Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288021
- eISBN:
- 9780191713446
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288021.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of ...
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This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of thought’ and the ‘meaningfulness of language’, which logical truths would delimit, and metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language would explain are issues constituted by confusions. What is exposed is a mirage of a kind of self-consciousness, a misperception of the ways in which we happen to think, talk, and act as reasons why we ought to think, talk, and act as we do. The root of that misperception is our confusedly endowing words with a life of their own: we enchant and are enchanted by words, colluding in a confusion that transposes on to them and the world which we then see them as ‘fitting’, responsibilities that are actually ours to bear. Such words promise to spare us the trouble not only of thinking, but of living. In presenting this view, the book offers readings of all of the major themes of the Tractatus, including its discussion of logical truth, objects, names, inferential relations, subjectivity, solipsism, and the inexpressible. It offers novel explanations of what is at stake in Wittgenstein’s comparison of propositions with pictures, of why Wittgenstein declared the point of the Tractatus to be ethical, of how a book — which infamously declares itself to be nonsensical— can clarify our thoughts and require of us that we exercise our capacity to reason in reading it, and of how Wittgenstein later came to re-evaluate the achievement of the Tractatus.Less
This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of thought’ and the ‘meaningfulness of language’, which logical truths would delimit, and metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language would explain are issues constituted by confusions. What is exposed is a mirage of a kind of self-consciousness, a misperception of the ways in which we happen to think, talk, and act as reasons why we ought to think, talk, and act as we do. The root of that misperception is our confusedly endowing words with a life of their own: we enchant and are enchanted by words, colluding in a confusion that transposes on to them and the world which we then see them as ‘fitting’, responsibilities that are actually ours to bear. Such words promise to spare us the trouble not only of thinking, but of living. In presenting this view, the book offers readings of all of the major themes of the Tractatus, including its discussion of logical truth, objects, names, inferential relations, subjectivity, solipsism, and the inexpressible. It offers novel explanations of what is at stake in Wittgenstein’s comparison of propositions with pictures, of why Wittgenstein declared the point of the Tractatus to be ethical, of how a book — which infamously declares itself to be nonsensical— can clarify our thoughts and require of us that we exercise our capacity to reason in reading it, and of how Wittgenstein later came to re-evaluate the achievement of the Tractatus.
Noam Reisner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199572625
- eISBN:
- 9780191721892
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572625.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, Milton Studies, 17th-century and Restoration Literature
This brief epilogue offers a quotation from Wittgenstein's letters about poetry as a concluding remark for the book as a whole, and speculates whether or not Wittgenstein — a philosopher everywhere ...
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This brief epilogue offers a quotation from Wittgenstein's letters about poetry as a concluding remark for the book as a whole, and speculates whether or not Wittgenstein — a philosopher everywhere committed to exploring the limits of language and the problems of ineffability — would have approved of Milton's poetry, which appears to transgress the limits of Wittgensteinian ‘sense’ as it moves into the realms of ineffable ‘nonsense’. Using Wittgenstein's say-show distinction, as outlined in the Tractatus and implicitly alluded to in the discussed quotation, the epilogue finally concludes that Milton only ever pretends to say the unsayable, and that this pretence is what matters in his poetry.Less
This brief epilogue offers a quotation from Wittgenstein's letters about poetry as a concluding remark for the book as a whole, and speculates whether or not Wittgenstein — a philosopher everywhere committed to exploring the limits of language and the problems of ineffability — would have approved of Milton's poetry, which appears to transgress the limits of Wittgensteinian ‘sense’ as it moves into the realms of ineffable ‘nonsense’. Using Wittgenstein's say-show distinction, as outlined in the Tractatus and implicitly alluded to in the discussed quotation, the epilogue finally concludes that Milton only ever pretends to say the unsayable, and that this pretence is what matters in his poetry.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the basis of the author's approach to the sequence of remarks on the idea of a private language in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the basis of the author's approach to the sequence of remarks on the idea of a private language in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It presents an alternative way of interpreting the Tractatus, which involves a so-called austere conception of nonsense. According to this ‘resolute’ reading, the author of the Tractatus recognized only one species of nonsense — mere gibberish; from the point of view of logic, mere nonsense is the only kind of nonsense there is. The objectives of the essay are then described.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the basis of the author's approach to the sequence of remarks on the idea of a private language in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It presents an alternative way of interpreting the Tractatus, which involves a so-called austere conception of nonsense. According to this ‘resolute’ reading, the author of the Tractatus recognized only one species of nonsense — mere gibberish; from the point of view of logic, mere nonsense is the only kind of nonsense there is. The objectives of the essay are then described.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291465
- eISBN:
- 9780191710667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter elaborates an application of Wittgenstein's new (Investigations) view of nonsense. It raises the question: are there lessons to be learned from privacy, which bear on the worry broached ...
