Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. This book aims to provide a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological ...
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The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. This book aims to provide a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the a priori that is sensitive to recent developments in the field of epistemology. Assessing the status of the a priori within contemporary epistemology requires distinguishing the requirements of the a priori from traditional assumptions about the nature of knowledge and justification. Freeing the a priori from those assumptions yields three major insights. First, the concept of a priori justification is minimal, it is simply the concept of nonexperiential justification. Second, the basic question that must be addressed to resolve the controversy over the existence of a priori knowledge is whether there are nonexperiential sources of justified beliefs. Third, is articulating the concept of nonexperiential justification and establishing that there are nonexperiential sources of justified belief that require empirical investigation. Hence, epistemologists must both acknowledge and embrace the role of empirical evidence in resolving these fundamental issues. The book concludes by arguing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus primarily on the concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth, are misguided.Less
The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. This book aims to provide a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the a priori that is sensitive to recent developments in the field of epistemology. Assessing the status of the a priori within contemporary epistemology requires distinguishing the requirements of the a priori from traditional assumptions about the nature of knowledge and justification. Freeing the a priori from those assumptions yields three major insights. First, the concept of a priori justification is minimal, it is simply the concept of nonexperiential justification. Second, the basic question that must be addressed to resolve the controversy over the existence of a priori knowledge is whether there are nonexperiential sources of justified beliefs. Third, is articulating the concept of nonexperiential justification and establishing that there are nonexperiential sources of justified belief that require empirical investigation. Hence, epistemologists must both acknowledge and embrace the role of empirical evidence in resolving these fundamental issues. The book concludes by arguing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus primarily on the concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth, are misguided.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199777860
- eISBN:
- 9780199933525
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777860.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the ...
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There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identify the central epistemological questions, and provide the leading ideas of a unified response to them. They offer a systematic treatment of the concept of a priori knowledge, the existence of a priori knowledge, and the relationship between a priori knowledge and the related concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth. The essays fall into three categories: six published prior to my 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 (Oxford University Press, 2003), four published after it, and four previously unpublished. The first six essays provide the background and an introduction to a number of the major themes of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the articulation and defense of the minimal conception of a priori justification, an exposition of the limitations of the traditional arguments both for and against a priori knowledge, and the relevance of empirical investigation to providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. The remaining four published essays explore diverse themes that were introduced in 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 but not developed in detail: epistemic overdetermination, the relationship between a priori knowledge and necessary truth, testimony and a priori knowledge, and the bearing of sociohistorical accounts of knowledge on the a priori. The four previously unpublished essays address issues that have either emerged or taken on more prominence in the literature on the a priori since the publication of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the evidential status of intuitions, the nature of modal knowledge, and challenges to the cogency or the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction.Less
There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identify the central epistemological questions, and provide the leading ideas of a unified response to them. They offer a systematic treatment of the concept of a priori knowledge, the existence of a priori knowledge, and the relationship between a priori knowledge and the related concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth. The essays fall into three categories: six published prior to my 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 (Oxford University Press, 2003), four published after it, and four previously unpublished. The first six essays provide the background and an introduction to a number of the major themes of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the articulation and defense of the minimal conception of a priori justification, an exposition of the limitations of the traditional arguments both for and against a priori knowledge, and the relevance of empirical investigation to providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. The remaining four published essays explore diverse themes that were introduced in 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 but not developed in detail: epistemic overdetermination, the relationship between a priori knowledge and necessary truth, testimony and a priori knowledge, and the bearing of sociohistorical accounts of knowledge on the a priori. The four previously unpublished essays address issues that have either emerged or taken on more prominence in the literature on the a priori since the publication of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the evidential status of intuitions, the nature of modal knowledge, and challenges to the cogency or the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The U.S. Constitution found in school textbooks and under glass in Washington is not the one enforced today by the Supreme Court. This book argues that since the nation's founding, but especially ...
