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This chapter discusses the complaint that the statist ideal is excessively biased in favour of the status quo and argues that this critique is only partly successful. While the statists’ (especially Rawls’s) refusal to extend egalitarian justice to the global realm does not in itself indicate subservience to the status quo, statist principles have unduly conservative implications because they are insufficiently sensitive to morally relevant phenomena characterizing the global realm. Although statists rightly identify peoples (states) as important subjects of international justice in virtue of the particular forms of coercive power they exercise by directly interfering in one another’s affairs, they fail to appreciate that these are not the only forms of international coercion in need of justification. Because the normative outlook underpinning Rawlsian statism is blind to these other potential sources of injustice, its principles may very well turn out to be status-quo biased and, therefore, rightly criticized on guidance grounds.

This chapter discusses how to move from a general concern with the justification of coercion to particular substantive principles of justice. It argues that a social system is just only so long as it respects the right to freedom of those subject to it, namely their right to the social conditions necessary to lead autonomous lives. For this to be the case, the distribution of freedom engendered by the system has to be justifiable in the eyes of all those who are subject to it. Focusing on domestic societies in particular, the chapter concludes that a multiplicity of principles of economic justice might instantiate mutually justifiable distributions of freedom, not all of which are egalitarian in form. In other words, contrary to most contemporary liberal theorists’ arguments on the view defended in this chapter, economic equality is not a fundamental, non-negotiable demand of justice.

While it is generally agreed that, metaphorically speaking, words are carriers of meaning, it is less widely recognized that grammatical categories of a language, too, encode meaning. But in fact this is what grammar is all about: certain meanings are so important to communities of speakers that they become not just lexicalized (linked with individual words) but grammaticalized, that is, embodied in the language's structural patterns. In this chapter, the theme of the “cultural elaboration of grammar” is applied to English causative constructions. The chapter seeks to show that English has an extremely wide range of such constructions (not only in comparison with other European languages but also from a universal perspective). This wealth is concealed, to some extent, by the use of the same key words such as make, have, or let in many different constructions, all of which may appear to be examples of a single “make construction”, “have construction”, or “let construction”. In fact, there are reasons to distinguish, on both semantic and structural grounds many different, “make constructions”, “have constructions”, and “let constructions”. This chapter seeks to clarify, by means of “NSM”, the precise nature of causal relations encoded in English grammar and to compare them with those encoded in German and Russian. It also seeks to explore the cultural roots of this extraordinary elaboration of causation in modern English grammar. A number of interpretive hypotheses are put forward, linking grammar with different patterns of social interaction, the rise of democracy, and with changing attitudes and values.

The policy of good neighbour as expounded throughout the Americas, was to have a novel foundation. In Nicaragua, it took as its guiding principle the ideal of non-interference in domestic political affairs. To argue that Somoza's ascent was directly promoted and indirectly facilitated by the practical application of this doctrine is not to suggest that his assumption of power represented, for Washington, an achieved goal. That Somoza rose to power during the infancy of good neighbourism, however, was more than coincidence. The relationship between the two countries, and between the political actors in each of them, was more complex — and certainly more interesting — than much of the received wisdom has tended to suggest. This chapter looks at how the United States applied the policy of becoming good neighbours to Nicaragua that led to Somoza's leadership, which endured until his assassination, and a regime that dominated the country for a very long time.

Discussion of the uses of indicative conditionals. Reasons for holding that when the antecedent is true, the conditional has the same truth value as the consequent. Conditionals as ‘inference‐tickets’. Non‐interference conditionals: ‘Even if A, still C’. So‐called ‘biscuit conditionals’.

This chapter discusses the role of the African Union (AU) in implementing the responsibility to protect (RtoP) in Africa, especially the relation of Article 4(h) of its Act to the principles of “non indifference” and “non-interference.” It considers whether (African) regional organizations have a residual role in implementing the RtoP, especially in light of the AU “Ezulwini Consensus” and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Documents. Additionally, the chapter briefly examines the relevance of the African Peace and Security Architecture, especially concerning the powers of the AU Peace and Security Council, and the Union's cooperation with Regional Economic Communities. Finally, it examines the legality of regional implementation of RtoP under international law.

