Tim Mulgan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199282203
- eISBN:
- 9780191603624
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928220X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book develops a new theory of the obligations to future generations, based on a new Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. The result is a coherent, ...
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This book develops a new theory of the obligations to future generations, based on a new Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. The result is a coherent, intuitively plausible moral theory that is not unreasonably demanding — even when extended to cover future people — and that accounts for a wide range of independently plausible intuitions covering individual morality, intergenerational justice, and international justice. In particular, it is superior to its two main rivals in this area: person-affecting theories and traditional Consequentialism. The former fall foul of Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, while the latter are invariably implausibly demanding. Furthermore, many puzzles in contemporary value theory (such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion) are best solved if strict Consequentialism is abandoned for a more moderate alternative. The heart of the book is the first systematic exploration of the Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. This yields a strong commitment to reproductive freedom, and also provides the best foundation for a liberal theory of intergenerational and international justice. The final chapters argue that while it will include a Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of reproduction, the best overall moral theory is likely to be a composite one, such as the Combined Consequentialism the author developed in The Demands of Consequentialism.Less
This book develops a new theory of the obligations to future generations, based on a new Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. The result is a coherent, intuitively plausible moral theory that is not unreasonably demanding — even when extended to cover future people — and that accounts for a wide range of independently plausible intuitions covering individual morality, intergenerational justice, and international justice. In particular, it is superior to its two main rivals in this area: person-affecting theories and traditional Consequentialism. The former fall foul of Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, while the latter are invariably implausibly demanding. Furthermore, many puzzles in contemporary value theory (such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion) are best solved if strict Consequentialism is abandoned for a more moderate alternative. The heart of the book is the first systematic exploration of the Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. This yields a strong commitment to reproductive freedom, and also provides the best foundation for a liberal theory of intergenerational and international justice. The final chapters argue that while it will include a Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of reproduction, the best overall moral theory is likely to be a composite one, such as the Combined Consequentialism the author developed in The Demands of Consequentialism.
Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of ...
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This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.Less
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.
Steve Vanderheiden
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195334609
- eISBN:
- 9780199868759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195334609.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter examines the extension of egalitarian justice theory to relations between generations (or intergenerational justice), as climate change likewise has effects upon future generations that ...
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This chapter examines the extension of egalitarian justice theory to relations between generations (or intergenerational justice), as climate change likewise has effects upon future generations that are regarded as giving rise to claims of intergenerational justice. Two main challenges to this extension of justice principles are considered: the problems associated with the difficulty in using egalitarian principles to make interpersonal comparisons among non-contemporaries, and the fact that it is apparently impossible for current policy decisions to harm specific persons in the future, given what Parfit terms the non-identity problem. It defends a foundation for obligations to futurity by appealing to the idea of foresight, which allows persons to reasonably predict the future effects of current actions, and thereby to account for them ethically.Less
This chapter examines the extension of egalitarian justice theory to relations between generations (or intergenerational justice), as climate change likewise has effects upon future generations that are regarded as giving rise to claims of intergenerational justice. Two main challenges to this extension of justice principles are considered: the problems associated with the difficulty in using egalitarian principles to make interpersonal comparisons among non-contemporaries, and the fact that it is apparently impossible for current policy decisions to harm specific persons in the future, given what Parfit terms the non-identity problem. It defends a foundation for obligations to futurity by appealing to the idea of foresight, which allows persons to reasonably predict the future effects of current actions, and thereby to account for them ethically.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines claims that compensation should be paid as a result of the lasting harm and benefit caused by historic injustice. It argues that present day parties who have benefited from the ...
