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Changes in religious demography have reshaped American political discourse in the early twenty-first century, as the public statements of Barack Obama and Donald J. Trump attest. The rise of the religiously unaffiliated “nones,” the return of “atheist” as an acceptable self-descriptor, a growing belief in the validity of multiple faiths, and the increasingly common experiences of religious mobility, intermarriage, and hybridity have all profoundly altered the religious and political landscapes, despite the Christian right’s continued power. Obama, who embodied the tendency toward religious hybridity, marked such changes by eschewing even the broad term “multireligious” and instead listing numerous belief communities by name, including atheists. Trump, however, departed even more substantially from past patterns. Despite championing the social and political interests of the Christian right, he abandoned both the customary expressions of personal piety and the hitherto unbroken tradition of defining the United States as the embodiment of a set of ideals, whether universal or particular. The book closes by reflecting on the possible futures of the Judeo-Christian and Abrahamic frameworks, the interpretive shortcomings of the culture wars concept, and the power of religious language in American politics.

The fastest-growing religious category in America is comprised of the not religious: atheists, agnostics, those who are religiously unaffiliated or uninterested, and those who call themselves “spiritual but not religious.” Previous research suggested that a majority of these come from a religious background but have rejected their parents’ faith. In this study, however, by 2005 it was far more common to see a high degree of intergenerational similarity with nonreligious children following in the path of their nonreligious parents. Such parent–child similarity increased markedly over the thirty-five years of the study: In 1970 only one in seven young adult nones had parents who also were nonaffiliated; by 2005 this had increased to six in ten youth.

The introduction presents the case of a single mobile Jew with eclectic religious practices, Edward Rosewater, arguing that he is a compelling if unexpected starting point from which to redescribe religion in America. Building on religious studies methodologies developed in the American Catholic context, this book helps explain American religious eclecticism. As with contemporary “nones,” for nineteenth-century Americans like Rosewater, congregations, denominations, and stable identities were not obvious or inevitable. Rather, they were particular strategies—among many others—for coping with life amidst the individuating forces of American law, economics, and racial logics. While some Jews believed that Judaism was already suitable for all locales, most Jews recognized that they would have to reconcile Judaism with this new context, whether through individual adaptations like those of Rosewater or through the national projects proposed by famous leaders Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise and Isaac Leeser.

This introduction describes the book’s fashion-focused approach to religion and its central argument. It sets up the concept of fashionable religion, which highlights how fashion constructs a specific vision of Christianity that celebrates beauty and wonder, innovation and enchantment. To establish this, the introduction provides an overview of the book’s primary sources and identifies how the book’s approach differs from existing scholarship on religion and dress. Rather than focusing on what religions do with or say about dress, the introduction highlights the importance of the fashion industry for thinking about the changing religious landscape of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, including the rise of spirituality and the increase in the religiously unaffiliated or “nones.”

The dramatic rise in the number of religiously unaffiliated, who nevertheless claim to be “spiritual but not religious,” suggests the need to rethink the categories of spirituality and religion. Although more a rhetorical device than true divorce, this important shift demands the study of the beliefs of “nones.” The “why” of this and the interview process are explained. The book asks whether this is a spiritual crisis or revolution, and whether the situation is really spirituality versus religion. It also explains why the study of belief, although often neglected by the social sciences, is critical. The interview process and the interviewees are discussed, showing that qualitative research is an appropriate method to elicit SBNR beliefs. A main contention is that SBNRs need to be heard in their own voices.

Whether aberration or heritage, the surge in organized religion during the 1950s and early 1960s still functions as the “gold standard” for many today, especially Protestants and Catholics. Athough there was still a common meta-narrative that many shared, giving stability to public and private life, it was soon to disintegrate. This seemingly idyllic picture also contained problems, which are discussed. The dramatic change in the ensuing years, especially during the later 1960s and beyond, as well as the parallel rise in conservative evangelicals and “nones” during the 1990s, is explored. The chapter refers to Robert Putnam’s work on the cultural shocks that promoted this change. It also discusses the rise in those disaffiliated and non-affiliated from religion. It looks more closely at the specifics about the “nones” and those who describe themselves “spiritual but not religious.”

The interviewees are categorized according to age cohorts and types. Although there were few “nones” who volunteered to be interviewed from “The Greatest Generation” (1901?1924), there were many women and men who came forward from “The Silent Generation” (1925?1945), “The Baby Boomers” (1946?1964), “Gen X” (1965?1981), and “Millennials” (born after 1981). The most enthusiastic interviewees were Baby Boomers and women. Cutting across the generations were five distinct types: Dissenters (those who object to specific doctrines or practices in religion and have either left or drifted away), Casuals (those who take spirituality and religion on an “as-needed” basis), Explorers (those who have a spiritual “wanderlust,” like spiritual tourists), Seekers (those who are looking for a more or less permanent spiritual home), and Immigrants (those who are trying out a new religion or spirituality but, like immigrants, may be having difficulty adjusting). Examples and many illustrative quotes from each generation and type are given.

