David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The cornerstone of recent work in the neuroscience of consciousness has been the search for the “neural correlate of consciousness” (NCC). This phrase refers to the neural system or systems primarily ...
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The cornerstone of recent work in the neuroscience of consciousness has been the search for the “neural correlate of consciousness” (NCC). This phrase refers to the neural system or systems primarily associated with conscious experience. This chapter addresses conceptual issues about what it is to be an NCC. The question generates all sorts of interesting puzzles: Must there be one neural correlate of consciousness, or might there be many? How strong a correlation is required? Over what range of cases? The chapter addresses these questions and a number of others, and puts forward a proposal for understanding the notion of an NCC.Less
The cornerstone of recent work in the neuroscience of consciousness has been the search for the “neural correlate of consciousness” (NCC). This phrase refers to the neural system or systems primarily associated with conscious experience. This chapter addresses conceptual issues about what it is to be an NCC. The question generates all sorts of interesting puzzles: Must there be one neural correlate of consciousness, or might there be many? How strong a correlation is required? Over what range of cases? The chapter addresses these questions and a number of others, and puts forward a proposal for understanding the notion of an NCC.
Jesse J. Prinz
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195314595
- eISBN:
- 9780199979059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314595.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapters 3 and 4 defend a theory according to which conscious states are attended intermediate-level representations, or AIRs. When expressed this way, the AIR theory described the psychological ...
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Chapters 3 and 4 defend a theory according to which conscious states are attended intermediate-level representations, or AIRs. When expressed this way, the AIR theory described the psychological correlated of consciousness, but not the neural correlates. This chapter asks how consciousness arises in the brain, and thus seeks the neural correlates of AIRs. Intermediate-level representations are hypothesized to be realized by temporal patterns in populations of neurons, or vectorwaves. Vectorwaves, it is argued, are important for distinguishing states with different qualitative character. Attention is said to be realized by neural oscillations within the gamma band. This confirms older theories that relate consciousness to gamma activity, but this theories differs from some others by relating gamma to attention rather than binding. Putting these two elements together, the neural correlates of AIRs are gamma vectorwaves.Less
Chapters 3 and 4 defend a theory according to which conscious states are attended intermediate-level representations, or AIRs. When expressed this way, the AIR theory described the psychological correlated of consciousness, but not the neural correlates. This chapter asks how consciousness arises in the brain, and thus seeks the neural correlates of AIRs. Intermediate-level representations are hypothesized to be realized by temporal patterns in populations of neurons, or vectorwaves. Vectorwaves, it is argued, are important for distinguishing states with different qualitative character. Attention is said to be realized by neural oscillations within the gamma band. This confirms older theories that relate consciousness to gamma activity, but this theories differs from some others by relating gamma to attention rather than binding. Putting these two elements together, the neural correlates of AIRs are gamma vectorwaves.
Tim Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199215386
- eISBN:
- 9780191594786
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
This chapter explores ways in which the unity of consciousness might constrain theories of consciousness. A distinction is made between two broad accounts of consciousness: atomistic accounts, ...
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This chapter explores ways in which the unity of consciousness might constrain theories of consciousness. A distinction is made between two broad accounts of consciousness: atomistic accounts, according to which the phenomenal field is built up out of independent phenomenal states, and holistic accounts, according to which the phenomenal field is the basic unit of consciousness. This chapter argues that the unity of consciousness supports holistic approaches to consciousness in favour of atomistic approaches. Feature binding and inter-modal integration put pressure on certain radical forms of atomism, while the unity thesis puts pressure on the atomistic approach more generally. In place of atomism it is argued that consciousness is fundamentally holistic, and that the unity of consciousness is ensured by the very mechanisms that generate consciousness in the first place. Drawing on Tononi's notion of the ‘dynamic core,’ a model of consciousness is sketched that aims to capture its ‘unity in multiplicity.’Less
This chapter explores ways in which the unity of consciousness might constrain theories of consciousness. A distinction is made between two broad accounts of consciousness: atomistic accounts, according to which the phenomenal field is built up out of independent phenomenal states, and holistic accounts, according to which the phenomenal field is the basic unit of consciousness. This chapter argues that the unity of consciousness supports holistic approaches to consciousness in favour of atomistic approaches. Feature binding and inter-modal integration put pressure on certain radical forms of atomism, while the unity thesis puts pressure on the atomistic approach more generally. In place of atomism it is argued that consciousness is fundamentally holistic, and that the unity of consciousness is ensured by the very mechanisms that generate consciousness in the first place. Drawing on Tononi's notion of the ‘dynamic core,’ a model of consciousness is sketched that aims to capture its ‘unity in multiplicity.’
