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In the first part of this chapter, the idea of last resort is interrelated with the idea of ‘coercive military threat’. In addition to questions about nuclear deterrence, a just war theory should address questions about conventional deterrence. In the second part of the chapter, a ‘penultimate’ (or ‘next-to-last’) resort principle about coercive military threats is proposed and supported. Coercive military threats should be a ‘next-to-last’ resort. Before threatening to use armed force, every reasonable nonmilitary measure that is not such a threat should be exhausted. Additionally, in the second and third parts of the chapter, four other resort principles are proposed and supported. There is a spectrum of nonmilitary measures, from ones that are very pacific to ones that are very coercive. And there is a spectrum of military measures, from ones that are very small-scale to ones that are very large-scale. The last resort principle and the other resort principles should serve to control or stop escalation from less destructive measures to more destructive measures. Finally, in the fourth part of the chapter, the core noncombatant immunity principle is introduced. The noncombatant immunity principle and the other core just war principles are affirmed as coequal deontological principles.

The military has witnessed the convergence of two trends over the past decade—a resurgence of population-centric warfare and the proliferation of unmanned systems. The combination of these two trends has created an environment where the population has become an inextricable part of the battlespace at precisely the same time the warfighter is increasingly protected in combat. This inversion of the norm of noncombatant immunity seemingly discredits the ethical use of unmanned systems. This chapter explores the question of whether unmanned systems have a defensible place in counterinsurgency operations. To the extent they enable service members to discriminate and target belligerents with greater accuracy; free them to focus on building relationships rather than provide security; and therefore support, rather than replace service members in the battlespace, they reinforce traditional efforts to protect civilians from the horrors of war.

Some standard norms of conduct in war are morally unsustainable. The “noncombatant immunity” principle that prohibits deliberate use of force against noncombatants represents one such norm. Standard noncombatant immunity is limited, its focus on intention, allowing, in effect, ordinary noncombatants to be harmed routinely through lawful attacks by combatants. These noncombatant casualties often are likely, foreseeable, and avoidable and thus not merely accidental. Apart from the moral problem of just war legalism, the practical problem is this: a military power cannot expect to win hearts and minds in foreign populations, as the war on terrorism requires, when its approach to fighting expresses relatively little concern for noncombatant lives. Greatly reducing noncombatant casualties is a pragmatic imperative that recommends fighting to a much higher standard—even when prevailing moral and legal norms allow collaterally harming noncombatants.

To establish prospectively that a proposed military action would be just, we have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that all of the core just war principles would be satisfied. In the first part of this chapter, our shared responsibility for global human security is elucidated. The idea of collective self-defence is examined. For the sake of concreteness, a contemporary case is detailed, the case of Sudan versus South Sudan. In the second and third parts, the question of how the core just war principles of just cause, last resort, proportionality, and noncombatant immunity are applied conjointly to particular cases is investigated. In applying them conjointly, two questions need to be distinguished. Would a proposed military action be just? Among alternative proposed military actions, each of which would be just, which one would be best? The former question is considered in the second part, and the latter in the third part. The second part includes discussions of the topics of moral dilemmas, burden of proof, and noncombatant immunity. Among topics discussed in the third part are the Rwandan genocide, the Security Council, and the goal of peace.

In this chapter, the question of why just war principles should be accepted is explored. Central to the chapter is a discussion of how just war principles can be elucidated by means of general moral principles – in particular, prima facie principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence. Some other topics of moral theory discussed in the chapter are coherentism, moral universalism, the moral relevance of particular cases, the pertinence of human rights theory, moral deliberation, and the problem of moral conflict. As specific moral principles about a limited domain of particular cases, just war principles are intermediate between moral judgements about particular cases in that domain and general moral principles that hold comprehensively of all particular cases. On the one hand, we can make moral judgements about particular cases of armed conflict, in order to rethink or revise just war principles. On the other hand, in order to rethink or revise just war principles, we can also make use of such prima facie moral principles as nonmaleficence and beneficence. For concreteness, the chapter features the idea of noncombatant immunity.

Unlike kinetic weapons, cyberweapons purport to target facilities (rather than individuals) and, to date, have caused no immediate injuries. While some theorists focus upon the direct nature of a cyberattack, the chapter focuses on the harm a cyberattack causes. Although many believe that cyberattacks do not cause sufficient harm to violate noncombatant immunity, we dispute this. The chapter examines the effects of long-term destruction brought about in the course of regular warfare to draw conclusions about the probable knock-on effects of cyberterrorism. To evaluate the psychological effects of cyberterrorism the chapter draws on existing studies of cyberbullying and identity theft. Additionally, the chapter offers our own data drawn from simulated cyberattacks that include invasion of privacy, unauthorized dissemination of personal information, stolen data, and threats. The chapter's analysis suggests that cyberterrorism causes significant anxiety and substantially influences rational political thinking, so much so that cyberterrorism violates the principle of noncombatant immunity even when it does not cause physical harm.

This chapter introduces and clarifies Moral Distinction, the principle that killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. It develops the conceptual apparatus deployed in subsequent chapters, then explains why Moral Distinction matters, focusing in particular on its connection to similar principles in international law. It explains why recent just war theory and political discourse have placed Moral Distinction at risk, then outlines the pluralist approach to defending it, and in particular the central contention that almost all civilians (as well as many soldiers) are not liable to be killed in war. Since killing innocent civilians is necessarily worse than killing liable soldiers, the real challenge is to show that killing innocent civilians is worse than killing innocent soldiers. Only a pluralist approach will do: each argument will have exceptions; only taken together will they provide civilians with robust protection in war.

