Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most ...
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So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.Less
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.
Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199733477
- eISBN:
- 9780199949823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion about the prospects of developing a “naturalized epistemology,” though different authors tend to interpret this label in quite different ...
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In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion about the prospects of developing a “naturalized epistemology,” though different authors tend to interpret this label in quite different ways. This chapter sketches three projects that might lay claim to the “naturalized epistemology” label, and argues that they are not all equally attractive. Indeed, the first of the three—the one attributed to Quine—is simply incoherent. There is no way we could get what we want from an epistemological theory by pursuing the project Quine proposes. The second project is a naturalized version of reliabilism. While this project is not fatally flawed in the way that Quine’s is, the sort of theory this project would yield is much less interesting than might at first be thought. The third project is located squarely in the pragmatist tradition. One of the claims made for this project is that if it can be pursued successfully the results will be both more interesting and more useful than the results that might emerge from the reliabilist project. A second is that there is some reason to suppose that it can be pursued successfully. It is argued that for over a decade one version of the project has been pursued with considerable success by Herbert Simon and his co-workers in their ongoing attempt to simulate scientific reasoning. The final section offers a few thoughts on the various paths Simon’s project, and pragmatist naturalized epistemology, might follow in the future.Less
In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion about the prospects of developing a “naturalized epistemology,” though different authors tend to interpret this label in quite different ways. This chapter sketches three projects that might lay claim to the “naturalized epistemology” label, and argues that they are not all equally attractive. Indeed, the first of the three—the one attributed to Quine—is simply incoherent. There is no way we could get what we want from an epistemological theory by pursuing the project Quine proposes. The second project is a naturalized version of reliabilism. While this project is not fatally flawed in the way that Quine’s is, the sort of theory this project would yield is much less interesting than might at first be thought. The third project is located squarely in the pragmatist tradition. One of the claims made for this project is that if it can be pursued successfully the results will be both more interesting and more useful than the results that might emerge from the reliabilist project. A second is that there is some reason to suppose that it can be pursued successfully. It is argued that for over a decade one version of the project has been pursued with considerable success by Herbert Simon and his co-workers in their ongoing attempt to simulate scientific reasoning. The final section offers a few thoughts on the various paths Simon’s project, and pragmatist naturalized epistemology, might follow in the future.
David K. Henderson and Terence Horgan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199608546
- eISBN:
- 9780191729584
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important ...
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This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important junctures, the book finds a way of “going between” the commonly conceived epistemological alternatives. The result is both a retentive and a revisionary account of various matters: (i) of the character of a priori reflective inquiry, (ii) of conceptual analysis as a form of a priori inquiry and as a cornerstone of philosophical methodology, (iii) of reliabilism, (iv) of epistemological internalism and epistemological externalism, (v) of epistemically relevant, evidence-sensitive, cognitive processes, (vi) of both epistemic foundationalism and coherentism, and (vii) of the role of a priori, a posteriori, and empirical elements within epistemological theorizing itself. “The epistemological spectrum” comprises inquiry ranging from a priori reflection on concepts such as epistemic justification and knowledge to richly empirical work within cognitive science. The conceptual truths regarding justification (for one example) serve to orient a fitting naturalized epistemology, while empirical information is necessarily involved in arriving at determinate specification of what processes are fitting and justificatory of beliefs. The book argues for this “big-tent” understanding of naturalized epistemology. It also illustrates it while arriving at a distinctive form of reliabilism, an importantly expansive view of the range and character of information on which human epistemic agents can and must rely, and a principled way of reconciling what are commonly thought to be incompatible positions such as foundationalism and coherentism.Less
This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important junctures, the book finds a way of “going between” the commonly conceived epistemological alternatives. The result is both a retentive and a revisionary account of various matters: (i) of the character of a priori reflective inquiry, (ii) of conceptual analysis as a form of a priori inquiry and as a cornerstone of philosophical methodology, (iii) of reliabilism, (iv) of epistemological internalism and epistemological externalism, (v) of epistemically relevant, evidence-sensitive, cognitive processes, (vi) of both epistemic foundationalism and coherentism, and (vii) of the role of a priori, a posteriori, and empirical elements within epistemological theorizing itself. “The epistemological spectrum” comprises inquiry ranging from a priori reflection on concepts such as epistemic justification and knowledge to richly empirical work within cognitive science. The conceptual truths regarding justification (for one example) serve to orient a fitting naturalized epistemology, while empirical information is necessarily involved in arriving at determinate specification of what processes are fitting and justificatory of beliefs. The book argues for this “big-tent” understanding of naturalized epistemology. It also illustrates it while arriving at a distinctive form of reliabilism, an importantly expansive view of the range and character of information on which human epistemic agents can and must rely, and a principled way of reconciling what are commonly thought to be incompatible positions such as foundationalism and coherentism.