Uriah Kriegel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570355
- eISBN:
- 9780191721625
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
There are two major scientific questions surrounding consciousness: the neural correlate of consciousness and the function of consciousness. This chapter derives specific hypotheses about the neural ...
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There are two major scientific questions surrounding consciousness: the neural correlate of consciousness and the function of consciousness. This chapter derives specific hypotheses about the neural correlate and function of consciousness from the self‐representational theory of consciousness.Less
There are two major scientific questions surrounding consciousness: the neural correlate of consciousness and the function of consciousness. This chapter derives specific hypotheses about the neural correlate and function of consciousness from the self‐representational theory of consciousness.
Uriah Kriegel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570355
- eISBN:
- 9780191721625
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? This book offers an answer. It attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of the feature that all and ...
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Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? This book offers an answer. It attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of the feature that all and only conscious mental events have. According to the theory, conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. The book fleshed out this idea and argues for it.Less
Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? This book offers an answer. It attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of the feature that all and only conscious mental events have. According to the theory, conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. The book fleshed out this idea and argues for it.
David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter addresses the question: how can we isolate the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) in the absence of a “consciousness meter,” which measures consciousness directly? The obvious ...
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This chapter addresses the question: how can we isolate the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) in the absence of a “consciousness meter,” which measures consciousness directly? The obvious answer is that we rely on verbal reports and other behavioral indicators of consciousness. Importantly, the use of these indicators tacitly relies on pre-experimental principles that connect these behavioral indicators to consciousness. The use of these principles is unavoidable, and this has a number of interesting consequences for the science. After drawing out some of the key principles, the chapter presents some conclusions that bear directly on the practical methodology of the scientific work in this area.Less
This chapter addresses the question: how can we isolate the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) in the absence of a “consciousness meter,” which measures consciousness directly? The obvious answer is that we rely on verbal reports and other behavioral indicators of consciousness. Importantly, the use of these indicators tacitly relies on pre-experimental principles that connect these behavioral indicators to consciousness. The use of these principles is unavoidable, and this has a number of interesting consequences for the science. After drawing out some of the key principles, the chapter presents some conclusions that bear directly on the practical methodology of the scientific work in this area.
Pascale Michelon and Abraham Z. Snyder
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195169669
- eISBN:
- 9780199847563
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195169669.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Most of the objects in our environment are familiar and expected in a given situation. A mnemonic advantage can be attributed to the distinctiveness of perceived events. Two types of distinctiveness ...
