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Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ... More


A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0021
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents the simpleminded form of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism. In the good+ case our agent — this chapter calls him ‘John’ — perceptually knows the target empirical ... More


Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0022
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that what is missing from the simpleminded version of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism is an account of why the extent to which one needs to cite an independent ... More


Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0023
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents the radical sceptical paradox, at least insofar as it made use of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: BIV-Based Radical Scepticism qua Paradox — (BIV1) I don't know that I'm not a ... More


Concluding Remarks

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0026
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter summarizes the discussions in Part 3 of the book. It has been shown that epistemological disjunctivism can be successfully applied to the problem of radical scepticism, at least provided ... More


McDowellian Neo‐Mooreanism

Duncan Pritchard

in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199231546
eISBN:
9780191716126
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

It is claimed that McDowell's treatment of scepticism offers a potential way of resurrecting the much-derided ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism in a fashion that avoids the problems facing classical ... More


Neo-Mooreanism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I contend that in so far as the contemporary debate about scepticism has formulated the sceptical problem correctly, and in so far as one is entitled to adopt epistemological externalism as part of ... More


The Source of Scepticism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I maintain that the neo-Moorean response to scepticism is unable, by itself at any rate, to completely resolve the sceptical problem. The reason for this is that the contemporary discussion of ... More


Two Varieties of Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I examine two species of epistemic luck that I claim are not benign and explain how they feature in the main epistemological debates. The first species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘veritic’ ... More


Scepticism and Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary ... More


Wright on Moore *

José L. Zalabardo

in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199278053
eISBN:
9780191745386
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

To the sceptic’s contention that I don’t know that I have hands because I don’t know that there is an external world, the Moorean replies that I know that there is an external world because I know ... More


Forms of ‘Envatment’: ‘Local’ and ‘Global’

Genia Schönbaumsfeld

in The Illusion of Doubt

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198783947
eISBN:
9780191826597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783947.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter focuses on the following sceptical move: that of arguing that if something can sometimes be the case, it is conceivable that it could always be the case. Or, more pertinently, if one can ... More


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