Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It ...
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This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.Less
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter outlines a number of critical responses to the project of seeking to rectify historic injustice, and explains why they largely do not apply to international libertarian accounts of ...
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This chapter outlines a number of critical responses to the project of seeking to rectify historic injustice, and explains why they largely do not apply to international libertarian accounts of international justice. It distinguishes between backward-looking and forward-looking accounts of distributive justice in both ideal and non-ideal theory, and looks at how both accounts relate to ideas of rectificatory justice. If one advocates a forward-looking account of distributive justice, and so advocates a redistribution of resources with each new generation, then the rectificatory project will seem to be of little importance. However, this nonchalance in the face of historic injustice is unsustainable if one advocates backward-looking principles. Since international libertarians resist cosmopolitan calls for a generational redistribution of resources across political boundaries, they must carefully scrutinize the provenance of modern day distributions.Less
This chapter outlines a number of critical responses to the project of seeking to rectify historic injustice, and explains why they largely do not apply to international libertarian accounts of international justice. It distinguishes between backward-looking and forward-looking accounts of distributive justice in both ideal and non-ideal theory, and looks at how both accounts relate to ideas of rectificatory justice. If one advocates a forward-looking account of distributive justice, and so advocates a redistribution of resources with each new generation, then the rectificatory project will seem to be of little importance. However, this nonchalance in the face of historic injustice is unsustainable if one advocates backward-looking principles. Since international libertarians resist cosmopolitan calls for a generational redistribution of resources across political boundaries, they must carefully scrutinize the provenance of modern day distributions.
Gopal Sreenivasan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814794661
- eISBN:
- 9780814725276
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814794661.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter presents John Rawls' ideal and non-ideal theory of justice. The ideal theory argues that institutions are well ordered when they are both just and known to be just, and when individuals ...
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This chapter presents John Rawls' ideal and non-ideal theory of justice. The ideal theory argues that institutions are well ordered when they are both just and known to be just, and when individuals both accept and comply fully with the requirements these institutions impose on them. This notion suggests two different ways in which circumstances may fail to be ideal. On the one hand, background institutions may not be just; on the other hand, individuals may not fully comply with the standing requirements placed on them. For each kind of defective case, there is a corresponding branch of non-ideal theory—the partial compliance theory and the transitional theory. The former specifies what happens to an individual's obligations when others fail to do their fair share within some distributive scheme, while the latter specifies the obligations that individuals have to bring just institutions into existence.Less
This chapter presents John Rawls' ideal and non-ideal theory of justice. The ideal theory argues that institutions are well ordered when they are both just and known to be just, and when individuals both accept and comply fully with the requirements these institutions impose on them. This notion suggests two different ways in which circumstances may fail to be ideal. On the one hand, background institutions may not be just; on the other hand, individuals may not fully comply with the standing requirements placed on them. For each kind of defective case, there is a corresponding branch of non-ideal theory—the partial compliance theory and the transitional theory. The former specifies what happens to an individual's obligations when others fail to do their fair share within some distributive scheme, while the latter specifies the obligations that individuals have to bring just institutions into existence.
Gopal Sreenivasan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780195379907
- eISBN:
- 9780190267711
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195379907.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses non-ideal theory of justice and its significance in bioethics, with special emphasis on distributive justice. The two major branches of this theory are an innovation of John ...
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This chapter discusses non-ideal theory of justice and its significance in bioethics, with special emphasis on distributive justice. The two major branches of this theory are an innovation of John Rawls. The divisions are: the partial compliance theory and the transitional theory. But a discourse into non-ideal theory shouldn't stop there, as one may extend the concepts of the theory beyond the two branches mentioned above. The chapter concludes with an illustrative example of their extension vis-à-vis Rawls' division.Less
This chapter discusses non-ideal theory of justice and its significance in bioethics, with special emphasis on distributive justice. The two major branches of this theory are an innovation of John Rawls. The divisions are: the partial compliance theory and the transitional theory. But a discourse into non-ideal theory shouldn't stop there, as one may extend the concepts of the theory beyond the two branches mentioned above. The chapter concludes with an illustrative example of their extension vis-à-vis Rawls' division.
Rosa Terlazzo
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190280598
- eISBN:
- 9780190280628
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190280598.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Non-ideal theorists often charge that doing ideal theory involves unacceptable idealizations that make political philosophy’s recommendations inappropriate for real-world injustice. Using the test ...
