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This chapter examines EU policies concerning social exclusion, migrant integration, labour migration, and asylum in the early 21st century. A two-pronged approach analyzes EU efforts in the realm of migrant integration together with its interventions in the area of immigration and asylum. A new anti-discrimination orientation is being turned into mandatory EU directives and EU-sponsored transnational development programmes, but this reorientation towards diversity, social inclusion, and equal opportunity is part of a new European Social Model, which is conditioned by a neo-liberal policy dynamic. The contours of the EU’s modernized Social Model are those of a post-national workfare regime. This has critical implications for the transformation of the frameworks of citizenship marking the post-war European welfare states in general, and the incorporation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in European societies in particular. The first part of the chapter explores the changing conditionality posed by the neo-liberal turn and changing frameworks of citizenship with regard to the inclusion of resident denizens and citizens with migrant background. That is, it focuses on the actual condition of being a citizen. The second half of the chapter discusses the changing conditions for becoming (or not becoming) a citizen, framed by a newly emerging supranational political economy of border control, migration management, and asylum.

The ‘Thatcher revolution’ and its continuation by New Labour make Britain a kind of master model for the neo-liberalization or Americanization of European welfare states. This chapter examines Britain’s new political economy and its links with immigration and ethnic diversity. The development of the specific model of state managed race relations and multiculturalism went parallel to the growth of inequality and the restructuring of the labour force according to the criteria of race, gender, human capital, and legal status. Current debates on the alleged threat from disaffected Muslim youth and the need for social cohesion arise from this failure of British multiculturalism to overcome barriers of race and class, and indicate a search for new forms of social control: less state in economic and social issues is matched by a stronger state in matters of identity and order.

The neo‐liberal/realism trend in international relations grew from a frustration (specifically of Waltz) with the simplicity and reductionism of realism. Game theoretical rigour and analysis of competition between nation‐states developed the field, but Sanders questions how much more we understand as a result. An alternative is offered in ‘concessional realism’, whereby analysis is furthered by a simple and flexible set of propositions about nation‐state behaviour. The propositions of each approach are outlined.

This chapter analyses NGO participation in social provisioning in Chile for the advancement of gender equality. It presents an overview of the social development strategy of the two Concertación governments since 1990, focusing on the social programmes involving partnerships between NGOs and government agencies. The gendered impact of global economic integration on people’s working lives and communities are discussed. It then outlines the implications of a gender equity agenda, which aims to integrate women as subjects of rights into the development process but does so by relying on the volunteer-like work of women, and which targets only the poorest of the poor.

This chapter examines two challenges to promoting the right of education in India: economic and education policies, and the gender perspective used to justify a focus on women’s education. The capabilities framework is used to distinguish rights-based approaches to social development from the more conventional policy debates in the education sector. The application of the capabilities approach to arguments for the right to education is discussed.

While the formal welfare states of Australia and New Zealand resembled the British model in the post‐war period, economic policies and industrial‐relations systems differed. As highly competitive exporters of agricultural products and raw materials, both countries had developed highly protected import‐substituting manufacturing industries to ensure full employment as a complement to the minimal protection provided by the ‘liberal’ welfare state. When this configuration ceased to be economically viable in the 1970s, both countries chose to liberalize their industrial sectors, attempting to achieve price competitiveness through government‐controlled wage‐setting procedures. In New Zealand, these efforts failed and its Westminster‐type government opted for radical neo‐liberal reforms in the 1980s that reduced welfare‐state protection and caused a steep rise of unemployment. In Australia, by contrast, unions were better able to cooperate with the government in defending international competitiveness, and federal and bicameral institutions did favour policy compromises that combined liberalization with the maintenance and even expansion of welfare‐state protection.

Among ‘Continental’ welfare states, Switzerland had and has the highest per capita income and the highest employment ratio in the group of advanced welfare states included in this study. Its export‐oriented industries and services have remained highly competitive; its levels of taxation and welfare expenditures are low; and its labour‐market institutions are highly flexible. Nevertheless, Switzerland suffered severe job losses in the first oil‐price crisis and responded by introducing compulsory unemployment insurance. In the 1980s and 1990s, political pressures from export‐oriented businesses were successful in reducing the tariff and non‐tariff barriers, protecting the sheltered sectors of the Swiss economy, whose inefficiency was beginning to hurt the competitiveness of internationally exposed firms. However, when the demand for neo‐liberal reforms touched on the benefits provided by the — not particularly generous — Swiss welfare state, they were stopped not by the ‘social partners’ as in other consociational/ corporatist democracies, or by electoral shifts in governments, but by the direct democracy of the referendum system. As a consequence, limited retrenchment had to be combined with some important extensions of welfare coverage.