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This chapter elaborates an application of Wittgenstein's new (Investigations) view of nonsense. It raises the question: are there lessons to be learned from privacy, which bear on the worry broached in §242 — which, perhaps, help put it to rest? Wittgenstein provides assurance that the ‘agreement in judgement’ of which he speaks does not abolish logic. Is the private language discussion meant as, inter alia, an elaboration of that thought? Three simple ideas on how this might be are discussed.Less
This chapter elaborates an application of Wittgenstein's new (Investigations) view of nonsense. It raises the question: are there lessons to be learned from privacy, which bear on the worry broached in §242 — which, perhaps, help put it to rest? Wittgenstein provides assurance that the ‘agreement in judgement’ of which he speaks does not abolish logic. Is the private language discussion meant as, inter alia, an elaboration of that thought? Three simple ideas on how this might be are discussed.
Maximilian de Gaynesford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287826
- eISBN:
- 9780191603570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287821.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
‘Independence’, or the claim that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to, is a myth. It depends on a two-step argument from explanation: that it would ...
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‘Independence’, or the claim that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to, is a myth. It depends on a two-step argument from explanation: that it would make no sense to ask certain questions, and that we must appeal to ‘independence’ to explain this phenomenon. But other explanations are available, such as a pragmatic account. Alternatives are preferable since ‘independence’ not only threatens the referential character of I, its use to express thoughts about particular objects, and its communicative role, but also undermines a plausible account of the links between I-use and empirical identity criteria.Less
‘Independence’, or the claim that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to, is a myth. It depends on a two-step argument from explanation: that it would make no sense to ask certain questions, and that we must appeal to ‘independence’ to explain this phenomenon. But other explanations are available, such as a pragmatic account. Alternatives are preferable since ‘independence’ not only threatens the referential character of I, its use to express thoughts about particular objects, and its communicative role, but also undermines a plausible account of the links between I-use and empirical identity criteria.
Mary-Ann Constantine and Gerald Porter
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197262887
- eISBN:
- 9780191734441
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197262887.003.0004
- Subject:
- Music, Ethnomusicology, World Music
This chapter discusses a comparison of the scholarly criteria used to describe ‘nonsense’ with the attitudes of singers, in the mutually related areas of lexical corruption and narrative collapse. ...
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This chapter discusses a comparison of the scholarly criteria used to describe ‘nonsense’ with the attitudes of singers, in the mutually related areas of lexical corruption and narrative collapse. The anxiety of corruption and nonsense and narrative collapse in the Child ballads of Nelson Ridley are examined in this chapter. The chapter concludes that incoherence is the state of not being whole or of being ‘not all there’.Less
This chapter discusses a comparison of the scholarly criteria used to describe ‘nonsense’ with the attitudes of singers, in the mutually related areas of lexical corruption and narrative collapse. The anxiety of corruption and nonsense and narrative collapse in the Child ballads of Nelson Ridley are examined in this chapter. The chapter concludes that incoherence is the state of not being whole or of being ‘not all there’.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288021
- eISBN:
- 9780191713446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288021.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This introductory chapter presents a sketch of the book as a whole. It identifies several features of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein himself described as crucial. It sets out a philosophical ...
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This introductory chapter presents a sketch of the book as a whole. It identifies several features of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein himself described as crucial. It sets out a philosophical conception of the intelligibility of thought labeled as ‘con-formism’, and which, the book argues, Wittgenstein seeks to undermine.Less
This introductory chapter presents a sketch of the book as a whole. It identifies several features of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein himself described as crucial. It sets out a philosophical conception of the intelligibility of thought labeled as ‘con-formism’, and which, the book argues, Wittgenstein seeks to undermine.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288021
- eISBN:
- 9780191713446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288021.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter presents three more crucial ideas in the interpretation of the Tractatus. The first is ‘resolution’; it discusses attempts to articulate quite what ‘resolute readings’ of the Tractatus ...
