sentimentalism founds its ideas about justice on a different basis from that which any form of rationalism would appeal to, but on such a differing and sentimentalist basis, it can in fact deal with the entire range of issues that any systematic approach to social/moral issues will want to discuss.
Jesse J. Prinz
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199571543
- eISBN:
- 9780191702075
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571543.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Friedrich Nietzsche is sometimes called a moral nihilist, and not without warrant. He wanted to undermine Christian morality, but he did not want to eliminate morality altogether. He wanted to ...
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Friedrich Nietzsche is sometimes called a moral nihilist, and not without warrant. He wanted to undermine Christian morality, but he did not want to eliminate morality altogether. He wanted to replace existing values with better values. If every moral system is a cultural construction, and none has greater claim to absolute truth, what grounds do we have for saying any one system is better than any other? There are two kinds of moral nihilism. According to the first, all moral systems are empty: the claims they make are false. Error theories of morality are nihilistic in this sense. Morality is an illusion, but moral claims can be true. Our current values seem to be an improvement over the values of the past, and moral humility leads us to hope for continued improvement. If moral truth is shallow, then moral change is not a move forward, but a lateral repositioning in a space of equally acceptable options. This is a nihilism of directionless abundance.Less
Friedrich Nietzsche is sometimes called a moral nihilist, and not without warrant. He wanted to undermine Christian morality, but he did not want to eliminate morality altogether. He wanted to replace existing values with better values. If every moral system is a cultural construction, and none has greater claim to absolute truth, what grounds do we have for saying any one system is better than any other? There are two kinds of moral nihilism. According to the first, all moral systems are empty: the claims they make are false. Error theories of morality are nihilistic in this sense. Morality is an illusion, but moral claims can be true. Our current values seem to be an improvement over the values of the past, and moral humility leads us to hope for continued improvement. If moral truth is shallow, then moral change is not a move forward, but a lateral repositioning in a space of equally acceptable options. This is a nihilism of directionless abundance.
