Paul Faulkner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589784
- eISBN:
- 9780191725517
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589784.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to the non-reductive theory of testimony, an audience is entitled to believe testimony, other things being equal. And testimony is distinctive as an epistemic source in that it transmits ...
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According to the non-reductive theory of testimony, an audience is entitled to believe testimony, other things being equal. And testimony is distinctive as an epistemic source in that it transmits knowledge and warrant. This chapter outlines four arguments for an entitlement to believe testimony, namely those given by Sandford Goldberg, Tony Coady, Tyler Burge, and John McDowell. And it considers two different explanations of how testimony transmits knowledge and warrant.Less
According to the non-reductive theory of testimony, an audience is entitled to believe testimony, other things being equal. And testimony is distinctive as an epistemic source in that it transmits knowledge and warrant. This chapter outlines four arguments for an entitlement to believe testimony, namely those given by Sandford Goldberg, Tony Coady, Tyler Burge, and John McDowell. And it considers two different explanations of how testimony transmits knowledge and warrant.
Paul Faulkner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589784
- eISBN:
- 9780191725517
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589784.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the non-reductive theory of testimony suffers two failings. First, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong descriptively. Either it ...
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This chapter argues that the non-reductive theory of testimony suffers two failings. First, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong descriptively. Either it wrongly takes gullibly formed beliefs to be warranted, or it wrongly takes beliefs formed on trust to be unwarranted. Second, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong normatively. Rather, testimonial uptake must be reasonable for an audience. Existing non-reductive theories misconceive what motivates this requirement, taking it to be imposed by an argument from testimonial error when it is motivated by the problem of cooperation. And the responses that Tyler Burge and John McDowell give to the argument from error do not allow a response to this problem.Less
This chapter argues that the non-reductive theory of testimony suffers two failings. First, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong descriptively. Either it wrongly takes gullibly formed beliefs to be warranted, or it wrongly takes beliefs formed on trust to be unwarranted. Second, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong normatively. Rather, testimonial uptake must be reasonable for an audience. Existing non-reductive theories misconceive what motivates this requirement, taking it to be imposed by an argument from testimonial error when it is motivated by the problem of cooperation. And the responses that Tyler Burge and John McDowell give to the argument from error do not allow a response to this problem.
Rowland Stout
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748623433
- eISBN:
- 9780748652501
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748623433.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter sets the scene by considering in partly historical terms the theories of philosophical and psychological behaviourism. This discussion is not a mere digression. It establishes where a ...
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This chapter sets the scene by considering in partly historical terms the theories of philosophical and psychological behaviourism. This discussion is not a mere digression. It establishes where a non-reductive theory such as the one presented in the book fits into the picture of behaviourism as it emerged in the twentieth century. Such a theory need not be embarrassed by being called ‘behaviourist’.Less
This chapter sets the scene by considering in partly historical terms the theories of philosophical and psychological behaviourism. This discussion is not a mere digression. It establishes where a non-reductive theory such as the one presented in the book fits into the picture of behaviourism as it emerged in the twentieth century. Such a theory need not be embarrassed by being called ‘behaviourist’.