David Henderson and Terence Horgan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199608546
- eISBN:
- 9780191729584
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Justificatory cognitive processes must be tractable. That one ought to produce and sustain beliefs in certain ways entails that one can. Fitting epistemic standards for human epistemic agents must be ...
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Justificatory cognitive processes must be tractable. That one ought to produce and sustain beliefs in certain ways entails that one can. Fitting epistemic standards for human epistemic agents must be sensitive to which potential belief-forming processes humans are capable of employing, at least with training. Such (low-grade a priori) points call for a naturalized epistemology. This chapter clarifies this demand by elaborating upon the kind of idealized normative standards one can expect from a naturalized epistemology, and on the range of disciplines that can contribute to normative naturalized epistemology. It also advances a way of thinking about naturalized epistemology as encompassing a broad spectrum of inquiry ranging from low-grade reflection about central evaluative concepts to richly empirical inquiry revealing the character of actual human cognitive processes and the possibilities for variation. The organizing principle that holds the spectrum together is the concern for a kind of engineering for truth seeking. Just as various kinds of inquiry find a place within common engineering disciplines, so likewise a wide range of inquiries can find a place within naturalized epistemology. The spectrum of inquiry falling within naturalized epistemology is the E-spectrum (the ‘E’ standing both for epistemology and for engineering).Less
Justificatory cognitive processes must be tractable. That one ought to produce and sustain beliefs in certain ways entails that one can. Fitting epistemic standards for human epistemic agents must be sensitive to which potential belief-forming processes humans are capable of employing, at least with training. Such (low-grade a priori) points call for a naturalized epistemology. This chapter clarifies this demand by elaborating upon the kind of idealized normative standards one can expect from a naturalized epistemology, and on the range of disciplines that can contribute to normative naturalized epistemology. It also advances a way of thinking about naturalized epistemology as encompassing a broad spectrum of inquiry ranging from low-grade reflection about central evaluative concepts to richly empirical inquiry revealing the character of actual human cognitive processes and the possibilities for variation. The organizing principle that holds the spectrum together is the concern for a kind of engineering for truth seeking. Just as various kinds of inquiry find a place within common engineering disciplines, so likewise a wide range of inquiries can find a place within naturalized epistemology. The spectrum of inquiry falling within naturalized epistemology is the E-spectrum (the ‘E’ standing both for epistemology and for engineering).
Margaret Urban Walker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195315394
- eISBN:
- 9780199872053
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315394.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
In an age of moral skepticism, moral philosophers are often casual about their own positions to represent moral life in societies segmented by gender, race, class, and other differences. Drawing on ...
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In an age of moral skepticism, moral philosophers are often casual about their own positions to represent moral life in societies segmented by gender, race, class, and other differences. Drawing on resources of feminist epistemology and naturalized epistemology, this chapter critiques a theoretical-juridical model of morality and defends an expressive-collaborative one sensitive to questions about epistemic authority, credibility, and claims to represent common moral thought and life. Intuitions are moral judgments we have learned in common with others, but which may be modified or relinquished in a process of moral reasoning that involves analogy and narrative. Reflective equilibrium is recast as a moral equilibrium among persons sustaining moral understandings and mutual intelligibility in a shared and stable way of life they can find valuable. A key critical method is thus testing for transparency the actual arrangements of power and authority that hold moral understandings in place.Less
In an age of moral skepticism, moral philosophers are often casual about their own positions to represent moral life in societies segmented by gender, race, class, and other differences. Drawing on resources of feminist epistemology and naturalized epistemology, this chapter critiques a theoretical-juridical model of morality and defends an expressive-collaborative one sensitive to questions about epistemic authority, credibility, and claims to represent common moral thought and life. Intuitions are moral judgments we have learned in common with others, but which may be modified or relinquished in a process of moral reasoning that involves analogy and narrative. Reflective equilibrium is recast as a moral equilibrium among persons sustaining moral understandings and mutual intelligibility in a shared and stable way of life they can find valuable. A key critical method is thus testing for transparency the actual arrangements of power and authority that hold moral understandings in place.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, Stroud discusses W. V. Quine’s project of a ‘naturalized epistemology’, and assesses its consequences for philosophical scepticism.According to Quine, science and everyday knowledge ...