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Non-ideal theorists often charge that doing ideal theory involves unacceptable idealizations that make political philosophy’s recommendations inappropriate for real-world injustice. Using the test case of adaptive preferences, the chapter shows that non-ideal theorizing runs the same risk. While work on adaptive preferences obviously belongs in non-ideal theory, proposals for appropriate political responses to adaptive preferences are almost universally taken to be constrained by respect-based requirements to avoid paternalistic intervention, and to defer to individuals’ conceptions of the good. Since both considerations are irrelevant for children, political solutions that focus only on respect fail to provide viable solutions to real-world injustice—at best they benefit children by happy and unintended accident, and at worst they negligently harm them. Political philosophers, then, must ask not simply whether to do both ideal and non-ideal theory, but also which common idealizations are often harmfully and inadvertently employed even in non-ideal theory.Less
Non-ideal theorists often charge that doing ideal theory involves unacceptable idealizations that make political philosophy’s recommendations inappropriate for real-world injustice. Using the test case of adaptive preferences, the chapter shows that non-ideal theorizing runs the same risk. While work on adaptive preferences obviously belongs in non-ideal theory, proposals for appropriate political responses to adaptive preferences are almost universally taken to be constrained by respect-based requirements to avoid paternalistic intervention, and to defer to individuals’ conceptions of the good. Since both considerations are irrelevant for children, political solutions that focus only on respect fail to provide viable solutions to real-world injustice—at best they benefit children by happy and unintended accident, and at worst they negligently harm them. Political philosophers, then, must ask not simply whether to do both ideal and non-ideal theory, but also which common idealizations are often harmfully and inadvertently employed even in non-ideal theory.
Daniel Engster
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198719564
- eISBN:
- 9780191788659
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719564.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter discusses the crisis of contemporary welfare states and the need for a new non-ideal theory of justice to address it. Many existing welfare policies have fallen out-of-step with the ...
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This chapter discusses the crisis of contemporary welfare states and the need for a new non-ideal theory of justice to address it. Many existing welfare policies have fallen out-of-step with the social and economic conditions of post-industrial countries and need to be reformed. Normative political philosophers have largely failed to discuss contemporary welfare state reform, or public policy more generally, due to a fixation on ideal justice theories. This chapter explores the distinction in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal justice theories and argues for the importance of developing a non-ideal justice theory to help guide contemporary welfare state reform. It further suggests that care ethics represents an especially valuable resource for developing a non-ideal theory of welfare state justice due to the fact that many of the problems facing people in post-industrial societies today are problems relating to care (childcare, care for the elderly, and so forth).Less
This chapter discusses the crisis of contemporary welfare states and the need for a new non-ideal theory of justice to address it. Many existing welfare policies have fallen out-of-step with the social and economic conditions of post-industrial countries and need to be reformed. Normative political philosophers have largely failed to discuss contemporary welfare state reform, or public policy more generally, due to a fixation on ideal justice theories. This chapter explores the distinction in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal justice theories and argues for the importance of developing a non-ideal justice theory to help guide contemporary welfare state reform. It further suggests that care ethics represents an especially valuable resource for developing a non-ideal theory of welfare state justice due to the fact that many of the problems facing people in post-industrial societies today are problems relating to care (childcare, care for the elderly, and so forth).
Matt Sleat
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780719088902
- eISBN:
- 9781781706190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719088902.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines the recent resurgence of interest in realist political theory, discusses the relationship between political realism and classical realism in ideal theory, and the relationship ...
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This chapter examines the recent resurgence of interest in realist political theory, discusses the relationship between political realism and classical realism in ideal theory, and the relationship between realism and the ideal/non-ideal theory debate. It concludes by setting out the structure of the argument of the monograph.Less
This chapter examines the recent resurgence of interest in realist political theory, discusses the relationship between political realism and classical realism in ideal theory, and the relationship between realism and the ideal/non-ideal theory debate. It concludes by setting out the structure of the argument of the monograph.
Mark Evans
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748620746
- eISBN:
- 9780748672042
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748620746.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter provides an historical overview of the just war tradition and how it has evolved over time, contending that its remarkable longevity should perhaps not be forgotten in any reassessment ...
