Gyula Klima
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195176223
- eISBN:
- 9780199871957
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals ...
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John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals in reality are “names”: the common terms of our language and the common concepts of our minds. But these items are universal only in their signification; they are just as singular entities themselves as are any other items in reality. This book critically examines what is most intriguing to contemporary readers in Buridan’s medieval philosophical system: his nominalist account of the relationships among language, thought, and reality. The main focus of the discussion is Buridan’s deployment of the Ockhamist conception of a “mental language” for mapping the complex structures of written and spoken human languages onto a parsimoniously construed reality. Concerning these linguistic structures themselves, the book carefully analyzes Buridan’s conception of the radical conventionality of written and spoken languages, in contrast to the natural semantic features of concepts. The discussion pays special attention to Buridan’s token-based semantics of terms and propositions, his conception of existential import, ontological commitment, truth, and logical validity. Finally, the book presents a detailed discussion of how these logical devices allow Buridan to maintain his nominalist position without giving up Aristotelian essentialism or yielding to skepticism, always relating the discussion to contemporary concerns with these issues.Less
John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals in reality are “names”: the common terms of our language and the common concepts of our minds. But these items are universal only in their signification; they are just as singular entities themselves as are any other items in reality. This book critically examines what is most intriguing to contemporary readers in Buridan’s medieval philosophical system: his nominalist account of the relationships among language, thought, and reality. The main focus of the discussion is Buridan’s deployment of the Ockhamist conception of a “mental language” for mapping the complex structures of written and spoken human languages onto a parsimoniously construed reality. Concerning these linguistic structures themselves, the book carefully analyzes Buridan’s conception of the radical conventionality of written and spoken languages, in contrast to the natural semantic features of concepts. The discussion pays special attention to Buridan’s token-based semantics of terms and propositions, his conception of existential import, ontological commitment, truth, and logical validity. Finally, the book presents a detailed discussion of how these logical devices allow Buridan to maintain his nominalist position without giving up Aristotelian essentialism or yielding to skepticism, always relating the discussion to contemporary concerns with these issues.
Geoffrey Hellman
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198240341
- eISBN:
- 9780191597664
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198240341.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set‐ or type‐theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while minimizing Platonist commitments to ...
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Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set‐ or type‐theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while minimizing Platonist commitments to abstract entities. Modal logic is combined with notions of part/whole (mereology) enabling a systematic interpretation of ordinary mathematical statements as asserting what would be the case in any (suitable) structure there (logically) might be, e.g. for number theory, functional analysis, algebra, pure geometry, etc. Structures are understood as comprising objects, whatever their nature, standing in suitable relations as given by axioms or defining conditions in mathematics proper. The characterization of structures is aided by the addition of plural quantifiers, e.g. ‘Any objects of sort F’ corresponding to arbitrary collections of Fs, achieving the expressive power of second‐order logic, hence a full logic of relations. (See the author's ‘Structuralism without Structures’, Philosophia Mathematica 4 (1996): 100–123.) Claims of absolute existence of structures are replaced by claims of (logical) possibility of enough structurally interrelated objects (modal‐existence postulates). The vast bulk of ordinary mathematics, and scientific applications, can thus be recovered on the basis of the possibility of a countable infinity of atoms. As applied to set theory itself, these ideas lead to a ‘many worlds’—– as opposed to the standard ‘fixed universe’—view, inspired by Zermelo (1930), respecting the unrestricted, indefinite extendability of models of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms. Natural motivation for (‘small’) large cardinal axioms is thus provided. In sum, the vast bulk of abstract mathematics is respected as objective, while literal reference to abstracta and related problems with Platonism are eliminated.Less
Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set‐ or type‐theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while minimizing Platonist commitments to abstract entities. Modal logic is combined with notions of part/whole (mereology) enabling a systematic interpretation of ordinary mathematical statements as asserting what would be the case in any (suitable) structure there (logically) might be, e.g. for number theory, functional analysis, algebra, pure geometry, etc. Structures are understood as comprising objects, whatever their nature, standing in suitable relations as given by axioms or defining conditions in mathematics proper. The characterization of structures is aided by the addition of plural quantifiers, e.g. ‘Any objects of sort F’ corresponding to arbitrary collections of Fs, achieving the expressive power of second‐order logic, hence a full logic of relations. (See the author's ‘Structuralism without Structures’, Philosophia Mathematica 4 (1996): 100–123.) Claims of absolute existence of structures are replaced by claims of (logical) possibility of enough structurally interrelated objects (modal‐existence postulates). The vast bulk of ordinary mathematics, and scientific applications, can thus be recovered on the basis of the possibility of a countable infinity of atoms. As applied to set theory itself, these ideas lead to a ‘many worlds’—– as opposed to the standard ‘fixed universe’—view, inspired by Zermelo (1930), respecting the unrestricted, indefinite extendability of models of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms. Natural motivation for (‘small’) large cardinal axioms is thus provided. In sum, the vast bulk of abstract mathematics is respected as objective, while literal reference to abstracta and related problems with Platonism are eliminated.
