David Ross
Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a ...
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The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.Less
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a ...
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According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘constitutive generalism’. This chapter defends a form of generalism and it argues against constitutive generalism by deploying a version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument.Less
According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘constitutive generalism’. This chapter defends a form of generalism and it argues against constitutive generalism by deploying a version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and ...
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This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.Less
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.
David O. Brink
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266401
- eISBN:
- 9780191600906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266409.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter focuses on Green's non-naturalism, which commits him to his own dualism, inasmuch as he seems to think that a precondition of conscious experience is an active self-conscious mind that ...
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This chapter focuses on Green's non-naturalism, which commits him to his own dualism, inasmuch as he seems to think that a precondition of conscious experience is an active self-conscious mind that is prior to and independent of experience and so outside space and time. It is argued that Green's non-naturalism is problematic. His non-naturalism about the self threatens to reintroduce the very dualism for which he criticizes Kant. A related problem afflicts his view of the Absolute. Whereas the metaphysical and epistemological arguments of the first part of the Prolegomena seem to demand a single transcendent self-consciousness that is outside space and time, much of Green's ethics, political philosophy, and theology seems to treat the corporate spiritual principle as a transhistorical agent that is immanent in the lives of individual agents and progressive social institutions. Green must choose whether the Absolute is transcendent or immanent.Less
This chapter focuses on Green's non-naturalism, which commits him to his own dualism, inasmuch as he seems to think that a precondition of conscious experience is an active self-conscious mind that is prior to and independent of experience and so outside space and time. It is argued that Green's non-naturalism is problematic. His non-naturalism about the self threatens to reintroduce the very dualism for which he criticizes Kant. A related problem afflicts his view of the Absolute. Whereas the metaphysical and epistemological arguments of the first part of the Prolegomena seem to demand a single transcendent self-consciousness that is outside space and time, much of Green's ethics, political philosophy, and theology seems to treat the corporate spiritual principle as a transhistorical agent that is immanent in the lives of individual agents and progressive social institutions. Green must choose whether the Absolute is transcendent or immanent.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter provides a partial defence of non-naturalism. It first provides an epistemological criterion for understanding the metaphysical thesis of non-naturalism and then proceeds to mount a ...
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This chapter provides a partial defence of non-naturalism. It first provides an epistemological criterion for understanding the metaphysical thesis of non-naturalism and then proceeds to mount a defence of the view against two common objections: objections based on facts about ethical disagreement, and on causal criteria for having ontological status. The strategy is to call attention to the close parallel between ethical inquiry and philosophical inquiry generally, and to argue that these parallels provide a basis for rejecting the lines of objection in question and also provide positive reasons to favour non-naturalism over its metaethical rivals. So first, just as disagreement in philosophy itself does not undermine (or should not undermine) thinking that there are objective truths about such matters, neither should disagreement in ethics undermine thinking that there are objective truths, or justified belief in such truths. As for the causal efficacy criterion of ontological status, Shafer–Landau argues that even if moral facts do not possess causal efficacy, we need not be sceptics about their ontological status as objectively real. If one insists on the causal efficacy test, then it looks as if all putative normative facts fail the criterion and are not real. The implausibility of this implication, then, casts doubt on the causal argument against moral facts.Less
This chapter provides a partial defence of non-naturalism. It first provides an epistemological criterion for understanding the metaphysical thesis of non-naturalism and then proceeds to mount a defence of the view against two common objections: objections based on facts about ethical disagreement, and on causal criteria for having ontological status. The strategy is to call attention to the close parallel between ethical inquiry and philosophical inquiry generally, and to argue that these parallels provide a basis for rejecting the lines of objection in question and also provide positive reasons to favour non-naturalism over its metaethical rivals. So first, just as disagreement in philosophy itself does not undermine (or should not undermine) thinking that there are objective truths about such matters, neither should disagreement in ethics undermine thinking that there are objective truths, or justified belief in such truths. As for the causal efficacy criterion of ontological status, Shafer–Landau argues that even if moral facts do not possess causal efficacy, we need not be sceptics about their ontological status as objectively real. If one insists on the causal efficacy test, then it looks as if all putative normative facts fail the criterion and are not real. The implausibility of this implication, then, casts doubt on the causal argument against moral facts.