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The U.S. Constitution found in school textbooks and under glass in Washington is not the one enforced today by the Supreme Court. This book argues that since the nation's founding, but especially since the 1930s, the courts have been cutting holes in the original Constitution and its amendments to eliminate the parts that protect liberty from the power of government. From the Commerce Clause, to the Necessary and Proper Clause, to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has rendered each of these provisions toothless. In the process, the written Constitution has been lost. This book establishes the original meaning of these lost clauses and offers a practical way to restore them to their central role in constraining government: adopting a “presumption of liberty” to give the benefit of the doubt to citizens when laws restrict their rightful exercises of liberty. It also provides a new, realistic and philosophically rigorous theory of constitutional legitimacy that justifies both interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning and, where that meaning is vague or open-ended, construing it so as to better protect the rights retained by the people. The book disputes the conventional wisdom, posing a powerful challenge to which others must now respond. This updated edition features an afterword with further reflections on individual popular sovereignty, originalist interpretation, judicial engagement, and the gravitational force that original meaning has exerted on the Supreme Court in several recent cases.Less
The U.S. Constitution found in school textbooks and under glass in Washington is not the one enforced today by the Supreme Court. This book argues that since the nation's founding, but especially since the 1930s, the courts have been cutting holes in the original Constitution and its amendments to eliminate the parts that protect liberty from the power of government. From the Commerce Clause, to the Necessary and Proper Clause, to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has rendered each of these provisions toothless. In the process, the written Constitution has been lost. This book establishes the original meaning of these lost clauses and offers a practical way to restore them to their central role in constraining government: adopting a “presumption of liberty” to give the benefit of the doubt to citizens when laws restrict their rightful exercises of liberty. It also provides a new, realistic and philosophically rigorous theory of constitutional legitimacy that justifies both interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning and, where that meaning is vague or open-ended, construing it so as to better protect the rights retained by the people. The book disputes the conventional wisdom, posing a powerful challenge to which others must now respond. This updated edition features an afterword with further reflections on individual popular sovereignty, originalist interpretation, judicial engagement, and the gravitational force that original meaning has exerted on the Supreme Court in several recent cases.
Anthony Brueckner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585861
- eISBN:
- 9780191595332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0033
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is a reply to Ted Warfield's claim that you cannot refute closure by showing that some necessary condition for knowledge is not closed.
This chapter is a reply to Ted Warfield's claim that you cannot refute closure by showing that some necessary condition for knowledge is not closed.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145281
- eISBN:
- 9780199833702
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145283.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In ...
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In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In Beyond Rigidity, Scott Soames strengthens Kripke's attack, while also providing a positive theory of the semantics and pragmatics of names. Using a new conception of how the meaning of a sentence relates to the information asserted and conveyed by utterances, Soames argues that the meaning of a linguistically simple name is its referent, and that the meaning of a linguistically complex, partially descriptive, name is a compound that includes both its referent and a partial description. After illustrating these analyses with simple sentences containing names, Soames extends them to sentences that report the assertions and beliefs of agents. Appealing again to his new understanding of the relationship between meaning and information asserted and conveyed, Soames attempts to reconcile the central semantic doctrines of Millianism and Russellianism with Fregean intuitions about the information carried by belief and other propositional attitude ascriptions. Finally, Soames investigates the relationship between proper names and natural kind terms, including mass nouns, count nouns, and adjectives functioning as predicates. After showing that natural kind predicates do not fit reasonable definitions of rigidity, he argues that there is no notion of rigid designation for predicates that (1) is a natural extension of the notion of rigidity for singular terms, (2) is such that simple natural kind predicates are standardly rigid whereas many other predicates are not, and (3) plays the role imagined by Kripke in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of theoretical identities like Water is H2O and An object x is hotter than an object y iff x has a higher mean molecular kinetic energy than y. Finally, Soames uses key elements of Kripke's discussion to construct an alternative explanation of the necessary a posteriori character of these sentences that is based on the nondescriptionality of simple natural kind predicates, and the manner in which their meaning and reference is determined.Less