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This chapter examines claims that compensation should be paid as a result of the lasting harm and benefit caused by historic injustice. It argues that present day parties who have benefited from the automatic effects of past wrongdoing may possess compensatory duties if others are still disadvantaged, insofar as the victims and beneficiaries are not in a state of moral equilibrium. It argues that any claims relating to compensation must make reference to some account of counterfactual reasoning in order to assess the degree of harm which has been suffered. The question of identifying the morally relevant counterfactual is something which has been frequently misunderstood, particularly in relation to exploitation. Having considered, and dismissed, objections stemming from the ‘non-identity problem’, the chapter concludes by putting forward a substantive defence of the claim that benefiting from injustice can give rise to rectificatory duties, even when the receipt of benefit is involuntary.Less
This chapter examines claims that compensation should be paid as a result of the lasting harm and benefit caused by historic injustice. It argues that present day parties who have benefited from the automatic effects of past wrongdoing may possess compensatory duties if others are still disadvantaged, insofar as the victims and beneficiaries are not in a state of moral equilibrium. It argues that any claims relating to compensation must make reference to some account of counterfactual reasoning in order to assess the degree of harm which has been suffered. The question of identifying the morally relevant counterfactual is something which has been frequently misunderstood, particularly in relation to exploitation. Having considered, and dismissed, objections stemming from the ‘non-identity problem’, the chapter concludes by putting forward a substantive defence of the claim that benefiting from injustice can give rise to rectificatory duties, even when the receipt of benefit is involuntary.
David Benatar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199296422
- eISBN:
- 9780191712005
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296422.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Engaging the non-identity problem, this chapter begins by showing that it is possible to be harmed by being brought into existence. In the process, a distinction is drawn between two quality of life ...
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Engaging the non-identity problem, this chapter begins by showing that it is possible to be harmed by being brought into existence. In the process, a distinction is drawn between two quality of life judgements — ‘a life worth starting’ and ‘a life worth continuing’. The chapter argues that coming into existence is always a harm. An asymmetry between pleasure and pain (and between benefit and harm more generally) is described and defended. Although the good things in one's life make one's life go better than it otherwise would have gone, one could not have been deprived by their absence if one had not existed. However, by coming into existence one does suffer harm.Less
Engaging the non-identity problem, this chapter begins by showing that it is possible to be harmed by being brought into existence. In the process, a distinction is drawn between two quality of life judgements — ‘a life worth starting’ and ‘a life worth continuing’. The chapter argues that coming into existence is always a harm. An asymmetry between pleasure and pain (and between benefit and harm more generally) is described and defended. Although the good things in one's life make one's life go better than it otherwise would have gone, one could not have been deprived by their absence if one had not existed. However, by coming into existence one does suffer harm.
R. Jay Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Consider a teenage girl who is contemplating motherhood. Prior to her becoming pregnant, it seems that she might truly judge that it would be a bad thing on balance to have a child at this stage in ...
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Consider a teenage girl who is contemplating motherhood. Prior to her becoming pregnant, it seems that she might truly judge that it would be a bad thing on balance to have a child at this stage in her life. After giving birth as a teenager, however, she might also truly judge that it is not a bad thing on balance that her child exists. These attitudes have commonly been thought to be in tension with each other. This chapter argues, however, that when correctly interpreted in deliberative terms, as judgments about the agent's reasons, the apparent conflict disappears. Giving birth changes the girl's situation, in ways that give rise to corresponding changes in her reasons for action and for various emotional responses. A consequence of this analysis, however, is that there may be mistakes or errors in deliberation that the agent is unable to regret having made. The teenage mother ought not to having conceived and given birth to a child at that stage in her life; and yet, as a mother, she can hardly regret having made the wrong decision in this particular matter. This raises large questions about the relation between justification and regret. Williams argues in ‘Moral Luck’ that our decisions can be justified or ‘unjustified’ retroactively through intervening circumstances that make regret either impossible or unavoidable. The chapter challenges Williams' assumption that justification and regret are necessarily connected in this way, and shows that the things that drive a wedge between justification and regret need not have anything to do with epistemic luck.Less
Consider a teenage girl who is contemplating motherhood. Prior to her becoming pregnant, it seems that she might truly judge that it would be a bad thing on balance to have a child at this stage in her life. After giving birth as a teenager, however, she might also truly judge that it is not a bad thing on balance that her child exists. These attitudes have commonly been thought to be in tension with each other. This chapter argues, however, that when correctly interpreted in deliberative terms, as judgments about the agent's reasons, the apparent conflict disappears. Giving birth changes the girl's situation, in ways that give rise to corresponding changes in her reasons for action and for various emotional responses. A consequence of this analysis, however, is that there may be mistakes or errors in deliberation that the agent is unable to regret having made. The teenage mother ought not to having conceived and given birth to a child at that stage in her life; and yet, as a mother, she can hardly regret having made the wrong decision in this particular matter. This raises large questions about the relation between justification and regret. Williams argues in ‘Moral Luck’ that our decisions can be justified or ‘unjustified’ retroactively through intervening circumstances that make regret either impossible or unavoidable. The chapter challenges Williams' assumption that justification and regret are necessarily connected in this way, and shows that the things that drive a wedge between justification and regret need not have anything to do with epistemic luck.
