Michael J. Murray
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199237272
- eISBN:
- 9780191717291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237272.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter and the next explore explanations of animal suffering in which the overriding goods arising from the permission of animal suffering do not accrue to animals themselves. The most common ...
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This chapter and the next explore explanations of animal suffering in which the overriding goods arising from the permission of animal suffering do not accrue to animals themselves. The most common theistic explanation of natural evil holds that it is a byproduct of an outweighing good feature of the world, namely, that the world is governed by stable, regular laws of nature (‘nomically regularity’). If such regularity has (natural) evil as a byproduct (perhaps including animal pain), those byproducts are morally permissible as long as the good of nomic regularity is outweighing. While it can plausibly be argued that nomic regularity is a good feature of the world, even one that outweighs substantial evil byproducts, it is implausible to hold that the animal pain and suffering in our world is a necessary consequence of such a good. The chapter argues that explanations of this sort ultimately fail on their own either because they cannot explain the reality of pre-human animal suffering and/or the existence of animals with mental capacities that render them liable to pain.Less
This chapter and the next explore explanations of animal suffering in which the overriding goods arising from the permission of animal suffering do not accrue to animals themselves. The most common theistic explanation of natural evil holds that it is a byproduct of an outweighing good feature of the world, namely, that the world is governed by stable, regular laws of nature (‘nomically regularity’). If such regularity has (natural) evil as a byproduct (perhaps including animal pain), those byproducts are morally permissible as long as the good of nomic regularity is outweighing. While it can plausibly be argued that nomic regularity is a good feature of the world, even one that outweighs substantial evil byproducts, it is implausible to hold that the animal pain and suffering in our world is a necessary consequence of such a good. The chapter argues that explanations of this sort ultimately fail on their own either because they cannot explain the reality of pre-human animal suffering and/or the existence of animals with mental capacities that render them liable to pain.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198235446
- eISBN:
- 9780191705618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
God may be expected to give humans significant responsibility for themselves and each other (including responsibility for forming their own characters). This involves allowing them to do significant ...
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God may be expected to give humans significant responsibility for themselves and each other (including responsibility for forming their own characters). This involves allowing them to do significant moral evil, and it involves allowing for natural evil, without which they would not have much opportunity for heroic actions. God has a (limited) right to allow some humans to suffer at the hands of others for these good reasons. Hence, the problem of evil is not a good objection to the existence of God.Less
God may be expected to give humans significant responsibility for themselves and each other (including responsibility for forming their own characters). This involves allowing them to do significant moral evil, and it involves allowing for natural evil, without which they would not have much opportunity for heroic actions. God has a (limited) right to allow some humans to suffer at the hands of others for these good reasons. Hence, the problem of evil is not a good objection to the existence of God.
Jeff Astley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195383355
- eISBN:
- 9780199870561
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195383355.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies, History of Christianity
Despite the complacent reaction of many theologians, Darwinism remains a dangerous idea for any religion that embraces a doctrine of creation. In particular, the evolutionary perspective—especially ...
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Despite the complacent reaction of many theologians, Darwinism remains a dangerous idea for any religion that embraces a doctrine of creation. In particular, the evolutionary perspective—especially Darwin's fundamental insight about the inevitable role of natural selection—presents a profound challenge to explanatory Christian theodicy. This chapter addresses the ways in which our understanding of natural and moral evil needs to be reassessed in light of an evolutionary view of nature and of human beings as a part of nature. But it goes beyond this cognitive task to discuss the appropriate spiritual attitudes that Christians might adopt to help them cope with their own and others' sufferings and sins in an evolutionary framework. The chapter also touches on God's action in the world, the doctrine of the Fall, the origins and status of human virtue, and the importance of theological humility.Less
Despite the complacent reaction of many theologians, Darwinism remains a dangerous idea for any religion that embraces a doctrine of creation. In particular, the evolutionary perspective—especially Darwin's fundamental insight about the inevitable role of natural selection—presents a profound challenge to explanatory Christian theodicy. This chapter addresses the ways in which our understanding of natural and moral evil needs to be reassessed in light of an evolutionary view of nature and of human beings as a part of nature. But it goes beyond this cognitive task to discuss the appropriate spiritual attitudes that Christians might adopt to help them cope with their own and others' sufferings and sins in an evolutionary framework. The chapter also touches on God's action in the world, the doctrine of the Fall, the origins and status of human virtue, and the importance of theological humility.