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Most of the objects in our environment are familiar and expected in a given situation. A mnemonic advantage can be attributed to the distinctiveness of perceived events. Two types of distinctiveness can be distinguished: primary and secondary distinctiveness. Primary distinctiveness is due to item contrast with respect to the surroundings. The likelihood that an item will be remembered increases as the number of properties shared with its contextual neighbors decreases. Secondary distinctiveness is generated by violation of expectations about the world. Multiple behavioral studies have shown a memory advantage for incongruous versus ordinary material. This result is commonly known as the bizarreness effect. This chapter deals with secondary distinctiveness, which underlies the subjective percept of bizarreness or incongruity. The neural correlates of the encoding of incongruous information are explored in an attempt to understand why it is better remembered. Three interpretations of the bizarreness effect are considered: the attentional or processing-time hypothesis, the distinctiveness hypothesis, and the surprise or expectation violation hypothesis.Less
Most of the objects in our environment are familiar and expected in a given situation. A mnemonic advantage can be attributed to the distinctiveness of perceived events. Two types of distinctiveness can be distinguished: primary and secondary distinctiveness. Primary distinctiveness is due to item contrast with respect to the surroundings. The likelihood that an item will be remembered increases as the number of properties shared with its contextual neighbors decreases. Secondary distinctiveness is generated by violation of expectations about the world. Multiple behavioral studies have shown a memory advantage for incongruous versus ordinary material. This result is commonly known as the bizarreness effect. This chapter deals with secondary distinctiveness, which underlies the subjective percept of bizarreness or incongruity. The neural correlates of the encoding of incongruous information are explored in an attempt to understand why it is better remembered. Three interpretations of the bizarreness effect are considered: the attentional or processing-time hypothesis, the distinctiveness hypothesis, and the surprise or expectation violation hypothesis.
Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780823276073
- eISBN:
- 9780823277100
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823276073.003.0003
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, History of Neuroscience
This chapter considers the emergence, since the 1990s, of fields whose names often combine the suffix neuro with the name of one of the human and social sciences, from anthropology and art history to ...
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This chapter considers the emergence, since the 1990s, of fields whose names often combine the suffix neuro with the name of one of the human and social sciences, from anthropology and art history to education, law and theology. These “disciplines of the neuro” reframe the human sciences and their corresponding subjects on the basis of knowledge about the brain. Driven by the availability of imaging technologies, they look for neural correlates of behaviors and mental processes. Brain imaging studies since the early 1990s have increasingly dealt with topics of potential ethical, legal and social implications, such as attitudes, cooperation and competition, violence, political preference or religious experience. The media, both popular and specialized, has given much room to these new fields, thus underlining how rapidly neuroscientific knowledge spreads beyond the confines of brain research proper into different areas of life and culture as a whole. We provide an overview of these fields, as well as a more focused examination of neuroaesthetics and the “neurodisciplines” of culture. Though recurrently presented as a way of solving centuries-old riddles and offering solutions to supposed crises in the humanities, these new fields apply methods that are intrinsically inadequate to the objects and phenomena they claim to address.Less
This chapter considers the emergence, since the 1990s, of fields whose names often combine the suffix neuro with the name of one of the human and social sciences, from anthropology and art history to education, law and theology. These “disciplines of the neuro” reframe the human sciences and their corresponding subjects on the basis of knowledge about the brain. Driven by the availability of imaging technologies, they look for neural correlates of behaviors and mental processes. Brain imaging studies since the early 1990s have increasingly dealt with topics of potential ethical, legal and social implications, such as attitudes, cooperation and competition, violence, political preference or religious experience. The media, both popular and specialized, has given much room to these new fields, thus underlining how rapidly neuroscientific knowledge spreads beyond the confines of brain research proper into different areas of life and culture as a whole. We provide an overview of these fields, as well as a more focused examination of neuroaesthetics and the “neurodisciplines” of culture. Though recurrently presented as a way of solving centuries-old riddles and offering solutions to supposed crises in the humanities, these new fields apply methods that are intrinsically inadequate to the objects and phenomena they claim to address.
HANS C. LOU and TROELS W. KJAER
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195173413
- eISBN:
- 9780199865758
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173413.003.0016
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Molecular and Cellular Systems
This chapter introduces the study of meditation as a vehicle for discovering the neural correlates of the self. It begins with a thorough introduction to experiments designed to isolate the neural ...
