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In the first chapter of Principia Ethica, ‘The Subject-Matter of Ethics’, Moore spends the first four sections explaining his conception of the field of ethics. In these passages, he refers to an ‘ideal of ethical science’ (56) which he divides into two main parts. First, there are semantic and related metaphysical questions about the meanings of moral terms (and the concepts they express) and, second, there are questions about what sorts of items possess the properties which moral terms denote. Two theses emerge from Moore's discussion of the subject matter of ethics. First is the independence thesis, according to which semantic and related metaphysical questions — questions of metaethics — can be pursued independently of and are properly prior to enquiry into substantive matters about the kinds of items that are good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious. Second, Moore holds a certain primacy thesis, according to which the concept of goodness (and badness) is more fundamental than and can be used to define the concepts of rightness (and wrongness) and virtue (and vice). Thus, for Moore, the study of ethics, properly conducted, should begin with an enquiry focused on the concept of goodness. This chapter challenges both the claims of independence and priority. It argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. This mutual dependence is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the center of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics.

What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? This chapter first reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical distinction, general features of constructivism, and earlier versions of Kantian constructivism described by Rawls, O’Neill, and Hill. The chapter then highlights features of the normative ethical theory that Kant developed in his late work, the Doctrine of Virtue (The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II), proposing that this can be viewed as a normative ethical theory with constructivist features separable from the more ambitious metaethical claims in the prominent Kantian constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill. When interpreted in this way the Doctrine of Virtue fits well with the constructivist normative theory suggested by Kant’s later formulations of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork. Finally, the chapter responds to some of Onora O’Neill’s objections to partially similar constructivisms proposed by Rawls.

This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections.

What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? First this paper reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical distinction, general features of constructivism, and the versions of Kantian constructivism described by Rawls, O’Neill, and Hill. It then highlights features of the normative ethical theory that Kant developed in his late work, the Doctrine of Virtue (The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II), proposing that this can be viewed as a normative ethical theory with constructivist features separable from the more ambitious metaethical claims in the prominent Kantian constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill. When interpreted in this way the Doctrine of Virtue fits well with the constructivist normative theory that earlier the author drew from Kant’s later formulations of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork. Finally, the paper responds to some of O’Neill’s objections to Rawls’ constructivisms that would apply as well to the author’s project.

Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative express basic requirements to universalize our maxims, respect humanity as an end in itself, and conform to the more specific moral principles that we do or would will as rational persons with autonomy. Kantians disagree about the interpretation and relative importance of these various formulations, but most now agree that, although they provide no algorithms, the formulations can be helpful in guiding moral deliberation and judgment. This chapter explains the basic features of the formulations, reviews different interpretations, and notes various problems that each formulation raises. Views of Alan Donagan, Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, H.J. Paton, Thomas Pogge, John Rawls, and Allen Wood are reviewed briefly A primary aim is to call attention to the different ways in which contemporary Kantians have attempted to develop Kant’s normative ethics. A secondary aim is to show how Kantian ethics, under different interpretations, addresses the question when and why we are morally required to help others. Kant’s theory is justly famous for its insistence that pursuit of happiness, for oneself and others, is constrained by moral requirements of justice and respect for human dignity. Kant also argues, however, that it is categorically imperative for us to make it our maxim to promote the happiness of others. It is currently a matter of controversy how much latitude this requirement is supposed to leave us to pursue non-obligatory projects of our own. Focusing on beneficence to illustrate various contemporary developments in Kantian ethical theory helps to bring out similarities and differences among them and may reveal some relative strengths and weaknesses.

There is substantial disagreement between scholars about what the proper focus for the study of ‘Hebrew Bible Ethics’ or ‘Old Testament Ethics’ should be. The subject of ethics in ancient Israel and the Hebrew Bible is a difficult one to enter for a number of reasons. For example, there is considerable uncertainty about what we mean when we use an expression like ‘the ethics of the Hebrew Bible’. Are we interested in the beliefs of all or most ancient Israelites, the views of certain biblical authors, or indeed the ethical outlook of the whole Hebrew Bible? This chapter discusses ancient Israelite ethics in a social context, descriptive ethics and normative ethics, moral horizons and social groups, social stratification and moral worlds, and the social location of biblical literature.

This chapter focuses on the notion/phenomenon of empathy. It clarifies what we nowadays mean when we talk about empathy, but it also explains how the recent literature of psychology bears on moral sentimentalism. In particular, it shows how that literature supports the conclusion that empathy plays a crucial role in developing and sustaining genuinely altruistic, caring motivation. This chapter also points out the ways in which the moral distinctions we commonsensically make generally correspond to normal differences in empathic responsiveness. This moves us in the direction of the central idea that empathy plays a role in our understanding, and in the semantics, of moral claims.

Normative ethics has traditionally considered chiefly three related questions. First, the character question: what is a morally good person? More specifically, what character traits are moral virtues? Second, the conduct question: What do people need to do, especially in distributing benefits and burdens and in regulating conduct? Third, the value question: What things in life are good as ends, worth seeking for their own sake and not just as means to something else? One's view of these goods largely determines the kind and content of the education one supports. This chapter examines four kinds of normative view that derive, respectively, from stress on these three practical questions: the questions of the kind of character people should have, of what deeds they should do, and of what in human life is good.

This chapter moves into normative ethics and focuses in particular on issues and concepts that relate to larger social issues. It talks about the moral issues that surround paternalism and patriarchy and argues that respect and autonomy can both be understood in purely sentimentalist terms.

This paper introduces a two level account of moral thinking that, unlike the alternatives, is able to do justice to three very plausible propositions that seem to form an inconsistent triad: (1) people can be morally virtuous without the aid of philosophy; (2) morally virtuous people non-accidentally act for good reasons, and work out what it is that they ought to do on the basis of considering such reasons; and (3) philosophers engaged in the project of normative ethics are not wasting their time when they search after highly general moral principles which could not be discovered through non-philosophical thinking, and which specify the good reasons that virtuous people act on, as well as provide a criterion or criteria for determining what it is that people ought to do. In order to reconcile all three of these claims it is arguably necessary to adopt a particular way of thinking about virtue, as well as a particular two-level account of reasons (reasons as evidence).

This chapter goes on to discuss justice. It shows how an ethics of care based on our understanding of how empathy operates can deal plausibly with issues of basic rights and liberties and issues of economic distribution (both within society and internationally). Such sentimentalism founds its ideas about justice on a different basis from that which any form of rationalism would appeal to, but on such a differing and sentimentalist basis, it can in fact deal with the entire range of issues that any systematic approach to social/moral issues will want to discuss.

Friedrich Nietzsche is sometimes called a moral nihilist, and not without warrant. He wanted to undermine Christian morality, but he did not want to eliminate morality altogether. He wanted to replace existing values with better values. If every moral system is a cultural construction, and none has greater claim to absolute truth, what grounds do we have for saying any one system is better than any other? There are two kinds of moral nihilism. According to the first, all moral systems are empty: the claims they make are false. Error theories of morality are nihilistic in this sense. Morality is an illusion, but moral claims can be true. Our current values seem to be an improvement over the values of the past, and moral humility leads us to hope for continued improvement. If moral truth is shallow, then moral change is not a move forward, but a lateral repositioning in a space of equally acceptable options. This is a nihilism of directionless abundance.