Abdulaziz Sachedina
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195378504
- eISBN:
- 9780199869688
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378504.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
Muslims, like other peoples of faith, have struggled to reconcile God‘s omnipotence with the persistent evils of the world, including the pain and suffering that attend illness. This chapter treats ...
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Muslims, like other peoples of faith, have struggled to reconcile God‘s omnipotence with the persistent evils of the world, including the pain and suffering that attend illness. This chapter treats the problem of theodicy in the context of Islamic biomedical ethics. The purpose of raising the issue of suffering in the context of disease and death is not to provide a definitive solution to the problem, nor is it to absolve God of responsibility for evil by granting it a separate ontological status. The main objective in this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of understanding religious and cultural attitudes among Muslims that influence their choices in health-care and medical treatment. It addresses the relationship between theology and medicine in Islam to probe the sociological and psychological dimensions of the problem of suffering as it relates to a bioethical principle such as, “No harm, no harassment.” This principle has become the major source of bioethical decisions in the Muslim community and obliges an active response to unparalleled medical advancements in prolonging the lifespan of terminally ill patients.Less
Muslims, like other peoples of faith, have struggled to reconcile God‘s omnipotence with the persistent evils of the world, including the pain and suffering that attend illness. This chapter treats the problem of theodicy in the context of Islamic biomedical ethics. The purpose of raising the issue of suffering in the context of disease and death is not to provide a definitive solution to the problem, nor is it to absolve God of responsibility for evil by granting it a separate ontological status. The main objective in this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of understanding religious and cultural attitudes among Muslims that influence their choices in health-care and medical treatment. It addresses the relationship between theology and medicine in Islam to probe the sociological and psychological dimensions of the problem of suffering as it relates to a bioethical principle such as, “No harm, no harassment.” This principle has become the major source of bioethical decisions in the Muslim community and obliges an active response to unparalleled medical advancements in prolonging the lifespan of terminally ill patients.
Peter van Inwagen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245604
- eISBN:
- 9780191715310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245604.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the ...
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The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.Less
The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the ...
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Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful.Less
Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199609574
- eISBN:
- 9780191731822
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609574.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
How is evil—and so much of it—possible if God, as conceived in classical theism, is sovereign in the universe? This chapter explains how moral evil (wrongdoing) can occur under God—given human ...
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How is evil—and so much of it—possible if God, as conceived in classical theism, is sovereign in the universe? This chapter explains how moral evil (wrongdoing) can occur under God—given human freedom as a crucial element in understanding that evil—and how such natural evils as suffering in earthquakes are possible, given some plausible assumptions about the kind of universe one might think God would create. The explanation proceeds in the light of a theory of value and related points concerning the understanding of God’s possible relations to the universe conceived as divinely created.Less
How is evil—and so much of it—possible if God, as conceived in classical theism, is sovereign in the universe? This chapter explains how moral evil (wrongdoing) can occur under God—given human freedom as a crucial element in understanding that evil—and how such natural evils as suffering in earthquakes are possible, given some plausible assumptions about the kind of universe one might think God would create. The explanation proceeds in the light of a theory of value and related points concerning the understanding of God’s possible relations to the universe conceived as divinely created.
Paul S. Fiddes
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198263470
- eISBN:
- 9780191682568
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263470.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter examines the argument from the nature of creaturely existence, one of the two main routes which theologians have taken to arrive at the idea of a hostile non-being which people and God ...