Orthodox just war theorists argue that the principles governing conduct in war—jus in bello—broadly track the current laws of armed conflict. Revisionists deny this. This chapter argues that these first-order disagreements are traceable to second-order disputes about (i) the appropriate site of principles of jus in bello and (ii) the feasibility constraints that theorizing about jus in bello should take into account. Regarding (i), orthodox theorists focus on the institutions that govern armed conflict, revisionists on individuals’ conduct. The chapter shows that, holding a given site constant, the substantive disagreement between the camps shrinks. Regarding (ii), orthodox theorists factor likely non-compliance into the design of the jus in bello, revisionists resist this move. It is argued that, relative to the site for which each is theorizing, both stances are defensible. Attention to second-order disputes in the ethics of war helps us better diagnose and adjudicate first-order ones.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore and defend the analogy of war to punishment that has come under recent and powerful criticism. The defense of war as “punishment” involves rejecting the dominant alternative approach that views war as justifiable only by analogy to war as “self-defense.” The latter approach washes out the significance of “guilt” and “innocence” and renders more fragile the critical principle of “discrimination” or “distinction.” Thus, in section two of the chapter we look at discrimination and noncombatant immunity and “intention” in action, in particular in response to a very recent and troubling argument advanced by Nigel Biggar in his book, In Defence of War. The chapter finishes with a rejection of Walzer’s justification of intentional targeting of noncombatants in the face of the so-called “supreme emergency.”

The epilogue draws together the lessons of earlier chapters, and rebuts the objection that all we need is an effective code—international law—that minimizes suffering in the long run. We do need such a code. But we also need an account of the morality of war that defends Moral Distinction, otherwise we should pursue radical revisions of international law.

Is killing civilians worse than killing soldiers because killing soldiers is necessary in war; killing civilians is not? Though often asserted, this argument’s normative and empirical premises have gone largely unexamined. If we work with a plausible analysis of necessity, and develop a testable hypothesis, we find that the argument is relatively weak. Research by political scientists, international relations scholars, and military strategists suggests that, in interstate wars, counterinsurgencies, and terrorist campaigns, killing civilians sometimes is necessary. Grounding their protection in this argument gives them least support when they need it most. However, often killing civilians is utterly pointless, which does help explain why, on those occasions, it is so egregiously wrongful.

Previous chapters have focused on arguing why killing innocent civilians is so bad. This chapter instead asks why killing innocent soldiers is somewhat easier to justify. It offers a series of novel arguments to show how even innocent combatants suffer a diminishment of their moral standing in war, in part through their recklessness in going to war with little regard to whether their cause is just, and in part through their heroism, in choosing to draw fire away from their civilian population. It rejects the idea that combatants can lose their rights to life merely through their membership of the armed forces, but argues that mere membership grounds positive obligations to bear costs to remedy actions taken in one’s name, and those obligations can make it easier to justify harm than would be the case in their absence.

Killing an innocent person is worse, the likelier it was that he would be innocent. Riskier killings are worse than less risky killings, because they more gravely disrespect their victim, and they undermine the victim’s interest in being secure. In war, killing innocent civilians is almost always riskier than killing innocent soldiers. So, killing innocent civilians is worse than killing innocent soldiers. Since almost all civilians are innocent in war, and since killing innocent civilians is worse than killing liable soldiers, killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers.

In ordinary thinking about the morality of war, the vulnerability and defencelessness of civilians is at the heart of their privileged moral status. But we lack both analyses of what these concepts are, and explanations of why they matter. This chapter analyses defencelessness in terms of vulnerability, then presents a series of arguments to show that harming those who are more defenceless and vulnerable is worse than harming those who are less so, drawing on prioritarian moral considerations, reasons of fairness, and the special wrong of disempowering one’s victims, as well as killing them. Although there are exceptions, civilians are typically more vulnerable and defenceless than soldiers, so killing innocent civilians is worse than killing innocent soldiers (vulnerability and defencelessness are irrelevant when the target is not innocent).

Opportunistic killing derives a benefit from the victim that one could not have secured in his absence. Eliminative killing leaves one no better off than had the victim not been there. Opportunistic killing disrespects the victim more gravely than eliminative killing and is, other things equal, more seriously wrongful. Almost all killing in war involves both eliminative and opportunistic elements. But killing civilians is typically more opportunistic than killing soldiers, and for this reason is worse.

This chapter considers how autonomous weapons systems (AWS) impact the armed conflicts of the future. Conceptually, the chapter argues that AWS should not be seen as on a par with precision weaponry, which makes them normatively problematic. Against this background, the chapter considers the relationship between AWS and two narratives, The Humane Warfare Narrative and the Excessive Risk Narrative, which have been used to theorize contemporary armed conflict. AWS, the chapter contends, are unlikely to usher in an era of humane warfare. Rather, they are likely to reinforce existing trends with regard to the imposition of excessive risk on noncombatants in armed conflict. Future conflicts in which AWS are deployed are thus likely to share many characteristics of the risk-transfer wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The chapter concludes by putting these abstract considerations to the test in the practical context of military intervention.