In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In Beyond Rigidity, Scott Soames strengthens Kripke's attack, while also providing a positive theory of the semantics and pragmatics of names. Using a new conception of how the meaning of a sentence relates to the information asserted and conveyed by utterances, Soames argues that the meaning of a linguistically simple name is its referent, and that the meaning of a linguistically complex, partially descriptive, name is a compound that includes both its referent and a partial description. After illustrating these analyses with simple sentences containing names, Soames extends them to sentences that report the assertions and beliefs of agents. Appealing again to his new understanding of the relationship between meaning and information asserted and conveyed, Soames attempts to reconcile the central semantic doctrines of Millianism and Russellianism with Fregean intuitions about the information carried by belief and other propositional attitude ascriptions. Finally, Soames investigates the relationship between proper names and natural kind terms, including mass nouns, count nouns, and adjectives functioning as predicates. After showing that natural kind predicates do not fit reasonable definitions of rigidity, he argues that there is no notion of rigid designation for predicates that (1) is a natural extension of the notion of rigidity for singular terms, (2) is such that simple natural kind predicates are standardly rigid whereas many other predicates are not, and (3) plays the role imagined by Kripke in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of theoretical identities like Water is H2O and An object x is hotter than an object y iff x has a higher mean molecular kinetic energy than y. Finally, Soames uses key elements of Kripke's discussion to construct an alternative explanation of the necessary a posteriori character of these sentences that is based on the nondescriptionality of simple natural kind predicates, and the manner in which their meaning and reference is determined.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, an analogous argument in the case of the a priori entailment view is advanced. On the one hand, the mere idea of priori entailment will not answer the argument — further material ...
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In this chapter, an analogous argument in the case of the a priori entailment view is advanced. On the one hand, the mere idea of priori entailment will not answer the argument — further material needs to be added. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a priori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.Less
In this chapter, an analogous argument in the case of the a priori entailment view is advanced. On the one hand, the mere idea of priori entailment will not answer the argument — further material needs to be added. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a priori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view ...
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This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view emerges when we notice that Kripke, the philosopher who did most to make it prominent, also considered and rejected it. The lesson of Kripke’s discussion on this point is that the mere idea of a posteriori entailment does not solve the problem of experience, and therefore that a proponent of the a posteriori entailment view is obliged to add further material. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a posteriori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.Less
This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view emerges when we notice that Kripke, the philosopher who did most to make it prominent, also considered and rejected it. The lesson of Kripke’s discussion on this point is that the mere idea of a posteriori entailment does not solve the problem of experience, and therefore that a proponent of the a posteriori entailment view is obliged to add further material. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a posteriori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re ...
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This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.Less
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not ...
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The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not necessary to answer the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge: What is it? Does it exist? This chapter argues that the prominence of questions about the relationship between the a priori and the necessary derives from two traditional views: the rationalist conception of a priori knowledge and Kant’s claim that necessity is a criterion of the a priori. Independent grounds for rejecting both are offered, and it is argued that the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge can be answered without resolving the disputes over its relationship to necessary truth.Less
The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not necessary to answer the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge: What is it? Does it exist? This chapter argues that the prominence of questions about the relationship between the a priori and the necessary derives from two traditional views: the rationalist conception of a priori knowledge and Kant’s claim that necessity is a criterion of the a priori. Independent grounds for rejecting both are offered, and it is argued that the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge can be answered without resolving the disputes over its relationship to necessary truth.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199217168
- eISBN:
- 9780191712401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217168.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter argues that a theistic natural sign pointing to God's existence lies at the core of cosmological arguments; this sign is called “cosmic wonder” and is sometimes elicited by considering ...