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This chapter examines the argument from the nature of creaturely existence, one of the two main routes which theologians have taken to arrive at the idea of a hostile non-being which people and God confront. The first section deals with the conception of hostile non-being and creaturely existence. The last two sections explore the Alienation of the Creator both by moral evil and natural evil. It argues that both these concepts offer an experience of something strange to God, and cannot be understood as logical consequences of creation. The objectivity of hostile non-being lies in the strangeness of the situation to God, disrupting the harmony of life that he shares with the world.Less
This chapter examines the argument from the nature of creaturely existence, one of the two main routes which theologians have taken to arrive at the idea of a hostile non-being which people and God confront. The first section deals with the conception of hostile non-being and creaturely existence. The last two sections explore the Alienation of the Creator both by moral evil and natural evil. It argues that both these concepts offer an experience of something strange to God, and cannot be understood as logical consequences of creation. The objectivity of hostile non-being lies in the strangeness of the situation to God, disrupting the harmony of life that he shares with the world.
William Hasker
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199590629
- eISBN:
- 9780191731280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets forth a theodicy of natural evil. General characteristics of theodicy are discussed, including the distinction between general‐policy theodicies and specific-benefit theodicies. ...
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This chapter sets forth a theodicy of natural evil. General characteristics of theodicy are discussed, including the distinction between general‐policy theodicies and specific-benefit theodicies. There is also consideration of the relationship between theodicy and different theories of providence, including Augustinianism, Molinism, and open theism. It is argued that the ‘skeptical theist defense’ against the problem of evil should be rejected because it leads to an unacceptable moral skepticism. A theodicy of natural evil is presented, and it is argued that open theism makes the prospects for such a theodicy better than they are for either Augustinianism or MolinismLess
This chapter sets forth a theodicy of natural evil. General characteristics of theodicy are discussed, including the distinction between general‐policy theodicies and specific-benefit theodicies. There is also consideration of the relationship between theodicy and different theories of providence, including Augustinianism, Molinism, and open theism. It is argued that the ‘skeptical theist defense’ against the problem of evil should be rejected because it leads to an unacceptable moral skepticism. A theodicy of natural evil is presented, and it is argued that open theism makes the prospects for such a theodicy better than they are for either Augustinianism or Molinism
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237983
- eISBN:
- 9780191598548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237987.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The ‘higher‐order goods’ defence claims that natural evils (bad states caused by processes over which humans have no control) give humans the opportunity to react to them in the right way by actions, ...
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The ‘higher‐order goods’ defence claims that natural evils (bad states caused by processes over which humans have no control) give humans the opportunity to react to them in the right way by actions, which otherwise they would have little opportunity to perform. Humans can show courage and sympathy in response to suffering, and by doing such good actions in difficult circumstances, gradually form their characters for good. It is good too that animals should have some opportunity for heroic actions.Less
The ‘higher‐order goods’ defence claims that natural evils (bad states caused by processes over which humans have no control) give humans the opportunity to react to them in the right way by actions, which otherwise they would have little opportunity to perform. Humans can show courage and sympathy in response to suffering, and by doing such good actions in difficult circumstances, gradually form their characters for good. It is good too that animals should have some opportunity for heroic actions.
Dominic J. O'Meara
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198751472
- eISBN:
- 9780191598128
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198751478.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Plotinus identifies matter as absolute evil and as the principle of (secondary) evil – i.e. natural evil and moral evil (vice). This much‐disputed theory of evil is presented in its main lines, as ...
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Plotinus identifies matter as absolute evil and as the principle of (secondary) evil – i.e. natural evil and moral evil (vice). This much‐disputed theory of evil is presented in its main lines, as are some of the difficulties it involves and some possible solutions. The world, as containing matter, contains evil, but this evil is integrated in a whole that is good.Less
Plotinus identifies matter as absolute evil and as the principle of (secondary) evil – i.e. natural evil and moral evil (vice). This much‐disputed theory of evil is presented in its main lines, as are some of the difficulties it involves and some possible solutions. The world, as containing matter, contains evil, but this evil is integrated in a whole that is good.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237983
- eISBN:
- 9780191598548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237987.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The opportunity to study natural processes that produce good and bad effects gives humans the opportunity to acquire knowledge of how to produce good and bad effects themselves, and thus to make the ...
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The opportunity to study natural processes that produce good and bad effects gives humans the opportunity to acquire knowledge of how to produce good and bad effects themselves, and thus to make the efficacious choices, which the ‘free will defence’ sees as such a good thing. If God gave us this knowledge in some other way, this would give us too evident an awareness of his presence.Less
The opportunity to study natural processes that produce good and bad effects gives humans the opportunity to acquire knowledge of how to produce good and bad effects themselves, and thus to make the efficacious choices, which the ‘free will defence’ sees as such a good thing. If God gave us this knowledge in some other way, this would give us too evident an awareness of his presence.