Tristram McPherson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199653492
- eISBN:
- 9780191741661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in ...
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It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter defends: that a defensible non-naturalism is committed to the supervenience of the ethical, that this commits the non-naturalist to a brute necessary connection between properties of distinct kinds, and that commitment to such brute connections counts against the non-naturalist’s view. Each of these claims has recently been challenged. Against Nicholas Sturgeon’s recent doubts about the dialectical force of supervenience, this chapter defends a supervenience thesis as deserving to be common ground among ethical realists. It is then argued that attempts to explain supervenience on behalf of the non-naturalist either fail as explanations, generate near-identical explanatory burdens elsewhere, or appeal to commitments that are inconsistent with core motivations for non-naturalism. The chapter concludes that, suitably refined, the traditional argument against non-naturalism from supervenience is alive and well.Less
It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter defends: that a defensible non-naturalism is committed to the supervenience of the ethical, that this commits the non-naturalist to a brute necessary connection between properties of distinct kinds, and that commitment to such brute connections counts against the non-naturalist’s view. Each of these claims has recently been challenged. Against Nicholas Sturgeon’s recent doubts about the dialectical force of supervenience, this chapter defends a supervenience thesis as deserving to be common ground among ethical realists. It is then argued that attempts to explain supervenience on behalf of the non-naturalist either fail as explanations, generate near-identical explanatory burdens elsewhere, or appeal to commitments that are inconsistent with core motivations for non-naturalism. The chapter concludes that, suitably refined, the traditional argument against non-naturalism from supervenience is alive and well.
Jonas Olson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199572939
- eISBN:
- 9780191722165
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter focuses on two recent trends in meta-ethics. One is the revival of non-naturalistic realism. The other is the preoccupation with reasons. The two trends are not unconnected. The renewed ...
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This chapter focuses on two recent trends in meta-ethics. One is the revival of non-naturalistic realism. The other is the preoccupation with reasons. The two trends are not unconnected. The renewed interest in non-naturalism seems to have gained fuel from the preoccupation with reasons. The chapter distinguishes old and new non-naturalism. Old non-naturalism places intrinsic goodness at the normative centre stage; new non-naturalism places the notion of a reason at the normative centre stage. There is a presentiment about that new non-naturalism's shift of focus from intrinsic goodness to reasons promises to make non-naturalism more credible. It is argued that this line of thinking involves an ‘extensional fallacy’. Unmasking the fallacy reveals that the notion of a reason is no less problematic than the notion of intrinsic goodness, and that the supervenience of the normative on the natural is no less problematic for new non-naturalism than for old non-naturalism.Less
This chapter focuses on two recent trends in meta-ethics. One is the revival of non-naturalistic realism. The other is the preoccupation with reasons. The two trends are not unconnected. The renewed interest in non-naturalism seems to have gained fuel from the preoccupation with reasons. The chapter distinguishes old and new non-naturalism. Old non-naturalism places intrinsic goodness at the normative centre stage; new non-naturalism places the notion of a reason at the normative centre stage. There is a presentiment about that new non-naturalism's shift of focus from intrinsic goodness to reasons promises to make non-naturalism more credible. It is argued that this line of thinking involves an ‘extensional fallacy’. Unmasking the fallacy reveals that the notion of a reason is no less problematic than the notion of intrinsic goodness, and that the supervenience of the normative on the natural is no less problematic for new non-naturalism than for old non-naturalism.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
How should we characterize the quarry of practical thought? Some hold that practical thinking must ultimately find some non‐evaluative fact to be a reason for action. Some have affirmed a ...