Charles S. Chihara
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239758
- eISBN:
- 9780191597190
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239750.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the ...
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A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention to the applications of mathematics in science and everyday life. The book also contains detailed discussions of rival views (Mathematical Structuralism, Field's Instrumentalism, Burgess's Moderate Realism, Maddy's Set Theoretical Realism, and Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics), in which many comparisons with the Constructibility Theory are made.Less
A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention to the applications of mathematics in science and everyday life. The book also contains detailed discussions of rival views (Mathematical Structuralism, Field's Instrumentalism, Burgess's Moderate Realism, Maddy's Set Theoretical Realism, and Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics), in which many comparisons with the Constructibility Theory are made.
John P. Burgess and Gideon Rosen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250128
- eISBN:
- 9780191597138
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250126.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space and time and no causes or effects in the physical world. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility ...
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Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space and time and no causes or effects in the physical world. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of mathematical knowledge, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no abstract entities. It has also led some of them to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects, eliminating so‐called ontological commitment to numbers, sets, and the like. These projects differ considerably in the apparatus they employ, and the spirit in which they are put forward. Some employ synthetic geometry, others modal logic. Some are put forward as revolutionary replacements for existing mathematics and science, others hermeneutic hypotheses about what they have meant all along. We attempt to cut through technicalities that have obscured previous discussions of these projects, and to present concise accounts with minimal prerequisites of a dozen strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics. We also examine critically the aims and claims of such interpretations, suggesting that what they really achieve is something quite different from what the authors of such projects usually assume.Less
Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space and time and no causes or effects in the physical world. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of mathematical knowledge, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no abstract entities. It has also led some of them to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects, eliminating so‐called ontological commitment to numbers, sets, and the like. These projects differ considerably in the apparatus they employ, and the spirit in which they are put forward. Some employ synthetic geometry, others modal logic. Some are put forward as revolutionary replacements for existing mathematics and science, others hermeneutic hypotheses about what they have meant all along. We attempt to cut through technicalities that have obscured previous discussions of these projects, and to present concise accounts with minimal prerequisites of a dozen strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics. We also examine critically the aims and claims of such interpretations, suggesting that what they really achieve is something quite different from what the authors of such projects usually assume.
Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199691494
- eISBN:
- 9780191746277
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691494.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The standard way of thinking about non-repeatable (single-instance) artworks such as paintings, drawings, and non-cast sculpture is that they are concrete things (i.e. material, causally efficacious, ...