Joseph Corabi
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198806967
- eISBN:
- 9780191844461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. ...
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Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. After an initial introduction to social evil and discussion of why it might be thought to constitute evidence against theism, I argue that social evil is in fact much rarer than it might initially appear to be, at least when we adopt a Christian ethical framework. In addition, I argue that the genuine social evils that remain after scrutiny do not provide significant new evidence against the existence of God.Less
Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. After an initial introduction to social evil and discussion of why it might be thought to constitute evidence against theism, I argue that social evil is in fact much rarer than it might initially appear to be, at least when we adopt a Christian ethical framework. In addition, I argue that the genuine social evils that remain after scrutiny do not provide significant new evidence against the existence of God.
Eric Martin and Eric Watkins
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780199915453
- eISBN:
- 9780190248383
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199915453.003.0022
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter investigates how historical developments within the natural sciences—specifically, the emergence of mathematical physics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and of evolutionary ...
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This chapter investigates how historical developments within the natural sciences—specifically, the emergence of mathematical physics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and of evolutionary biology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—shaped European thought about evil. The chapter also considers how the problem of evil takes on different forms and elicits different responses as a result. The first section describes how laws of nature became fundamental to science in the early modern period and then shows how that development influenced conceptions of both moral and natural evil. The second section turns to evolutionary biology and describes the evolutionary problem of evil in its terms. The third section considers Charles Darwin’s position on the problem before examining broadly Darwinian theodicies in the fourth section.Less
This chapter investigates how historical developments within the natural sciences—specifically, the emergence of mathematical physics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and of evolutionary biology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—shaped European thought about evil. The chapter also considers how the problem of evil takes on different forms and elicits different responses as a result. The first section describes how laws of nature became fundamental to science in the early modern period and then shows how that development influenced conceptions of both moral and natural evil. The second section turns to evolutionary biology and describes the evolutionary problem of evil in its terms. The third section considers Charles Darwin’s position on the problem before examining broadly Darwinian theodicies in the fourth section.
Ted Poston
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198704768
- eISBN:
- 9780191774300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704768.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Social evil is any pain or suffering brought about by game-theoretic interactions of many individuals. This chapter introduces and discusses social evil. It begins with social evil brought about by ...
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Social evil is any pain or suffering brought about by game-theoretic interactions of many individuals. This chapter introduces and discusses social evil. It begins with social evil brought about by game-theoretic interactions of rational moral individuals. The problem social evil poses for theism is distinct from the problems of natural and moral evils. Social evil is not a natural evil because it is brought about by the choices of individuals. But social evil is not a form of moral evil because each individual actor does not misuse his free will. Traditional defenses for natural and moral evil fall short in addressing social evil. The final section discusses social evil and virtue. It is argued that social evil arises even when all the participants are truly virtuous. The conclusion of this chapter is that social evil is problematic and provides new ground for exploring the conceptual resources of theism.Less
Social evil is any pain or suffering brought about by game-theoretic interactions of many individuals. This chapter introduces and discusses social evil. It begins with social evil brought about by game-theoretic interactions of rational moral individuals. The problem social evil poses for theism is distinct from the problems of natural and moral evils. Social evil is not a natural evil because it is brought about by the choices of individuals. But social evil is not a form of moral evil because each individual actor does not misuse his free will. Traditional defenses for natural and moral evil fall short in addressing social evil. The final section discusses social evil and virtue. It is argued that social evil arises even when all the participants are truly virtuous. The conclusion of this chapter is that social evil is problematic and provides new ground for exploring the conceptual resources of theism.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239635
- eISBN:
- 9780191598609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239637.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
It is a good thing that humans should have the opportunity to choose freely between good and evil; and hence the “free will” defence to “moral evil”, that God has reason to allow such evil. There are ...
