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The Objectivity of Moral Judgements

G. E. Moore

in Ethics: and "The Nature of Moral Philosophy"

Moore maintains that, in principle, there is an objective answer to questions of right and wrong. More specifically, that a particular action cannot be both right and wrong, either at the same time ... More

Moore maintains that, in principle, there is an objective answer to questions of right and wrong. More specifically, that a particular action cannot be both right and wrong, either at the same time or at different times. In this chapter and the next, Moore argues against theories that deny this latter proposition and thus reject the objectivity of moral judgments. Beginning with a critique of the thesis that when one asserts that an action is right or wrong, one is merely asserting that one has a certain feeling towards it, this chapter focuses its critical fire on various attitudinal theories of ethics.Less

Nature as the School of the Moral World: Kant on Taking an Interest in Natural Beauty

Joseph Cannon

in The Environment: Philosophy, Science, and Ethics

This chapter discusses Kantian principles regarding natural beauty and its destruction. The works of Kant are rarely called upon in discussion of the ethics of nature; Kant’s ethics of nature is ... More

This chapter discusses Kantian principles regarding natural beauty and its destruction. The works of Kant are rarely called upon in discussion of the ethics of nature; Kant’s ethics of nature is considered a stumbling block because it implies that one can only have duties to persons. He argues that the destruction or corruption of natural beauty is wrong because of its negative effect on one’s own character, not because the actual act of destruction is wrong. The chapter aims to prove that this principle is not the greatest stumbling block to an ethics of the natural environment as others seem to believe. It must be considered that Kant interprets taking an immediate interest in natural beauty as taking a moral interest in nature regarded as a person—specifically as a being who wills the achievement of moral character as its end.Less

The Nature of Ethics

Roger Crisp

in The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics

This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ... More

This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ‘Preface’, and his modest ‘quietist’ metaethics examined. Sidgwick’s objections to several forms of naturalism are explained, and an account is offered of Sidgwick’s non-naturalism and of his rationalist views on justification and his internalism about motivation. Methods are distinguished from principles, and Sidgwick’s focus on only three ethical theories is defended. Sidgwick is criticized for seeking excessive precision in ethics, and for use of unnecessary ethical concepts. The chapter ends with a section on Sidgwick’s views of politics, where it is argued that there is a stronger case than Sidgwick allows for seeing political theory as a branch of ethics.Less

Conclusion: The Claims in Summary

Philip Pettit

in The Birth of Ethics: Reconstructing the Role and Nature of Morality

The conclusion provides an analytical summary of the preceding chapters.