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This chapter argues that a theistic natural sign pointing to God's existence lies at the core of cosmological arguments; this sign is called “cosmic wonder” and is sometimes elicited by considering questions like “Why is there something rather than nothing?” The author first explains some of the different types of the cosmological arguments, argues that the Easy Resistibility Principle explains why we should not be surprised that they fail as conclusive proofs, and considers the thesis that Cosmic Wonder is the source of the persistent intuition that undergirds the arguments. Finally, it is argued that traditional theists, non‐traditional theists, and non‐theists often sense the force of Cosmic Wonder. This fact indicates that it is widely accessible as a sign.Less
This chapter argues that a theistic natural sign pointing to God's existence lies at the core of cosmological arguments; this sign is called “cosmic wonder” and is sometimes elicited by considering questions like “Why is there something rather than nothing?” The author first explains some of the different types of the cosmological arguments, argues that the Easy Resistibility Principle explains why we should not be surprised that they fail as conclusive proofs, and considers the thesis that Cosmic Wonder is the source of the persistent intuition that undergirds the arguments. Finally, it is argued that traditional theists, non‐traditional theists, and non‐theists often sense the force of Cosmic Wonder. This fact indicates that it is widely accessible as a sign.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This book examines whether the U.S. Constitution—either as written or as actually applied—is legitimate. It argues that the most commonly held view of constitutional legitimacy—the “consent of the ...
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This book examines whether the U.S. Constitution—either as written or as actually applied—is legitimate. It argues that the most commonly held view of constitutional legitimacy—the “consent of the governed”—is wrong because it is a standard that no constitution can meet. It shows why holding the Constitution to this unattainable ideal both undermines its legitimacy and allows others to substitute their own meaning for that of the text. The book considers the notion of “natural rights” as “liberty rights,” along with the nature and scope of the so-called police power of states. Furthermore, it analyzes the original meaning of key provisions of the text that have been either distorted or excised entirely from the judges' Constitution and ignored: the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause in the original Constitution, the Ninth Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Less
This book examines whether the U.S. Constitution—either as written or as actually applied—is legitimate. It argues that the most commonly held view of constitutional legitimacy—the “consent of the governed”—is wrong because it is a standard that no constitution can meet. It shows why holding the Constitution to this unattainable ideal both undermines its legitimacy and allows others to substitute their own meaning for that of the text. The book considers the notion of “natural rights” as “liberty rights,” along with the nature and scope of the so-called police power of states. Furthermore, it analyzes the original meaning of key provisions of the text that have been either distorted or excised entirely from the judges' Constitution and ignored: the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause in the original Constitution, the Ninth Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter examines what it takes to achieve constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent by focusing on the effort of those who drafted and adopted the Constitution to constrain the fiction ...
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This chapter examines what it takes to achieve constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent by focusing on the effort of those who drafted and adopted the Constitution to constrain the fiction of popular sovereignty they themselves accepted. The fiction of popular sovereignty originated as an antidote to the fiction of the divine right of the king. If the king obtained his authority from God, the Commons gained its authority from the people. Despite their rhetorical commitment to “popular sovereignty,” by the time the Constitution was written, its framers were convinced that pure majority rule or democracy was a bad idea. The chapter first considers democratic majoritarianism and and what James Madison called “the problem of faction” before discussing constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent. It argues that a constitutional regime is legitimate only if it provides sufficient assurances that the laws it produces are “necessary and proper.”Less
This chapter examines what it takes to achieve constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent by focusing on the effort of those who drafted and adopted the Constitution to constrain the fiction of popular sovereignty they themselves accepted. The fiction of popular sovereignty originated as an antidote to the fiction of the divine right of the king. If the king obtained his authority from God, the Commons gained its authority from the people. Despite their rhetorical commitment to “popular sovereignty,” by the time the Constitution was written, its framers were convinced that pure majority rule or democracy was a bad idea. The chapter first considers democratic majoritarianism and and what James Madison called “the problem of faction” before discussing constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent. It argues that a constitutional regime is legitimate only if it provides sufficient assurances that the laws it produces are “necessary and proper.”