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This chapter introduces the study of meditation as a vehicle for discovering the neural correlates of the self. It begins with a thorough introduction to experiments designed to isolate the neural components of meditation. Studies on meditation are discussed, which show precuneal, medial frontal, and striatal activation during meditation. It is argued that a network involving medial parietal, medial prefrontal, and right lateral parietal regions are critically involved in self-representation.Less
This chapter introduces the study of meditation as a vehicle for discovering the neural correlates of the self. It begins with a thorough introduction to experiments designed to isolate the neural components of meditation. Studies on meditation are discussed, which show precuneal, medial frontal, and striatal activation during meditation. It is argued that a network involving medial parietal, medial prefrontal, and right lateral parietal regions are critically involved in self-representation.
David Hodgson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845309
- eISBN:
- 9780199932269
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845309.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
In Chapter 4, I outline my views concerning conscious experiences, and I identify three distinguishing features of conscious processes that I contend contribute to decision-making, namely ...
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In Chapter 4, I outline my views concerning conscious experiences, and I identify three distinguishing features of conscious processes that I contend contribute to decision-making, namely subjectivity, qualia and unity. I argue that consciousness must have a role to play in our decision-making, and that this role is not one that could be performed by rule-determined processes (if it were, consciousness would be a superfluity).Less
In Chapter 4, I outline my views concerning conscious experiences, and I identify three distinguishing features of conscious processes that I contend contribute to decision-making, namely subjectivity, qualia and unity. I argue that consciousness must have a role to play in our decision-making, and that this role is not one that could be performed by rule-determined processes (if it were, consciousness would be a superfluity).
Randolph Blake and Sheng He
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198529699
- eISBN:
- 9780191689697
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198529699.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Adaptation within sensory systems broadens the dynamic range of those systems, making it possible for organisms to function efficiently over a wide variety of environmental conditions. To maximize ...
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Adaptation within sensory systems broadens the dynamic range of those systems, making it possible for organisms to function efficiently over a wide variety of environmental conditions. To maximize efficiency sensory adaptation is characteristically ‘selective’ for different stimulus attributes, as it should be in order to promote adaptive changes in neural representations of environmental stimuli. This chapter considers several simple but potentially revealing questions about adaptation aftereffects, and interrelated questions that attempt to get at the neural bases of perceptual awareness: What happens when a visual adapting stimulus falls outside of conscious awareness for a substantial portion of the adaptation period, thereby dissociating phenomenal perception from physical stimulation? What transpires within the visual nervous system when a given stimulus takes on different appearances owing to visual adaptation?Less
Adaptation within sensory systems broadens the dynamic range of those systems, making it possible for organisms to function efficiently over a wide variety of environmental conditions. To maximize efficiency sensory adaptation is characteristically ‘selective’ for different stimulus attributes, as it should be in order to promote adaptive changes in neural representations of environmental stimuli. This chapter considers several simple but potentially revealing questions about adaptation aftereffects, and interrelated questions that attempt to get at the neural bases of perceptual awareness: What happens when a visual adapting stimulus falls outside of conscious awareness for a substantial portion of the adaptation period, thereby dissociating phenomenal perception from physical stimulation? What transpires within the visual nervous system when a given stimulus takes on different appearances owing to visual adaptation?
Matthew R. Johnson and Marcia K. Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199217298
- eISBN:
- 9780191696077
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217298.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures
This chapter describes a component-process approach in investigating the neural correlates of cognition, using the Multiple-Entry, Modular (MEM) framework, which defines a set of basic ‘building ...
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This chapter describes a component-process approach in investigating the neural correlates of cognition, using the Multiple-Entry, Modular (MEM) framework, which defines a set of basic ‘building blocks’ of cognition that, when combined, could form the many more complex operations of which the mind is capable. It also describes studies using neuroimaging to test and characterize the component processes of this model.Less
This chapter describes a component-process approach in investigating the neural correlates of cognition, using the Multiple-Entry, Modular (MEM) framework, which defines a set of basic ‘building blocks’ of cognition that, when combined, could form the many more complex operations of which the mind is capable. It also describes studies using neuroimaging to test and characterize the component processes of this model.
Andreas K. Engel
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198508571
- eISBN:
- 9780191687358
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198508571.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter aims to contribute to the ongoing debate about the neural correlates of consciousness from the viewpoint of a particular experimental approach: the study of distributed neuronal ...
