Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ...
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What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.Less
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an ...
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Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an anti-descriptivist semantic theory of natural kind terms. It attempts to clarify various issues about the characteristics of natural kind essentialism and its relation to semantic theory, as well as reinforcing the distinction made earlier in the book between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. The author remains agnostic on the question of the truth of essentialism about natural kinds, but suggests reasons for scepticism about its plausibility in comparison with some weaker views, such as the theory that a natural kind has a Lockean ‘real essence’ which need not belong to the kind in all possible worlds.Less
Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an anti-descriptivist semantic theory of natural kind terms. It attempts to clarify various issues about the characteristics of natural kind essentialism and its relation to semantic theory, as well as reinforcing the distinction made earlier in the book between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. The author remains agnostic on the question of the truth of essentialism about natural kinds, but suggests reasons for scepticism about its plausibility in comparison with some weaker views, such as the theory that a natural kind has a Lockean ‘real essence’ which need not belong to the kind in all possible worlds.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285549
- eISBN:
- 9780191713965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter aims to work out the positive theory behind Kant's surprising claim that gold is necessarily a yellow metal, using scientific essentialism only as a critical foil. It discusses Kant's ...
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This chapter aims to work out the positive theory behind Kant's surprising claim that gold is necessarily a yellow metal, using scientific essentialism only as a critical foil. It discusses Kant's theory of natural kind terms and scientific realism in the manifest image. It explains Kant's Other Joke, which vindicates both natural science in general and fundamental physics in particular in a way that would similarly flummox the noumenal scientific realist.Less
This chapter aims to work out the positive theory behind Kant's surprising claim that gold is necessarily a yellow metal, using scientific essentialism only as a critical foil. It discusses Kant's theory of natural kind terms and scientific realism in the manifest image. It explains Kant's Other Joke, which vindicates both natural science in general and fundamental physics in particular in a way that would similarly flummox the noumenal scientific realist.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, ...
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The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.Less
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter defends a commitment to an ontology of kinds for the special case of natural kinds; such a commitment plays an important role in motivating and underwriting the structure-based and ...
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This chapter defends a commitment to an ontology of kinds for the special case of natural kinds; such a commitment plays an important role in motivating and underwriting the structure-based and restricted conception of parthood and composition outlined in the previous chapter. The special case of natural kinds is intended as an illustration of how a commitment to a certain class of kinds in general, or to specific kinds among them, may be generated on the basis of extra-mereological considerations. The belief in the existence of natural kinds, for example, may be supported by an appeal to their role in prediction and explanation; particularly noteworthy in this respect is the weight borne by scientific natural kinds (e.g., physical, chemical and biological kinds) in (i) inductive arguments, (ii) the laws of nature, and (iii) causal explanations.Less
This chapter defends a commitment to an ontology of kinds for the special case of natural kinds; such a commitment plays an important role in motivating and underwriting the structure-based and restricted conception of parthood and composition outlined in the previous chapter. The special case of natural kinds is intended as an illustration of how a commitment to a certain class of kinds in general, or to specific kinds among them, may be generated on the basis of extra-mereological considerations. The belief in the existence of natural kinds, for example, may be supported by an appeal to their role in prediction and explanation; particularly noteworthy in this respect is the weight borne by scientific natural kinds (e.g., physical, chemical and biological kinds) in (i) inductive arguments, (ii) the laws of nature, and (iii) causal explanations.
Edouard Machery
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195306880
- eISBN:
- 9780199867950
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the ...
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Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. The book shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. The book concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification.Less
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. The book shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. The book concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification.
James Ladyman, Don Ross, David Spurrett, and John Collier
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276196
- eISBN:
- 9780191706127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that the idea of causation has similar status to ideas of cohesion, forces, and things. Appreciating the role of causation in a notional world is crucial to understanding the ...