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter examines whether the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution precludes or invites the exercise of judicial review of a federal law to see if it lies within the powers of Congress ...
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This chapter examines whether the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution precludes or invites the exercise of judicial review of a federal law to see if it lies within the powers of Congress to enact. Evaluating whether a federal law is constitutional must begin with whether Congress has acted within the powers it is granted in the Constitution. The chapter first provides an overview of the origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause before discussing the meaning of the term “proper.” It then examines the merits of applying the presumption of constitutionality to federal laws. In particular, it considers the original meaning of the constitutional provision giving Congress the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”Less
This chapter examines whether the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution precludes or invites the exercise of judicial review of a federal law to see if it lies within the powers of Congress to enact. Evaluating whether a federal law is constitutional must begin with whether Congress has acted within the powers it is granted in the Constitution. The chapter first provides an overview of the origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause before discussing the meaning of the term “proper.” It then examines the merits of applying the presumption of constitutionality to federal laws. In particular, it considers the original meaning of the constitutional provision giving Congress the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”
D.M. Gabbay and L. Maksimova
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198511748
- eISBN:
- 9780191705779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198511748.003.0010
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This chapter examines the family NE(K) of normal extensions of K4. With any such logic L its reflexive fragment r(L) is associated, which contains the logic S4. A logic L is of infinite slice if ...
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This chapter examines the family NE(K) of normal extensions of K4. With any such logic L its reflexive fragment r(L) is associated, which contains the logic S4. A logic L is of infinite slice if Kripke frames, satisfying L, can contain subchains of any finite length. It is proved that for any logic in NE(K4), being of infinite slice and possessing the interpolation property for deducibility, its reflexive fragment is contained in Grz.2. As a consequence, interpolation theorems fail in logics of infinite slice and of finite width, in logics of finite irreflexive trees, and so on.Less
This chapter examines the family NE(K) of normal extensions of K4. With any such logic L its reflexive fragment r(L) is associated, which contains the logic S4. A logic L is of infinite slice if Kripke frames, satisfying L, can contain subchains of any finite length. It is proved that for any logic in NE(K4), being of infinite slice and possessing the interpolation property for deducibility, its reflexive fragment is contained in Grz.2. As a consequence, interpolation theorems fail in logics of infinite slice and of finite width, in logics of finite irreflexive trees, and so on.
Jon McGinnis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195331479
- eISBN:
- 9780199868032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331479.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of what Avicenna considers to be the proper subject matter of metaphysics, namely, existents qua existents, followed by a brief outline of his Metaphysics. ...
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The chapter begins with a brief discussion of what Avicenna considers to be the proper subject matter of metaphysics, namely, existents qua existents, followed by a brief outline of his Metaphysics. Since it would be impossible to cover all of the issues with which Avicenna wrestles in his Metaphysics, this and the next chapter consider two closely related topics: Avicenna’s theology and cosmology. To appreciate Avicenna’s contribution to these two subjects, there is a brief history of how earlier philosophers had viewed God’s relation to the cosmos, which involved a cluster of core philosophical problems that Avicenna’s metaphysical system attempts to address. This brief history is followed by a look at Avicenna’s modal ontology, an investigation of Avicenna’s celebrated analysis of the Necessary Existent, and then ends with his account of the divine attributes.Less
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of what Avicenna considers to be the proper subject matter of metaphysics, namely, existents qua existents, followed by a brief outline of his Metaphysics. Since it would be impossible to cover all of the issues with which Avicenna wrestles in his Metaphysics, this and the next chapter consider two closely related topics: Avicenna’s theology and cosmology. To appreciate Avicenna’s contribution to these two subjects, there is a brief history of how earlier philosophers had viewed God’s relation to the cosmos, which involved a cluster of core philosophical problems that Avicenna’s metaphysical system attempts to address. This brief history is followed by a look at Avicenna’s modal ontology, an investigation of Avicenna’s celebrated analysis of the Necessary Existent, and then ends with his account of the divine attributes.