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This chapter aims to contribute to the ongoing debate about the neural correlates of consciousness from the viewpoint of a particular experimental approach: the study of distributed neuronal processing and of dynamic interactions which implement specific bindings in neural network architectures. The now classic notion of binding and the search for potential binding mechanisms has received increasing attention during the past decade. Having been introduced first in psychological discourse, the issue of binding has now advanced into the focus of research in other disciplines within cognitive science in areas such as neural network modeling, philosophy of mind, and cognitive neuroscience.Less
This chapter aims to contribute to the ongoing debate about the neural correlates of consciousness from the viewpoint of a particular experimental approach: the study of distributed neuronal processing and of dynamic interactions which implement specific bindings in neural network architectures. The now classic notion of binding and the search for potential binding mechanisms has received increasing attention during the past decade. Having been introduced first in psychological discourse, the issue of binding has now advanced into the focus of research in other disciplines within cognitive science in areas such as neural network modeling, philosophy of mind, and cognitive neuroscience.
John Campbell
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243815
- eISBN:
- 9780191597145
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243816.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative is provided by conscious attention to the object. This conscious attention causes and justifies your use of particular information‐processing procedures ...
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Knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative is provided by conscious attention to the object. This conscious attention causes and justifies your use of particular information‐processing procedures to verify and to find the implications of propositions involving the term. Feature‐integration theory provides a way of characterizing how conscious attention can recruit information in different processing streams to verify propositions about a single perceived object; we can give a parallel account of action on the object. This approach provides an explanation of the appeal of the idea that binding mechanisms are a neural correlate of consciousness.Less
Knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative is provided by conscious attention to the object. This conscious attention causes and justifies your use of particular information‐processing procedures to verify and to find the implications of propositions involving the term. Feature‐integration theory provides a way of characterizing how conscious attention can recruit information in different processing streams to verify propositions about a single perceived object; we can give a parallel account of action on the object. This approach provides an explanation of the appeal of the idea that binding mechanisms are a neural correlate of consciousness.
Jeffrey Gray
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198520917
- eISBN:
- 9780191584916
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198520917.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter explores the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), a phrase coined by Francis Crick, which describes the neural activity that is proximal to any particular form of conscious ...
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This chapter explores the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), a phrase coined by Francis Crick, which describes the neural activity that is proximal to any particular form of conscious experience. Crick's particular interest lies in the NCC of specifically visual awareness. He asks the question: what is the proximal activity underlying the visual qualia of colour, motion, shape, etc.? This emphasis on vision is driven, not theoretically, but practically, since so much more is known about this sense, both psychologically and physiologically, than any of the others. However, there is no reason to think that a solution found for the NCC of vision would be inapplicable in principle to the other senses, though the details, of course, might differ considerably. Note that this concept of the NCC specifically for vision is incompatible with the notion of a single Cartesian Theatre for all conscious experience considered in Chapter 11. Crick's approach implies, in contrast, that there will be multiple foci of neural activity, each proximal to a different type of qualia. However, it further implies that only some forms of neural activity can serve as NCCs. In particular, NCCs should be found in perceptual systems (since one is consciously aware of percepts) but not in systems whose operation does not figure in conscious awareness (ones, for example, that control pupillary dilation or walking).Less
This chapter explores the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), a phrase coined by Francis Crick, which describes the neural activity that is proximal to any particular form of conscious experience. Crick's particular interest lies in the NCC of specifically visual awareness. He asks the question: what is the proximal activity underlying the visual qualia of colour, motion, shape, etc.? This emphasis on vision is driven, not theoretically, but practically, since so much more is known about this sense, both psychologically and physiologically, than any of the others. However, there is no reason to think that a solution found for the NCC of vision would be inapplicable in principle to the other senses, though the details, of course, might differ considerably. Note that this concept of the NCC specifically for vision is incompatible with the notion of a single Cartesian Theatre for all conscious experience considered in Chapter 11. Crick's approach implies, in contrast, that there will be multiple foci of neural activity, each proximal to a different type of qualia. However, it further implies that only some forms of neural activity can serve as NCCs. In particular, NCCs should be found in perceptual systems (since one is consciously aware of percepts) but not in systems whose operation does not figure in conscious awareness (ones, for example, that control pupillary dilation or walking).