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This chapter argues that the idea of causation has similar status to ideas of cohesion, forces, and things. Appreciating the role of causation in a notional world is crucial to understanding the nature of the special sciences, and the general ways in which they differ from fundamental physics. Causation, unlike cohesion, is both a notional-world concept and a folk concept. Moreover, causation, unlike cohesion, is a basic category of traditional metaphysics, including metaphysics that purports to be naturalistic but falls short of this ambition. This chapter also argues that causation, just like cohesion, is a representational real pattern that is necessary for an adequately comprehensive science. It begins with an account that eliminates causation altogether on naturalistic grounds, and then shows, using principle of naturalistic closure (PNC)-mandated motivations, why this outright eliminativism is too strong. The eliminativist argument to be discussed is due to Bertrand Russell, whose view has some important contemporary adherents among philosophers of physics.Less
This chapter argues that the idea of causation has similar status to ideas of cohesion, forces, and things. Appreciating the role of causation in a notional world is crucial to understanding the nature of the special sciences, and the general ways in which they differ from fundamental physics. Causation, unlike cohesion, is both a notional-world concept and a folk concept. Moreover, causation, unlike cohesion, is a basic category of traditional metaphysics, including metaphysics that purports to be naturalistic but falls short of this ambition. This chapter also argues that causation, just like cohesion, is a representational real pattern that is necessary for an adequately comprehensive science. It begins with an account that eliminates causation altogether on naturalistic grounds, and then shows, using principle of naturalistic closure (PNC)-mandated motivations, why this outright eliminativism is too strong. The eliminativist argument to be discussed is due to Bertrand Russell, whose view has some important contemporary adherents among philosophers of physics.
Mark Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269259
- eISBN:
- 9780191710155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269259.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
After summarizing the key ingredients within a facade, this chapter reexamines the standard cases of philosophical puzzlement that were introduced in earlier chapters employing these structural ...
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After summarizing the key ingredients within a facade, this chapter reexamines the standard cases of philosophical puzzlement that were introduced in earlier chapters employing these structural possibilities, emphasizing the factors that lead us to overlook the patch-to-patch realignments typical of facade organization. It is emphasized that the fine grain of a facade-based usage rarely represents the result of original linguistic preparation, but arises later in silent adaptation to environmental pressures.Less
After summarizing the key ingredients within a facade, this chapter reexamines the standard cases of philosophical puzzlement that were introduced in earlier chapters employing these structural possibilities, emphasizing the factors that lead us to overlook the patch-to-patch realignments typical of facade organization. It is emphasized that the fine grain of a facade-based usage rarely represents the result of original linguistic preparation, but arises later in silent adaptation to environmental pressures.
Lance J. Rips
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195183054
- eISBN:
- 9780199865109
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183054.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter grapples with the question of how seemingly objective categories like lions could have properties that extend beyond the set of their actual members. The first part looks at ...
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This chapter grapples with the question of how seemingly objective categories like lions could have properties that extend beyond the set of their actual members. The first part looks at psychological evidence that pins down the modal qualities of natural kinds (e.g., daisies, lions, copper). The second part examines some approaches that may have a chance of explaining these qualities. It compares two general ideas about modal properties: the “intrinsic” and the “interactional” views. The intrinsic view allies itself with psychological essentialism in holding that people believe the modal properties of natural kinds are the results of a single necessary property residing within each instance of the kind. The interactional view maintains instead that these kinds depend on a set of co-operating causes, some internal and some external to a member of the kind. Although each view can claim some advantages, it is argued that the interactional view comes closest to beliefs about these matters, at least for adults. The view of kinds therefore meshes with the view of individuals that presented in Chapter 1.Less
This chapter grapples with the question of how seemingly objective categories like lions could have properties that extend beyond the set of their actual members. The first part looks at psychological evidence that pins down the modal qualities of natural kinds (e.g., daisies, lions, copper). The second part examines some approaches that may have a chance of explaining these qualities. It compares two general ideas about modal properties: the “intrinsic” and the “interactional” views. The intrinsic view allies itself with psychological essentialism in holding that people believe the modal properties of natural kinds are the results of a single necessary property residing within each instance of the kind. The interactional view maintains instead that these kinds depend on a set of co-operating causes, some internal and some external to a member of the kind. Although each view can claim some advantages, it is argued that the interactional view comes closest to beliefs about these matters, at least for adults. The view of kinds therefore meshes with the view of individuals that presented in Chapter 1.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145281
- eISBN:
- 9780199833702
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145283.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In ...