Jon McGinnis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195331479
- eISBN:
- 9780199868032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331479.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
After a quick survey of the positions prior to Avicenna concerning the age of the universe, the chapter focuses on Avicenna’s unique arguments for the eternity of the world. To this end, it presents ...
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After a quick survey of the positions prior to Avicenna concerning the age of the universe, the chapter focuses on Avicenna’s unique arguments for the eternity of the world. To this end, it presents his conception of possibility as well as considering how Avicenna envisions the most basic modes of possible existence, namely, substances and accidents, with a particular emphasis on forms and matter. There is then a general discussion of Avicenna’s notion of metaphysical causality. Upon completing the investigation of possible existence, one will be in a position to appreciate Avicenna’s new modal arguments for the world’s eternity and his response to earlier criticisms against that thesis. The chapter, then, concludes with a section on the Necessary Existent’s relation to possible existence as exemplified in Avicenna’s unique twist on the Neoplatonic theory of emanation.Less
After a quick survey of the positions prior to Avicenna concerning the age of the universe, the chapter focuses on Avicenna’s unique arguments for the eternity of the world. To this end, it presents his conception of possibility as well as considering how Avicenna envisions the most basic modes of possible existence, namely, substances and accidents, with a particular emphasis on forms and matter. There is then a general discussion of Avicenna’s notion of metaphysical causality. Upon completing the investigation of possible existence, one will be in a position to appreciate Avicenna’s new modal arguments for the world’s eternity and his response to earlier criticisms against that thesis. The chapter, then, concludes with a section on the Necessary Existent’s relation to possible existence as exemplified in Avicenna’s unique twist on the Neoplatonic theory of emanation.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Posidonius denied that Chrysippus' judgements were necessary for emotion in the cases mentioned in Chapter 4 of disowned judgements, animals or infants, and response to wordless music. There may more ...
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Posidonius denied that Chrysippus' judgements were necessary for emotion in the cases mentioned in Chapter 4 of disowned judgements, animals or infants, and response to wordless music. There may more often be some appearance of good or bad, but not always judgement in Chrysippus' sense of assent to appearance.Less
Posidonius denied that Chrysippus' judgements were necessary for emotion in the cases mentioned in Chapter 4 of disowned judgements, animals or infants, and response to wordless music. There may more often be some appearance of good or bad, but not always judgement in Chrysippus' sense of assent to appearance.
Gary Goertz and James Mahoney
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149707
- eISBN:
- 9781400845446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149707.003.0002
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Research and Statistics
This chapter considers some key ideas from logic and set theory as they relate to qualitative research in the social sciences, including ideas concerning necessary and sufficient conditions. It also ...
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This chapter considers some key ideas from logic and set theory as they relate to qualitative research in the social sciences, including ideas concerning necessary and sufficient conditions. It also highlights a major contrast between qualitative and quantitative research: whereas quantitative research draws on mathematical tools associated with statistics and probability theory, qualitative research is often based on set theory and logic. The chapter first compares the natural language of logic in the qualitative culture with the language of probability and statistics in the quantitative culture. It then considers the necessary conditions and sufficient conditions as basis for qualitative methods, focusing on set theory and Venn diagrams, two-by-two tables, and truth tables. It also discusses the use of qualitative and quantitative aggregation techniques and concludes by explaining the criteria for assessing the “fit” of the model or the “importance” of a given causal factor.Less
This chapter considers some key ideas from logic and set theory as they relate to qualitative research in the social sciences, including ideas concerning necessary and sufficient conditions. It also highlights a major contrast between qualitative and quantitative research: whereas quantitative research draws on mathematical tools associated with statistics and probability theory, qualitative research is often based on set theory and logic. The chapter first compares the natural language of logic in the qualitative culture with the language of probability and statistics in the quantitative culture. It then considers the necessary conditions and sufficient conditions as basis for qualitative methods, focusing on set theory and Venn diagrams, two-by-two tables, and truth tables. It also discusses the use of qualitative and quantitative aggregation techniques and concludes by explaining the criteria for assessing the “fit” of the model or the “importance” of a given causal factor.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the correct internalist account of perceptual experience involves four key claims, that sensory contents are qualia, that experiences of qualia are constituted in a necessary ...