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How should we characterize the quarry of practical thought? Some hold that practical thinking must ultimately find some non‐evaluative fact to be a reason for action. Some have affirmed a ‘buck‐passing’ view of the good, according to which talk of goodness or value can be reduced to talk of the reason‐giving force of non‐evaluative facts. In this book, it has been argued that practical thinking must sometimes apprehend the intrinsic goodness or value of an activity, where this cannot be reduced to the reason‐giving force of any non‐evaluative fact. The task of this chapter is to show that this latter, recognizably Ancient understanding of value‐talk remains implicit in a great deal of our talk about value, and that we cannot consistently renounce it without incurring a steep cost in the metric of articulacy about value. Nor can we sequester off a subset of the things we care about, under the heading of the moral, and reduce our talk of values to talk of reasons in this domain. Our actual sense of the moral value of human beings cannot plausibly be characterized in terms of the reason‐giving force of non‐evaluative facts about them.Less
How should we characterize the quarry of practical thought? Some hold that practical thinking must ultimately find some non‐evaluative fact to be a reason for action. Some have affirmed a ‘buck‐passing’ view of the good, according to which talk of goodness or value can be reduced to talk of the reason‐giving force of non‐evaluative facts. In this book, it has been argued that practical thinking must sometimes apprehend the intrinsic goodness or value of an activity, where this cannot be reduced to the reason‐giving force of any non‐evaluative fact. The task of this chapter is to show that this latter, recognizably Ancient understanding of value‐talk remains implicit in a great deal of our talk about value, and that we cannot consistently renounce it without incurring a steep cost in the metric of articulacy about value. Nor can we sequester off a subset of the things we care about, under the heading of the moral, and reduce our talk of values to talk of reasons in this domain. Our actual sense of the moral value of human beings cannot plausibly be characterized in terms of the reason‐giving force of non‐evaluative facts about them.
John Caughie
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198742197
- eISBN:
- 9780191694981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198742197.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, Film, Media, and Cultural Studies
It has been long established that television dramas and other television programs greatly affect the manner in which audiences perceive their realities along with the actual state of British ...
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It has been long established that television dramas and other television programs greatly affect the manner in which audiences perceive their realities along with the actual state of British politics, society, and culture, among other things. The debate whether popular television programs sufficiently represent the naturalism and realities of its audience has been continuously argued by various groups. Television critics have, then, conceptualized the term non-naturalism and modernism as a result of this contention. This chapter explores the non-naturalistic facet and criticism of British television dramas as well as the accuracy of its depiction of reality.Less
It has been long established that television dramas and other television programs greatly affect the manner in which audiences perceive their realities along with the actual state of British politics, society, and culture, among other things. The debate whether popular television programs sufficiently represent the naturalism and realities of its audience has been continuously argued by various groups. Television critics have, then, conceptualized the term non-naturalism and modernism as a result of this contention. This chapter explores the non-naturalistic facet and criticism of British television dramas as well as the accuracy of its depiction of reality.
David Copp
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in ...
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This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections.Less
This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections.
Arthur N. Prior
- Published in print:
- 1963
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198241577
- eISBN:
- 9780191680380
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198241577.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses two main matters. The first is the relation to the subject of Kant’s distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. The second matter discussed in this chapter ...
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This chapter discusses two main matters. The first is the relation to the subject of Kant’s distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. The second matter discussed in this chapter is the regrettable lapse of Mr. E. F. Carritt’s from the ‘party line’ of consistent non-naturalism.Less
This chapter discusses two main matters. The first is the relation to the subject of Kant’s distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. The second matter discussed in this chapter is the regrettable lapse of Mr. E. F. Carritt’s from the ‘party line’ of consistent non-naturalism.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259755.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Defends ethical non‐naturalism. Presents G. E. Moore's open question argument as the basis for drawing a natural/non‐natural divide, and discusses various ways of marking the distinction between the ...
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Defends ethical non‐naturalism. Presents G. E. Moore's open question argument as the basis for drawing a natural/non‐natural divide, and discusses various ways of marking the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. Includes criticisms of ethical naturalism.Less
Defends ethical non‐naturalism. Presents G. E. Moore's open question argument as the basis for drawing a natural/non‐natural divide, and discusses various ways of marking the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. Includes criticisms of ethical naturalism.
Thomas Hurka
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577446
- eISBN:
- 9780191725425
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter identifies the features that made the philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing a unified and distinctive group in the history of ethics. These include their conceptual minimalism, whereby all ...
