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This chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of corporate networks between major firms in the United States and five countries in Europe: Germany, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. It shows that the structure of networks can be compared with the dominant forms of intermediary interest representation found in each country. In Germany, the network between companies is dense, comprehensive, centralized, and corresponds in this regard with the corporatist structures also existing in the country. German corporate networks and capital networks overlap considerably, meaning that companies are not only linked together through interlocking directorates but also often through capital networks (ownership relationships). In Great Britain, the network is sparse, non-comprehensive (a large percentage of isolated companies), and non-centralized. The potential influence in this network is diffuse and not geared toward the organization of markets. This chapter looks at the relationship between markets and institutions, networks as part of the market order, regulation of competition through the so-called organization, differences in network structures, capital networks, and centrality of firms in the network.

This chapter presents a detailed comparative analysis of firms and network structures in Germany and Great Britain. It focuses on the degree of ownership concentration, the different types of owners, and the differences in the configuration of corporate networks, as well as competition and cooperation in the network. The concept of network configuration is explained, and national networks are compared in terms of ownership concentration and the overlap of capital networks and interlocking directorates. The overlap of interlocks and ownership and the mutual reinforcement of bureaucratic power (management) and power conveyed by ownership characterize the specific control structure of German capitalism.

This chapter looks at the evolution of capitalism in France. The analysis concentrates on the question whether the governance structure of large French corporations is an example of a lagged modernization process or whether it represents a genuine type of corporate governance which may be as efficient as the shareholder value model. The transformations from family to managerial, and from managerial to shareholder value capitalism may be described as sequential stages in the evolution of the capitalist system. This chapter discusses modernization theories, theories of social evolution, network configurations in France, and French capital networks and interlocking directorates. In France, two types of corporate networks are differentiated: a network that is integrated through several levels of hierarchical coordination, and a network in which the internal integration stems from ownership and family relations.

This chapter deals with corporate networks in East Germany. Corporate networks and the reconstitution of traditions are of particular importance for the transformation process in East Germany. The existence of networks offers a substitute to open market competition, transforming the economic conditions into a system of ‘controlled competition’. Experience shows that successful countries have not built their institutions along a neoliberal model of competition but have reconstituted their own respective traditions and integrated new business enterprises into a complex system of networks which provide effective protection to specialized companies. This sort of mutually protective networks is lacking in East Germany; instead, the East German network is dominated by corporations from West Germany. This chapter also looks at growth paradigms, political exchange in social networks, capital networks, and interlocking directorates in East Germany.

This chapter examines the many and varied policy instruments that are available to creditor states and to debtor states and the challenge of matching deeds to words. It looks at the factors that affect their use by governing elites. These factors include size and systemic significance, including financial market scale and depth; core and periphery status; and whether the international political economy is in good or hard times. The focus is on spatial and temporal determinants of the use of statecraft. The chapter provides a typology of creditor and debtor states, distinguishing illusory creditors, lapsed creditors, productive debtors, regular debtors, and chronic debtors. It offers historical examples of each type. The chapter then analyses the various persuasive instruments and coercive instruments of statecraft. Finally, it assesses the relative power of creditor state and debtor states, emphasizing the contingent and context-specific nature of statecraft and the consequent difficulties that face the ambition to construct general theories about sovereign debt.

This chapter shows how much processes of gentrification diverge in a single city – Beirut. Different networks of capital formation and visions of the urban future reflect Lebanon’s history of conflict. They are also shown in the various ways in which neighbourhoods and social groups are linked to regional and global circuits of capital.