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The standard way of thinking about non-repeatable (single-instance) artworks such as paintings, drawings, and non-cast sculpture is that they are concrete things (i.e. material, causally efficacious, located in space and time). For example, Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is currently located in Paris, Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc weighs 73 tonnes, Vermeer’s The Concert was stolen in 1990, and Michaelangelo’s David was attacked with a hammer in 1991. By contrast, consider the current location of Melville’s Moby Dick or the weight of Yeats’s ‘Sailing to Byzantium’ or how one might go about stealing Puccini’s La Bohemme. The standard view of repeatable (multiple-instance) artworks such as novels, poems, plays, operas, films, and symphonies is that they must be abstract things (i.e. immaterial, casually inert, outside space-time). Although novels, poems, and symphonies may not appear to be stock abstract objects, most philosophers of art claim that for the basic intuitions, practices, and conventions surrounding such works to be preserved, repeatable artworks must be abstracta. The purpose of this volume is to examine how philosophical enquiry into the nature of art might productively inform or be productively informed by enquiry into the nature of abstracta taking place within other areas of philosophy such as metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and language. The aim is to provide a general methodological blueprint from which those within philosophy of art and those without can begin building responsible, and therefore mutually informative and productive, relationships between their respective fields.Less
The standard way of thinking about non-repeatable (single-instance) artworks such as paintings, drawings, and non-cast sculpture is that they are concrete things (i.e. material, causally efficacious, located in space and time). For example, Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is currently located in Paris, Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc weighs 73 tonnes, Vermeer’s The Concert was stolen in 1990, and Michaelangelo’s David was attacked with a hammer in 1991. By contrast, consider the current location of Melville’s Moby Dick or the weight of Yeats’s ‘Sailing to Byzantium’ or how one might go about stealing Puccini’s La Bohemme. The standard view of repeatable (multiple-instance) artworks such as novels, poems, plays, operas, films, and symphonies is that they must be abstract things (i.e. immaterial, casually inert, outside space-time). Although novels, poems, and symphonies may not appear to be stock abstract objects, most philosophers of art claim that for the basic intuitions, practices, and conventions surrounding such works to be preserved, repeatable artworks must be abstracta. The purpose of this volume is to examine how philosophical enquiry into the nature of art might productively inform or be productively informed by enquiry into the nature of abstracta taking place within other areas of philosophy such as metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and language. The aim is to provide a general methodological blueprint from which those within philosophy of art and those without can begin building responsible, and therefore mutually informative and productive, relationships between their respective fields.
Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199656417
- eISBN:
- 9780191742163
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. ...
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This book is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes work in any area of philosophy of religion. Topics covered include secular belief, theories of analogical predication, nominalism and divine aseity, meticulous providence and gratuitous evil, many-one identity and how it relates to the Trinity, atheism and theistic belief, the Epistemology of the Agape struggle, Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism, the semantics for blasphemy, and grounding and omniscience.Less
This book is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes work in any area of philosophy of religion. Topics covered include secular belief, theories of analogical predication, nominalism and divine aseity, meticulous providence and gratuitous evil, many-one identity and how it relates to the Trinity, atheism and theistic belief, the Epistemology of the Agape struggle, Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism, the semantics for blasphemy, and grounding and omniscience.
Douglas Ehring
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608539
- eISBN:
- 9780191729607
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608539.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The main goal of this work is to provide a metaphysical account of properties and of how they are related to concrete particulars. On the broadest level, this work is a defense of tropes and of trope ...
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The main goal of this work is to provide a metaphysical account of properties and of how they are related to concrete particulars. On the broadest level, this work is a defense of tropes and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, respectively, and, second, a defense of a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Each of these tasks is pursued separately, with the first Part of this work acting as a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory, and the second Part acting as the more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism. In Part 1 it is argued that there are tropes. Part 1 also provides an outline of what tropes can do for us metaphysically, while remaining neutral between different theories of tropes. Included in Part 1 are an account of the universal–particular distinction, an argument for the existence of tropes based on the phenomenon of moving properties, the development of a trope bundle theory of objects and a trope-based solution to the problems of mental causations. The second Part presents a fuller picture of what a trope is by way of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, according to which a trope's nature is determined by membership in natural classes of tropes. In addition, in Part 2 a defense is developed of Natural Class Trope Nominalism against what have been thought to be fatal objections to this view, a defense grounded in property counterpart theory without modal realism.Less
The main goal of this work is to provide a metaphysical account of properties and of how they are related to concrete particulars. On the broadest level, this work is a defense of tropes and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, respectively, and, second, a defense of a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Each of these tasks is pursued separately, with the first Part of this work acting as a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory, and the second Part acting as the more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism. In Part 1 it is argued that there are tropes. Part 1 also provides an outline of what tropes can do for us metaphysically, while remaining neutral between different theories of tropes. Included in Part 1 are an account of the universal–particular distinction, an argument for the existence of tropes based on the phenomenon of moving properties, the development of a trope bundle theory of objects and a trope-based solution to the problems of mental causations. The second Part presents a fuller picture of what a trope is by way of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, according to which a trope's nature is determined by membership in natural classes of tropes. In addition, in Part 2 a defense is developed of Natural Class Trope Nominalism against what have been thought to be fatal objections to this view, a defense grounded in property counterpart theory without modal realism.