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This chapter identifies the features that made the philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing a unified and distinctive group in the history of ethics. These include their conceptual minimalism, whereby all normative judgements can be expressed using a few basic concepts; their non‐naturalist metaethics, whereby moral judgements express sui generis truths that can be known by moral intuition; their goal of theorizing common‐sense morality by relating it to more abstract principles; their interest in moral explanations, or in why acts are right or wrong; and their pursuit of what can be called ‘structural’ as against ‘foundational’ explanations. Many of these views are summarized in the idea that some moral duties, the basic ones, are underivative.Less
This chapter identifies the features that made the philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing a unified and distinctive group in the history of ethics. These include their conceptual minimalism, whereby all normative judgements can be expressed using a few basic concepts; their non‐naturalist metaethics, whereby moral judgements express sui generis truths that can be known by moral intuition; their goal of theorizing common‐sense morality by relating it to more abstract principles; their interest in moral explanations, or in why acts are right or wrong; and their pursuit of what can be called ‘structural’ as against ‘foundational’ explanations. Many of these views are summarized in the idea that some moral duties, the basic ones, are underivative.
Jonas Olson and Mark Timmons
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577446
- eISBN:
- 9780191725425
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Metaethical non‐naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of ...
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Metaethical non‐naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of non‐naturalism, the work of A. C. Ewing is an interesting case. In his 1947 The Definition of Good he defended non‐naturalism. But by the early 1950s he proposed a ‘middle way in ethics’ — a metaethical position meant to represent a compromise between non‐naturalism and its rival, non‐cognitivism, defended in his 1959 Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. One aim of this chapter is to further explain and illustrate the decline of non‐naturalism, using Ewing's two main works on moral philosophy as case studies. But we are also interested in the plausibility and indeed the metaethical space for the kind of compromise view Ewing aimed for with his middle way, and how his view contributes to contemporary metaethical debate.Less
Metaethical non‐naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of non‐naturalism, the work of A. C. Ewing is an interesting case. In his 1947 The Definition of Good he defended non‐naturalism. But by the early 1950s he proposed a ‘middle way in ethics’ — a metaethical position meant to represent a compromise between non‐naturalism and its rival, non‐cognitivism, defended in his 1959 Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. One aim of this chapter is to further explain and illustrate the decline of non‐naturalism, using Ewing's two main works on moral philosophy as case studies. But we are also interested in the plausibility and indeed the metaethical space for the kind of compromise view Ewing aimed for with his middle way, and how his view contributes to contemporary metaethical debate.
Erik J. Wielenberg
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714323
- eISBN:
- 9780191782725
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714323.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book draws on recent work in analytic philosophy (particularly meta-ethics and epistemology) and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism and develop an ...
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This book draws on recent work in analytic philosophy (particularly meta-ethics and epistemology) and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism and develop an empirically grounded account of human moral knowledge. Non-theistic robust normative realism has it that there are objective, non-natural, sui generis ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. The early chapters address various challenges to the intelligibility and plausibility of the claim that irreducible ethical features of things supervene on their non-ethical features, as well as challenges from defenders of theistic ethics who argue that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. Later chapters develop an account of moral knowledge and answer various recent purported debunkings of morality, including those based on scientific research into the nature of the proximate causes of human moral beliefs as well as those based on proposed evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs.Less
This book draws on recent work in analytic philosophy (particularly meta-ethics and epistemology) and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism and develop an empirically grounded account of human moral knowledge. Non-theistic robust normative realism has it that there are objective, non-natural, sui generis ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. The early chapters address various challenges to the intelligibility and plausibility of the claim that irreducible ethical features of things supervene on their non-ethical features, as well as challenges from defenders of theistic ethics who argue that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. Later chapters develop an account of moral knowledge and answer various recent purported debunkings of morality, including those based on scientific research into the nature of the proximate causes of human moral beliefs as well as those based on proposed evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs.
Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198823841
- eISBN:
- 9780191862625
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198823841.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview ...
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This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume cover normative supervenience; non-naturalism; non-descriptive relativism; learning about aesthetics and morality through acquaintance and deference; the possibility of moral epistemology; pure moral motivation; virtue ethics; moral uncertainty and value comparison; (in)coherence; the authority of formality; authoritatively normative concepts; ‘ought’ simpliciter; and the rationality of ends.Less
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume cover normative supervenience; non-naturalism; non-descriptive relativism; learning about aesthetics and morality through acquaintance and deference; the possibility of moral epistemology; pure moral motivation; virtue ethics; moral uncertainty and value comparison; (in)coherence; the authority of formality; authoritatively normative concepts; ‘ought’ simpliciter; and the rationality of ends.
Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198805076
- eISBN:
- 9780191843174
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805076.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview ...
More
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this 12th volume cover moral imperatives as bodily imperatives; difficult cases and the epistemic justification of moral belief; moral testimony; non-naturalism and supervenience; the grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism; moral law; the puzzle of moral science; disagreement; normative language in context; using Frege–Geach to illuminate expressivism; expressivism and varieties of normality; and the predicament of choice.Less
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this 12th volume cover moral imperatives as bodily imperatives; difficult cases and the epistemic justification of moral belief; moral testimony; non-naturalism and supervenience; the grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism; moral law; the puzzle of moral science; disagreement; normative language in context; using Frege–Geach to illuminate expressivism; expressivism and varieties of normality; and the predicament of choice.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198778608
- eISBN:
- 9780191853487
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to ...
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This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: normative naturalism, quasi-realist expressivism, and non-metaphysical non-naturalism, which this book refers to as non-realist cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word ‘reality’ in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use ‘reality’ in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths — such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths — raise no difficult ontological questions. This book discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity.Less
This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: normative naturalism, quasi-realist expressivism, and non-metaphysical non-naturalism, which this book refers to as non-realist cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word ‘reality’ in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use ‘reality’ in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths — such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths — raise no difficult ontological questions. This book discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199696680
- eISBN:
- 9780191744266
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696680.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter considers a number of metaethical accounts which are often regarded as rivals to a divine command account. The chapter argues that some of them, such as ethical naturalism, ethical ...
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This chapter considers a number of metaethical accounts which are often regarded as rivals to a divine command account. The chapter argues that some of them, such as ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism, and sensibility theories, are actually not rivals to a divine command account when developed in a reasonable form. Error theory, while certainly a rival, also provides support for a divine command account at key points. The chapter argues that varieties of expressivism fail adequately to account for the objectivity and authority of moral obligations. Some constructivist accounts, such as social contract theories, also have these defects, and fail to explain the universality of moral obligations as well. Other constructivist accounts, such as that of Christine Korsgaard, turn out to be forms of moral realism on close inspection, and are compatible with a divine command view when developed in accordance with Kant's account.Less
This chapter considers a number of metaethical accounts which are often regarded as rivals to a divine command account. The chapter argues that some of them, such as ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism, and sensibility theories, are actually not rivals to a divine command account when developed in a reasonable form. Error theory, while certainly a rival, also provides support for a divine command account at key points. The chapter argues that varieties of expressivism fail adequately to account for the objectivity and authority of moral obligations. Some constructivist accounts, such as social contract theories, also have these defects, and fail to explain the universality of moral obligations as well. Other constructivist accounts, such as that of Christine Korsgaard, turn out to be forms of moral realism on close inspection, and are compatible with a divine command view when developed in accordance with Kant's account.
Matti Eklund
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198717829
- eISBN:
- 9780191787331
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198717829.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explores the view—“presentationalism”—that normative sentences and propositions are mind-independently true, but what they represent is not normative. There are no normative properties ...
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This chapter explores the view—“presentationalism”—that normative sentences and propositions are mind-independently true, but what they represent is not normative. There are no normative properties or facts. This view, whatever in the end its fate, combines attractive features of realism and antirealism. The view is curiously absent from prominent accounts of the theoretical options. The possibility of a view like this problematizes important arguments in the literature, for example certain arguments for non-naturalism, and shows that one must be careful to distinguish between normative facts and normative truths. Toward the end of the chapter, I consider whether the Moral Twin Earth arguments present problems for the view.Less
This chapter explores the view—“presentationalism”—that normative sentences and propositions are mind-independently true, but what they represent is not normative. There are no normative properties or facts. This view, whatever in the end its fate, combines attractive features of realism and antirealism. The view is curiously absent from prominent accounts of the theoretical options. The possibility of a view like this problematizes important arguments in the literature, for example certain arguments for non-naturalism, and shows that one must be careful to distinguish between normative facts and normative truths. Toward the end of the chapter, I consider whether the Moral Twin Earth arguments present problems for the view.
