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This chapter discusses how to explain the relation between ascriptions of belief and intention, and statements ascribing the corresponding implication or means-end commitments. Dispositionalism about propositional attitudes must explain the link in terms of principles connecting a non-normative attitude ascription with a normative commitment. It is argued that such explanations are unsatisfactory because they cannot do justice to the peculiar character of our relation to our own current intentions and beliefs. Under dispositionalism, it would be possible to adopt a purely contemplative attitude to our current intentions and beliefs just as it is possible to adopt such an attitude to our character traits. Such an attitude to our current beliefs and intentions is not intelligible and we can make better sense of how we stand in relation to those beliefs and intentions if we assume that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions are implicitly normative.

We respect certain epistemic norms — including (roughly) that one should tentatively believe things to have the colors they seem to have, should conform to modus ponens and the principle of non-contradiction, and should reason in accord with induction. But what could make these (or certain alternative norms, perhaps) the right ones? What could explain their correctness? This chapter scrutinizes the most commonly offered answers to this question. Special attention is devoted to the ‘semantogenetic’ strategy whereby the correctness of such norms is grounded in the meaning-engendering features of words. (For example, it's sometimes said that the axioms of arithmetic should be accepted because they implicitly define the primitive arithmetical terms). But amongst the competing strategies briefly examined here are proposals that invoke rational intuition, those that are militantly internalistic, those that prioritize considerations of reliability, and those that aim to ground the facts of epistemic rationality ‘constructively’ in normative commitments implicit in our linguistic activity. It is argued that none of these approaches is remotely adequate. And it is suggested, in conclusion, both that the correctness of the above-mentioned norms cannot be explained, and that this result should be neither surprising nor worrying.

The introduction introduces the problem of accounting for the rationality of scientific paradigm shifts that motivates the book, sketches the solution proposed, and briefly outlines the chapters to come. To replace a scientific framework rationally requires deeming it sufficiently wanting to merit seeking an alternative. But how can one’s scientific norms and standards be found scientifically wanting if it is by means of them that one scientifically appraises? The solution turns on the difference between self-criticism and exposure to external criticism, which at times can destabilize a norm sufficiently, and render those committed to it sufficiently ambivalent to take a critical stand. The Introduction briefly indicates how this works in science, and outlines the case study detailed in the final three chapters.

The interlude recaptures the philosophical argument of the last four chapters and explains the nature of the case study in the three to come. First the difference between the view of rationality here employed and that of the game theoretic variety is argued for. The latter it is claimed is not about acting rationally, but about deeming an act beneficial in retrospect. It is therefore not about human agency or judgment at all. A brief summary follows of how the philosophical chapters proposed to contend with the problem of accounting for the rationality of framework transitions in science while remaining faithful to critical rationalism even when it is applied reflectively to the framework it presupposes in criticism, yet without diluting that framework or the seriousness of the commitment it commands, as in Friedman’s account.

Disciplinary understanding is answerable to normative and methodological demands. This raises the question whether a work in one discipline can also belong to another. Can works of art, functioning as such, satisfy the demands of history? If so, they provide a historical understanding of their subject.

The first part of this chapter builds on the previous two by showing how commentators attacked one another not only from the safety of their written texts but also face to face, during commentary sessions on the canonical hadith compilation Sahih al-Bukhari in the presence of the political and judicial elite at the citadel during Ramadan. That commentary was delivered live meant that performances of memory worked alongside markers of ethnicity, including fashion and elocution, to persuade diverse audiences of one’s power within the scholarly scene and one’s faithfulness to the Prophet’s example. The second part of this chapter analyzes a rare episode of debate in the sultan’s garden over fruit and sweets, which was preserved both in the chronicles as well commentaries. By juxtaposing accounts of the live commentary with the text of the written commentary, this chapter makes visible the political and social conditions that make a commentary possible without losing sight of what normative commitments and beliefs were of grave concern in determining the meaning and application of these texts.

Chapter 26 focuses on liturgy. Prominent within the ancient Christian liturgies, such as the Eastern Orthodox liturgies, is the activity of reenacting various episodes depicted in the Gospels, such as the burial of Jesus. Asking how we should understand these reenactments and what they are for, the chapter is primarily devoted to answering the second of these questions, contending that a dominant aim of liturgical reenactment is to contribute to the construction of a narrative identity in its participants. Specifically, the chapter’s discussion is devoted to exploring the normative commitments that agents undertake when engaging in liturgical reenactment and how these commitments might contribute to the construction of narrative identities that, in turn, inform and sustain character traits of various kinds.

The preceding case studies have demonstrated how countries sought to utilize flexibilities in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement to keep as much material as possible free of claims to ownership and to withstand bilateral and unilateral attempts to impose TRIPS-plus obligations. They have offered evidence on the ways in which procedural and substantive issues are intertwined, and how far adherence to administrative values can go in producing substantive results that are accepted as legitimate. They have also shed light on the factors that permit effective resistance in an asymmetric contestation environment. This chapter discusses five variables that appear to have influenced the outcomes in these cases: expertise; the structure of civil society; institutional competence; normative commitments; and political opportunity structures.

A long-standing and fundamental facet of global governance for health has been the development of an international human rights framework. Arising from the aftermath of World War II, human rights are comprised of several different covenants that constitute international law, albeit lacking in international enforcement measures. When these rights are instantiated within national laws or constitutions, however, they become justiciable within a country’s legal system. There are also global bodies responsible for oversight of their implementation. Their strength, as with that of the Sustainable Development Goals’ Agenda 2030, may rest more on their normative force—how the world’s people imperfectly expressed through their governments believe the world should work and look like. Given a growing illiberal temper in the emerging post-truth world, whether the norms embedded in human rights law can rise to the challenge of ‘taming’ globalization’s neoliberal underpinnings is a pivotal question still awaiting a firm answer.