Matthew Levering
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199535293
- eISBN:
- 9780191715839
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535293.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
This chapter surveys the efforts of three contemporary Catholic theorists to recover a deeper appreciation for the natural law: Martin Rhonheimer, Servais Pinckaers, and Graham McAleer. Whereas ...
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This chapter surveys the efforts of three contemporary Catholic theorists to recover a deeper appreciation for the natural law: Martin Rhonheimer, Servais Pinckaers, and Graham McAleer. Whereas Rhonheimer suggests that human practical reason humanizes the natural inclinations, thereby constituting the natural law, Pinckaers and McAleer give a stronger place to created receptivity and body-soul unity.Less
This chapter surveys the efforts of three contemporary Catholic theorists to recover a deeper appreciation for the natural law: Martin Rhonheimer, Servais Pinckaers, and Graham McAleer. Whereas Rhonheimer suggests that human practical reason humanizes the natural inclinations, thereby constituting the natural law, Pinckaers and McAleer give a stronger place to created receptivity and body-soul unity.
Richard Viladesau
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195335668
- eISBN:
- 9780199869015
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335668.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
This chapter examines the place of the cross in the theology and preaching of the century leading into the Protestant Reformation. The writings of Vincent Ferrer and Girolomo Savonarola provide ...
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This chapter examines the place of the cross in the theology and preaching of the century leading into the Protestant Reformation. The writings of Vincent Ferrer and Girolomo Savonarola provide examples of the stress placed in preaching on an emotional identification with the sufferings of Christ and of Mary. The theology of Gabriel Biel exemplifies the nominalist approach to soteriology. The art of Frà Angelico, the young Michelangelo, and other early Renaissance painters shows the effect of humanism on the portrayal of the Passion.Less
This chapter examines the place of the cross in the theology and preaching of the century leading into the Protestant Reformation. The writings of Vincent Ferrer and Girolomo Savonarola provide examples of the stress placed in preaching on an emotional identification with the sufferings of Christ and of Mary. The theology of Gabriel Biel exemplifies the nominalist approach to soteriology. The art of Frà Angelico, the young Michelangelo, and other early Renaissance painters shows the effect of humanism on the portrayal of the Passion.
Gyula Klima
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195176223
- eISBN:
- 9780199871957
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.003.0013
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
The final chapter provides a summary account of Buridan’s essentialist nominalism, showing how Buridan can successfully claim to be both a nominalist denying the existence of real shared essences and ...
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The final chapter provides a summary account of Buridan’s essentialist nominalism, showing how Buridan can successfully claim to be both a nominalist denying the existence of real shared essences and an essentialist endorsing the possibility of discovering truly essential attributes of things, which allows valid scientific generalizations. The concluding critical part of the chapter, however, points out a fundamental conflict between Buridan’s abstractionist cognitive psychology of absolute concepts and his logical semantics of the corresponding absolute terms that grounds his nominalist essentialism.Less
The final chapter provides a summary account of Buridan’s essentialist nominalism, showing how Buridan can successfully claim to be both a nominalist denying the existence of real shared essences and an essentialist endorsing the possibility of discovering truly essential attributes of things, which allows valid scientific generalizations. The concluding critical part of the chapter, however, points out a fundamental conflict between Buridan’s abstractionist cognitive psychology of absolute concepts and his logical semantics of the corresponding absolute terms that grounds his nominalist essentialism.
Douglas Anderson and Carl Hausman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780823234677
- eISBN:
- 9780823238842
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823234677.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
The book is a collection of chapters on the work of Charles S. Peirce that grew out of conversations between the authors over the last decade and a half. The chapters focus primarily on Peirce's ...
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The book is a collection of chapters on the work of Charles S. Peirce that grew out of conversations between the authors over the last decade and a half. The chapters focus primarily on Peirce's consideration of realism and idealism as philosophical outlooks. Some deal directly with Peirce's accounts of realism and idealism; others look to the consequences of these accounts for other features of Peirce's overall philosophical system.Less
The book is a collection of chapters on the work of Charles S. Peirce that grew out of conversations between the authors over the last decade and a half. The chapters focus primarily on Peirce's consideration of realism and idealism as philosophical outlooks. Some deal directly with Peirce's accounts of realism and idealism; others look to the consequences of these accounts for other features of Peirce's overall philosophical system.