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In this chapter, Stroud discusses W. V. Quine’s project of a ‘naturalized epistemology’, and assesses its consequences for philosophical scepticism.According to Quine, science and everyday knowledge and the languages and thought processes in which they are pursued and expressed are to be seen as natural phenomena which can be studied and described and explained scientifically like any other part of the natural world: all attempts to find out about ourselves and the world must be made from within the conceptual and scientific resources we have already developed for finding out about anything.Stroud points out that this can make it look as if Quine is simply changing the subject; that would leave open the possibility, sometimes apparently endorsed by Quine, that scepticism is and remains the only answer to the traditional question, and that nothing he says in his naturalized epistemology affects the answer one way or the other. But Quine also appears to want to resist scepticism on the grounds of his naturalized account of our epistemic situation; the argument is that scientific knowledge can be used to meet the sceptical challenge because the challenge arises from, and within, the domain of science itself.This is ineffective as a response to scepticism, according to Stroud, because the fact that sceptical doubts are scientific doubts does not put the epistemologist who raises such doubts in the stronger position of being free to use scientific knowledge of the world in his effort to answer those doubts and explain how knowledge is possible; in fact, the view endorsed by Quine turns out not only to tolerate scepticism but to be committed to it: the argument is that I cannot understand my own knowledge of the world as a mere ‘projection’ from ‘meagre sensory data’, and since my own knowledge of what the world is like is required for me to be able to ascribe knowledge of the world to other people, I cannot ascribe knowledge to anyone, and this is scepticism.Less
In this chapter, Stroud discusses W. V. Quine’s project of a ‘naturalized epistemology’, and assesses its consequences for philosophical scepticism.
According to Quine, science and everyday knowledge and the languages and thought processes in which they are pursued and expressed are to be seen as natural phenomena which can be studied and described and explained scientifically like any other part of the natural world: all attempts to find out about ourselves and the world must be made from within the conceptual and scientific resources we have already developed for finding out about anything.
Stroud points out that this can make it look as if Quine is simply changing the subject; that would leave open the possibility, sometimes apparently endorsed by Quine, that scepticism is and remains the only answer to the traditional question, and that nothing he says in his naturalized epistemology affects the answer one way or the other. But Quine also appears to want to resist scepticism on the grounds of his naturalized account of our epistemic situation; the argument is that scientific knowledge can be used to meet the sceptical challenge because the challenge arises from, and within, the domain of science itself.
This is ineffective as a response to scepticism, according to Stroud, because the fact that sceptical doubts are scientific doubts does not put the epistemologist who raises such doubts in the stronger position of being free to use scientific knowledge of the world in his effort to answer those doubts and explain how knowledge is possible; in fact, the view endorsed by Quine turns out not only to tolerate scepticism but to be committed to it: the argument is that I cannot understand my own knowledge of the world as a mere ‘projection’ from ‘meagre sensory data’, and since my own knowledge of what the world is like is required for me to be able to ascribe knowledge of the world to other people, I cannot ascribe knowledge to anyone, and this is scepticism.
Lorraine Code
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577477
- eISBN:
- 9780191595189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Epistemologists in the 21st century come from a long tradition in which perception, memory, and testimony were viewed as the sources of knowledge. Of these, perception and memory, however enhanced, ...
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Epistemologists in the 21st century come from a long tradition in which perception, memory, and testimony were viewed as the sources of knowledge. Of these, perception and memory, however enhanced, abstracted, or elaborated, counted as the most reliable sources, with testimony ranking as a distant, and usually compromised, third. In this chapter's view, social epistemology reverses this ranking, granting a central place to testimony in the production of knowledge, and interrogating assumptions about the replicability and homogeneity of perception and memory. It thus generates a range of issues that had seemed to be hors de question for traditional epistemologists. Drawing on the conceptual framework developed in Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location, this chapter proposes that epistemic inquiry socially reconfigured is more fully naturalized than post-Quinean naturalized epistemology has been. Social epistemology focuses on epistemic practices communally engaged by identifiable knowers in the world (thus not principally in the laboratory); who are situated not just socially, but ethically, politically, demographically, geographically, and ecologically, where aspects of such “situatedness” often count among the conditions that make knowledge possible. The inquiry focuses on testimony and advocacy as practices where these factors are particularly salient, and on ignorance not as a mere lack or failure of knowledge, but as a modality of not-knowing, or knowing inadequately, unjustly, which is itself situationally fostered, inhibited, or eradicated.Less
Epistemologists in the 21st century come from a long tradition in which perception, memory, and testimony were viewed as the sources of knowledge. Of these, perception and memory, however enhanced, abstracted, or elaborated, counted as the most reliable sources, with testimony ranking as a distant, and usually compromised, third. In this chapter's view, social epistemology reverses this ranking, granting a central place to testimony in the production of knowledge, and interrogating assumptions about the replicability and homogeneity of perception and memory. It thus generates a range of issues that had seemed to be hors de question for traditional epistemologists. Drawing on the conceptual framework developed in Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location, this chapter proposes that epistemic inquiry socially reconfigured is more fully naturalized than post-Quinean naturalized epistemology has been. Social epistemology focuses on epistemic practices communally engaged by identifiable knowers in the world (thus not principally in the laboratory); who are situated not just socially, but ethically, politically, demographically, geographically, and ecologically, where aspects of such “situatedness” often count among the conditions that make knowledge possible. The inquiry focuses on testimony and advocacy as practices where these factors are particularly salient, and on ignorance not as a mere lack or failure of knowledge, but as a modality of not-knowing, or knowing inadequately, unjustly, which is itself situationally fostered, inhibited, or eradicated.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Quine’s naturalism is not well appreciated for either its force or its detail. It is a scientific view of what science, knowledge and objectivity amount to that takes seriously the fact that such a ...