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This chapter provides an historical overview of the just war tradition and how it has evolved over time, contending that its remarkable longevity should perhaps not be forgotten in any reassessment of its importance and plausibility. It then proceeds to identify some key features and issues in just war theory as a moral theory, in particular what it means to present it as “non-ideal”. It identifies some examples of its misuse which have mistakenly been cited as reasons to reject it. The chapter concludes with a statement of one contemporary version of the theory, with introductory discussion of its elements (in particular the argument for a theory of jus post bellum to supplement the traditional accounts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello) to preface the more detailed analyses to come.Less
This chapter provides an historical overview of the just war tradition and how it has evolved over time, contending that its remarkable longevity should perhaps not be forgotten in any reassessment of its importance and plausibility. It then proceeds to identify some key features and issues in just war theory as a moral theory, in particular what it means to present it as “non-ideal”. It identifies some examples of its misuse which have mistakenly been cited as reasons to reject it. The chapter concludes with a statement of one contemporary version of the theory, with introductory discussion of its elements (in particular the argument for a theory of jus post bellum to supplement the traditional accounts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello) to preface the more detailed analyses to come.
Robert Garner
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199396078
- eISBN:
- 9780199396108
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199396078.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Chapter 12 continues the debate about the moral value of animal lives. Its approach is inherently political, because it invokes the need to take into account non-ideal constraints on ideal theory. ...
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Chapter 12 continues the debate about the moral value of animal lives. Its approach is inherently political, because it invokes the need to take into account non-ideal constraints on ideal theory. Thus, while it might be the case that a valid ideal theory attaches considerable moral value to animal lives (as many other chapters in this book have suggested), the chapter argues that such a step is incompatible with the development of a realizable non-ideal theory of justice or morality for animals. This is partly because the killing of animals is such a central part of modern societies that to prohibit much of it, as the traditional animal rights ethic has sought to do, is politically unrealistic and borders on the utopian.Less
Chapter 12 continues the debate about the moral value of animal lives. Its approach is inherently political, because it invokes the need to take into account non-ideal constraints on ideal theory. Thus, while it might be the case that a valid ideal theory attaches considerable moral value to animal lives (as many other chapters in this book have suggested), the chapter argues that such a step is incompatible with the development of a realizable non-ideal theory of justice or morality for animals. This is partly because the killing of animals is such a central part of modern societies that to prohibit much of it, as the traditional animal rights ethic has sought to do, is politically unrealistic and borders on the utopian.
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198744047
- eISBN:
- 9780191804038
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744047.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, Environmental Politics
This introduction starts with an overview of the development of climate justice literature. It juxtaposes this with the extent and kind of climate action that has occurred in recent years. This leads ...
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This introduction starts with an overview of the development of climate justice literature. It juxtaposes this with the extent and kind of climate action that has occurred in recent years. This leads to the conclusion that normative theorizing on climate change should engage more with non-ideal theory which assumes (various types of) failures to comply with the demands of justice, as well as unfavourable circumstances. When it engages with the practical context, it can arrive at action-guidance. The various themes and issues covered by chapters of the volume, and its overall structure, are then described. The first part of the volume reflects on general issues in responding to the shortcomings of climate action whereas the second engages with practical reforms. The third part examines how moral values ought to be brought into the scientific, political, and public debates under non-ideal circumstances.Less
This introduction starts with an overview of the development of climate justice literature. It juxtaposes this with the extent and kind of climate action that has occurred in recent years. This leads to the conclusion that normative theorizing on climate change should engage more with non-ideal theory which assumes (various types of) failures to comply with the demands of justice, as well as unfavourable circumstances. When it engages with the practical context, it can arrive at action-guidance. The various themes and issues covered by chapters of the volume, and its overall structure, are then described. The first part of the volume reflects on general issues in responding to the shortcomings of climate action whereas the second engages with practical reforms. The third part examines how moral values ought to be brought into the scientific, political, and public debates under non-ideal circumstances.
Samuel Freeman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- July 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190699260
- eISBN:
- 9780190699291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190699260.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The first part of this chapter addresses Amartya Sen’s argument against Rawls’s reliance on ideal theory and “a perfectly just society.” I argue that Rawls’s ideal theory and principles of justice ...