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It is a good thing that humans should have the opportunity to choose freely between good and evil; and hence the “free will” defence to “moral evil”, that God has reason to allow such evil. There are two substantial reasons why God should bring about natural evil – to give us the knowledge of how to bring about good and evil consequence ourselves; and to give us the opportunity to react to it with courage, sympathy etc. and to do virtuous acts of a kind, which we would not otherwise have such opportunity to do.Less
It is a good thing that humans should have the opportunity to choose freely between good and evil; and hence the “free will” defence to “moral evil”, that God has reason to allow such evil. There are two substantial reasons why God should bring about natural evil – to give us the knowledge of how to bring about good and evil consequence ourselves; and to give us the opportunity to react to it with courage, sympathy etc. and to do virtuous acts of a kind, which we would not otherwise have such opportunity to do.
Gavin Rae
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474445320
- eISBN:
- 9781474465205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445320.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter takes up Leibniz’s theodicy to show that while he agrees with Descartes that God’s creation is linked to His will, Leibniz claims that God’s will is an effect of His knowledge. This is ...
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This chapter takes up Leibniz’s theodicy to show that while he agrees with Descartes that God’s creation is linked to His will, Leibniz claims that God’s will is an effect of His knowledge. This is not arbitrary, which would call into question the notion of ‘truth,’ but is based on the Idea that defines the unchanging essence of each thing. God must, then, create in accordance with the Idea of each particular thing, meaning that there is determinacy to His actions. God is further constrained in what He can create by virtue of His goodness: He must create the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz supports this through the introduction of a number of conceptual innovations, namely the distinction between natural, moral, and metaphysical evils and that between God’s antecedent and consequential wills. The result is a conception of evil that holds it to be a necessary part of God’s plan for existence, which admits the least amount of evil required for God to create the best of all possible worlds.Less
This chapter takes up Leibniz’s theodicy to show that while he agrees with Descartes that God’s creation is linked to His will, Leibniz claims that God’s will is an effect of His knowledge. This is not arbitrary, which would call into question the notion of ‘truth,’ but is based on the Idea that defines the unchanging essence of each thing. God must, then, create in accordance with the Idea of each particular thing, meaning that there is determinacy to His actions. God is further constrained in what He can create by virtue of His goodness: He must create the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz supports this through the introduction of a number of conceptual innovations, namely the distinction between natural, moral, and metaphysical evils and that between God’s antecedent and consequential wills. The result is a conception of evil that holds it to be a necessary part of God’s plan for existence, which admits the least amount of evil required for God to create the best of all possible worlds.
Nicola Hoggard Creegan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199931842
- eISBN:
- 9780199345762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931842.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The chapter examines philosophical approaches to the problem of evil. The philosophical arguments for the existence of God, given the presence of evolutionary evil and suffering, can in some sense be ...
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The chapter examines philosophical approaches to the problem of evil. The philosophical arguments for the existence of God, given the presence of evolutionary evil and suffering, can in some sense be largely included under one heading: in spite of evil a greater good will be the result or is the case. Thus some argue that the high freedom of humans requires the presence of evil in the evolutionary process; others argue that a greater good as yet unknown to us will come of all the evil. Together with this argument is the argument that this world is the best of all possible worlds. This chapter accepts that there are few consistent ways forward other than to accept the paradoxical situation of good and evil we see around us, but it notes that theology has more resources to bring to this situation than does philosophy alone.Less
The chapter examines philosophical approaches to the problem of evil. The philosophical arguments for the existence of God, given the presence of evolutionary evil and suffering, can in some sense be largely included under one heading: in spite of evil a greater good will be the result or is the case. Thus some argue that the high freedom of humans requires the presence of evil in the evolutionary process; others argue that a greater good as yet unknown to us will come of all the evil. Together with this argument is the argument that this world is the best of all possible worlds. This chapter accepts that there are few consistent ways forward other than to accept the paradoxical situation of good and evil we see around us, but it notes that theology has more resources to bring to this situation than does philosophy alone.
Andrew P. Chignell (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780199915453
- eISBN:
- 9780190248383
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199915453.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
What, if anything, is evil? Is it just badness by another name? Is it the shadow side of good, or is it an active force opposed to the good in a Manichean/Star Wars kind of way? Does evil have its ...
