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Transglobal Reliabilism

David Henderson and Terence Horgan

in The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608546
eISBN:
9780191729584
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The neoclassical reliabilism of chapter three is found to be flawed. Its inadequacy is strongly suggested by variants of the so-called “new evil demon problem.” Discussion of such scenarios, and the ... More


Defeating the Externalist’s Demons

Errol Lord

in The Importance of Being Rational

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198815099
eISBN:
9780191852916
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815099.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter is about the New Evil Demon problem for externalist accounts of rationality. The New Evil Demon problem plagues views that hold that what is rational is not solely determined by internal ... More


Defending Transglobal Reliabilism

David Henderson and Terence Horgan

in The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608546
eISBN:
9780191729584
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The overall work of this chapter is two-fold: First, it illustrates how philosophical reflection leading to transglobal reliabilism fully conforms to the model of low-grade a priori reflection ... More


The Costs of Demon-Proof Justification

Sanford C. Goldberg

in Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
April 2016
ISBN:
9780198719632
eISBN:
9780191788727
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Internalist justification is standardly motivated by appeal to the New Evil Demon intuition. In this chapter it is argued that the Demon-proofing of justification comes at a great cost. Assuming that ... More


Mentalism

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 6 develops a theory of epistemic justification designed to capture the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness: namely, phenomenal mentalism. Section 6.1 defines epistemic justification ... More


Perception

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 3 explores the epistemic role of consciousness in perception. Section 3.1 argues that unconscious perceptual representation in blindsight cannot justify beliefs about the external world. ... More


Justification, Luminosity, and Credences

Susanna Schellenberg

in The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
October 2018
ISBN:
9780198827702
eISBN:
9780191866784
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198827702.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 8 discusses the repercussions of capacitism for the justification of beliefs, the credences we should assign to perceptual beliefs, and the luminosity of mental states. In light of this ... More


In Support of the Knowledge-First Conception of the Normativity of Justification

Anne Meylan

in Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198716310
eISBN:
9780191785023
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics

The knowledge-first solution to the New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) goes hand in hand with a particular conception of the normativity of justification, one according to which a justified belief is one ... More


Accessibilism

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 7 answers the explanatory challenge by combining phenomenal mentalism with accessibilism to yield phenomenal accessibilism. Section 7.1 defines accessibilism as the thesis that epistemic ... More


The Importance of Being Rational

Errol Lord

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198815099
eISBN:
9780191852916
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815099.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book’s central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to ... More


What’s wrong with internalism?

Sven Rosenkranz

in Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198865636
eISBN:
9780191897979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Extant internalists are either accessibilists or mentalists. Accessibilists standardly claim that whenever p is justified, one is in a position to know this fact by reflection alone or else this fact ... More


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