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As nation states lose a number of monetary and fiscal policy powers through the introduction of European monetary union, national industrial relations systems may acquire a new importance. Within those countries where neo‐corporatist collective bargaining survives, it becomes a means whereby wages can adapt to different levels of productivity and competitiveness when devaluation and variable interest rates are no longer an option.

The purpose of this chapter is to place contemporary debate about European democracy in a wider historical context by considering how analyses of the institutions that underpin democracy in Europe have evolved over time in tandem with political developments. It is said that those who neglect history are doomed to repeat it, and that can be also true of social science. We depend on the insights of successive generations of scholars for much of what we know about democracy, and by examining how their analyses shifted as European governance itself evolved, we can develop perspectives with which to understand the problems confronting Europe today. The survey is necessarily brief survey, but references are provided that lead to deeper debates. The different sections of the chapter are: The Feasibility of Popular Government; The Importance of Culture, Organization, and Social Conditions; Technocracy, Neo–Corporatism, and the Romantic Revolt; The Move to the Market; and Contemporary European Democracy.

Reviews the mechanisms of delegation and accountability in post-war Belgium prior to the major reforms of the 1990s and the subsequent reforms. Discusses how political parties dominate these processes and reduce many actors in the parliamentary chain of delegation (MPs, ministers, civil servants) to mere party agents. Partitocracy is unavoidable and even functional for political system stability in Belgium, but it does come at the cost of undermining political legitimacy and governability.

The interposition of political parties as key actors is the most striking deviation from the ideal-type delegation chain in the Netherlands. The electoral system does not produce a real relationship of delegation between voters in a particular district and an individual MP. The chain of delegation in the Netherlands is indirect: voters delegate to parties and, consequently, parties are the selectors to whom MPs are responsive. In addition to the role of political parties, the sheer complexity of the Dutch system of governance and the dynamics of coalition politics also are the sources of delegation problems and agency loss.

While far from perfect, for much of the post-war period the Swedish chain of democratic delegation and accountability has not been affected by serious agency problems. Fierce electoral competition between two clearly defined blocs and two alternative visions of society allowed voters to be reasonably sure that elections would impact on the direction of national politics. At the same time, the minority status of most cabinets allowed for moderation in policy decisions. Since the late 1980s, however, Swedish politicians have increasingly been faced with distrust, lower electoral turnout, and a loss of party members. It is possible that the growing discrepancy between de facto power relations and the ideal-typical Constitution contributes to a declining popular trust in politicians and political parties.

Consensus democracy refers to a general model of integrative‐indirect democracy, a specific version of which can be found in countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. Contrary to common belief, it is built on dissensus rather than consensus, on differences in conviction and outlook on life, which need to be carefully integrated. Accommodation and pacification, coalitions and compromises, abound. Leadership is a more moderate and less expressive affair in consensus democracy than it is in pendulum democracy. Citizens play the role of, primarily, spectator and, secondarily, that of consulted party. Critics of consensus democracy focus on the tedious, paternalistic, and expertocratic tendencies, advocates praise the pragmatic, ‘kind and gentle’ collaboration of pluriform elites. In terms of (dis)advantages, consensus democracy is the reverse of pendulum democracy: its core quality is not swift decisiveness but controlled integration, its pitfall not so much over‐commitment as viscosity.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book's main themes. This book explains how traditionally low-tech European economies, including Ireland, Finland, and Denmark, successfully competed in rapidly evolving high-tech markets. Furthermore, each has done so by entering precisely those dynamic high-tech industries in which they should be most disadvantaged. Ireland, which depended on footwear and textiles until the 1970s, redefined itself as a software and computer export platform. Finland and Denmark made an even more implausible transformation, moving from wood processing and food processing into knowledge-intensive research and design activities in a range of high-tech industries, from telecommunications equipment to biotechnology. These diverse pathways into new markets are particularly puzzling because they defy liberal market-oriented narrative. The remainder of the chapter discusses the level and nature of neo-corporatism in postwar Denmark, Finland, and Ireland.

