J. W. HARRIS
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199251407
- eISBN:
- 9780191681998
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251407.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter considers whether there are moral property rights to ownership falling within the sixth of the seven categories of property rights set out in section (ii) of Chapter 10 — that is, moral ...
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This chapter considers whether there are moral property rights to ownership falling within the sixth of the seven categories of property rights set out in section (ii) of Chapter 10 — that is, moral standing to claim that a person or group ought to be vested with an ownership interest over some specific resource. Topics discussed include natural property rights, self-ownership, creation-without-wrong, desert and justice, and desert and property.Less
This chapter considers whether there are moral property rights to ownership falling within the sixth of the seven categories of property rights set out in section (ii) of Chapter 10 — that is, moral standing to claim that a person or group ought to be vested with an ownership interest over some specific resource. Topics discussed include natural property rights, self-ownership, creation-without-wrong, desert and justice, and desert and property.
J. W. Harris
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199251407
- eISBN:
- 9780191681998
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251407.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
When philosophers put forward claims for or against ‘property’, it is often unclear whether they are talking about the same thing that lawyers mean by ‘property’. Likewise, when lawyers appeal to ...
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When philosophers put forward claims for or against ‘property’, it is often unclear whether they are talking about the same thing that lawyers mean by ‘property’. Likewise, when lawyers appeal to ‘justice’ in interpreting or criticizing legal rules we do not know if they have in mind something that philosophers would recognize as ‘justice’. Bridging the gulf between juristic writing on property and speculations about it appearing in the tradition of western political philosophy, the author has built from entirely new foundations an analytical framework for understanding the nature of property and its connection with justice. This book ranges over natural property rights; property as a prerequisite of freedom; incentives and markets; demands for equality of resources; property as domination; property and basic needs; and the question of whether property should be extended to information and human bodily parts. It maintains that property institutions deal both with the use of things and the allocation of wealth, and that everyone has a ‘right’ that society should provide such an institution.Less
When philosophers put forward claims for or against ‘property’, it is often unclear whether they are talking about the same thing that lawyers mean by ‘property’. Likewise, when lawyers appeal to ‘justice’ in interpreting or criticizing legal rules we do not know if they have in mind something that philosophers would recognize as ‘justice’. Bridging the gulf between juristic writing on property and speculations about it appearing in the tradition of western political philosophy, the author has built from entirely new foundations an analytical framework for understanding the nature of property and its connection with justice. This book ranges over natural property rights; property as a prerequisite of freedom; incentives and markets; demands for equality of resources; property as domination; property and basic needs; and the question of whether property should be extended to information and human bodily parts. It maintains that property institutions deal both with the use of things and the allocation of wealth, and that everyone has a ‘right’ that society should provide such an institution.
Rowan Cruft
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- October 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198793366
- eISBN:
- 9780191884122
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 12 assesses arguments that certain specific property rights, and some general rights to participate in property systems, can be morally justifiable for the right-holder’s own sake—primarily ...
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Chapter 12 assesses arguments that certain specific property rights, and some general rights to participate in property systems, can be morally justifiable for the right-holder’s own sake—primarily on the basis of the right-holder’s own good—in a way that makes them ‘natural’ or recognition-independent rights. Versions of such arguments based on the importance of the right-holder’s freedom, her chosen purposes, and her other human rights, are developed from the work of Hegel, Locke, and Nickel, respectively. The chapter shows that the reach of these arguments is limited. Some property rights might indeed be ‘natural’ rights groundable for the right-holder’s sake, but the chapter’s arguments imply that most property held by those who are moderately wealthy cannot be—including any property rights morally justifiable only as the results of a market exchange.Less
Chapter 12 assesses arguments that certain specific property rights, and some general rights to participate in property systems, can be morally justifiable for the right-holder’s own sake—primarily on the basis of the right-holder’s own good—in a way that makes them ‘natural’ or recognition-independent rights. Versions of such arguments based on the importance of the right-holder’s freedom, her chosen purposes, and her other human rights, are developed from the work of Hegel, Locke, and Nickel, respectively. The chapter shows that the reach of these arguments is limited. Some property rights might indeed be ‘natural’ rights groundable for the right-holder’s sake, but the chapter’s arguments imply that most property held by those who are moderately wealthy cannot be—including any property rights morally justifiable only as the results of a market exchange.