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Quine’s naturalism is not well appreciated for either its force or its detail. It is a scientific view of what science, knowledge and objectivity amount to that takes seriously the fact that such a view is benignly circular: there is no point of view commanding knowledge or science that transcends science. After explaining how Quine himself accepted the view after his famous responses to Carnap, the chapter discusses naturalized epistemology and its implications for the study of language, the specter of indeterminacy, the fundamental importance for naturalism of the inscrutability of reference, and the place within naturalism of ontology. The chapter concludes with the implications for compositionality, truth, semantical holism, instrumentalism, realism, objectivity, the status of psychological characterization and the propositional attitudes.Less
Quine’s naturalism is not well appreciated for either its force or its detail. It is a scientific view of what science, knowledge and objectivity amount to that takes seriously the fact that such a view is benignly circular: there is no point of view commanding knowledge or science that transcends science. After explaining how Quine himself accepted the view after his famous responses to Carnap, the chapter discusses naturalized epistemology and its implications for the study of language, the specter of indeterminacy, the fundamental importance for naturalism of the inscrutability of reference, and the place within naturalism of ontology. The chapter concludes with the implications for compositionality, truth, semantical holism, instrumentalism, realism, objectivity, the status of psychological characterization and the propositional attitudes.
Panayot Butchvarov
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ...
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This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.Less
This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.
Robert D. Rupert
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195379457
- eISBN:
- 9780199869114
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter summarizes the book's arguments against the extended view, as well as the primary conciliatory contentions advanced with regard to the embedded and embodied views. The chapter closes ...
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This chapter summarizes the book's arguments against the extended view, as well as the primary conciliatory contentions advanced with regard to the embedded and embodied views. The chapter closes with comments on the positive importance of the embodied and embedded programs, particularly in respect of such philosophical issues as reductionism and naturalized epistemology.Less
This chapter summarizes the book's arguments against the extended view, as well as the primary conciliatory contentions advanced with regard to the embedded and embodied views. The chapter closes with comments on the positive importance of the embodied and embedded programs, particularly in respect of such philosophical issues as reductionism and naturalized epistemology.
Peter Poellner
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250630
- eISBN:
- 9780191598258
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250630.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
In contrast with views that attribute the biological utility of beliefs to their truth, Nietzsche maintains that their relative utility renders them proportionately more likely to be idiosyncratic ...
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In contrast with views that attribute the biological utility of beliefs to their truth, Nietzsche maintains that their relative utility renders them proportionately more likely to be idiosyncratic expressions of species‐relative concerns. Nietzsche's sceptical ‘argument from utility’—the inference from the practical utility of beliefs to the improbability of their being metaphysically true—is examined and rejected. It is argued that Nietzsche is an early proponent of naturalized epistemology. His objections to the ‘best explanation’ defence of metaphysical realism are discussed. It emerges that the ‘evolutionary’ strand of thought is incompatible with his other sceptical arguments. The chapter pursues Nietzsche's doctrine that the ‘ruling drives’ representing the dominant manifestation of the will to power in an individual determine the standards for validation, evidence, and truth. The discussion proceeds to an examination of Nietzsche's remarks that the external world is created in a manner depending on the specific form of the will to power instantiated by the empirical subject.Less
In contrast with views that attribute the biological utility of beliefs to their truth, Nietzsche maintains that their relative utility renders them proportionately more likely to be idiosyncratic expressions of species‐relative concerns. Nietzsche's sceptical ‘argument from utility’—the inference from the practical utility of beliefs to the improbability of their being metaphysically true—is examined and rejected. It is argued that Nietzsche is an early proponent of naturalized epistemology. His objections to the ‘best explanation’ defence of metaphysical realism are discussed. It emerges that the ‘evolutionary’ strand of thought is incompatible with his other sceptical arguments. The chapter pursues Nietzsche's doctrine that the ‘ruling drives’ representing the dominant manifestation of the will to power in an individual determine the standards for validation, evidence, and truth. The discussion proceeds to an examination of Nietzsche's remarks that the external world is created in a manner depending on the specific form of the will to power instantiated by the empirical subject.