Gideon Rosen and John P. Burgess
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195148770
- eISBN:
- 9780199835560
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148770.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Nominalism is the view that mathematical objects do not exist. This chapter delimits several types of nominalistic projects: revolutionary programs that attempt to change mathematics and hermeneutic ...
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Nominalism is the view that mathematical objects do not exist. This chapter delimits several types of nominalistic projects: revolutionary programs that attempt to change mathematics and hermeneutic programs that attempt to interpret mathematics. Some programs accord with naturalism, and some oppose naturalism. Steven Yablo’s fictionalism is brought into the fold and discussed at some length.Less
Nominalism is the view that mathematical objects do not exist. This chapter delimits several types of nominalistic projects: revolutionary programs that attempt to change mathematics and hermeneutic programs that attempt to interpret mathematics. Some programs accord with naturalism, and some oppose naturalism. Steven Yablo’s fictionalism is brought into the fold and discussed at some length.
Julian Dodd
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284375
- eISBN:
- 9780191713743
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284375.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter makes the case for the claim that the type/token theory is the prima facie answer to the categorial question: that is, the account that must be accepted unless it is defeated. This it ...
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This chapter makes the case for the claim that the type/token theory is the prima facie answer to the categorial question: that is, the account that must be accepted unless it is defeated. This it does by arguing that the type/token theory gives natural and convincing explanations of two phenomena: the fact that musical works are repeatable (i.e., susceptible of multiple occurrence), and the fact that we listen to a work by listening to one of its occurrences. The effective way in which the type/token theory provides explanations of these phenomena is favourably contrasted with the attempted explanations offered by its standard competitors: the conception of musical works as sets of sound-sequence-events, the view of such works as properties of such events, nominalist theories, and anti-realist accounts.Less
This chapter makes the case for the claim that the type/token theory is the prima facie answer to the categorial question: that is, the account that must be accepted unless it is defeated. This it does by arguing that the type/token theory gives natural and convincing explanations of two phenomena: the fact that musical works are repeatable (i.e., susceptible of multiple occurrence), and the fact that we listen to a work by listening to one of its occurrences. The effective way in which the type/token theory provides explanations of these phenomena is favourably contrasted with the attempted explanations offered by its standard competitors: the conception of musical works as sets of sound-sequence-events, the view of such works as properties of such events, nominalist theories, and anti-realist accounts.
John P. Burgess and Gideon Rosen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250128
- eISBN:
- 9780191597138
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250126.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Begins by distinguishing different varieties of nominalism. All adherents of nominalism agree in rejecting mathematical and other abstract entities, and many have attempted to develop nominalist ...
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Begins by distinguishing different varieties of nominalism. All adherents of nominalism agree in rejecting mathematical and other abstract entities, and many have attempted to develop nominalist interpretations of scientific theories that appear to involve mathematical objects, with some (hermeneutic nominalists) claiming that these interpretations reveal what the theories really meant all along, and others (revolutionary nominalists) admitting that what they are developing are new, replacement theories. Before beginning our examination of these interpretative projects, we stop to examine critically their presuppositions, beginning with the distinction between abstract objects and concrete objects. We devote special attention to epistemological arguments and semantical arguments for nominalism, based on causal theories of knowledge and causal theories of reference. We also consider why more nominalists have not been content simply to adopt instrumentalism, which declares science to be a useful fiction, and offers no reinterpretation to turn theory into fact.Less
Begins by distinguishing different varieties of nominalism. All adherents of nominalism agree in rejecting mathematical and other abstract entities, and many have attempted to develop nominalist interpretations of scientific theories that appear to involve mathematical objects, with some (hermeneutic nominalists) claiming that these interpretations reveal what the theories really meant all along, and others (revolutionary nominalists) admitting that what they are developing are new, replacement theories. Before beginning our examination of these interpretative projects, we stop to examine critically their presuppositions, beginning with the distinction between abstract objects and concrete objects. We devote special attention to epistemological arguments and semantical arguments for nominalism, based on causal theories of knowledge and causal theories of reference. We also consider why more nominalists have not been content simply to adopt instrumentalism, which declares science to be a useful fiction, and offers no reinterpretation to turn theory into fact.
Frank Griffel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331622
- eISBN:
- 9780199867998
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Islam
The seventeenth discussion of al-Ghazali’s Incoherence (Tahafut) shows that he remains uncommitted as to whether God creates events in the world in an occasionalist way or by means of secondary ...
