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Natural Goodness

Philippa Foot

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198235088
eISBN:
9780191597428
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198235089.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and ... More


 Knowing Spirits

John Russell Roberts

in A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195313932
eISBN:
9780199871926
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual ... More


Frege, Relativism and Faultless Disagreement

Sven Rosenkranz

in Relative Truth

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199234950
eISBN:
9780191715846
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Allegedly, relativism can make sense of faultless disagreements, where A and B faultlessly disagree if A sincerely asserts P, B sincerely asserts ~P and yet neither assertion is incorrect. Such cases ... More


Mental Agency and Metaethics

Matthew Evans and Nishi Shah

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199653492
eISBN:
9780191741661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter argues that none of the traditional anti-realist metaethical views—error theory, non-cognitivism, and constructivism—can fully accommodate certain central features of mental agency. It ... More


Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons

Ulrike Heuer

in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199599325
eISBN:
9780191741500
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the ... More


Expressivism

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Nature of Normativity

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199251315
eISBN:
9780191719127
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Many philosophers think that internalism supports a non-cognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive ... More


The Ontology of Reason Relations

John Skorupski

in The Domain of Reasons

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199587636
eISBN:
9780191595394
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 17 shows how reason relations differ from other relations in ways that can be summarised by saying that, unlike these other relations, reason relations are irreal. It also endorses a ... More


Introduction:: Metaethics and Normative Ethics

David Copp

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195147797
eISBN:
9780199785841
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195147790.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in ... More


Biology and Ethics

Philip Kitcher

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195147797
eISBN:
9780199785841
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195147790.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa ... More


Metaphor and Judgements of Experience

A. E. Denham

in Metaphor and Moral Experience

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198240105
eISBN:
9780191680076
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy

Experience can be difficult to describe and hence requires the use of figurative devices such as metaphors and similes. This chapter argues that figurative language sometimes succeeds in representing ... More


The Language of Morals

R. M. Hare

Published in print:
1963
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198810773
eISBN:
9780191597619
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198810776.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This book about ethics is, according to the author, an exercise in the logical study of the language of morals. In it, Hare presents his own brand of non‐cognitivism, generally referred to as ... More


A Fresh Start?

Philippa Foot

in Natural Goodness

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198235088
eISBN:
9780191597428
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198235089.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of ... More


Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake ?

Philippa Foot

in Moral Dilemmas: and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199252848
eISBN:
9780191597411
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019925284X.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake ... More


The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique

Ruth Leys

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780226488424
eISBN:
9780226488738
Item type:
book
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:
10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.001.0001
Subject:
History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine

This book analyzes the conflicting paradigms and interpretations that have governed the study of the emotions from the 1960s to the present. It seems obvious to the majority of today's researchers ... More


Spinoza and Natural Law

Jon Miller

in Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: From Plato to Spinoza

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199767175
eISBN:
9780199979592
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199767175.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

The chapter connects Spinoza's thought with important Stoic ideas and also with some contemporary metaethical issues. The core of Spinoza's normative view of law is that divine laws are end-oriented ... More


The Non-cognitivist Challenge

Russ Shafer-Landau

in Moral Realism: A Defence

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199259755
eISBN:
9780191601835
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259755.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Sets out the contours of the moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and provides an extended series of arguments against non‐cognitivism and expressivism. Seeks to establish a presumptive ... More


Nietzsche and Non-cognitivism

Nadeem J. Z. Hussain

in Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199583676
eISBN:
9780191745294
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583676.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible meta-ethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have ... More


A Grand Strategy

Herman Philipse

in God in the Age of Science?: A Critique of Religious Reason

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199697533
eISBN:
9780191738470
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Can we validate domain-specific methods of research for natural theology? All these methods have turned out to be unreliable, as is illustrated by the example of prayer (Mantra II, STEP). This fact ... More


Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge

Dorit Bar-On

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199590728
eISBN:
9780191725456
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter is a reply too Anthony Brueckner's critique of the Neo-Expressivist interpretation of avowals and its ramifications for the philosophical analysis of self-knowledge.


A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics

Jonas Olson and Mark Timmons

in Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199577446
eISBN:
9780191725425
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Metaethical non‐naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of ... More


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