Jack C. Lyons
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195373578
- eISBN:
- 9780199871988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter extrapolates from the earlier account of perceptual belief and proposes a general theory of basic beliefs: a basic belief is one that is the result of the noninferential operation of a ...
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This chapter extrapolates from the earlier account of perceptual belief and proposes a general theory of basic beliefs: a basic belief is one that is the result of the noninferential operation of a primal system: an inferentially opaque cognitive system that has a normal developmental etiology. The chapter explains all this and argues that it gets the cases intuitively right. It is argued that we can transcend and improve on our naive epistemic intuitions by turning to the empirical sciences to correct our untutored assumptions about which cognitive systems there are, where they come from, and what their outputs are.Less
This chapter extrapolates from the earlier account of perceptual belief and proposes a general theory of basic beliefs: a basic belief is one that is the result of the noninferential operation of a primal system: an inferentially opaque cognitive system that has a normal developmental etiology. The chapter explains all this and argues that it gets the cases intuitively right. It is argued that we can transcend and improve on our naive epistemic intuitions by turning to the empirical sciences to correct our untutored assumptions about which cognitive systems there are, where they come from, and what their outputs are.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130058
- eISBN:
- 9780199833481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130057.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In “The Sciences and Epistemology,” Alvin Goldman argues that epistemology and the sciences should remain distinct yet cooperative. He presents several examples that illustrate the relevance of ...
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In “The Sciences and Epistemology,” Alvin Goldman argues that epistemology and the sciences should remain distinct yet cooperative. He presents several examples that illustrate the relevance of science to epistemology. Drawing from work in psychology, he proposes that science can shed light on epistemic achievements by contributing to our understanding of the nature and extent of human cognitive endowments. He suggests, in addition, that psychology can also contribute to our understanding of the sources of knowledge. Finally, Goldman argues that some specific projects in epistemology can receive important contributions from psychology, economics, and sociology.Less
In “The Sciences and Epistemology,” Alvin Goldman argues that epistemology and the sciences should remain distinct yet cooperative. He presents several examples that illustrate the relevance of science to epistemology. Drawing from work in psychology, he proposes that science can shed light on epistemic achievements by contributing to our understanding of the nature and extent of human cognitive endowments. He suggests, in addition, that psychology can also contribute to our understanding of the sources of knowledge. Finally, Goldman argues that some specific projects in epistemology can receive important contributions from psychology, economics, and sociology.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a set of six principles ...
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This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a set of six principles concerning when non-moral beliefs require justifying beliefs to back them up. In short, whenever a belief is important, partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources, then that belief needs to be backed up by confirming beliefs, if the believer is to be epistemically justified in holding it. By appealing to recent empirical work, moral beliefs of all sorts fall under one or more of his principles, and thus are in need of support from other relevant beliefs. If so, then moral intuitionism is incorrect: no moral beliefs enjoy the status of being non-inferentially justified. This is his strong claim. More cautiously, the chapter claims that even if there may be some individuals who, in some contexts, have moral beliefs that do not require inferential support, still, for educated adults who are well aware of the various possible distorting factors affecting beliefs, no moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified. Even if moral judgments are not themselves claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed entirely by empirical means (including the methods of science), it does not follow that developments in the sciences, including biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, cognitive science, and brain science, are not relevant to whether a person's (or group's) moral beliefs are epistemically justified.Less
This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a set of six principles concerning when non-moral beliefs require justifying beliefs to back them up. In short, whenever a belief is important, partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources, then that belief needs to be backed up by confirming beliefs, if the believer is to be epistemically justified in holding it. By appealing to recent empirical work, moral beliefs of all sorts fall under one or more of his principles, and thus are in need of support from other relevant beliefs. If so, then moral intuitionism is incorrect: no moral beliefs enjoy the status of being non-inferentially justified. This is his strong claim. More cautiously, the chapter claims that even if there may be some individuals who, in some contexts, have moral beliefs that do not require inferential support, still, for educated adults who are well aware of the various possible distorting factors affecting beliefs, no moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified. Even if moral judgments are not themselves claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed entirely by empirical means (including the methods of science), it does not follow that developments in the sciences, including biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, cognitive science, and brain science, are not relevant to whether a person's (or group's) moral beliefs are epistemically justified.