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In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In Beyond Rigidity, Scott Soames strengthens Kripke's attack, while also providing a positive theory of the semantics and pragmatics of names. Using a new conception of how the meaning of a sentence relates to the information asserted and conveyed by utterances, Soames argues that the meaning of a linguistically simple name is its referent, and that the meaning of a linguistically complex, partially descriptive, name is a compound that includes both its referent and a partial description. After illustrating these analyses with simple sentences containing names, Soames extends them to sentences that report the assertions and beliefs of agents. Appealing again to his new understanding of the relationship between meaning and information asserted and conveyed, Soames attempts to reconcile the central semantic doctrines of Millianism and Russellianism with Fregean intuitions about the information carried by belief and other propositional attitude ascriptions. Finally, Soames investigates the relationship between proper names and natural kind terms, including mass nouns, count nouns, and adjectives functioning as predicates. After showing that natural kind predicates do not fit reasonable definitions of rigidity, he argues that there is no notion of rigid designation for predicates that (1) is a natural extension of the notion of rigidity for singular terms, (2) is such that simple natural kind predicates are standardly rigid whereas many other predicates are not, and (3) plays the role imagined by Kripke in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of theoretical identities like Water is H2O and An object x is hotter than an object y iff x has a higher mean molecular kinetic energy than y. Finally, Soames uses key elements of Kripke's discussion to construct an alternative explanation of the necessary a posteriori character of these sentences that is based on the nondescriptionality of simple natural kind predicates, and the manner in which their meaning and reference is determined.Less
In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In Beyond Rigidity, Scott Soames strengthens Kripke's attack, while also providing a positive theory of the semantics and pragmatics of names. Using a new conception of how the meaning of a sentence relates to the information asserted and conveyed by utterances, Soames argues that the meaning of a linguistically simple name is its referent, and that the meaning of a linguistically complex, partially descriptive, name is a compound that includes both its referent and a partial description. After illustrating these analyses with simple sentences containing names, Soames extends them to sentences that report the assertions and beliefs of agents. Appealing again to his new understanding of the relationship between meaning and information asserted and conveyed, Soames attempts to reconcile the central semantic doctrines of Millianism and Russellianism with Fregean intuitions about the information carried by belief and other propositional attitude ascriptions. Finally, Soames investigates the relationship between proper names and natural kind terms, including mass nouns, count nouns, and adjectives functioning as predicates. After showing that natural kind predicates do not fit reasonable definitions of rigidity, he argues that there is no notion of rigid designation for predicates that (1) is a natural extension of the notion of rigidity for singular terms, (2) is such that simple natural kind predicates are standardly rigid whereas many other predicates are not, and (3) plays the role imagined by Kripke in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of theoretical identities like Water is H2O and An object x is hotter than an object y iff x has a higher mean molecular kinetic energy than y. Finally, Soames uses key elements of Kripke's discussion to construct an alternative explanation of the necessary a posteriori character of these sentences that is based on the nondescriptionality of simple natural kind predicates, and the manner in which their meaning and reference is determined.
Edouard Machery
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195306880
- eISBN:
- 9780199867950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter draws the conclusion of the argument developed in previous chapters: The notion of concept should be eliminated from contemporary psychology. Previous eliminativist arguments against the ...
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This chapter draws the conclusion of the argument developed in previous chapters: The notion of concept should be eliminated from contemporary psychology. Previous eliminativist arguments against the notion of concept are considered and are judged to be inconclusive. A new type of eliminativist argument called “scientific eliminativism”—showing that the extension of a scientific notion is not a natural kind—is developed and is applied to concepts. Because concepts are not a natural kind, the notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology, if this discipline is to progress further.Less
This chapter draws the conclusion of the argument developed in previous chapters: The notion of concept should be eliminated from contemporary psychology. Previous eliminativist arguments against the notion of concept are considered and are judged to be inconclusive. A new type of eliminativist argument called “scientific eliminativism”—showing that the extension of a scientific notion is not a natural kind—is developed and is applied to concepts. Because concepts are not a natural kind, the notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology, if this discipline is to progress further.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re ...
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This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.Less
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter reviews the central arguments of this book and charts the directions for future work on dispositional essentialism, identifying the need for an account of natural kinds and for responses ...
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This chapter reviews the central arguments of this book and charts the directions for future work on dispositional essentialism, identifying the need for an account of natural kinds and for responses to certain problems from physics, concerning fundamental constants, least-action principles, and conservation laws. Responses to these problems are sketched.Less
This chapter reviews the central arguments of this book and charts the directions for future work on dispositional essentialism, identifying the need for an account of natural kinds and for responses to certain problems from physics, concerning fundamental constants, least-action principles, and conservation laws. Responses to these problems are sketched.