This chapter examines the context and dynamics of promoting responsibility to protect (RtoP) in the Asia Pacific, focusing on China and Southeast Asia and the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A discussion of other Asia Pacific countries' positions on the the RtoP debate in the United Nations in July 2009 is also presented to show whether there is an emerging consensus in the region about the principle and its application. It is argued that, notwithstanding a number of challenges and constraints, a stronger commitment in protecting peoples against mass atrocities is possible in the long run. This would depend largely on how the RtoP is adapted and operationalized in the context of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, which is still valued by many states in the region. At the same time, there is a need to promote constituency-building around RtoP at both regional and domestic levels.

The duty to respect property by not interfering with it should not involve the duty-ower in any personal dealings with the owner in order to respect his ownership. The duty of non-interference with respect to most kinds of property is quite straightforward. The duty can, broadly speaking, prohibit two classes of interference: specific interference with the owner's own use and the unlicensed use of the property by a non-owner that to some extent dispossesses the owner; both clearly interfere with the owner's determination of how his property is to be used. Figuring out how a sensible duty of non-interference protects choses in action is the key to understanding how they are property, but this task is complicated by the fact that common law jurisdictions recognise two separate kinds of ownership of rights in action: legal choses and choses in equity. This chapter also discusses the law of wrongs.

This chapter examines the legitimation efforts of ECOWAS from three perspectives: norms, institutions, and compliance. It highlights how military interventions by ECOWAS to address the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s strongly challenged its legitimacy in the eyes of a number of some of its member states, not least because they were seen at odds with the traditional principle of non-intervention. It shows that this resulted in efforts by ECOWAS members to develop a new regional norm emphasising “non-indifference” over the traditional norm of “non-interference”, and the strengthening of its security architecture to enforce the principle of non-indifference and legitimise ECOWAS’s new role. Through several examples, the chapter also highlights the limits of ECOWAS’s legitimation efforts, not least the reliance on the regional hegemon, Nigeria, to provide the necessary resources to enforce ECOWAS’s decisions.

This chapter considers the issues of child discipline and favouritism and ‘the rules’ that apply to the relationship between grandparents and their grandchildren. It asks: 1) does the ‘norm of non-interference’ mean that grandparents should hesitate to discipline their grandchildren? 2) do grandparents often ‘spoil’ grandchildren, and do parents object to the grandparents' indulgence and lax discipline? 3) are there rules about reprimanding grandchildren when a parent is present? 4) are grandparents who have been asked to provide regular childcare given free rein to discipline their grandchildren as if they were their own children? 5) do parents feel resentful when they learn that their ex-spouse's parents have reprimanded their child for bad behaviour?

Chapter 11 summarizes the central argument of the book—that the global spread of diaspora institutions is now being driven by the accelerating evolution of a global migration regime, and is enabling the re-emergence of strategic competitions over population in some parts of the world. The chapter highlights the main conceptual and practical contributions of the book, and highlights priorities for future research, including on the emergence of ‘authoritarian emigration states’ at the time of writing. It also argues that the emerging global migration regime needs more clearly articulated principles to guide the benevolent engagement of diasporas in their homelands, and to avoid outbreaks of human geopolitics. The chapter outlines principles of internal non-interference, external non-interference, non-preference as starting points.

If agency is the affirmation of one’s subjective existence through concrete action in the world, political freedom is the set of interpersonal conditions that make this affirming action possible. To be free in this sense is to be able to exercise one’s agency, to live among others in such a way that the possibility of affirming one’s identity in one’s deeds is generally open, or not systematically foreclosed. This chapter examines three views of freedom that are highly influential in political theory today through the lens of non-sovereign agency: freedom as non-interference, freedom as non-domination, and freedom as collective world-making. In addition, an ideal of freedom as non-oppression is developed and its value defended. Freedom takes multiple forms because the enabling conditions of agency are diverse. Persons can be more and less free, and free in different ways, depending on which enabling conditions are present and on how deeply and widely entrenched in society they are.

Most theories of freedom today are alike in being monist rather than pluralist in character. A pluralist view would recognize multiple forms of freedom that operate concurrently in the same domains and it would resist an easy rank ordering of them. It would insist that no one account of freedom can capture without remainder all that is important to the meaning of freedom in any sphere of activity. The non-sovereign model of human agency points to the plurality of freedom because it makes clear both the limits and the value of political freedom in its various forms. This chapter defends a pluralism of freedom, drawing on the concepts of non-interference, non-domination, non-oppression, and collective world-making. It then specifies how these different forms of freedom can be expected to interact in a liberal-democratic society such as the U.S., what principles might be employed in the effort to balance them relative to one another, and what advantages there are in conceiving freedom in this multidimensional way.