David Henderson and Terence Horgan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199608546
- eISBN:
- 9780191729584
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides an overview of the chapters to follow, their central arguments, and how the various pieces of the view developed in the book fit together. Two of the subsequent chapters are ...
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This chapter provides an overview of the chapters to follow, their central arguments, and how the various pieces of the view developed in the book fit together. Two of the subsequent chapters are identified as pivotal methodological chapters: Chapter Two—on the a priori and on philosophical reflection in particular—and Chapter Six—on the spectrum of inquiry to be pursued within a fittingly naturalized epistemology. The chapters that follow each of these methodological chapters implement and illustrate their lessons. The discussion of various versions of reliabilism in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters provides an extended instance of the “low-grade priori” reflection characterized in Chapter Two. The discussion and criticism (in Chapter Seven) of the psychological “proto-theories” that have mis-informed much epistemology reflects the far-reaching significance of certain empirical parts of the epistemological spectrum, while Chapter Eight articulates some consequences of an empirically better informed understanding of epistemically relevant processes. Thus, the revisionary treatments (in Chapter Eight) of foundationalism, coherentism, and contextualism constitute important lessons to be gained from a fittingly naturalized epistemology.Less
This chapter provides an overview of the chapters to follow, their central arguments, and how the various pieces of the view developed in the book fit together. Two of the subsequent chapters are identified as pivotal methodological chapters: Chapter Two—on the a priori and on philosophical reflection in particular—and Chapter Six—on the spectrum of inquiry to be pursued within a fittingly naturalized epistemology. The chapters that follow each of these methodological chapters implement and illustrate their lessons. The discussion of various versions of reliabilism in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters provides an extended instance of the “low-grade priori” reflection characterized in Chapter Two. The discussion and criticism (in Chapter Seven) of the psychological “proto-theories” that have mis-informed much epistemology reflects the far-reaching significance of certain empirical parts of the epistemological spectrum, while Chapter Eight articulates some consequences of an empirically better informed understanding of epistemically relevant processes. Thus, the revisionary treatments (in Chapter Eight) of foundationalism, coherentism, and contextualism constitute important lessons to be gained from a fittingly naturalized epistemology.
Penelope Maddy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199273669
- eISBN:
- 9780191706264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The closest ancestor of Second Philosophy is Quine's naturalism. This chapter details the Second Philosopher's departures from Quinean orthodoxy: the Quinean chooses naturalism in response to the ...
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The closest ancestor of Second Philosophy is Quine's naturalism. This chapter details the Second Philosopher's departures from Quinean orthodoxy: the Quinean chooses naturalism in response to the failures of first philosophy, the Second Philosopher simply begins in her characteristic ways; she doesn't share his empiricism leanings, e.g., in her modified approach to epistemology naturalized; her reactions to radical skepticism differ from his; and perhaps most dramatically, she rejects his holism. These differences ramify into the philosophy of logic, mathematics, and natural science in subsequent chapters.Less
The closest ancestor of Second Philosophy is Quine's naturalism. This chapter details the Second Philosopher's departures from Quinean orthodoxy: the Quinean chooses naturalism in response to the failures of first philosophy, the Second Philosopher simply begins in her characteristic ways; she doesn't share his empiricism leanings, e.g., in her modified approach to epistemology naturalized; her reactions to radical skepticism differ from his; and perhaps most dramatically, she rejects his holism. These differences ramify into the philosophy of logic, mathematics, and natural science in subsequent chapters.
Simon J. Evnine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239948
- eISBN:
- 9780191716898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is argued that it is both rational for persons to believe the conjunctions of their beliefs and that they must do so to a large extent. Arguments against the rationality claim stemming from the ...
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It is argued that it is both rational for persons to believe the conjunctions of their beliefs and that they must do so to a large extent. Arguments against the rationality claim stemming from the Lottery and Preface paradoxes and from naturalized epistemology are answered. It is further argued that, under normal circumstances, what it is to believe a conjunction simply is to believe each of its conjuncts.Less
It is argued that it is both rational for persons to believe the conjunctions of their beliefs and that they must do so to a large extent. Arguments against the rationality claim stemming from the Lottery and Preface paradoxes and from naturalized epistemology are answered. It is further argued that, under normal circumstances, what it is to believe a conjunction simply is to believe each of its conjuncts.