Lukas H. Meyer and Dominic Roser
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Reflecting the normative significance of specific features of intergenerational relations this chapter investigates the justice claims of future people vis-à-vis currently living people. It discusses ...
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Reflecting the normative significance of specific features of intergenerational relations this chapter investigates the justice claims of future people vis-à-vis currently living people. It discusses sufficientarian and egalitarian conceptions of justice, and argues that a sufficientarian approach is appropriate in the intergenerational context. This conclusion is based, first, on the argument that by relying on a threshold conception of harm we can solve the non-identity problem and that there are good reasons to specify the relevant threshold in sufficientarian terms. Second, it is based upon an examination of reasons given for a sufficientarian understanding of global justice. These reasons are shown to speak even more strongly for a sufficientarian understanding of intergenerational justice.Less
Reflecting the normative significance of specific features of intergenerational relations this chapter investigates the justice claims of future people vis-à-vis currently living people. It discusses sufficientarian and egalitarian conceptions of justice, and argues that a sufficientarian approach is appropriate in the intergenerational context. This conclusion is based, first, on the argument that by relying on a threshold conception of harm we can solve the non-identity problem and that there are good reasons to specify the relevant threshold in sufficientarian terms. Second, it is based upon an examination of reasons given for a sufficientarian understanding of global justice. These reasons are shown to speak even more strongly for a sufficientarian understanding of intergenerational justice.
David Benatar
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590704
- eISBN:
- 9780191595547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590704.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
It is argued that the strength or scope of the right to reproductive freedom currently recognized in liberal democracies needs to be reconsidered, such that it does not include a right to engage in ...
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It is argued that the strength or scope of the right to reproductive freedom currently recognized in liberal democracies needs to be reconsidered, such that it does not include a right to engage in very risky or harmful procreation. More specifically, it is argued that if there would be no right to impose risk X of harm Y to some other person in non‐reproductive contexts, then there should be no right to do so in reproductive contexts. Thus, some (but not all) methods, including some coercive methods, of preventing or discouraging such reproduction are morally acceptable. Two arguments against this thesis are examined. The first is the ‘non‐identity’ argument that people cannot be harmed by being brought into existence. This is an argument against the possibility of wrongful life. The second argument is that, although the interests of future people are important, these are outweighed by their parents' right to reproductive freedom. After discerning different senses of a right to reproductive freedom, four arguments for the special importance of reproductive freedom are considered. It is argued that none of them is sufficient to undermine the thesis that there should be limits on the right to reproductive freedom. Because of the long history of bias and arbitrary discrimination in curtailments of reproductive freedom, some suggestions for avoiding bias are provided.Less
It is argued that the strength or scope of the right to reproductive freedom currently recognized in liberal democracies needs to be reconsidered, such that it does not include a right to engage in very risky or harmful procreation. More specifically, it is argued that if there would be no right to impose risk X of harm Y to some other person in non‐reproductive contexts, then there should be no right to do so in reproductive contexts. Thus, some (but not all) methods, including some coercive methods, of preventing or discouraging such reproduction are morally acceptable. Two arguments against this thesis are examined. The first is the ‘non‐identity’ argument that people cannot be harmed by being brought into existence. This is an argument against the possibility of wrongful life. The second argument is that, although the interests of future people are important, these are outweighed by their parents' right to reproductive freedom. After discerning different senses of a right to reproductive freedom, four arguments for the special importance of reproductive freedom are considered. It is argued that none of them is sufficient to undermine the thesis that there should be limits on the right to reproductive freedom. Because of the long history of bias and arbitrary discrimination in curtailments of reproductive freedom, some suggestions for avoiding bias are provided.