Bajpai begins by examining these four dominant traditions of thought and compares the attitudes of the four traditions towards state sovereignty, the use of force, the utility of rules and institutions, and inequality. The author shows the degree of compatibility between these four perspectives and the Westphalian concept of order and justice as well as with more solidarist approaches. He concludes by outlining what a just world order would look like from the four perspectives, and notes that a three‐way conversation on this topic is taking place between the Nehruvians, the increasingly influential Hindutvas, and the nascent neo‐liberals.

The battle of the systems within the EU is as lively as it ever was, if not livelier. Europe is not converging on a single capitalism, but the many national forms it takes are all subject to similar forces. There is convergence in the processes at work in the world and in Europe — the complex processes often summarized as ‘globalization’ — but there is continued divergence in national structures. Convergence with the USA is otherwise taking place for political reasons, since the euro is working as a neo-liberal engine.

This chapter focuses on the initial entry of professional women on Wall Street. It locates women's accounts of corporate life in relation to historical factors, including and encompassing the context over women's legitimate place on Wall Street and the transformation of gendered relations amid the upheaval in institutional structures produced by global capitalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing on life-history interviews, the chapter analyses the ways in which the first cohort of women in research drew on natural attributes of American femininity, such as conservative risk-averse behaviour, to legitimize their relationships with clients. It also examines the ways women pioneers in investment banking drew on supposedly masculine characteristics of calculated rationality and risk-taking to construct themselves as authoritative financial subjects. The chapter argues for historians to analyse the discourse of executives, including their talk about corporate culture, as a window onto the gendered construction of business on Wall Street.

Rationalist or mainstream theories focus on the causal effects and functional properties of international law. One of the central problems of explaining the effectiveness of the ICC is that not all states can be expected to cooperate with the Office of the Prosecutor. While such uncertainty involves primarily the interests of non-State Parties, it is not entirely clear as to how territorial States Parties will seek to maximize their interests in their dealings with the Court. This chapter addresses this issue by focusing on the relationship between the institutional effectiveness of the ICC and the interests of State Parties. A key issue examined is the maximization of interests of these states vis-à-vis ICC prosecutorial discretion, and the problem that this raises for full cooperation. Employing a legalization framework, the chapter analyzes this issue in the context of the self-referral by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It argues that legalization theory, while limited in certain respects, offers an important analytical framework for examining the parameters or matrix of politicized justice.

Chapter 10 deals with the family policy of the OECD. International organizations like the OECD have come to play an increasingly important role in coordinating policy responses. While much of the OECD's advice may have contributed to the construction of a neoliberal world order, neoliberal solutions are not the only ones on offer; nor has neoliberalism managed to eliminate alternative, more egalitarian conceptions. Since the mid‐1990s, the discourses of some international organizations, including the OECD, have come to include elements of what might be called ‘inclusive liberalism’. This chapter focuses in this chapter on one policy area where the turn from neoliberalism is clearly evident — the OECD's generation and dissemination of a new family policy designed to meet the cluster of needs associated with the emergence of the adult earner family.

John Erik Fossum and Cathrine Holst discuss their approach in relation to three conceptions of the European Union: as a problem‐solving entity; as a value community; and as a rights‐based Union. The great majority of Norwegian public intellectuals frown at the notion of Europe as a democratic anchor, and instead insist that the EU is a democratic curse, which Norway should stay away from. The European project and European governance are seen to have profoundly negative effects on the role of politics, autonomy, agency, sovereignty and republican ideals. The same can be said of how Norwegian public intellectuals consider the relationship between Europe‐as‐values and Europe‐as‐prosperity. There is a strongly held conviction that Europe is a “rich man's club”, a conviction that has remained unscathed throughout the last two bouts of EU enlargement because of a subtle shift to Europe‐as‐a‐businessman's club, and fountain of all‐permeating neo‐liberal economics.