Peter Poellner
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250630
- eISBN:
- 9780191598258
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250630.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
A reconstruction of Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics aimed at isolating and assessing dominant lines of argument concerning truth, knowledge, and reality in Nietzsche's mature and late ...
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A reconstruction of Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics aimed at isolating and assessing dominant lines of argument concerning truth, knowledge, and reality in Nietzsche's mature and late period. The book initially focuses on Nietzsche's sceptical remarks, directed at specific metaphysical theories (causation, self, Newtonian force) and more generally at the concepts of knowledge as justified true belief and rational justification. The discussion proceeds to Nietzsche's own historically unprecedented strain of scepticism. This is the argument from utility—maintaining that the pragmatic utility of belief renders it unlikely to be true. Nietzsche's naturalized epistemology is discussed in the context of modern evolutionary epistemology. It is argued that the two kinds of scepticism are not compatible. In addition, Nietzsche's sceptical stance presupposes the intelligibility of a metaphysically realist conception of absolute truth. Yet, he simultaneously doubts the very notion of truth underpinning his sceptical arguments. It is proposed that Nietzsche is not committed to scepticism but employs sceptical considerations in his attempt to discredit the ascetic ideal. He is strategically qualifying his deductions to the extent that even if the notion of metaphysical truth were allowed to pass muster, metaphysical theories about the world would still be demonstrably otiose. The book emphasizes the centrality of his attack on the notion of metaphysical truth, which purports to describe the objective existence and intrinsic properties of a subject‐independent reality as it is ‘in itself’ and from no ‘point of view’, referred to as Nietzsche's anti‐essentialist or anti‐metaphysical thinking. The affinity of Nietzsche's outlook to anti‐realism, idealism, and classic conceivability objections to metaphysical realism is developed along with emphasis on the original form it takes in Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the perspectival, subject‐implying character of representational content cannot be discounted without rendering the representation meaningless. As the concept of reality refers to recalcitrant patterns of representational contents that affect empirical subjects by ‘resisting’ them, gaining purchase on it involves anthropocentric notions such as interest, concern, and experience. It is only as beings with interests and capable of intentional and volitional agency that we have the concepts of objective reality and the external world. Having thus laid out Nietzsche's anti‐essentialism, it is argued that a difficult problem arises over the incompatibility of anti‐essentialism with Nietzsche's theory of the mind, in particular his concern with psychology and human agency. His analysis of the concepts of self‐deception, ressentiment, and the Christian ideal, and more generally, of the ascetic ideal or ‘will to truth’, imply that there is a realm of metaphysical fact described, at the very least, by his own theoretical pronouncements. This problem is compounded by his views of the nature of inner experience as the domain of ‘ruling drives’ privileged by being the sole causally efficacious movers. Anticipating Freud's theory of the unconscious, Nietzsche argues that the processes of the mind are not necessarily accessible to self‐consciousness. The book concludes with an analysis of the ‘metaphysics of the will to power’ offered by Nietzsche as an explanatory ontology of relational entities. The final chapter illustrates the recurrent problem of reconciling Nietzsche's overt metaphysical assertions with his sceptical and anti‐essentialist objections to metaphysical truth.Less
A reconstruction of Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics aimed at isolating and assessing dominant lines of argument concerning truth, knowledge, and reality in Nietzsche's mature and late period. The book initially focuses on Nietzsche's sceptical remarks, directed at specific metaphysical theories (causation, self, Newtonian force) and more generally at the concepts of knowledge as justified true belief and rational justification. The discussion proceeds to Nietzsche's own historically unprecedented strain of scepticism. This is the argument from utility—maintaining that the pragmatic utility of belief renders it unlikely to be true. Nietzsche's naturalized epistemology is discussed in the context of modern evolutionary epistemology. It is argued that the two kinds of scepticism are not compatible. In addition, Nietzsche's sceptical stance presupposes the intelligibility of a metaphysically realist conception of absolute truth. Yet, he simultaneously doubts the very notion of truth underpinning his sceptical arguments. It is proposed that Nietzsche is not committed to scepticism but employs sceptical considerations in his attempt to discredit the ascetic ideal. He is strategically qualifying his deductions to the extent that even if the notion of metaphysical truth were allowed to pass muster, metaphysical theories about the world would still be demonstrably otiose. The book emphasizes the centrality of his attack on the notion of metaphysical truth, which purports to describe the objective existence and intrinsic properties of a subject‐independent reality as it is ‘in itself’ and from no ‘point of view’, referred to as Nietzsche's anti‐essentialist or anti‐metaphysical thinking. The affinity of Nietzsche's outlook to anti‐realism, idealism, and classic conceivability objections to metaphysical realism is developed along with emphasis on the original form it takes in Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the