Georg Northoff
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199826995
- eISBN:
- 9780199979776
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199826995.003.0002
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
The book turns to the phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl and his description of what it calls “inner time consciousness.” One hallmark of our “inner time consciousness” is that we experience ...
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The book turns to the phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl and his description of what it calls “inner time consciousness.” One hallmark of our “inner time consciousness” is that we experience events and objects in succession and duration in our consciousness; following Husserl, this amounts to what he calls the “width of present.” The concept of the “width of present” describes the extension of the present beyond the single discrete time point, such as when perceiving different tones as a melody. The book now hypothesizes the degree of the “width of present” to be directly dependent on and thus predisposed by the degree of the temporal differences between two (or more) discrete time points as they are encoded into neural activity. He therefore concludes that the SCPs and their encoding of neural activity in terms of temporal differences must be regarded a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) as distinguished from a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC).Less
The book turns to the phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl and his description of what it calls “inner time consciousness.” One hallmark of our “inner time consciousness” is that we experience events and objects in succession and duration in our consciousness; following Husserl, this amounts to what he calls the “width of present.” The concept of the “width of present” describes the extension of the present beyond the single discrete time point, such as when perceiving different tones as a melody. The book now hypothesizes the degree of the “width of present” to be directly dependent on and thus predisposed by the degree of the temporal differences between two (or more) discrete time points as they are encoded into neural activity. He therefore concludes that the SCPs and their encoding of neural activity in terms of temporal differences must be regarded a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) as distinguished from a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC).
Bruno G. Breitmeyer
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198712237
- eISBN:
- 9780191794209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712237.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Vision
The discussion covers problems regarding consciousness as a trait. These revolve around the qualitative aspects of consciousness, specifically the ontological status of qualia. Qualia arethe ...
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The discussion covers problems regarding consciousness as a trait. These revolve around the qualitative aspects of consciousness, specifically the ontological status of qualia. Qualia arethe subjective aspects of conscious experience, the primary qualities of visual perception such as color. The function that consciousness serves is often questioned. There are some philosophic approaches that give priority to consciousness as state, and other approaches that give priority to consciousness as trait. To these problematic issues are added the problem of determining how neural activities are linked to conscious experience, that is, of what constitutes the neural correlates or causes of consciousness. Stimulus-dependent, unconscious processing, and percept-dependent, conscious processing correlate with the initial feedforward neural sweep, and the activation of subsequent feedforward–reentrant processing loops playing out in the ventral cortical pathway. It raises a further issue regarding whether or not visual consciousness is globally unitary or a composite of several “microconsciousnesses.”Less
The discussion covers problems regarding consciousness as a trait. These revolve around the qualitative aspects of consciousness, specifically the ontological status of qualia. Qualia arethe subjective aspects of conscious experience, the primary qualities of visual perception such as color. The function that consciousness serves is often questioned. There are some philosophic approaches that give priority to consciousness as state, and other approaches that give priority to consciousness as trait. To these problematic issues are added the problem of determining how neural activities are linked to conscious experience, that is, of what constitutes the neural correlates or causes of consciousness. Stimulus-dependent, unconscious processing, and percept-dependent, conscious processing correlate with the initial feedforward neural sweep, and the activation of subsequent feedforward–reentrant processing loops playing out in the ventral cortical pathway. It raises a further issue regarding whether or not visual consciousness is globally unitary or a composite of several “microconsciousnesses.”
Hakwan C. Lau
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199233151
- eISBN:
- 9780191696596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233151.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter is concerned with the behavioural paradigms used in the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). Many researchers have questioned whether looking for the neural correlates ...