Günter P. Wagner
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691156460
- eISBN:
- 9781400851461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691156460.003.0008
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
This chapter examines the implications of homology as a scientifically credible concept for the metaphysics of evolutionary biology, that is, the question of whether such words as “characters” can ...
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This chapter examines the implications of homology as a scientifically credible concept for the metaphysics of evolutionary biology, that is, the question of whether such words as “characters” can refer to real things. It first considers the relationship between philosophy and science before discussing how the notions of class, individuals, and natural kinds relate to the conceptual proposal in this book. To introduce the idea of a class, the chapter looks at the history of the concepts of acids and bases. It then describes the notion of natural kinds and emphasizes the usefulness of definitions and models in the study of character evolution and development. It concludes by arguing that characters can be understood as natural kinds, if the latter notion is appropriately modified.Less
This chapter examines the implications of homology as a scientifically credible concept for the metaphysics of evolutionary biology, that is, the question of whether such words as “characters” can refer to real things. It first considers the relationship between philosophy and science before discussing how the notions of class, individuals, and natural kinds relate to the conceptual proposal in this book. To introduce the idea of a class, the chapter looks at the history of the concepts of acids and bases. It then describes the notion of natural kinds and emphasizes the usefulness of definitions and models in the study of character evolution and development. It concludes by arguing that characters can be understood as natural kinds, if the latter notion is appropriately modified.
Gregory D. Alles
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195394337
- eISBN:
- 9780199777358
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394337.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter discusses Joachim Wach’s efforts in formulating typologies within the study of religions. It argues that these efforts fail not because of their ethnocentric character—although they are ...
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This chapter discusses Joachim Wach’s efforts in formulating typologies within the study of religions. It argues that these efforts fail not because of their ethnocentric character—although they are ethnocentric—but because they provide a conceptual simplification that does not meet any further intellectual goals and so remains impressionistic. It then considers the conditions under which adequate typologies could be formulated within the study of religions. It argues that, as a non-natural-kind term, “religion” itself is “inference-poor”; unlike natural-kind terms, the inferences that one can reliably draw about something that is classified as “religion” are extremely limited. In other language, it lacks projectable properties or stable features. As a result, typologies of the sort Wach was seeking must be formulated on different grounds.Less
This chapter discusses Joachim Wach’s efforts in formulating typologies within the study of religions. It argues that these efforts fail not because of their ethnocentric character—although they are ethnocentric—but because they provide a conceptual simplification that does not meet any further intellectual goals and so remains impressionistic. It then considers the conditions under which adequate typologies could be formulated within the study of religions. It argues that, as a non-natural-kind term, “religion” itself is “inference-poor”; unlike natural-kind terms, the inferences that one can reliably draw about something that is classified as “religion” are extremely limited. In other language, it lacks projectable properties or stable features. As a result, typologies of the sort Wach was seeking must be formulated on different grounds.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter contends that proponents of the a priori face two major challenges: articulating the experiential/nonexperiential distinction, and providing supporting evidence for the claim that there ...
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This chapter contends that proponents of the a priori face two major challenges: articulating the experiential/nonexperiential distinction, and providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. It is argued that the most promising approaches to addressing both challenges involve empirical investigation. With respect to the first, “experience” should be viewed as a natural kind term whose extension is fixed by certain paradigms. The underlying nature of the paradigms must be uncovered by empirical investigation. With respect to the second, it is argued that providing compelling support for the a priori involves two related projects: the Articulation Project, whose goal is to more fully articulate the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification; and the Empirical Project, whose goal is to provide empirical supporting evidence for the articulated claim.Less
This chapter contends that proponents of the a priori face two major challenges: articulating the experiential/nonexperiential distinction, and providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. It is argued that the most promising approaches to addressing both challenges involve empirical investigation. With respect to the first, “experience” should be viewed as a natural kind term whose extension is fixed by certain paradigms. The underlying nature of the paradigms must be uncovered by empirical investigation. With respect to the second, it is argued that providing compelling support for the a priori involves two related projects: the Articulation Project, whose goal is to more fully articulate the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification; and the Empirical Project, whose goal is to provide empirical supporting evidence for the articulated claim.
Timothy McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145069
- eISBN:
- 9780199833436
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145062.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Applies the ‘Conformal Framework’ developed in Ch. 2 to some problems of the classical theory of reference, namely, to the question of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, ...