Rahul Kumar
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The discussion of obligations to future generations often assumes that though the global poor can be wronged because there are obligations the affluent owe to them, those who will live in the further ...
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The discussion of obligations to future generations often assumes that though the global poor can be wronged because there are obligations the affluent owe to them, those who will live in the further future can't. They can't be wronged, the thought goes, because though we have obligations with regard to future generations, they aren't obligations owed to them. This chapter argues that the assumption is mistaken. Adopting a Scanlonian contractualist account of what it is for one person to wrong another, it turns out that there is no good reason to think that those who will live in the further future can't be wronged by the choices we make now. This conclusion, it is suggested, has importance for how we understand the normative basis of claims to reparations for past injustice.Less
The discussion of obligations to future generations often assumes that though the global poor can be wronged because there are obligations the affluent owe to them, those who will live in the further future can't. They can't be wronged, the thought goes, because though we have obligations with regard to future generations, they aren't obligations owed to them. This chapter argues that the assumption is mistaken. Adopting a Scanlonian contractualist account of what it is for one person to wrong another, it turns out that there is no good reason to think that those who will live in the further future can't be wronged by the choices we make now. This conclusion, it is suggested, has importance for how we understand the normative basis of claims to reparations for past injustice.
Ruth Deech and Anna Smajdor
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199219780
- eISBN:
- 9780191713002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219780.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
This chapter explores the ethical issues raised by reproductive technologies. The authors discuss the idea that relief of infertility is in itself a worthy ethical goal. They evaluate the concept of ...
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This chapter explores the ethical issues raised by reproductive technologies. The authors discuss the idea that relief of infertility is in itself a worthy ethical goal. They evaluate the concept of autonomy in the context of reproduction, and evaluate the role of law and regulation in constraining people's reproductive desires. The risks associated with reproductive technology are discussed, and the effects of individual reproductive decisions on the public are considered. The importance of consent in the context of fertility treatment is explored, and the idea that reproduction is inherently private is analysed. Ethical considerations related to children born as a result of reproductive children are also considered.Less
This chapter explores the ethical issues raised by reproductive technologies. The authors discuss the idea that relief of infertility is in itself a worthy ethical goal. They evaluate the concept of autonomy in the context of reproduction, and evaluate the role of law and regulation in constraining people's reproductive desires. The risks associated with reproductive technology are discussed, and the effects of individual reproductive decisions on the public are considered. The importance of consent in the context of fertility treatment is explored, and the idea that reproduction is inherently private is analysed. Ethical considerations related to children born as a result of reproductive children are also considered.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on ...
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This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.Less
This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.
John Malcolm
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239062
- eISBN:
- 9780191679827
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239062.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter undertakes some observations of the Third Man Argument (TMA). Although the two basic assumptions upon which the TMA rests are inconsistent — for by Non-Identity the Form is not an ...
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This chapter undertakes some observations of the Third Man Argument (TMA). Although the two basic assumptions upon which the TMA rests are inconsistent — for by Non-Identity the Form is not an instance of itself and by Self-Exemplification it is — it is argued that the TMA need not be presented as an argument with inconsistent premisses, but may be seen as generating an unending regress through requiring, for each move, an additional move in order to avoid inconsistency. It is stressed that Non-Identity is logically independent of transcendence and has to hold for most, but not all, Forms.Less
This chapter undertakes some observations of the Third Man Argument (TMA). Although the two basic assumptions upon which the TMA rests are inconsistent — for by Non-Identity the Form is not an instance of itself and by Self-Exemplification it is — it is argued that the TMA need not be presented as an argument with inconsistent premisses, but may be seen as generating an unending regress through requiring, for each move, an additional move in order to avoid inconsistency. It is stressed that Non-Identity is logically independent of transcendence and has to hold for most, but not all, Forms.