perspectival, subject‐implying character of representational content cannot be discounted without rendering the representation meaningless. As the concept of reality refers to recalcitrant patterns of representational contents that affect empirical subjects by ‘resisting’ them, gaining purchase on it involves anthropocentric notions such as interest, concern, and experience. It is only as beings with interests and capable of intentional and volitional agency that we have the concepts of objective reality and the external world. Having thus laid out Nietzsche's anti‐essentialism, it is argued that a difficult problem arises over the incompatibility of anti‐essentialism with Nietzsche's theory of the mind, in particular his concern with psychology and human agency. His analysis of the concepts of self‐deception, ressentiment, and the Christian ideal, and more generally, of the ascetic ideal or ‘will to truth’, imply that there is a realm of metaphysical fact described, at the very least, by his own theoretical pronouncements. This problem is compounded by his views of the nature of inner experience as the domain of ‘ruling drives’ privileged by being the sole causally efficacious movers. Anticipating Freud's theory of the unconscious, Nietzsche argues that the processes of the mind are not necessarily accessible to self‐consciousness. The book concludes with an analysis of the ‘metaphysics of the will to power’ offered by Nietzsche as an explanatory ontology of relational entities. The final chapter illustrates the recurrent problem of reconciling Nietzsche's overt metaphysical assertions with his sceptical and anti‐essentialist objections to metaphysical truth.
P. M. S. Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199674824
- eISBN:
- 9780191761287
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674824.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
It has been remarked that the distinctive development in philosophy over the past thirty-five years has been a naturalist turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception ...
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It has been remarked that the distinctive development in philosophy over the past thirty-five years has been a naturalist turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception of philosophy as continuous with natural science. This is a reversion to the conception of philosophy advanced by Russell in the 1910s. The most august modern originator of such naturalism in contemporary philosophy was Quine. He advanced three forms of naturalism: naturalized epistemology, ontological naturalism, and philosophical naturalism. This chapter shows the errors and confusions that inform all three. The programme of naturalized epistemology is incoherent, and its claim to be an enlightened substitute for epistemology unwarranted. Quine's occasional forays into epistemology are examined and found wanting.Less
It has been remarked that the distinctive development in philosophy over the past thirty-five years has been a naturalist turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception of philosophy as continuous with natural science. This is a reversion to the conception of philosophy advanced by Russell in the 1910s. The most august modern originator of such naturalism in contemporary philosophy was Quine. He advanced three forms of naturalism: naturalized epistemology, ontological naturalism, and philosophical naturalism. This chapter shows the errors and confusions that inform all three. The programme of naturalized epistemology is incoherent, and its claim to be an enlightened substitute for epistemology unwarranted. Quine's occasional forays into epistemology are examined and found wanting.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In order to achieve a deeper understanding of warrant (and in reply to some objections), I turn in this chapter to a closer look at the idea of a design plan. I do so under the following six section ...
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In order to achieve a deeper understanding of warrant (and in reply to some objections), I turn in this chapter to a closer look at the idea of a design plan. I do so under the following six section headings: the max plan versus the design plan, unintended by‐products, functional multiplicity, the distinction between purpose and design, trade‐offs and compromises, and defeaters and overriders. In connection to the notion of trade‐offs and compromises in our cognitive design plan, I take up the subject of Gettier problems, trying to understand what really underlies Gettier situations and then seeing how these situations look from the vantage point of my conception of warrant. While Gettier problems do not in fact plague my account of warrant (as I try to point out), considering them nonetheless enables us to deepen our analysis of warrant. I close the chapter with a brief argument for the conclusion that my account of warrant qualifies as an example of naturalized epistemology (or naturalistic epistemology).Less
In order to achieve a deeper understanding of warrant (and in reply to some objections), I turn in this chapter to a closer look at the idea of a design plan. I do so under the following six section headings: the max plan versus the design plan, unintended by‐products, functional multiplicity, the distinction between purpose and design, trade‐offs and compromises, and defeaters and overriders. In connection to the notion of trade‐offs and compromises in our cognitive design plan, I take up the subject of Gettier problems, trying to understand what really underlies Gettier situations and then seeing how these situations look from the vantage point of my conception of warrant. While Gettier problems do not in fact plague my account of warrant (as I try to point out), considering them nonetheless enables us to deepen our analysis of warrant. I close the chapter with a brief argument for the conclusion that my account of warrant qualifies as an example of naturalized epistemology (or naturalistic epistemology).