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Applies the ‘Conformal Framework’ developed in Ch. 2 to some problems of the classical theory of reference, namely, to the question of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined. McCarthy proposes interpretationally motivated accounts of the reference of these terms that cut across the conflicting accounts presented by causal and descriptive theories of reference. The striking feature of these accounts is their ‘local holism’: in each of the three cases under consideration, the answer provided takes the form of saying how the reference of expressions of the given sort is fixed relative to the interpretations of expressions in one or both of the other sorts. The reference mechanisms suggested stand in a dialectical relation to the Conformal Framework, in the sense that they are justified by the latter and at the same time lend support the Framework's constitutive principles proposed in Ch. 2.Less
Applies the ‘Conformal Framework’ developed in Ch. 2 to some problems of the classical theory of reference, namely, to the question of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined. McCarthy proposes interpretationally motivated accounts of the reference of these terms that cut across the conflicting accounts presented by causal and descriptive theories of reference. The striking feature of these accounts is their ‘local holism’: in each of the three cases under consideration, the answer provided takes the form of saying how the reference of expressions of the given sort is fixed relative to the interpretations of expressions in one or both of the other sorts. The reference mechanisms suggested stand in a dialectical relation to the Conformal Framework, in the sense that they are justified by the latter and at the same time lend support the Framework's constitutive principles proposed in Ch. 2.
Hilary Kornblith
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246311
- eISBN:
- 9780191597862
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246319.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues that conceptual analysis should be rejected in favour of a more naturalistic approach to epistemology. There is a robust natural phenomenon of knowledge; knowledge is a natural kind. An ...
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Argues that conceptual analysis should be rejected in favour of a more naturalistic approach to epistemology. There is a robust natural phenomenon of knowledge; knowledge is a natural kind. An examination of the cognitive ethology literature reveals a category of knowledge that does both causal and explanatory work. It is argued that knowledge in this very sense is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts of knowledge that are more demanding—requiring either that certain social conditions be met or that an agent engage in some sort of reflection—are discussed in detail, and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon. In addition, it is argued that the account of knowledge that emerges from the cognitive ethology literature can provide an explanation of the normative force of epistemic claims.Less
Argues that conceptual analysis should be rejected in favour of a more naturalistic approach to epistemology. There is a robust natural phenomenon of knowledge; knowledge is a natural kind. An examination of the cognitive ethology literature reveals a category of knowledge that does both causal and explanatory work. It is argued that knowledge in this very sense is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts of knowledge that are more demanding—requiring either that certain social conditions be met or that an agent engage in some sort of reflection—are discussed in detail, and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon. In addition, it is argued that the account of knowledge that emerges from the cognitive ethology literature can provide an explanation of the normative force of epistemic claims.
Neil Feit
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195341362
- eISBN:
- 9780199866922
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers Twin Earth cases of the sort introduced by Hilary Putnam. The goal is to present a collection of answers to various metaphysical and semantic questions raised by these cases. ...
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This chapter considers Twin Earth cases of the sort introduced by Hilary Putnam. The goal is to present a collection of answers to various metaphysical and semantic questions raised by these cases. The chapter defends a property-theoretic version of internalism about the mind, which is defended in part by a critical examination of the standard arguments that draw externalist conclusions from Twin Earth examples. The first section reviews Putnam's classic example and distinguishes psychological from semantic externalism. The second section discusses the general Twin Earth argument against psychological internalism. The third and fourth sections contain a two-stage internalist response to Twin Earth arguments for externalism. The fifth and final section presents and defends some concluding remarks about self-ascription and belief about natural kinds.Less
This chapter considers Twin Earth cases of the sort introduced by Hilary Putnam. The goal is to present a collection of answers to various metaphysical and semantic questions raised by these cases. The chapter defends a property-theoretic version of internalism about the mind, which is defended in part by a critical examination of the standard arguments that draw externalist conclusions from Twin Earth examples. The first section reviews Putnam's classic example and distinguishes psychological from semantic externalism. The second section discusses the general Twin Earth argument against psychological internalism. The third and fourth sections contain a two-stage internalist response to Twin Earth arguments for externalism. The fifth and final section presents and defends some concluding remarks about self-ascription and belief about natural kinds.
Timothy McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145069
- eISBN:
- 9780199833436
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145062.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising ...
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Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.Less
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.
