Search Results

 Knowing Spirits

John Russell Roberts

in A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley

This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual ... More

This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual spirits, the nature of spirits themselves. It is shown that the basic relations between spirits are normative in nature. For the purposes of elucidation, Berkeley's approach is compared and contrasted with that of Daniel Dennett's “intentional stance”.Less

Frege, Relativism and Faultless Disagreement

Sven Rosenkranz

in Relative Truth

Allegedly, relativism can make sense of faultless disagreements, where A and B faultlessly disagree if A sincerely asserts P, B sincerely asserts ~P and yet neither assertion is incorrect. Such cases ... More

Allegedly, relativism can make sense of faultless disagreements, where A and B faultlessly disagree if A sincerely asserts P, B sincerely asserts ~P and yet neither assertion is incorrect. Such cases seem to abound in areas of evaluative discourse. The trouble with taking these appearances at face value is that P and ~P cannot both be true so that at least one of the speakers would seem at fault. To defuse this objection, relativists suggest conceiving of propositional truth as being relative to perspectives. Drawing on Fregean insights into the nature of assertion, this chapter argues that this manoeuvre will not work and that relativists are anyway hard-pressed to account for genuine disagreement. Discarding the idea of faultlessness, some positive suggestions are made of how relativists might recover a sense in which A and B genuinely disagree. One tentative conclusion is that moral relativism is the non-cognitivists' best bet.Less

Mental Agency and Metaethics

Matthew Evans and Nishi Shah

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7

This chapter argues that none of the traditional anti-realist metaethical views—error theory, non-cognitivism, and constructivism—can fully accommodate certain central features of mental agency. It ... More

This chapter argues that none of the traditional anti-realist metaethical views—error theory, non-cognitivism, and constructivism—can fully accommodate certain central features of mental agency. It is also suggested that, in the end, it may be impossible for any metaethicist to accommodate these features and yet still achieve the kind of detached understanding of the practice of normative judgment that every metaethicist would like.Less

Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons

Ulrike Heuer

in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the ... More

In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the members of a community who have a disposition to be guided by the concepts in question. His internalism about practical reasons may help to explain this claim: the disposition to be guided by a thick concept provides the link to existing motives that all reasons must have. Understood thus, Williams makes room for explaining and vindicating Oscar Wilde's ‘…not one of my words’-dictum about certain thick concepts. However, the chapter argues that the combination of the account of thick concepts that Williams expounds with reasons internalism leads into a dilemma: either the facts that thick concepts, correctly applied, refer to, do not provide reasons (not even for those who have a disposition to be guided by them) — except perhaps in the way in which any other, non-evaluative fact may provide a reason; or they provide reasons for everyone, independently of the disposition to be guided by the concepts. Getting out of the dilemma requires giving up on reasons internalism or, alternatively, modifying the account of thick concepts that Williams sets out.Less

Expressivism

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Nature of Normativity

Many philosophers think that internalism supports a non-cognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive ... More

Many philosophers think that internalism supports a non-cognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive states of some kind. Such non-cognitivist accounts of normative judgments naturally accompany an expressivist account of the meaning of normative statements. This chapter considers the prospects of such an expressivist theory, taking as its paradigm the most recent theory of Allan Gibbard. It is argued that this theory is vulnerable to a strengthened form of the objection that P. T. Geach derived from the work of Frege. This makes it plausible that expressivist accounts face insuperable problems, and so that both expressivism and non-cognitivism should be rejected.Less

The Ontology of Reason Relations

John Skorupski

in The Domain of Reasons

Chapter 17 shows how reason relations differ from other relations in ways that can be summarised by saying that, unlike these other relations, reason relations are irreal. It also endorses a ... More

Chapter 17 shows how reason relations differ from other relations in ways that can be summarised by saying that, unlike these other relations, reason relations are irreal. It also endorses a ‘minimalist’ account of truth. It then argues that there is no reason to hold a non‐cognitivist view of the normative.Less

Introduction:: Metaethics and Normative Ethics

David Copp

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in ... More

This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections.Less

Biology and Ethics

Philip Kitcher

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa ... More

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa Foot; Humean approaches found in Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard; and biologically grounded approaches found in of Elliott Sober and Brian Skyrms. The first two approaches begin with a philosophical view, and seek support for it in biology. The third approach begins with biology, and uses it to illuminate the status of morality. This chapter pursues a version of the third program. A major accomplishment of evolutionary biology has been the explanation of biological altruism, which opens the door to a similar explanation of psychological altruism, or “fellow-feeling.” The chapter conjectures that humans have evolved a capacity for normative governance by socially shared rules. A process of cultural evolution led to the social rules with which we are familiar. This genealogical story poses a challenge, for the idea of moral truth plays no role in it. The story therefore lends support to non-cognitivism or anti-realist expressivism. The chapter concludes by exploring the implications of the genealogical story for moral knowledge, moral objectivity, and the idea of moral authority.Less

Metaphor and Judgements of Experience

A. E. Denham

in Metaphor and Moral Experience

Experience can be difficult to describe and hence requires the use of figurative devices such as metaphors and similes. This chapter argues that figurative language sometimes succeeds in representing ... More

Experience can be difficult to describe and hence requires the use of figurative devices such as metaphors and similes. This chapter argues that figurative language sometimes succeeds in representing aspects of experience which resist characterisation in literal terms. According to the Inexpressibility Thesis, the truth-conditions of some metaphors can not be represented by terms contained in the strictly literal lexicon (of a given language). By proposing a special category of phenomenological metaphors, this chapter offers an account of metaphor that both explains and supports the Inexpressibility Thesis. It also examines non-cognitivism and reductionism, metaphor and experience-dependent concepts, two models of similarity judgements, and phenomenological metaphors.Less

A Fresh Start?