There is no simple explanation for why the people in this book have felt compelled to minimize the importance of organized religion. Among the many reasons, however, prior research has given inadequate consideration to the belief factor. This book suggests the need for more awareness of the theological issues that are playing into the decrease in religious affiliation. Although there is diversity in the beliefs these interviewees hold, an underlying consensus appears to be developing and this bears further attention. There are important theological and practical implications that could spring from this developing ethos. The chapter suggests some possible outcomes and potential problems that could emerge which are especially relevant to four audiences: the “nones” who are “spiritual but not religious,” American society in general, American religion, and the church.

Lapsed Catholics are sometimes referred to as one of the largest religious groups in America, and yet we know little about what beliefs and behaviors may be associated with this social category. Using data from the Pew Religious Landscape Survey, this chapter compares the religious beliefs, social attitudes, and voluntary behavior of lapsed Catholics and other religious non-affiliates (nones, atheists, and agnostics) alongside lapsed evangelicals and lapsed mainline Protestants. Generally speaking, lapsed Catholics fall somewhere in the middle between practicing Catholics and those with no religious affiliation, but they are notably more liberal in their attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage. This study affirms the importance of considering the heterogeneity within the category of “nonreligious” by considering the lingering attachments people may hold to religion outside of church attendance. The chapter concludes by considering whether the glass is half full or half empty for those interested in the future of American Catholicism.

The purpose of this study was to examine the types, meanings, and benefits of spiritual practices among older adults and to discuss their implications for well-being. In-depth interviews were conducted with 122 individuals, with an average age of 77. Of these, 102 were highly involved in churches or synagogues, and 20 were atheists, agnostics, secular humanists, or religiously indifferent. The chapter’s authors found a wide array of activities identified by respondents as spiritual practices, ranging from the anticipated (prayer, participating in corporate worship, reading) to the more novel (attending long-distance Bible study groups via Skype, watercolor painting). They also found an overlap between the religious and the nonreligious older adults in many spiritual practices. Most respondents reported that their spiritual practices had increased with age. Respondents perceived significant benefits from their spiritual practices. Too often, health practitioners have not been sensitive to the benefits of spiritual practices in the lives of older adults.

Group religious freedom claims are growing in number and prominence, despite demographic shifts away from individual affiliation with religious groups. This chapter explores this apparent tension, focusing on why group claims have come to the fore now. The authors offer a multivalent explanation rooted in a single phenomenon: the continuing “culture wars” between religious conservatives and social progressives. Progressives have pressed claims for a broad egalitarian regulatory state and criticized religious accommodations. Religious conservatives, in turn, have intensified in their commitment to the value of religious group autonomy and drawn on group-oriented elements in social thought and legal doctrine to press such claims with the substantial resources at their command. Ultimately, both moves are underwritten by the cultural and political polarization of contemporary American society. The authors’ thesis has important implications for the law and policy of church-state relations.

The inter-war years are a comparatively neglected period of British religious history. Yet, on the measure of ‘active church adherence’ used in this book, they emerge as far more significant in Britain’s secularization journey than the intensively studied 1960s. Between 1918 and 1939, there was a marked shift away from religious commitment and participation towards nominalism, especially in the Free Churches. Although Protestant church membership recovered after the First World War, it peaked in England and Wales around 1927 and dropped absolutely thereafter. There was no such post-war recovery in churchgoing, rather an acceleration of decline, partly because people worshipped less regularly. This fall was fuelled by a weakening Sabbatarian culture and competition from Sunday cinema and religious broadcasting. Congregations were also ageing and take-up of Anglican baptismal and marriage services diminishing. A further 2 million Sunday scholars were lost, while the number of religious ‘nones’ rose by 1 million.

Analysis of the Second World War’s impact on religious allegiance is affected by data gaps and doubts about the accuracy of opinion polling and the rigour of membership roll revision. But the Church of England lost some market share, the Free Churches slid further towards nominalism, and the number of ‘nones’ grew, absolutely and relatively, more than in the First World War. Church membership losses were greatest in 1939–42. There were 1 million fewer Sunday scholars. Unlike the First World War, there was no temporary revival of churchgoing at the start of the Second World War, only continuous decline in Protestantism, with the index of attendance at ordinary services often reduced to ten or less, half of adults never attending or solely for rites of passage. The decrease is partly explained by wartime disruptions but churchgoing also faced competition from Sunday cinema and the BBC’s enhanced portfolio of religious broadcasts.

Chapter 1 introduces two key concepts, familism and liyi, and concludes with methodology and chapter overviews. While nonreligious Chinese Americans are heterogeneous in their worldviews, they are bound together by their familism, a transpacific lived tradition that prioritizes interdependence and right relationships through the meaningful rituals of being family. Moreover Chinese Americans tend to be heterodox and nonsystematic in their beliefs and practices, affirming the existence of spiritual beings and keeping home shrines, in spite of their nonreligious affiliations. American sociological accounts of “religious nones,” however, emphasize categories of belief and belonging that obscure Chinese Americans’ rituals, values, and practices. Thus this chapter discusses appropriating liyi as an indigenous Chinese framework in parallel with the Western category of religion. Liyi is a compound composed of two uniquely Chinese concepts: li (禮‎), which means “ritual propriety,” and yi (義‎), which means “righteousness.”