Gail Fine
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235491
- eISBN:
- 9780191597398
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235496.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The Third Man Argument is a regress argument that purports to show that if there is even one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. That a regress can be identified is in itself an ...
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The Third Man Argument is a regress argument that purports to show that if there is even one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. That a regress can be identified is in itself an objection to the theory of forms because forms ought to be unique; and a regress would destroy the possibility of knowledge. Apart from the one in the Peri Idēon, there are at least three other versions of the Third Man Argument; two in Plato's Parmenides, and one recorded by Eudemus. In this chapter, Fine explores the logic of and interconnections between the four regress arguments; she argues that the four arguments share the same premises (i.e. self‐predication, the one over many assumption, and a non‐identity assumption), and draw the same inference from these premises, i.e. that if there is one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. Furthermore, each argument conceives the forms as properties (in particular Aristotle's and Eudemus’ versions); hence Fine argues that, logically, they are the same argument.Less
The Third Man Argument is a regress argument that purports to show that if there is even one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. That a regress can be identified is in itself an objection to the theory of forms because forms ought to be unique; and a regress would destroy the possibility of knowledge. Apart from the one in the Peri Idēon, there are at least three other versions of the Third Man Argument; two in Plato's Parmenides, and one recorded by Eudemus. In this chapter, Fine explores the logic of and interconnections between the four regress arguments; she argues that the four arguments share the same premises (i.e. self‐predication, the one over many assumption, and a non‐identity assumption), and draw the same inference from these premises, i.e. that if there is one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. Furthermore, each argument conceives the forms as properties (in particular Aristotle's and Eudemus’ versions); hence Fine argues that, logically, they are the same argument.
Gail Fine
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235491
- eISBN:
- 9780191597398
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235496.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
If Plato is committed to the premises of the Third Man Argument, he is vulnerable to the Third Man Argument. Fine has argued that Plato is committed to self‐predication (in a broad sense); hence, if ...
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If Plato is committed to the premises of the Third Man Argument, he is vulnerable to the Third Man Argument. Fine has argued that Plato is committed to self‐predication (in a broad sense); hence, if he is not vulnerable to the Third Man Argument, he must not be committed to either one or the other of the non‐identity assumption and the one over many assumption. Fine argues that since Plato rejects both of these assumptions, in the senses necessary to carry the regress argument, he is not vulnerable to the Third Man Argument. Plato records the argument in the Parmenides, Fine argues, in order to stress the importance of clarifying the sort of self‐predication, non‐identity, and one over many assumptions that are compatible with a theory of forms. Finally, Fine once again explains that this reading does not mean that Aristotle's interpretation of Plato in the Peri Idēon is mistaken; and we can understand how this is so once we grasp Aristotle's argumentative strategy.Less
If Plato is committed to the premises of the Third Man Argument, he is vulnerable to the Third Man Argument. Fine has argued that Plato is committed to self‐predication (in a broad sense); hence, if he is not vulnerable to the Third Man Argument, he must not be committed to either one or the other of the non‐identity assumption and the one over many assumption. Fine argues that since Plato rejects both of these assumptions, in the senses necessary to carry the regress argument, he is not vulnerable to the Third Man Argument. Plato records the argument in the Parmenides, Fine argues, in order to stress the importance of clarifying the sort of self‐predication, non‐identity, and one over many assumptions that are compatible with a theory of forms. Finally, Fine once again explains that this reading does not mean that Aristotle's interpretation of Plato in the Peri Idēon is mistaken; and we can understand how this is so once we grasp Aristotle's argumentative strategy.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 1986
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198249085
- eISBN:
- 9780191598173
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824908X.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Examines how our identity depends on when we were conceived. It discusses cases that involve all and only the same people, same numbers but different people, and different numbers of people; what ...