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This chapter presents three more crucial ideas in the interpretation of the Tractatus. The first is ‘resolution’; it discusses attempts to articulate quite what ‘resolute readings’ of the Tractatus involve and introduces some of the main criticisms that critics of ‘resolution’ offer. The second is an understanding of what it might be to ‘elucidate’ nonsense. This understanding, which is presented partly through an exploration of examples of nonsense from Lewis Carroll’s work, shows a certain sense in talking about ‘understanding nonsense’ and nonsense having a ‘logic’. The third is an interpretation of the intent behind Wittgenstein’s remarks about ‘internal relations’ and ‘internal properties’. These ideas are drawn upon in the interpretation of the Tractatus as a working-through of the confused pseudo-logic of con-formism.Less
This chapter presents three more crucial ideas in the interpretation of the Tractatus. The first is ‘resolution’; it discusses attempts to articulate quite what ‘resolute readings’ of the Tractatus involve and introduces some of the main criticisms that critics of ‘resolution’ offer. The second is an understanding of what it might be to ‘elucidate’ nonsense. This understanding, which is presented partly through an exploration of examples of nonsense from Lewis Carroll’s work, shows a certain sense in talking about ‘understanding nonsense’ and nonsense having a ‘logic’. The third is an interpretation of the intent behind Wittgenstein’s remarks about ‘internal relations’ and ‘internal properties’. These ideas are drawn upon in the interpretation of the Tractatus as a working-through of the confused pseudo-logic of con-formism.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288021
- eISBN:
- 9780191713446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288021.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter presents an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s proposal that we see propositions as analogous to pictures. Thinking through this analogy in the way that Wittgenstein suggests reveals both ...
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This chapter presents an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s proposal that we see propositions as analogous to pictures. Thinking through this analogy in the way that Wittgenstein suggests reveals both a certain truth in his proposal that propositions and the names that make up those propositions are ‘internally related’, and a confusion in the belief that there is a substantial and philosophically interesting ‘relation’ to be found here. It is argued that the picture analogy helps us recognize ‘the illogical’ as merely the product of sign/symbol confusions, something that is not recognized by those who attempt to explain how ‘the logical’ differs from ‘the illogical’ on the basis of a substantial philosophy of thought and language.Less
This chapter presents an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s proposal that we see propositions as analogous to pictures. Thinking through this analogy in the way that Wittgenstein suggests reveals both a certain truth in his proposal that propositions and the names that make up those propositions are ‘internally related’, and a confusion in the belief that there is a substantial and philosophically interesting ‘relation’ to be found here. It is argued that the picture analogy helps us recognize ‘the illogical’ as merely the product of sign/symbol confusions, something that is not recognized by those who attempt to explain how ‘the logical’ differs from ‘the illogical’ on the basis of a substantial philosophy of thought and language.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288021
- eISBN:
- 9780191713446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288021.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses how Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘the illogical’ as sign/symbol confusion affects our understanding of logical and ontological ‘types’. It explores the notion that the ...
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This chapter discusses how Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘the illogical’ as sign/symbol confusion affects our understanding of logical and ontological ‘types’. It explores the notion that the confusion that ‘the illogical’ embodies needs to be addressed by introducing novel notations rather than constructing theories of logical and ontological ‘types’. It considers what talk of such ‘types’ amounts to if there is no real task for such theories to perform.Less
This chapter discusses how Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘the illogical’ as sign/symbol confusion affects our understanding of logical and ontological ‘types’. It explores the notion that the confusion that ‘the illogical’ embodies needs to be addressed by introducing novel notations rather than constructing theories of logical and ontological ‘types’. It considers what talk of such ‘types’ amounts to if there is no real task for such theories to perform.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288021
- eISBN:
- 9780191713446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288021.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter looks back once again at Wittgenstein’s methodology, picking out aspects that may be more easily understood in the light of Chs. 5-9. It examines further the ‘elucidatory’ method ...
