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Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain

Michael Tye

in Perceptual Experience

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199289769
eISBN:
9780191711046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter puts forth and defends three related claims about visual experience. First, it is argued that visual experiences have nonconceptual contents. Second, an explanation and defence is ... More


Information Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Molyneux's Question

John Campbell

in Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199248964
eISBN:
9780191719387
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter addresses some of the central issues raised by Evans's paper ‘Molyneux's question’, exploring how Evans's approach to Molyneux's question is informed by his account of the content of ... More


Cognitive Penetration and Nonconceptual Content

Fiona Macpherson

in The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780198738916
eISBN:
9780191802102
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. Cognitive penetration occurs when one’s beliefs or desires ... More


Nonconceptual Content

Kristina Musholt

in Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780262029209
eISBN:
9780262329767
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262029209.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content and presents several arguments in favour of nonconceptual content. It argues that the ... More


Primitive Self-Representation

Christopher Peacocke

in The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199699568
eISBN:
9780191760730
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

First person or de se content features in the nonconceptual content of perception, memory and action-awareness. This de se component is individuated by the rule that it refers, de jure, to the ... More


The First Person Concept and its Nonconceptual Parent

Christopher Peacocke

in The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199699568
eISBN:
9780191760730
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Concepts are individuated by their fundamental reference rules; the first person concept is individuated by the ‘thinker-rule’, that in any thinking it refers to the agent who produced the thinking. ... More


Experientialist Theories

Jack C. Lyons

in Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780195373578
eISBN:
9780199871988
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter offers a sustained attack on what is probably the standard view in contemporary epistemology, experientialism, which maintains that basic beliefs are justified by the corresponding ... More


The Unconscious

Paul Katsafanas

in The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780198737100
eISBN:
9780191800641
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737100.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter addresses Nietzsche’s distinction between the conscious and the unconscious. Many philosophers assume that the unconscious is simply the conscious pushed out of view, that the difference ... More


Sentience

Jonardon Ganeri

in The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

Dharmakīrti, Dignāga's very influential successor, expands the discussion with an impressive analysis of nonconceptual perceptual content. This chapter argues that Dharmakīrti's account should be ... More


Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Science

José Luis Bermúdez

in The Bodily Self: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780262037501
eISBN:
9780262344661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Taking as point of departure a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) that appears to block philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, this paper illustrates how highly conceptual forms of ... More


Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self

Kristina Musholt

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780262029209
eISBN:
9780262329767
Item type:
book
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262029209.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book offers a novel theory of self-consciousness, understood as the ability to think about oneself. The book’s aim is to explain this ability and its development. It argues for a ... More


A New Argument for Realism from Perceptual Content

E. J. Lowe

in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Raftopoulos suggests that realism can be defended only if it can be argued that perception includes nonconceptual content, to individuate objects in the perceiver’s environment. The perceptual ... More


Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content

J. Christopher Maloney

in What It Is Like To Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780190854751
eISBN:
9780190854782
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190854751.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Defending intentionalism, some argue that perceptual content is idiosyncratically nonconceptual: conceptually innocent; defiant of verbalization; or too richly fine-grained for subsumption under ... More


Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View

José Luis Bermúdez

in The Bodily Self: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780262037501
eISBN:
9780262344661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

One of the attractions of Gibson’s concept of ecological perception is that it seems to provide a basic awareness of the bodily self that can serve as the core of a comprehensive account of ... More


Brandom's Two‐Ply Error

Willem A. deVries and Paul Coates

in Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199573301
eISBN:
9780191722172
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In his Tales of the Mighty Dead, Robert B. Brandom's discussion of Sellars's two-ply account of observation and critique of Cartesian philosophies of mind makes several crucial errors that would ... More


Aesthetic Judgement and Perceptual Normativity

Hannah Ginsborg

in The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant's Critique of Judgement

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
March 2015
ISBN:
9780199547975
eISBN:
9780191789007
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547975.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The essay draws a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgements can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual ... More


Bodily Ownership, Bodily Awareness, and Knowledge without Observation

José Luis Bermúdez

in The Bodily Self: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780262037501
eISBN:
9780262344661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership. She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of ... More


Intermodal Intentionalism and Nonconceptual Content

Jeff Speaks

in The Phenomenal and the Representational

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780198732556
eISBN:
9780191796784
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732556.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapters 10–13 ask whether it is possible for distinct states of different types—for example, a visual experience and a belief—to have the same content, but differ phenomenally. It is argued that ... More


Introduction

Christopher Peacocke

in The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199699568
eISBN:
9780191760730
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The aim of the book is to present an integrated account of subjects of consciousness and the first person way of thinking about a subject of consciousness, and to apply the integrated account to some ... More


It’s Got to Be Human!

Michael Tye

in Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious?

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780190278014
eISBN:
9780190278045
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190278014.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Moral Philosophy

Historically, major intellectual figures, most notably Rene Descartes, have been committed to the claim that only humans can have experiences. Radical conservatism of this sort is a mistake. The ... More


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