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The seventeenth discussion of al-Ghazali’s Incoherence (Tahafut) shows that he remains uncommitted as to whether God creates events in the world in an occasionalist way or by means of secondary causality. Al-Ghazali assumes that neither revelation nor a study of the world allows us to settle the dispute between the occasionalists and those who propose secondary causality. If that is the case, what about the prophetical miracle? For occasionalists it is a break in God’s habit and thus would prove that there is no secondary causality. A close study of al-Ghazali’s teachings on prophecy reveals that he no longer shares the Ash’arite teaching that prophecy is confirmed and proven by the prophets’ performance of miracles. He thinks these miracles are indistinguishable from sorcery and magic and can be explained as the effects of natural causes that are yet unknown to us. According to al-Ghazali, God does not break his habit. In the Qur’an (Q 33:62, 48:23 ) God declares: “You will not find any change in God’s habit.” This implies that God’s habits – meaning the laws of nature – are unchanging and stable and that they will not be suspended. The lawful character of God’s arrangement of the world, however, is not something that we find in the world itself. Al-Ghazali still thinks that occasionalism is a viable explanation of God’s creative activity. The cause may not have any true efficacy on its effect. In the human understanding, however, the cause has such efficacy. God created our minds in a way that they always search for causes and look out for the rules that determine how things react to one another. While al-Ghazali remains uncommitted if what we consider a cause is truly connected with what we consider its effect, he acknowledges that the human mind considers there is a connection which will never change.Less
The seventeenth discussion of al-Ghazali’s Incoherence (Tahafut) shows that he remains uncommitted as to whether God creates events in the world in an occasionalist way or by means of secondary causality. Al-Ghazali assumes that neither revelation nor a study of the world allows us to settle the dispute between the occasionalists and those who propose secondary causality. If that is the case, what about the prophetical miracle? For occasionalists it is a break in God’s habit and thus would prove that there is no secondary causality. A close study of al-Ghazali’s teachings on prophecy reveals that he no longer shares the Ash’arite teaching that prophecy is confirmed and proven by the prophets’ performance of miracles. He thinks these miracles are indistinguishable from sorcery and magic and can be explained as the effects of natural causes that are yet unknown to us. According to al-Ghazali, God does not break his habit. In the Qur’an (Q 33:62, 48:23 ) God declares: “You will not find any change in God’s habit.” This implies that God’s habits – meaning the laws of nature – are unchanging and stable and that they will not be suspended. The lawful character of God’s arrangement of the world, however, is not something that we find in the world itself. Al-Ghazali still thinks that occasionalism is a viable explanation of God’s creative activity. The cause may not have any true efficacy on its effect. In the human understanding, however, the cause has such efficacy. God created our minds in a way that they always search for causes and look out for the rules that determine how things react to one another. While al-Ghazali remains uncommitted if what we consider a cause is truly connected with what we consider its effect, he acknowledges that the human mind considers there is a connection which will never change.
Philip Kreager
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270576
- eISBN:
- 9780191600883
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270570.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, demographic models, measures, and categories have played an influential role in identifying the groups of which modern societies are ...
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Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, demographic models, measures, and categories have played an influential role in identifying the groups of which modern societies are composed. By constituting the characteristics and problems of groups as objects of scientific inquiry and public intervention, demographic methods work to enfranchise (or disenfranchise) them for various purposes. As part of Europe's relations with colonial and post‐colonial states, demographic methods have helped shape a wide range of popular identities, as well as ordinary people's experience of basic vital processes. Understanding the impacts of demographic practice requires us to depart from the conventional view that population data and analysis merely represent social and biological phenomena. The impacts arise not only from eugenic and other biases that may shape demographic categories, but are integral to the actuarial matrix of what are usually considered purely formal modelling and quantitative methods. ‘Demographic nominalism’, i.e. the historical consequences of fixing the flow of vital and social events into discrete classificatory schemes and formal models, is examined in terms of three available historical approaches, and illustrated by instances drawn from the demography of Indian castes.Less
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, demographic models, measures, and categories have played an influential role in identifying the groups of which modern societies are composed. By constituting the characteristics and problems of groups as objects of scientific inquiry and public intervention, demographic methods work to enfranchise (or disenfranchise) them for various purposes. As part of Europe's relations with colonial and post‐colonial states, demographic methods have helped shape a wide range of popular identities, as well as ordinary people's experience of basic vital processes. Understanding the impacts of demographic practice requires us to depart from the conventional view that population data and analysis merely represent social and biological phenomena. The impacts arise not only from eugenic and other biases that may shape demographic categories, but are integral to the actuarial matrix of what are usually considered purely formal modelling and quantitative methods. ‘Demographic nominalism’, i.e. the historical consequences of fixing the flow of vital and social events into discrete classificatory schemes and formal models, is examined in terms of three available historical approaches, and illustrated by instances drawn from the demography of Indian castes.