This chapter examines the role of law and rights for democracy in the context of republicanism. It considers the neo-republican defense of judicial review and its attempt to secure individual rights, along with the ‘adjudication’ of political and social conflicts in courts, civic equality and the political struggle among citizens as an essential component of republican democracy. It highlights the link between the very nature of a rights claim and a democratic process that ensures political equality and relates this democratic argument for rights to the republican notion of liberty as nondomination. The chapter also discusses liberalism, rights and freedom as non-interference and concludes by arguing that the association of rights and democracy must be actualised within a real democratic process characterised by one person one vote, majority rule and regular elections between rival political parties.

Chapter 4 discusses the moral desert of punishment. After establishing the force of desert claims—that the claim ‘S deserves punishment’ signals a pro tanto ground for punishment, as Feinberg maintains—and why Morris’s argument concerning the fair distribution of the basic benefits and burdens of non-interference cannot be used to explicate desert of punishment, a distinction is drawn between a communicative and non-communicative understanding of such desert. On the communicative understanding, desert of punishment derives from desert of negative moral reactive attitudes; punishment is a vehicle for communicating to wrongdoers the negative attitudes they deserve. According to the non-communicative understanding, it is non-derivatively just that moral wrongdoers deliberately be made to suffer a loss. The difficulty with the latter, it is argued, is that it is uncomfortably close to the traditional moral retributivist understanding (on which morally culpable wrongdoers deserve to suffer simpliciter) that many deem morally indefensible.

This chapter explains the historical wellsprings and national interests that motivate China’s increasingly ambitious global policies including the Belt and Road Initiative. It discusses how Chinese security concerns, especially those related to Xinjiang, along with broader strategic aims lead Beijing to play a greater role in continental Eurasia. There China’s involvement tends to start with economic and trade relations, but in recent years (and especially under the leadership of President Xi Jinping), China has moved from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement” in ways that stray from “non-interference.” To accomplish its global aims, China is developing new tools of economic statecraft, security, and diplomacy. These are described in detail, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the China International Development Cooperation Agency, a modernized military with greater power projection capabilities, the port facility in Djibouti, private security contractors, the China Global Television Network, and new technologies for political repression.

This chapter shows how regional multilateralism contributed to the decline in mass atrocities. It proceeds in three main parts. First, it charts the rise of East Asian multilateralism and shows how the “ASEAN way” developed and was gradually exported to the rest of the region giving rise to both common rules and informal practices that have helped facilitate the decline of mass atrocities by promoting state consolidation and economic development whilst managing disputes between states. The second part of the chapter examines some of these norms and practices in more detail, showing how regional multilateralism has contributed to the decline of mass atrocities through normative socialization and conflict management. The final section turns to some of the perceived limits of multilateralism, focusing in particular on the incapacity of the region’s supranational institutions, the absence of shared identities, and the region’s inability to resolve protracted disputes.

This chapter provides a philosophical examination of the various dimensions of commercial sex as a form of work. It then offers perspectives on the legitimate role of the criminal law in regulating commercial sex, based upon three limiting principles. The first is a principle of ‘minimalism’ such that the criminal law should only be used as a last resort. The second is a principle of ‘modest legal moralism’ such that the criminal law should be reserved as a legal response to public wrongs. Finally, the third principle is a ‘presumption of non-interference’ based in the liberal harm principle, so that state coercion is limited to situations of direct or indirect harm. Given these three limiting principles, the chapter asks if the criminal law has a legitimate role in regulating, restricting, or prohibiting sex work.

This chapter explores why the international community has so often failed to protect people from genocide and mass atrocities. On the one hand, it shows that the colonial experience has made many states wary of Western interventionism and protective of their sovereignty. As a result, the contemporary international order is governed by rules designed to protect rights of self-determination through rules dictating non-interference. The chapter points out that there are perfectly good reasons for international politics to be guided by these rules. On the other hand, failures to protect are sometimes born of states’ unwillingness to commit resources to help people in foreign countries. This chapter sets out the myriad reasons that mitigate against committing resources and people to “save strangers” abroad.