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This chapter looks back once again at Wittgenstein’s methodology, picking out aspects that may be more easily understood in the light of Chs. 5-9. It examines further the ‘elucidatory’ method Wittgenstein uses in the Tractatus, its ‘therapeutic’ character, its necessarily ‘argumentative’ form, and its relationship to what he calls ‘the only strictly correct method in philosophy’. The author’s interpretation is placed in relation to claims made by other ‘resolute’ readers and criticisms made of ‘resolute’ approaches.Less
This chapter looks back once again at Wittgenstein’s methodology, picking out aspects that may be more easily understood in the light of Chs. 5-9. It examines further the ‘elucidatory’ method Wittgenstein uses in the Tractatus, its ‘therapeutic’ character, its necessarily ‘argumentative’ form, and its relationship to what he calls ‘the only strictly correct method in philosophy’. The author’s interpretation is placed in relation to claims made by other ‘resolute’ readers and criticisms made of ‘resolute’ approaches.
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199229826
- eISBN:
- 9780191710766
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229826.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The aim of this chapter is to undermine ‘resolute’ readings, advanced by James Conant, of both the Tractatus and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Interesting parallels are indeed discernible ...
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The aim of this chapter is to undermine ‘resolute’ readings, advanced by James Conant, of both the Tractatus and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Interesting parallels are indeed discernible between Kierkegaard and the early Wittgenstein, but the exposure of a doctrine of ‘substantial nonsense’ (or of ineffable truth) isn't one of them. For whilst Wittgenstein is clearly committed to the notion of ineffabilia in the Tractatus, Climacus'/Kierkegaard's project in Postscript has nothing whatever to do with such a conception. A profound disanalogy therefore exists, in this respect, between the early Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. The points of contact that can therefore be perceived between the early Wittgenstein and the Danish philosopher cannot be located in the actual endorsement (or rejection) of similar views about the nature of language and what lies beyond its limits, but are rather to be found in a certain commonality of vision as regards ethics and religion.Less
The aim of this chapter is to undermine ‘resolute’ readings, advanced by James Conant, of both the Tractatus and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Interesting parallels are indeed discernible between Kierkegaard and the early Wittgenstein, but the exposure of a doctrine of ‘substantial nonsense’ (or of ineffable truth) isn't one of them. For whilst Wittgenstein is clearly committed to the notion of ineffabilia in the Tractatus, Climacus'/Kierkegaard's project in Postscript has nothing whatever to do with such a conception. A profound disanalogy therefore exists, in this respect, between the early Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. The points of contact that can therefore be perceived between the early Wittgenstein and the Danish philosopher cannot be located in the actual endorsement (or rejection) of similar views about the nature of language and what lies beyond its limits, but are rather to be found in a certain commonality of vision as regards ethics and religion.
Steven Heine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195326772
- eISBN:
- 9780199870363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195326772.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
The first issue discussed in Chapter Two is ineffability versus speech, which concerns the role of language and discourse in a tradition that has produced voluminous texts despite an emphasis on ...
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The first issue discussed in Chapter Two is ineffability versus speech, which concerns the role of language and discourse in a tradition that has produced voluminous texts despite an emphasis on being a special transmission without reliance on words and letters. This chapter considers the question of whether Zen literature is primarily used as a heuristic device, as claimed by the traditional view, or represents some kind of gibberish, as charged by critical Buddhism's harshest skeptics, by comparing the wordplay and allusions in Zen commentaries to the “nonsense” writing in Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland and the free‐floating surrealism of T. S. Eliot's The Wasteland. By focusing on several specific kōan case records, the chapter argues that Zen literature is the product of carefully constructed narratives. The narratives are not nonsense in the conventional use of the term, but show the role of bizarre or outrageous personal interactions between masters and disciples that establish the value of radical anti‐structural behavior within the otherwise conservative setting of monastic institutional structure.Less
The first issue discussed in Chapter Two is ineffability versus speech, which concerns the role of language and discourse in a tradition that has produced voluminous texts despite an emphasis on being a special transmission without reliance on words and letters. This chapter considers the question of whether Zen literature is primarily used as a heuristic device, as claimed by the traditional view, or represents some kind of gibberish, as charged by critical Buddhism's harshest skeptics, by comparing the wordplay and allusions in Zen commentaries to the “nonsense” writing in Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland and the free‐floating surrealism of T. S. Eliot's The Wasteland. By focusing on several specific kōan case records, the chapter argues that Zen literature is the product of carefully constructed narratives. The narratives are not nonsense in the conventional use of the term, but show the role of bizarre or outrageous personal interactions between masters and disciples that establish the value of radical anti‐structural behavior within the otherwise conservative setting of monastic institutional structure.