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The first part of this chapter addresses Amartya Sen’s argument against Rawls’s reliance on ideal theory and “a perfectly just society.” I argue that Rawls’s ideal theory and principles of justice are not as redundant or irrelevant as Sen contends. The principles of justice that would be agreed to for an ideal society are necessary to determine a just distribution of income and wealth in our own non-ideal society. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss Sen’s rejection of Rawls’s “institutional approach” in favor of an account of “consequence-sensitive” evaluation of “comprehensive outcomes.” I argue that Rawls’s institutional approach, without being consequentialist, is also consequence-sensitive. I discuss some potential problems with a consequentialist interpretation of Sen’s comparative method and suggest that a pluralist interpretation of his account (one that combines deontological with consequentialist principles) is not as different from Rawls’s approach as Sen intends it to be.Less
The first part of this chapter addresses Amartya Sen’s argument against Rawls’s reliance on ideal theory and “a perfectly just society.” I argue that Rawls’s ideal theory and principles of justice are not as redundant or irrelevant as Sen contends. The principles of justice that would be agreed to for an ideal society are necessary to determine a just distribution of income and wealth in our own non-ideal society. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss Sen’s rejection of Rawls’s “institutional approach” in favor of an account of “consequence-sensitive” evaluation of “comprehensive outcomes.” I argue that Rawls’s institutional approach, without being consequentialist, is also consequence-sensitive. I discuss some potential problems with a consequentialist interpretation of Sen’s comparative method and suggest that a pluralist interpretation of his account (one that combines deontological with consequentialist principles) is not as different from Rawls’s approach as Sen intends it to be.
Ramon Das
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198812852
- eISBN:
- 9780191850646
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198812852.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that the philosophical debate around humanitarian intervention would be improved if it were less ‘ideal-theoretic’. It identifies two ideal-theoretic assumptions. One, in target ...
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This chapter argues that the philosophical debate around humanitarian intervention would be improved if it were less ‘ideal-theoretic’. It identifies two ideal-theoretic assumptions. One, in target states where humanitarian intervention is being considered, there are two distinct and easily identified groups: ‘bad guys’ committing serious human rights abuses, and innocent civilians against whom the abuses are being committed. Two, external to the target state in question, there are suitably qualified ‘good guys’—prospective interveners who possess both the requisite military power and moral integrity. If the assumptions hold, the prospects for successful humanitarian intervention are much greater. As a contrast, some possible non-ideal assumptions are that (i) there are many bad guys in a civil war, and (ii) the good guy intervener is itself supporting some of the bad guys. If these non-ideal assumptions hold, prospects for successful humanitarian intervention are small.Less
This chapter argues that the philosophical debate around humanitarian intervention would be improved if it were less ‘ideal-theoretic’. It identifies two ideal-theoretic assumptions. One, in target states where humanitarian intervention is being considered, there are two distinct and easily identified groups: ‘bad guys’ committing serious human rights abuses, and innocent civilians against whom the abuses are being committed. Two, external to the target state in question, there are suitably qualified ‘good guys’—prospective interveners who possess both the requisite military power and moral integrity. If the assumptions hold, the prospects for successful humanitarian intervention are much greater. As a contrast, some possible non-ideal assumptions are that (i) there are many bad guys in a civil war, and (ii) the good guy intervener is itself supporting some of the bad guys. If these non-ideal assumptions hold, prospects for successful humanitarian intervention are small.
Thomas J. Donahue-Ochoa
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190051686
- eISBN:
- 9780190051716
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190051686.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Chapter 1 argues that careful diagnosis of injustices is central to understanding what to do about them. This requires differential diagnosis: the comparative assessment of different diagnoses of ...
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Chapter 1 argues that careful diagnosis of injustices is central to understanding what to do about them. This requires differential diagnosis: the comparative assessment of different diagnoses of injustice. Yet present-day political theory treats such diagnostics as only a marginal task, even though past political theory considered it central. Chapter 1 undermines this marginalization, by tracing it to the tradition begun by John Rawls and its faulty practice of non-ideal theory. It argues that by the tradition’s own principles, non-ideal theory cannot succeed without such diagnostics. The chapter then recuperates such diagnostics by describing the leading theories of systematic injustice. These theories constitute the closest thing we have to a nosology (the classification of diseases) and pathology (the study of disease in general) of systematic injustice. If we wish to see political theory once again take seriously the differential diagnosis of injustices, then it will have to take these theories seriously.Less
Chapter 1 argues that careful diagnosis of injustices is central to understanding what to do about them. This requires differential diagnosis: the comparative assessment of different diagnoses of injustice. Yet present-day political theory treats such diagnostics as only a marginal task, even though past political theory considered it central. Chapter 1 undermines this marginalization, by tracing it to the tradition begun by John Rawls and its faulty practice of non-ideal theory. It argues that by the tradition’s own principles, non-ideal theory cannot succeed without such diagnostics. The chapter then recuperates such diagnostics by describing the leading theories of systematic injustice. These theories constitute the closest thing we have to a nosology (the classification of diseases) and pathology (the study of disease in general) of systematic injustice. If we wish to see political theory once again take seriously the differential diagnosis of injustices, then it will have to take these theories seriously.