Philippa Foot

in Natural Goodness

Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of ... More

Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of non‐cognitivism to a desire‐based, egoistic interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, i.e. that morality is necessarily practical. Foot eschews this interpretation of Hume's requirement for an alternative, cognitivist, notion of practical rationality that nevertheless still meets this requirement. Foot also denies that moral evaluation is opposed to descriptive statements, or matters of fact, as the non‐cognitivists argue; it has to do rather with facts about a particular subject matter, i.e. human life. Her main argument, which she will pursue throughout the book, is that the grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in these facts, or in what Elizabeth Anscombe refers to as ‘Aristotelian necessities’, i.e. the moral virtues; and thus the evaluation of the human will should be determined by facts about the nature of human beings and of the life of our species.Less

Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake ?

Philippa Foot

in Moral Dilemmas: and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy

Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake ... More

Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake is traced to a distinction taken for granted by non‐cognitivist moral philosophers such as A. J. Ayer (an emotivist) and R. M. Hare (a prescriptivist). Such philosophers wrongly believed that there is a logical gap between ‘descriptive language’ (which states facts) and ‘evaluative language’ (which expresses evaluations). Foot argues that this supposed gap between facts and values, which crucially gives a logical gap between a moral judgement and its grounds, is a chimera.Less

Spinoza and Natural Law

Jon Miller

in Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: From Plato to Spinoza

The chapter connects Spinoza's thought with important Stoic ideas and also with some contemporary metaethical issues. The core of Spinoza's normative view of law is that divine laws are end-oriented ... More

The chapter connects Spinoza's thought with important Stoic ideas and also with some contemporary metaethical issues. The core of Spinoza's normative view of law is that divine laws are end-oriented rules of conduct, and that they must be followed if human beings are to attain their summum bonum. Also, divine laws—which, for Spinoza, are not volitionally grounded commands but natural laws—have an intrinsically practical nature. In this aspect of his thought, Spinoza's view is much like the Stoics. Also, while denying that moral judgments are cognitivist judgments, Spinoza held that the basis of their prescriptivity is that we are to conform to our natures. His metaethics includes elements interpretable as quasi-realist. Spinoza's thought manages to connect a non-cognitivist account of moral value and moral judgment with a Stoic-like conception of the imperatives enjoining us to act in conformity with our nature as imperatives expressing a moral ought.Less

The Non-cognitivist Challenge

Russ Shafer-Landau

in Moral Realism: A Defence

Sets out the contours of the moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and provides an extended series of arguments against non‐cognitivism and expressivism. Seeks to establish a presumptive ... More

Sets out the contours of the moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and provides an extended series of arguments against non‐cognitivism and expressivism. Seeks to establish a presumptive case for moral cognitivism.Less

Nietzsche and Non-cognitivism

Nadeem J. Z. Hussain

in Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity

Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible meta-ethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have ... More

Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible meta-ethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have emerged in the secondary literature. Recently the possibility that Nietzsche is a non-cognitivist has been broached. If one sees Hume as a central non-cognitivist figure, as recent non-cognitivists such as Simon Blackburn have, then the similarities between Nietzsche and Hume can make this reading seem plausible. This chapter assesses the general plausibility of interpreting Nietzsche as a non-cognitivist. Non-cognitivism can mean various things and so some attempt is made to lay out the various kinds of non-cognitivism one might ascribe to Nietzsche. As part of the overall assessment of the plausibility of a non-cognitivist Nietzsche, the chapter considers in detail the arguments of Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick on behalf of a non-cognitivist reading. It argues, however, that there is insufficient evidence to justify the interpretation and that the analogy to Hume is unhelpful.Less

A Grand Strategy

Herman Philipse

in God in the Age of Science?: A Critique of Religious Reason

Can we validate domain-specific methods of research for natural theology? All these methods have turned out to be unreliable, as is illustrated by the example of prayer (Mantra II, STEP). This fact ... More

Can we validate domain-specific methods of research for natural theology? All these methods have turned out to be unreliable, as is illustrated by the example of prayer (Mantra II, STEP). This fact raises a dilemma for natural theologians: should they claim that their methods of investigation must be able to pass stringent tests of validation, like methods in science and historical scholarship? Or should they rather hold that the area of the divine is so totally different from all other areas of research that validation of methods is neither needed nor possible? The Wittgensteinean non-cognitivist escape from this dilemma turns out to be unattractive. Those who opt for its first horn are faced with the problem called The Tension: on the one hand the rationality of natural theology should resemble scientific rationality in order to be respectable in our age of science, but on the other hand it should not resemble scientific rationality too much, because in that case natural theology will be doomed to failure. Can the natural theologian solve this problem by devising a Grand Strategy?Less

Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge

Dorit Bar-On

in Self-Knowledge

This chapter is a reply too Anthony Brueckner's critique of the Neo-Expressivist interpretation of avowals and its ramifications for the philosophical analysis of self-knowledge.

A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics

Jonas Olson and Mark Timmons

in Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing

Metaethical non‐naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of ... More

Metaethical non‐naturalism went from being a dominant theory at the turn of the nineteenth century to being an intellectual curiosity a few decades later. With regard to the mercurial fortunes of non‐naturalism, the work of A. C. Ewing is an interesting case. In his 1947 The Definition of Good he defended non‐naturalism. But by the early 1950s he proposed a ‘middle way in ethics’ — a metaethical position meant to represent a compromise between non‐naturalism and its rival, non‐cognitivism, defended in his 1959 Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. One aim of this chapter is to further explain and illustrate the decline of non‐naturalism, using Ewing's two main works on moral philosophy as case studies. But we are also interested in the plausibility and indeed the metaethical space for the kind of compromise view Ewing aimed for with his middle way, and how his view contributes to contemporary metaethical debate.Less