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 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual ... More


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