Charles W. Mills
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190245412
- eISBN:
- 9780190245450
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190245412.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Feminist philosophy—such as in the work of Onora O’Neill—has played a crucial role in the critique of “ideal theory,” Rawlsian and otherwise. This chapter seeks to build on O’Neill’s insights by ...
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Feminist philosophy—such as in the work of Onora O’Neill—has played a crucial role in the critique of “ideal theory,” Rawlsian and otherwise. This chapter seeks to build on O’Neill’s insights by making a case that ideal theory is in part ideological, serving the group interests of the socially privileged. It begins by differentiating the diverse senses of “ideal” and then laying out the main features of ideal theory in the sense under examination. It then argues that ideal theory has no adequate rationale and that its hegemony in mainstream ethico-political theory must therefore be sought elsewhere. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the virtues of non-ideal theory—for example, its superior capacity to generate descriptive and normative mapping concepts appropriate to the existing non-ideal world, and its greater realism about the obstacles to the realization of a more just society.Less
Feminist philosophy—such as in the work of Onora O’Neill—has played a crucial role in the critique of “ideal theory,” Rawlsian and otherwise. This chapter seeks to build on O’Neill’s insights by making a case that ideal theory is in part ideological, serving the group interests of the socially privileged. It begins by differentiating the diverse senses of “ideal” and then laying out the main features of ideal theory in the sense under examination. It then argues that ideal theory has no adequate rationale and that its hegemony in mainstream ethico-political theory must therefore be sought elsewhere. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the virtues of non-ideal theory—for example, its superior capacity to generate descriptive and normative mapping concepts appropriate to the existing non-ideal world, and its greater realism about the obstacles to the realization of a more just society.
Charles W. Mills
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190245412
- eISBN:
- 9780190245450
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190245412.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
How should liberals interested in the issue of racial justice relate to John Rawls’s work? Some, such as Elizabeth Anderson, have rejected a Rawlsian approach altogether, while others, such as Tommie ...
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How should liberals interested in the issue of racial justice relate to John Rawls’s work? Some, such as Elizabeth Anderson, have rejected a Rawlsian approach altogether, while others, such as Tommie Shelby, have contended that it can indeed be used as is. Shelby argues that Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity principle (FEO) can be extended to deal with racial inequality. In this critique of Shelby, the chapter raises five objections to this line of argument: Rawls’s own non-endorsement, the ideal theory/non-ideal theory distinction, the lexically subordinate positioning of FEO, non-controversiality and public reason, and the difference between class and racial injustice. The conclusion is that what is needed instead is a Rawlsian apparatus modified to deal with corrective justice.Less
How should liberals interested in the issue of racial justice relate to John Rawls’s work? Some, such as Elizabeth Anderson, have rejected a Rawlsian approach altogether, while others, such as Tommie Shelby, have contended that it can indeed be used as is. Shelby argues that Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity principle (FEO) can be extended to deal with racial inequality. In this critique of Shelby, the chapter raises five objections to this line of argument: Rawls’s own non-endorsement, the ideal theory/non-ideal theory distinction, the lexically subordinate positioning of FEO, non-controversiality and public reason, and the difference between class and racial injustice. The conclusion is that what is needed instead is a Rawlsian apparatus modified to deal with corrective justice.
Darrel Moellendorf
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198744047
- eISBN:
- 9780191804038
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744047.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, Environmental Politics
The urgent need for a comprehensive climate change mitigation treaty affects the kinds of reasons for mitigation that we should expect and can reasonably propose to others. Insofar as non-ideal ...