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Examines how our identity depends on when we were conceived. It discusses cases that involve all and only the same people, same numbers but different people, and different numbers of people; what weight we should give to the interests of future people. It examines the case of a young girl's child; how lowering the quality of life might be worse for no one; and whether this fact makes any moral difference.Less
Examines how our identity depends on when we were conceived. It discusses cases that involve all and only the same people, same numbers but different people, and different numbers of people; what weight we should give to the interests of future people. It examines the case of a young girl's child; how lowering the quality of life might be worse for no one; and whether this fact makes any moral difference.
Matthew D. Adler
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195384994
- eISBN:
- 9780199918348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384994.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter outlines three large, difficult, and important problems, connected to the social welfare function (SWF) framework. First, what is the appropriate legal role of the SWF framework? Should ...
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This chapter outlines three large, difficult, and important problems, connected to the social welfare function (SWF) framework. First, what is the appropriate legal role of the SWF framework? Should governmental officials be legally required to use SWFs in evaluating laws and regulations, just as they are currently required (at least to some extent) to use cost-benefit analysis? Second, how should the SWF framework be outfitted to handle non-identity problems, variable populations, and infinite populations? This book has assumed that each of the members of a “population” (the individuals whose well-being is of interest to the decisionmaker) exist in all of the possible outcomes of choice; that the size of the population is the same number in all outcomes; and that this number is finite. What happens when these assumptions are relaxed? Finally, how should considerations of individual responsibility be integrated into the SWF framework? This chapter addresses these final questions.Less
This chapter outlines three large, difficult, and important problems, connected to the social welfare function (SWF) framework. First, what is the appropriate legal role of the SWF framework? Should governmental officials be legally required to use SWFs in evaluating laws and regulations, just as they are currently required (at least to some extent) to use cost-benefit analysis? Second, how should the SWF framework be outfitted to handle non-identity problems, variable populations, and infinite populations? This book has assumed that each of the members of a “population” (the individuals whose well-being is of interest to the decisionmaker) exist in all of the possible outcomes of choice; that the size of the population is the same number in all outcomes; and that this number is finite. What happens when these assumptions are relaxed? Finally, how should considerations of individual responsibility be integrated into the SWF framework? This chapter addresses these final questions.
Anja J. Karnein
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199782475
- eISBN:
- 9780199933297
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782475.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter spells out what it means to respect the independence of future persons. People frequently overlook the dangers inherent in the asymmetry of the relationship between the generations. They ...
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This chapter spells out what it means to respect the independence of future persons. People frequently overlook the dangers inherent in the asymmetry of the relationship between the generations. They think that adults are always entitled to make decisions about the “good” of their offspring, even if that entails interfering with their future children’s genetic constitution. In contrast, in this chapter independence is defended as the central notion for a morality of creating future persons. The only legitimate reason for members of the present generation to genetically intervene with future persons’ genetic make-up is to make sure that the latter are mentally and physically equipped for leading independent lives in order to protect them from domination by their contemporaries. The chapter proceeds by addressing five possible objections to this account. It closes with an argument about procreative responsibility, which maintains that the primary addressees of intergenerational obligations are not the child’s parents but society more generally.Less
This chapter spells out what it means to respect the independence of future persons. People frequently overlook the dangers inherent in the asymmetry of the relationship between the generations. They think that adults are always entitled to make decisions about the “good” of their offspring, even if that entails interfering with their future children’s genetic constitution. In contrast, in this chapter independence is defended as the central notion for a morality of creating future persons. The only legitimate reason for members of the present generation to genetically intervene with future persons’ genetic make-up is to make sure that the latter are mentally and physically equipped for leading independent lives in order to protect them from domination by their contemporaries. The chapter proceeds by addressing five possible objections to this account. It closes with an argument about procreative responsibility, which maintains that the primary addressees of intergenerational obligations are not the child’s parents but society more generally.