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This chapter is concerned with the behavioural paradigms used in the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). Many researchers have questioned whether looking for the neural correlates would eventually lead to an explanatory theory of consciousness, while the proponents of NCC research maintain that focusing on correlates is a strategically sensible first step, given the complexity of the problem. The aim of this chapter is to question whether researchers are really studying the NCC at all. It argues that in hoping to sidestep the difficult conceptual issues, the phenomenon of perceptual consciousness itself is also missed.Less
This chapter is concerned with the behavioural paradigms used in the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). Many researchers have questioned whether looking for the neural correlates would eventually lead to an explanatory theory of consciousness, while the proponents of NCC research maintain that focusing on correlates is a strategically sensible first step, given the complexity of the problem. The aim of this chapter is to question whether researchers are really studying the NCC at all. It argues that in hoping to sidestep the difficult conceptual issues, the phenomenon of perceptual consciousness itself is also missed.
Catherine Tallon-Baudry
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198508571
- eISBN:
- 9780191687358
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198508571.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
In the last decade a series of experiments in animals and humans pointed towards a functional role of oscillatory synchrony in linking together the different functional areas involved in the ...
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In the last decade a series of experiments in animals and humans pointed towards a functional role of oscillatory synchrony in linking together the different functional areas involved in the processing of the same visual object. In other words, oscillatory synchronization could provide the neural link between pieces of information spread all over the brain. It could thus account for our unified and coherent experience of the visual world. This mechanism has therefore been proposed to underlie the generation of object representations. Does it imply that it is a putative neural correlate of consciousness? It remains unclear whether representations are necessarily conscious. However, representations can be considered as the content of consciousness. A better understanding of their neural substrate should provide new insights on the neural correlates of consciousness.Less
In the last decade a series of experiments in animals and humans pointed towards a functional role of oscillatory synchrony in linking together the different functional areas involved in the processing of the same visual object. In other words, oscillatory synchronization could provide the neural link between pieces of information spread all over the brain. It could thus account for our unified and coherent experience of the visual world. This mechanism has therefore been proposed to underlie the generation of object representations. Does it imply that it is a putative neural correlate of consciousness? It remains unclear whether representations are necessarily conscious. However, representations can be considered as the content of consciousness. A better understanding of their neural substrate should provide new insights on the neural correlates of consciousness.
Rocco J. Gennaro
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262016605
- eISBN:
- 9780262298582
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The final chapter focuses on defending the HOT-Brain Thesis that states that there is a plausible account of how the version of the HOT theory discussed in this book might be realized in the brain ...
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The final chapter focuses on defending the HOT-Brain Thesis that states that there is a plausible account of how the version of the HOT theory discussed in this book might be realized in the brain and lead to an informative neurophysiological research agenda. Some basics on brain structure and function are discussed, together with some leading empirical theories of consciousness and the problem of finding the so-called neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). It is argued here that HOTs need not occur in the prefrontal cortex although HOT theory demands that conscious states be distributed to some degree. The mereological issue explored in a previous chapter is also revisited, putting more emphasis on the WIV, the brain, and feedback loops. The main issues in this chapter are framed by the question: “How global is the HOT theory?” More precisely, how widely distributed in the brain are conscious states?Less
The final chapter focuses on defending the HOT-Brain Thesis that states that there is a plausible account of how the version of the HOT theory discussed in this book might be realized in the brain and lead to an informative neurophysiological research agenda. Some basics on brain structure and function are discussed, together with some leading empirical theories of consciousness and the problem of finding the so-called neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). It is argued here that HOTs need not occur in the prefrontal cortex although HOT theory demands that conscious states be distributed to some degree. The mereological issue explored in a previous chapter is also revisited, putting more emphasis on the WIV, the brain, and feedback loops. The main issues in this chapter are framed by the question: “How global is the HOT theory?” More precisely, how widely distributed in the brain are conscious states?