Jordan Kirk
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- January 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780823294466
- eISBN:
- 9780823297467
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823294466.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
Five hundred years before “Jabberwocky” and Tender Buttons, writers were already preoccupied with the question of nonsense. But even as the prevalence in medieval texts of gibberish, babble, ...
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Five hundred years before “Jabberwocky” and Tender Buttons, writers were already preoccupied with the question of nonsense. But even as the prevalence in medieval texts of gibberish, babble, birdsong, and allusions to bare voice has come increasingly into view in recent years, an impression persists that these phenomena are exceptions that prove the rule of the period’s theologically motivated commitment to the kernel of meaning as over against the shell of the mere letter. This book shows that, to the contrary, the foundational object of study of medieval linguistic thought was vox non-significativa, the utterance insofar as it means nothing whatsoever, and that this fact was not lost on medieval writers of various kinds. In a series of close and unorthodox readings of works by Priscian, Boethius, Augustine, Walter Burley, Geoffrey Chaucer, and the anonymous authors of the Cloud of Unknowing and St. Erkenwald, it inquires into the way that a number of fourteenth-century writers recognized possibilities inherent in the traditional accounts of language transmitted to them from antiquity and transformed those accounts into new ideas, forms, and practices of non-signification. Retrieving a premodern hermeneutics of obscurity in order to provide materials for an archeology of the category of the literary, Medieval Nonsense shows how these medieval linguistic textbooks, mystical treatises, and poems were engineered in such a way as to arrest the faculty of interpretation and force it to focus on the extinguishing of sense that occurs in the encounter with language itself.Less
Five hundred years before “Jabberwocky” and Tender Buttons, writers were already preoccupied with the question of nonsense. But even as the prevalence in medieval texts of gibberish, babble, birdsong, and allusions to bare voice has come increasingly into view in recent years, an impression persists that these phenomena are exceptions that prove the rule of the period’s theologically motivated commitment to the kernel of meaning as over against the shell of the mere letter. This book shows that, to the contrary, the foundational object of study of medieval linguistic thought was vox non-significativa, the utterance insofar as it means nothing whatsoever, and that this fact was not lost on medieval writers of various kinds. In a series of close and unorthodox readings of works by Priscian, Boethius, Augustine, Walter Burley, Geoffrey Chaucer, and the anonymous authors of the Cloud of Unknowing and St. Erkenwald, it inquires into the way that a number of fourteenth-century writers recognized possibilities inherent in the traditional accounts of language transmitted to them from antiquity and transformed those accounts into new ideas, forms, and practices of non-signification. Retrieving a premodern hermeneutics of obscurity in order to provide materials for an archeology of the category of the literary, Medieval Nonsense shows how these medieval linguistic textbooks, mystical treatises, and poems were engineered in such a way as to arrest the faculty of interpretation and force it to focus on the extinguishing of sense that occurs in the encounter with language itself.
Caroline Jenkins
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231577
- eISBN:
- 9780191716102
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter considers objections to the proposal of the second part of the book which are not simply objections to the claim that our arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. These include ...
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This chapter considers objections to the proposal of the second part of the book which are not simply objections to the claim that our arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. These include some objections that might be generated by a broadly Quinean outlook, a circularity worry (which are related here to the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘deep nonsense’), and a number of issues concerning the epistemic step from possession of concepts to belief in conceptually true propositions. The chapter also discusses in some detail the objection that, by definition, arithmetical knowledge cannot be a priori if it is empirical.Less
This chapter considers objections to the proposal of the second part of the book which are not simply objections to the claim that our arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. These include some objections that might be generated by a broadly Quinean outlook, a circularity worry (which are related here to the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘deep nonsense’), and a number of issues concerning the epistemic step from possession of concepts to belief in conceptually true propositions. The chapter also discusses in some detail the objection that, by definition, arithmetical knowledge cannot be a priori if it is empirical.