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The urgent need for a comprehensive climate change mitigation treaty affects the kinds of reasons for mitigation that we should expect and can reasonably propose to others. Insofar as non-ideal theory is dependent on an account of ideal theory which it serves, this chapter argues that non-ideal theory is ill suited to offer practical moral guidance in light of the urgency and alternatively that there are compelling normative reasons for taking the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) seriously. These include the promissory obligation that a state assumes by ratifying the convention, the duty of fairness in an international system of energy use and climate change mitigation expressed by commitment to the right to sustainable development, and the good of having a normative background to treaty negotiations. Additionally, given the likely costs of weakening the background norms, most states also have prudential reasons for seeking to maintain UNFCCC norms.Less
The urgent need for a comprehensive climate change mitigation treaty affects the kinds of reasons for mitigation that we should expect and can reasonably propose to others. Insofar as non-ideal theory is dependent on an account of ideal theory which it serves, this chapter argues that non-ideal theory is ill suited to offer practical moral guidance in light of the urgency and alternatively that there are compelling normative reasons for taking the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) seriously. These include the promissory obligation that a state assumes by ratifying the convention, the duty of fairness in an international system of energy use and climate change mitigation expressed by commitment to the right to sustainable development, and the good of having a normative background to treaty negotiations. Additionally, given the likely costs of weakening the background norms, most states also have prudential reasons for seeking to maintain UNFCCC norms.
Joseph Millum and Ezekiel J. Emanuel (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780195379907
- eISBN:
- 9780190267711
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195379907.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Despite the massive scale of global inequalities, until recently few political philosophers or bioethicists addressed their ethical implications. Questions of justice were thought to be primarily ...
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Despite the massive scale of global inequalities, until recently few political philosophers or bioethicists addressed their ethical implications. Questions of justice were thought to be primarily internal to the nation state. Over the last decade or so, there has been an explosion of interest in the philosophical issues surrounding global justice. These issues are of direct relevance to bioethics. The links between poverty and health imply that we cannot separate questions of global health from questions about fair distribution of global resources and the institutions governing the world order. Similarly, as increasing numbers of medical trials are conducted in the developing world, researchers and their sponsors have to confront the special problems of doing research in an unjust world, with corresponding obligations to correct injustice and avoid exploitation. This book addresses the key issues concerning global justice and bioethics from two perspectives. The first is ideal theory, which is concerned with the social institutions that would regulate a just world. What is the relationship between human rights and the provision of health care? How, if at all, should a global order distinguish between obligations to compatriots and others? The second perspective is from non-ideal theory, which governs how people should behave in the unjust world in which we actually find ourselves. What sort of medical care should actual researchers working in impoverished countries offer their subjects? What should NGOs do in the face of cultural practices with which they deem unethical? If coordinated international action will not happen, what ought individual states to do?Less
Despite the massive scale of global inequalities, until recently few political philosophers or bioethicists addressed their ethical implications. Questions of justice were thought to be primarily internal to the nation state. Over the last decade or so, there has been an explosion of interest in the philosophical issues surrounding global justice. These issues are of direct relevance to bioethics. The links between poverty and health imply that we cannot separate questions of global health from questions about fair distribution of global resources and the institutions governing the world order. Similarly, as increasing numbers of medical trials are conducted in the developing world, researchers and their sponsors have to confront the special problems of doing research in an unjust world, with corresponding obligations to correct injustice and avoid exploitation. This book addresses the key issues concerning global justice and bioethics from two perspectives. The first is ideal theory, which is concerned with the social institutions that would regulate a just world. What is the relationship between human rights and the provision of health care? How, if at all, should a global order distinguish between obligations to compatriots and others? The second perspective is from non-ideal theory, which governs how people should behave in the unjust world in which we actually find ourselves. What sort of medical care should actual researchers working in impoverished countries offer their subjects? What should NGOs do in the face of cultural practices with which they deem unethical? If coordinated international action will not happen, what ought individual states to do?
Steven R. Ratner
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198704041
- eISBN:
- 9780191773204
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704041.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law, Philosophy of Law
This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, namely to offer a new approach to global justice that integrates the work and insights of international law and ethics. The book analyses the ...
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This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, namely to offer a new approach to global justice that integrates the work and insights of international law and ethics. The book analyses the international legal order for its contribution to global justice. It demonstrates that to build a more just world order, one must understand what has been achieved in international law and institutions. The chapter then explains how the appraisal of the law and legal institutions is a project of non-ideal theory in the philosophical sense. It highlights the fact that while non-ideal theories of global justice are not new, the non-ideal theory offered in this book is particular in one important sense: it is grounded in international law. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, namely to offer a new approach to global justice that integrates the work and insights of international law and ethics. The book analyses the international legal order for its contribution to global justice. It demonstrates that to build a more just world order, one must understand what has been achieved in international law and institutions. The chapter then explains how the appraisal of the law and legal institutions is a project of non-ideal theory in the philosophical sense. It highlights the fact that while non-ideal theories of global justice are not new, the non-ideal theory offered in this book is particular in one important sense: it is grounded in international law. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198744047
- eISBN:
- 9780191804038
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, Environmental Politics
Climate change confronts humanity with a challenge it has never faced before. It combines issues of global justice and intergenerational justice on an unprecedented scale. In particular, it stands to ...