Richard Viladesau
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195188110
- eISBN:
- 9780199784738
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019518811X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
The fresco of the crucifixion by Giotto in the Arena chapel represents the beginning of naturalism in Western painting. The theology of the cross during this period shows the increasing influence of ...
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The fresco of the crucifixion by Giotto in the Arena chapel represents the beginning of naturalism in Western painting. The theology of the cross during this period shows the increasing influence of the philosophy of the nominalism of William of Ockham and his followers. The separation of faith from reason, combined with incipient artistic naturalism and the religious pessimism that followed the great Plague, contributed to a new emphasis on the sufferings and wounds of Christ, which dramatically expressed the consequences of human sin. This was expressed artistically in expanded and emotional treatments of the crucifixion in drama (the passion plays), as well as new images like the pietà, that stressed compunction with Mary.Less
The fresco of the crucifixion by Giotto in the Arena chapel represents the beginning of naturalism in Western painting. The theology of the cross during this period shows the increasing influence of the philosophy of the nominalism of William of Ockham and his followers. The separation of faith from reason, combined with incipient artistic naturalism and the religious pessimism that followed the great Plague, contributed to a new emphasis on the sufferings and wounds of Christ, which dramatically expressed the consequences of human sin. This was expressed artistically in expanded and emotional treatments of the crucifixion in drama (the passion plays), as well as new images like the pietà, that stressed compunction with Mary.
Constant J. Mews
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195156881
- eISBN:
- 9780199835423
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195156889.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
The Early Years: Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux. This chapter examines Abelard’s intellectual debt to both the vocalist theories of Roscelin of Compiègne and ...
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The Early Years: Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux. This chapter examines Abelard’s intellectual debt to both the vocalist theories of Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux’s teaching about dialectic in shaping his philosophical nominalism. By looking at the earliest records of Abelard’s teaching of dialectic and glosses on Aristotle, Porphyry and Boethius, it observes how students identified him as an iconoclast teacher, who quickly provoked laughter by the examples that he chose. It traces how Abelard’s early conflict with his teachers laid the foundation for the subsequent difficulties he would experience in his career.Less
The Early Years: Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux. This chapter examines Abelard’s intellectual debt to both the vocalist theories of Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux’s teaching about dialectic in shaping his philosophical nominalism. By looking at the earliest records of Abelard’s teaching of dialectic and glosses on Aristotle, Porphyry and Boethius, it observes how students identified him as an iconoclast teacher, who quickly provoked laughter by the examples that he chose. It traces how Abelard’s early conflict with his teachers laid the foundation for the subsequent difficulties he would experience in his career.
M. Gail Hamner
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195155471
- eISBN:
- 9780199834266
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195155475.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Demonstrates the resonance between Charles Sanders Peirce (the American pragmatist) and William Hamilton (a Scottish professor of logic and metaphysics), which can be outlined in three ways: first, ...