Keith Hossack
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206728
- eISBN:
- 9780191709777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter outlines a theory of facts, according to which facts are combinations of particulars and universals. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the relation between the ...
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This chapter outlines a theory of facts, according to which facts are combinations of particulars and universals. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the relation between the theory of facts and Realism, the traditional metaphysical doctrine of universals. Section 2 places at the centre of the theory of facts and universals the relation of combination, a multigrade relation taking a variable number of terms. Section 3 discusses the ‘vector logic’ of multigrade relations. Section 4 introduces ‘the problem of the unity of the proposition’, i.e., the problem of why it is impossible to judge ‘nonsense’. This turns out to be the same as the problem of the distinction between particulars and universals. Section 5 rejects solutions that invoke extra entities such as propositions or states of affairs. Section 6 offers a solution via the theory of negative facts. Section 7 extends the theory of negative facts to other complex facts, namely conjunctive and general facts. Section 8 further extends the theory of complex facts to allow it to cope with multiple generality, without the need to resort either to ‘logical forms’ or to ‘variables’. Section 9 suggests that an adequate semantic theory for the Predicate Calculus can be developed within the theory of facts.Less
This chapter outlines a theory of facts, according to which facts are combinations of particulars and universals. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the relation between the theory of facts and Realism, the traditional metaphysical doctrine of universals. Section 2 places at the centre of the theory of facts and universals the relation of combination, a multigrade relation taking a variable number of terms. Section 3 discusses the ‘vector logic’ of multigrade relations. Section 4 introduces ‘the problem of the unity of the proposition’, i.e., the problem of why it is impossible to judge ‘nonsense’. This turns out to be the same as the problem of the distinction between particulars and universals. Section 5 rejects solutions that invoke extra entities such as propositions or states of affairs. Section 6 offers a solution via the theory of negative facts. Section 7 extends the theory of negative facts to other complex facts, namely conjunctive and general facts. Section 8 further extends the theory of complex facts to allow it to cope with multiple generality, without the need to resort either to ‘logical forms’ or to ‘variables’. Section 9 suggests that an adequate semantic theory for the Predicate Calculus can be developed within the theory of facts.
Roger Teichmann
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199299331
- eISBN:
- 9780191715068
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299331.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The recognition that P and not-P share their content is one of the main insights of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Anscombe uses this insight in her discussions of truth and falsehood, raising the ...
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The recognition that P and not-P share their content is one of the main insights of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Anscombe uses this insight in her discussions of truth and falsehood, raising the question: what sort of priority does truth have over falsehood? Another notion she examines is that of ‘making true’. Her discussion makes it clear how the applicability of this notion is more restricted than many philosophers would like. The difference between sense and nonsense is another Wittgensteinian theme. Like Wittgenstein, Anscombe takes seriously the possibility, in philosophy, of enlightening or useful nonsense, and her anti-Carnapian discussion of names of names brings this out. She goes further than early Wittgenstein, however, in making room for mystery. Her interpretation and discussion of the later Wittgenstein's remarks on essence and grammar, and on bedrock conclude this chapter.Less
The recognition that P and not-P share their content is one of the main insights of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Anscombe uses this insight in her discussions of truth and falsehood, raising the question: what sort of priority does truth have over falsehood? Another notion she examines is that of ‘making true’. Her discussion makes it clear how the applicability of this notion is more restricted than many philosophers would like. The difference between sense and nonsense is another Wittgensteinian theme. Like Wittgenstein, Anscombe takes seriously the possibility, in philosophy, of enlightening or useful nonsense, and her anti-Carnapian discussion of names of names brings this out. She goes further than early Wittgenstein, however, in making room for mystery. Her interpretation and discussion of the later Wittgenstein's remarks on essence and grammar, and on bedrock conclude this chapter.
Michael Kremer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691524
- eISBN:
- 9780191742262
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691524.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
At Tractatus 4.0031, Wittgenstein writes that ‘Russell's merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real form.’ What precisely did Wittgenstein take ...