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Climate change confronts humanity with a challenge it has never faced before. It combines issues of global justice and intergenerational justice on an unprecedented scale. In particular, it stands to adversely affect the global poor. So far, the global community has failed to reduce emissions to levels that are necessary to avoid unacceptable risks for the future. Nor are the burdens of emission reductions and of coping with climate impacts fairly shared. The shortcomings of both political and individual climate action thus seem like a paradigmatic case for non-ideal theory. Non-ideal theory can be understood as a form of political theorizing that compares different responses to (i) failures of agents to comply with the demands of justice and (ii) unfavourable circumstances. Insofar as non-ideal theory also aims to be action-guiding, it asks normative theorists for a more thorough engagement with the empirical context so as to arrive at practical recommendations for the ‘here and now’. This volume examines the normative issues that become relevant when the non-ideal circumstances of the climate context are fully taken into account. It comprises three parts. The first collects chapters that reflect on general issues in responding to the shortcomings of current climate action. Chapters in the second part propose more specific practical reforms. The third part examines how moral values ought to be brought into the scientific, political, and public debates under the non-ideal circumstances of this world.Less
Climate change confronts humanity with a challenge it has never faced before. It combines issues of global justice and intergenerational justice on an unprecedented scale. In particular, it stands to adversely affect the global poor. So far, the global community has failed to reduce emissions to levels that are necessary to avoid unacceptable risks for the future. Nor are the burdens of emission reductions and of coping with climate impacts fairly shared. The shortcomings of both political and individual climate action thus seem like a paradigmatic case for non-ideal theory. Non-ideal theory can be understood as a form of political theorizing that compares different responses to (i) failures of agents to comply with the demands of justice and (ii) unfavourable circumstances. Insofar as non-ideal theory also aims to be action-guiding, it asks normative theorists for a more thorough engagement with the empirical context so as to arrive at practical recommendations for the ‘here and now’. This volume examines the normative issues that become relevant when the non-ideal circumstances of the climate context are fully taken into account. It comprises three parts. The first collects chapters that reflect on general issues in responding to the shortcomings of current climate action. Chapters in the second part propose more specific practical reforms. The third part examines how moral values ought to be brought into the scientific, political, and public debates under the non-ideal circumstances of this world.
Holly M. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780199560080
- eISBN:
- 9780191853210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199560080.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The non-ideal Pragmatic theorist seeks the moral code whose usability value, if not perfect, nonetheless exceeds that of any rival code. Chapter 7 assesses the success of this approach, and concludes ...
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The non-ideal Pragmatic theorist seeks the moral code whose usability value, if not perfect, nonetheless exceeds that of any rival code. Chapter 7 assesses the success of this approach, and concludes that it fails. Comparing codes in terms of their usability value requires more information than any agent or theorist can command. Moreover, the code with the highest usability value is shown to be the moral laundry list, which earlier chapters rejected. Finally, Chapter 7 shows that there is no guarantee that the code with the highest usability value fulfills the rationales supporting the Usability Demand. Such a code will not necessarily offer agents the basic form of justice, providing everyone with the opportunity to lead a successful moral life; nor will it necessarily better enhance social welfare than rival codes; nor will it necessarily lead to a better pattern of actions among well-motivated agents.Less
The non-ideal Pragmatic theorist seeks the moral code whose usability value, if not perfect, nonetheless exceeds that of any rival code. Chapter 7 assesses the success of this approach, and concludes that it fails. Comparing codes in terms of their usability value requires more information than any agent or theorist can command. Moreover, the code with the highest usability value is shown to be the moral laundry list, which earlier chapters rejected. Finally, Chapter 7 shows that there is no guarantee that the code with the highest usability value fulfills the rationales supporting the Usability Demand. Such a code will not necessarily offer agents the basic form of justice, providing everyone with the opportunity to lead a successful moral life; nor will it necessarily better enhance social welfare than rival codes; nor will it necessarily lead to a better pattern of actions among well-motivated agents.