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Demonstrates the resonance between Charles Sanders Peirce (the American pragmatist) and William Hamilton (a Scottish professor of logic and metaphysics), which can be outlined in three ways: first, both men present a philosophy that balances Kant's idealism with T.H. Reid's naturalism (Peirce calls this task a ‘critical common‐sensism’); second, they both discuss questions of faith in a manner that implies a transcendent or cosmological perspective; and third, they exhibit a focused interest in logic. However, the pragmatist always evinces slightly different priorities: while Hamilton remains a committed nominalist throughout his writings, Peirce attempts to reconcile Kant and British empiricism as part of his larger argument against nominalism; while Hamilton maintains a Calvinist trinitarianism, Peirce's musings on questions of faith direct him closer to Spinoza's panentheism; and finally, while Hamilton's logic remains an important but separate line of philosophical inquiry, Peirce develops a logic of relations that conjoins his interest in logic to his semiotic and phenomenology, and thus becomes a pervasive part of his philosophy. After giving a brief exposition of the main points of his philosophy, the discussion of Hamilton examines how relativity, conditionality, and free will inform his statements about causality, consciousness, belief, and action. Of greatest interest is how the concept of consciousness relates to the concept of belief, such that the former acts as the guarantor of the latter.Less
Demonstrates the resonance between Charles Sanders Peirce (the American pragmatist) and William Hamilton (a Scottish professor of logic and metaphysics), which can be outlined in three ways: first, both men present a philosophy that balances Kant's idealism with T.H. Reid's naturalism (Peirce calls this task a ‘critical common‐sensism’); second, they both discuss questions of faith in a manner that implies a transcendent or cosmological perspective; and third, they exhibit a focused interest in logic. However, the pragmatist always evinces slightly different priorities: while Hamilton remains a committed nominalist throughout his writings, Peirce attempts to reconcile Kant and British empiricism as part of his larger argument against nominalism; while Hamilton maintains a Calvinist trinitarianism, Peirce's musings on questions of faith direct him closer to Spinoza's panentheism; and finally, while Hamilton's logic remains an important but separate line of philosophical inquiry, Peirce develops a logic of relations that conjoins his interest in logic to his semiotic and phenomenology, and thus becomes a pervasive part of his philosophy. After giving a brief exposition of the main points of his philosophy, the discussion of Hamilton examines how relativity, conditionality, and free will inform his statements about causality, consciousness, belief, and action. Of greatest interest is how the concept of consciousness relates to the concept of belief, such that the former acts as the guarantor of the latter.
Lloyd P. Gerson
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452413
- eISBN:
- 9780801469183
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452413.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
Was Plato a Platonist? While ancient disciples of Plato would have answered this question in the affirmative, modern scholars have generally denied that Plato's own philosophy was in substantial ...
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Was Plato a Platonist? While ancient disciples of Plato would have answered this question in the affirmative, modern scholars have generally denied that Plato's own philosophy was in substantial agreement with that of the Platonists of succeeding centuries. This book argues that the ancients are correct in their assessment. The conclusion is reached through challenging fundamental assumptions about how Plato's teachings have come to be understood. The book shows that Platonism, broadly conceived, is the polar opposite of naturalism and that the history of philosophy from Plato until the seventeenth century was the history of various efforts to find the most consistent and complete version of “anti-naturalism.” The book contends that the philosophical position of Plato—Plato's own Platonism, so to speak—was produced out of a matrix he calls “Ur-Platonism.” Ur-Platonism is the conjunction of five “antis” that in total arrive at anti-naturalism: anti-nominalism, anti-mechanism, anti-materialism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. Plato's Platonism is an attempt to construct the most consistent and defensible positive system uniting the five “antis.” It is also the system that all later Platonists throughout Antiquity attributed to Plato when countering attacks from critics including Peripatetics, Stoics, and Sceptics. In conclusion, the book shows that Late Antique philosophers such as Proclus were right in regarding Plotinus as “the great exegete of the Platonic revelation.”Less
Was Plato a Platonist? While ancient disciples of Plato would have answered this question in the affirmative, modern scholars have generally denied that Plato's own philosophy was in substantial agreement with that of the Platonists of succeeding centuries. This book argues that the ancients are correct in their assessment. The conclusion is reached through challenging fundamental assumptions about how Plato's teachings have come to be understood. The book shows that Platonism, broadly conceived, is the polar opposite of naturalism and that the history of philosophy from Plato until the seventeenth century was the history of various efforts to find the most consistent and complete version of “anti-naturalism.” The book contends that the philosophical position of Plato—Plato's own Platonism, so to speak—was produced out of a matrix he calls “Ur-Platonism.” Ur-Platonism is the conjunction of five “antis” that in total arrive at anti-naturalism: anti-nominalism, anti-mechanism, anti-materialism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. Plato's Platonism is an attempt to construct the most consistent and defensible positive system uniting the five “antis.” It is also the system that all later Platonists throughout Antiquity attributed to Plato when countering attacks from critics including Peripatetics, Stoics, and Sceptics. In conclusion, the book shows that Late Antique philosophers such as Proclus were right in regarding Plotinus as “the great exegete of the Platonic revelation.”