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At Tractatus 4.0031, Wittgenstein writes that ‘Russell's merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real form.’ What precisely did Wittgenstein take himself to have learned from Russell? The easy answer is that in ‘On Denoting,’ Russell showed that the logical form of sentences containing denoting phrases differs from that suggested by their surface grammar, but can be displayed perspicuously in a formal language. Thus, Russell's merit is to have shown that ‘colloquial language disguises the thought’ (Tractatus 4.002), while a formal language can reveal the form of the thought which colloquial language occludes. This interpretation faces several difficulties. Given Frege's analysis of universal propositions as containing covert applications of the conditional, why should this be Russell's merit, rather than Frege's? Why is Russell's merit mentioned in a comment (4.0031) on 4.003, which explains that the problems of philosophy are nonsensical, rather than on 4.002? How is Russell's merit related to the ‘critique of language’ identified with ‘all philosophy’ in 4.0031? The chapter develops an alternative interpretation capable of answering these questions, based on a careful account of the development and content of Wittgenstein's account of philosophical nonsense, and of Russell's use of the theory of descriptions to solve philosophical puzzles. Russell's merit is shown to involve the idea that a formal language can be used to reveal categorial equivocations in the nonsensical sentences of philosophers, thus showing those sentences to have no determinate logical form at all.Less
At Tractatus 4.0031, Wittgenstein writes that ‘Russell's merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real form.’ What precisely did Wittgenstein take himself to have learned from Russell? The easy answer is that in ‘On Denoting,’ Russell showed that the logical form of sentences containing denoting phrases differs from that suggested by their surface grammar, but can be displayed perspicuously in a formal language. Thus, Russell's merit is to have shown that ‘colloquial language disguises the thought’ (Tractatus 4.002), while a formal language can reveal the form of the thought which colloquial language occludes. This interpretation faces several difficulties. Given Frege's analysis of universal propositions as containing covert applications of the conditional, why should this be Russell's merit, rather than Frege's? Why is Russell's merit mentioned in a comment (4.0031) on 4.003, which explains that the problems of philosophy are nonsensical, rather than on 4.002? How is Russell's merit related to the ‘critique of language’ identified with ‘all philosophy’ in 4.0031? The chapter develops an alternative interpretation capable of answering these questions, based on a careful account of the development and content of Wittgenstein's account of philosophical nonsense, and of Russell's use of the theory of descriptions to solve philosophical puzzles. Russell's merit is shown to involve the idea that a formal language can be used to reveal categorial equivocations in the nonsensical sentences of philosophers, thus showing those sentences to have no determinate logical form at all.
Brian McGuinness
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691524
- eISBN:
- 9780191742262
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691524.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses the attribution to the early Wittgenstein of a therapeutic intent and of the view that there is only one kind of nonsense.
This chapter discusses the attribution to the early Wittgenstein of a therapeutic intent and of the view that there is only one kind of nonsense.
Anthony Simon Laden
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199606191
- eISBN:
- 9780191741081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606191.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter discusses the place of instrumental reasons and the basic schema of inference within the social picture. It argues that these principles play a role in reasoning through their capacity to ...
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The chapter discusses the place of instrumental reasons and the basic schema of inference within the social picture. It argues that these principles play a role in reasoning through their capacity to render what we say and do intelligible to one another, and thus are grounded, within the social picture, on the norm of mutual intelligibility governing conversation. It then discusses why these principles can serve a role in rendering what we say and do intelligible and why it is this role and not their connection to the structure of action or the world that makes reference to them reasonable. It concludes with a return to the question of how to make a proposal to a rational creature and the attractions of living together by reasoning.Less
The chapter discusses the place of instrumental reasons and the basic schema of inference within the social picture. It argues that these principles play a role in reasoning through their capacity to render what we say and do intelligible to one another, and thus are grounded, within the social picture, on the norm of mutual intelligibility governing conversation. It then discusses why these principles can serve a role in rendering what we say and do intelligible and why it is this role and not their connection to the structure of action or the world that makes reference to them reasonable. It concludes with a return to the question of how to make a proposal to a rational creature and the attractions of living together by reasoning.
