João P. Hespanha
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780691175218
- eISBN:
- 9781400885442
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691175218.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This book is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. The book shows that such design challenges can be ...
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This book is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. The book shows that such design challenges can be analyzed through game theoretical perspectives that help to pinpoint each problem's essence: Who are the players? What are their goals? Will the solution to “the game” solve the original design problem? Using the fundamentals of game theory, the book explores these issues and more. The use of game theory in technology design is a recent development arising from the intrinsic limitations of classical optimization-based designs. In optimization, one attempts to find values for parameters that minimize suitably defined criteria—such as monetary cost, energy consumption, or heat generated. However, in most engineering applications, there is always some uncertainty as to how the selected parameters will affect the final objective. Through a sequential and easy-to-understand discussion, the book examines how to make sure that the selection leads to acceptable performance, even in the presence of uncertainty—the unforgiving variable that can wreck engineering designs. The book looks at such standard topics as zero-sum, non-zero-sum, and dynamic games and includes a MATLAB guide to coding. This book offers students a fresh way of approaching engineering and computer science applications.Less
This book is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. The book shows that such design challenges can be analyzed through game theoretical perspectives that help to pinpoint each problem's essence: Who are the players? What are their goals? Will the solution to “the game” solve the original design problem? Using the fundamentals of game theory, the book explores these issues and more. The use of game theory in technology design is a recent development arising from the intrinsic limitations of classical optimization-based designs. In optimization, one attempts to find values for parameters that minimize suitably defined criteria—such as monetary cost, energy consumption, or heat generated. However, in most engineering applications, there is always some uncertainty as to how the selected parameters will affect the final objective. Through a sequential and easy-to-understand discussion, the book examines how to make sure that the selection leads to acceptable performance, even in the presence of uncertainty—the unforgiving variable that can wreck engineering designs. The book looks at such standard topics as zero-sum, non-zero-sum, and dynamic games and includes a MATLAB guide to coding. This book offers students a fresh way of approaching engineering and computer science applications.
Ambrose Peter
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9781861342201
- eISBN:
- 9781447302919
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781861342201.003.0002
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health
This chapter stresses the need to view the regeneration of estates in the context of how all public services operate. It cites the study of housing renewal in inner London, England, and on a ...
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This chapter stresses the need to view the regeneration of estates in the context of how all public services operate. It cites the study of housing renewal in inner London, England, and on a benchmarking study in Brighton. It argues against the claim that public services are now successfully engaged in joined-up thinking and action. It highlights the importance of considering the issues of osmotic effects and non-zero-sum situations, and exporting costs across sectoral boundaries in order to achieve a more holistic working in urban regeneration.Less
This chapter stresses the need to view the regeneration of estates in the context of how all public services operate. It cites the study of housing renewal in inner London, England, and on a benchmarking study in Brighton. It argues against the claim that public services are now successfully engaged in joined-up thinking and action. It highlights the importance of considering the issues of osmotic effects and non-zero-sum situations, and exporting costs across sectoral boundaries in order to achieve a more holistic working in urban regeneration.
João P. Hespanha
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780691175218
- eISBN:
- 9781400885442
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691175218.003.0009
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This chapter defines a number of key concepts for non-zero-sum games involving two players. It begins by considering a two-player game G in which two players P₁ and P₂ are allowed to select policies ...
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This chapter defines a number of key concepts for non-zero-sum games involving two players. It begins by considering a two-player game G in which two players P₁ and P₂ are allowed to select policies within action spaces Γ₁ and Γ₂, respectively. Each player wants to minimize their own outcome, and does not care about the outcome of the other player. The chapter proceeds by discussing the security policy and Nash equilibrium for two-player non-zero-sum games, bimatrix games, admissible Nash equilibrium, and mixed policy. It also explores the order interchangeability property for Nash equilibria in best-response equivalent games before concluding with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.Less
This chapter defines a number of key concepts for non-zero-sum games involving two players. It begins by considering a two-player game G in which two players P₁ and P₂ are allowed to select policies within action spaces Γ₁ and Γ₂, respectively. Each player wants to minimize their own outcome, and does not care about the outcome of the other player. The chapter proceeds by discussing the security policy and Nash equilibrium for two-player non-zero-sum games, bimatrix games, admissible Nash equilibrium, and mixed policy. It also explores the order interchangeability property for Nash equilibria in best-response equivalent games before concluding with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.
Gerald Lang
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- July 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198868507
- eISBN:
- 9780191905025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198868507.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines circumstantial luck, or the luck of being in circumstances where a moral response or course of action is called for. The anti-anti-luckist programme is maintained for ...
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This chapter examines circumstantial luck, or the luck of being in circumstances where a moral response or course of action is called for. The anti-anti-luckist programme is maintained for circumstantial luck as well as resultant luck. The argument proceeds, first, through an examination of Good Cases, calling for praiseworthiness. The fact that a well-intentioned agent is not in a position to collect praise for performing a meritorious act does not generate any serious moral concern. We can still praise this inactive agent for her dispositions if we wish to, and morality does not insist, in any case, upon equal opportunities for collecting praise. These lessons are then transferred to Bad Cases, calling for blameworthiness. The chapter also engages in detail with Michael Zimmerman’s argument involving situational luck, which combines circumstantial luck with constitutive luck. Zimmerman’s radical argument suggests that one agent should be no more blameworthy than another agent if they are separated only by luck, whether of the resultant, circumstantial, or constitutive variety. It is suggested here that Zimmerman’s argument misfires, due to an inconsistency between two principles he relies upon: the ‘Control Principle’ and the ‘No-Difference Claim’.Less
This chapter examines circumstantial luck, or the luck of being in circumstances where a moral response or course of action is called for. The anti-anti-luckist programme is maintained for circumstantial luck as well as resultant luck. The argument proceeds, first, through an examination of Good Cases, calling for praiseworthiness. The fact that a well-intentioned agent is not in a position to collect praise for performing a meritorious act does not generate any serious moral concern. We can still praise this inactive agent for her dispositions if we wish to, and morality does not insist, in any case, upon equal opportunities for collecting praise. These lessons are then transferred to Bad Cases, calling for blameworthiness. The chapter also engages in detail with Michael Zimmerman’s argument involving situational luck, which combines circumstantial luck with constitutive luck. Zimmerman’s radical argument suggests that one agent should be no more blameworthy than another agent if they are separated only by luck, whether of the resultant, circumstantial, or constitutive variety. It is suggested here that Zimmerman’s argument misfires, due to an inconsistency between two principles he relies upon: the ‘Control Principle’ and the ‘No-Difference Claim’.