Stephen M. Gardiner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195379440
- eISBN:
- 9780199897100
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379440.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that the distant future poses a severe moral problem, the nature and extent of which has not yet been adequately appreciated. It also claims (1) that the problem is the main ...
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This chapter argues that the distant future poses a severe moral problem, the nature and extent of which has not yet been adequately appreciated. It also claims (1) that the problem is the main concern of distinctively intergenerational ethics, and (2) that it occurs both in a pure, long-term form manifest across human history and global populations, and also in degenerate forms which apply to shorter time periods and to social institutions. The problem is compared with the traditional prisoner's dilemma analysis, and climate change is offered as a leading example. Three major objections are also considered: the invisible hand, future uncertainty, and the philosophical non-identity problem made popular by Derek ParfitLess
This chapter argues that the distant future poses a severe moral problem, the nature and extent of which has not yet been adequately appreciated. It also claims (1) that the problem is the main concern of distinctively intergenerational ethics, and (2) that it occurs both in a pure, long-term form manifest across human history and global populations, and also in degenerate forms which apply to shorter time periods and to social institutions. The problem is compared with the traditional prisoner's dilemma analysis, and climate change is offered as a leading example. Three major objections are also considered: the invisible hand, future uncertainty, and the philosophical non-identity problem made popular by Derek Parfit
Daniel J. Levine
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199916061
- eISBN:
- 9780199980246
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916061.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Why is reification so resilient, and critique so difficult to sustain? Developing a critique of knowledge with its roots in Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, this chapter shows the depth of the ...
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Why is reification so resilient, and critique so difficult to sustain? Developing a critique of knowledge with its roots in Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, this chapter shows the depth of the problem in conceptual-philosophical terms and sketches a conceptual path for meeting it.Less
Why is reification so resilient, and critique so difficult to sustain? Developing a critique of knowledge with its roots in Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, this chapter shows the depth of the problem in conceptual-philosophical terms and sketches a conceptual path for meeting it.
David Boonin
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199682935
- eISBN:
- 9780191787713
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682935.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Our actions sometimes have an effect not only on the quality of life that people will enjoy in the future, but on which particular people will exist in the future to enjoy it. In cases where this is ...
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Our actions sometimes have an effect not only on the quality of life that people will enjoy in the future, but on which particular people will exist in the future to enjoy it. In cases where this is so, the combination of certain assumptions that most people seem to accept can yield conclusions that most people seem to reject. The resulting puzzle is known as the non-identity problem and it has important implications both for ethical theory and for a number of topics in applied ethics, including controversial issues in bioethics, environmental ethics, and disability ethics. The non-identity problem has been the subject of a great deal of discussion for nearly four decades, but this is the first book-length study devoted exclusively to its examination. The book begins by explaining what the problem is, why the problem matters, and what criteria a solution to the problem must satisfy in order to count as a successful one. It then provides a critical survey of the solutions to the problem that have thus far been proposed in the sizeable literature that the problem has generated and concludes by developing and defending an unorthodox alternative solution, one that differs fundamentally from virtually every other available approach.Less
Our actions sometimes have an effect not only on the quality of life that people will enjoy in the future, but on which particular people will exist in the future to enjoy it. In cases where this is so, the combination of certain assumptions that most people seem to accept can yield conclusions that most people seem to reject. The resulting puzzle is known as the non-identity problem and it has important implications both for ethical theory and for a number of topics in applied ethics, including controversial issues in bioethics, environmental ethics, and disability ethics. The non-identity problem has been the subject of a great deal of discussion for nearly four decades, but this is the first book-length study devoted exclusively to its examination. The book begins by explaining what the problem is, why the problem matters, and what criteria a solution to the problem must satisfy in order to count as a successful one. It then provides a critical survey of the solutions to the problem that have thus far been proposed in the sizeable literature that the problem has generated and concludes by developing and defending an unorthodox alternative solution, one that differs fundamentally from virtually every other available approach.