Many western European economies traditionally relied on institutionalized cooperation among state actors and encompassing producer associations (industry and labor) to manage economic adjustment. This “neo-corporatist” approach to governance differs from the decentralized competition among individual firms and employees that prevails in liberal market economies such as the United States, Britain, and Australia, and the hierarchical command-and-control structure that characterizes statist economies such as France. Neo-corporatist economies are instead characterized by voluntary cooperation rather than hierarchical state control, as policymakers actively consult and share responsibility with societal actors. This chapter examines how neo-corporate countries such as Ireland, Finland, and Denmark were able to compete in high-tech markets, where they should be most disadvantaged. Ireland redefined itself as Europe's leading computer exporter, Finland emerged to dominate mobile telephony, and Denmark has quietly entered a diverse array of industries from biotechnology to software.

This concluding chapter revisits arguments about institutional innovation and, by extension, the future of neo-corporatism. It argues economic globalization and rapid technological change may make countries, even predominantly market-oriented economies, even more likely to strike competitive corporatist pacts. Creative corporatist arrangements are also likely to feature prominently as countries grapple with disruptive shocks, although this form of institutional conversion is most likely to occur in the countries that have done the least to reform their neocorporatist institutions and will evolve over time as countries confront disruptive new challenges. The remainder of the chapter discusses conservative corporatism, unilateral liberalization, competitive corporatism, and creative corporatism. It concludes with insights for the future of European corporatism. It suggests that convergence on a liberal economic model is unlikely, even as economic internationalization and technological competition intensifies. Far from weakening institutionalized cooperation among organized actors, economic crises may reinforce or even increase reliance on neo-corporatist institutions.

In Belgium, there are about 250 advisory bodies at the federal level and 46 at the regional level. These advisory bodies tend to be highly integrated into the policy-making cycle. They also seem to rely more on experience-based expertise than on academic expert opinion, which is not surprising in a consensus-based political system with neo-corporatist traits where traditional stakeholder groups possess policy-making powers. This chapter analyses the cross-regional and cross-government variation of the nature and role of advisory bodies. It also discusses how the policy advisory system has become subject of reforms that seek to meet four challenges: restoring political primacy in policy-making, dealing with growing advice competition, addressing the coincidence of expert advice and representative opinion, and securing societal support for policy interventions from groups other than traditional representative organizations.

This chapter examines Greece's reform process in the context of three of the most important strands of comparative political economy and social policy: neo-corporatism, varieties of capitalism, and welfare regimes. Drawing on these frameworks, it provides structural explanations of how the interests and strategies of rational actors are shaped by economic and social conditions. The frameworks posit a path dependency of reform constrained by indigenous conditions. As such, they offer a useful counter-point to the currently fashionable academic application of the ‘Europeanization’ conceptual framework.

Selective migration policies can be grouped into three ideal-typical models: the Canadian ‘human capital’ model based on state selection of permanent immigrants using a points system; the Australian ‘neo-corporatist’ model based on state selection using a points system with extensive business and labour participation; and the market-oriented, demand-driven model based primarily on employer selection of migrants, as practised by the US. This chapter compares the selective migration polices of the three countries in terms of policy outcomes measured by varying metrics, examines policy implementation that diverges from the models, and explores a trend in all three countries towards recruiting foreign students to become immigrants. It finds that Canadian and Australian practices are shifting towards the US demand-driven model as employers rather than government officials are selecting increasing percentages of permanent immigrants from pools of temporary foreign workers and foreign students already in Canada and Australia rather than from abroad.

Austria was once a near-archetypical consociational democracy. Its densely organized ‘pillar parties’ (SPÖ and ÖVP) controlled extensive subcultural networks that included trade union organizations. They also dominated Austrian neo-corporatism, both as governing parties and through their formally non-partisan interest group proxies. This chapter maps contemporary links between Austria’s pillar parties, the Austrian Trade Union Confederation and the three largest of its seven individual unions. It finds that party–union relationships remain very close and are mediated especially via the partisan ‘fractions’ that contest intra-union elections, as well as being key components in an enduring system of interlocking party–union directorates. That system’s persistence, despite wide-ranging depillarization and party system fragmentation, underscores Austria’s transition from a consociational to a cartel democracy. It also raises questions about the relevance and long-term viability of the stubborn embrace between Austrian pillar parties and trade unions