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This chapter argues that the correct internalist account of perceptual experience involves four key claims, that sensory contents are qualia, that experiences of qualia are constituted in a necessary a posteriori manner by internal physical states, that these states have the modal structural architecture pioneered for color experience by Hardin, and that intentionalism is the correct account of the semantic contribution of these experiences. It considers contrary externalist arguments, including arguments rooted in the claim of Williamson and Harman that knowledge is a basic mental state, in Kant's Refutation of Idealism, and in disjunctivism.Less
This chapter argues that the correct internalist account of perceptual experience involves four key claims, that sensory contents are qualia, that experiences of qualia are constituted in a necessary a posteriori manner by internal physical states, that these states have the modal structural architecture pioneered for color experience by Hardin, and that intentionalism is the correct account of the semantic contribution of these experiences. It considers contrary externalist arguments, including arguments rooted in the claim of Williamson and Harman that knowledge is a basic mental state, in Kant's Refutation of Idealism, and in disjunctivism.
Eric Lomazoff
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226579313
- eISBN:
- 9780226579597
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226579597.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This book provides a revisionist history of the constitutional controversy over a national bank (1791-1832), and uses that history to reinforce and refine broader propositions respecting American ...
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This book provides a revisionist history of the constitutional controversy over a national bank (1791-1832), and uses that history to reinforce and refine broader propositions respecting American constitutional development. While the controversy is traditionally presented as a recurring two-sided struggle over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, with national bank advocates repeatedly pushing a “broad” reading of the provision and their opponents pressing for a “strict” understanding of it, the book reveals both that a larger and more diverse set of constitutional claims were deployed and that these claims varied over time. In particular, several post-1815 iterations of the national bank controversy featured claims respecting Congress’s ability to charter the institution pursuant to its power under the Coinage Clause of Article I, Section 8. The book demonstrates that much of the variation in constitutional claims between 1791 and 1832 is attributable to three factors: ideological strife within Jefferson and Madison’s Republican party, institutional change within the national bank itself, and economic stress that commenced during (but continued after) the War of 1812. The book argues that collectively, these three factors help to reinforce the broader proposition that American constitutional development is routinely driven as much by politics as by law. Those same factors also help to furnish more specific developmental propositions, including the idea that the terms of a long-running constitutional dispute may shift in response to change in the underlying object of disputation.Less
This book provides a revisionist history of the constitutional controversy over a national bank (1791-1832), and uses that history to reinforce and refine broader propositions respecting American constitutional development. While the controversy is traditionally presented as a recurring two-sided struggle over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, with national bank advocates repeatedly pushing a “broad” reading of the provision and their opponents pressing for a “strict” understanding of it, the book reveals both that a larger and more diverse set of constitutional claims were deployed and that these claims varied over time. In particular, several post-1815 iterations of the national bank controversy featured claims respecting Congress’s ability to charter the institution pursuant to its power under the Coinage Clause of Article I, Section 8. The book demonstrates that much of the variation in constitutional claims between 1791 and 1832 is attributable to three factors: ideological strife within Jefferson and Madison’s Republican party, institutional change within the national bank itself, and economic stress that commenced during (but continued after) the War of 1812. The book argues that collectively, these three factors help to reinforce the broader proposition that American constitutional development is routinely driven as much by politics as by law. Those same factors also help to furnish more specific developmental propositions, including the idea that the terms of a long-running constitutional dispute may shift in response to change in the underlying object of disputation.