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What, if anything, is evil? Is it just badness by another name? Is it the shadow side of good, or is it an active force opposed to the good in a Manichean/Star Wars kind of way? Does evil have its source in something personal—a malevolent, striving will that makes the universe tend not just to entropic winding-down but also to outbreaks of targeted hellishness? These are some of the main ontological questions that philosophers raise about evil. There are related epistemological questions: Can we really know evil? Does a victim know evil in a way that is entirely different from the way a perpetrator or witness knows it? Does a perpetrator know evil as evil at all? There are also psychological questions: what motivates people to perpetrate evil? Satan’s rebellion, Iago’s machinations, and Stalin’s gulags might be hard to grasp. But what about less remarkable evils: Can we make sense of how former vacuum oil salesman Adolf Eichmann could regard himself as an effective bureaucrat? And what about structural and symbolic evils—can they be explained in terms of actions on the part of individuals? In Evil: A History, 13original essays tell the story of the concept of evil in the west, starting with its origins in early Hebrew wisdom literature and ending with evolutionary theory and the Holocaust. 13 Reflections contextualize these developments by considering evil through the eyes of poets, mystics, witches, librettists, directors, livestock, and a Google product manager.Less
What, if anything, is evil? Is it just badness by another name? Is it the shadow side of good, or is it an active force opposed to the good in a Manichean/Star Wars kind of way? Does evil have its source in something personal—a malevolent, striving will that makes the universe tend not just to entropic winding-down but also to outbreaks of targeted hellishness? These are some of the main ontological questions that philosophers raise about evil. There are related epistemological questions: Can we really know evil? Does a victim know evil in a way that is entirely different from the way a perpetrator or witness knows it? Does a perpetrator know evil as evil at all? There are also psychological questions: what motivates people to perpetrate evil? Satan’s rebellion, Iago’s machinations, and Stalin’s gulags might be hard to grasp. But what about less remarkable evils: Can we make sense of how former vacuum oil salesman Adolf Eichmann could regard himself as an effective bureaucrat? And what about structural and symbolic evils—can they be explained in terms of actions on the part of individuals? In Evil: A History, 13original essays tell the story of the concept of evil in the west, starting with its origins in early Hebrew wisdom literature and ending with evolutionary theory and the Holocaust. 13 Reflections contextualize these developments by considering evil through the eyes of poets, mystics, witches, librettists, directors, livestock, and a Google product manager.
Andrew Chignell
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780199915453
- eISBN:
- 9780190248383
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199915453.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter articulates two concerns that Karl Jaspers raised (with Hannah Arendt) about the common practice of viewing moral evil as unintelligible. The first is that this involves exoticizing the ...
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This chapter articulates two concerns that Karl Jaspers raised (with Hannah Arendt) about the common practice of viewing moral evil as unintelligible. The first is that this involves exoticizing the act and/or perpetrator in such a way that moral condemnation becomes difficult. The second is that it can lead us to treat the perpetrator, place, or victim as tainted or stained by a force whose motives we cannot grasp; this in turn can lead to magical thinking about evil as somehow contagious or contaminating. After distinguishing some of the main categories of evil discussed in the western tradition, I examine ways in which moral evil, in particular, has been characterized as unintelligible, and try to discern which of them raises these Jaspersian concerns. I argue that there are at least two conceptions of “radical evil”—not the Kantian one, but the ones articulated by Hannah Arendt—that do so.Less
This chapter articulates two concerns that Karl Jaspers raised (with Hannah Arendt) about the common practice of viewing moral evil as unintelligible. The first is that this involves exoticizing the act and/or perpetrator in such a way that moral condemnation becomes difficult. The second is that it can lead us to treat the perpetrator, place, or victim as tainted or stained by a force whose motives we cannot grasp; this in turn can lead to magical thinking about evil as somehow contagious or contaminating. After distinguishing some of the main categories of evil discussed in the western tradition, I examine ways in which moral evil, in particular, has been characterized as unintelligible, and try to discern which of them raises these Jaspersian concerns. I argue that there are at least two conceptions of “radical evil”—not the Kantian one, but the ones articulated by Hannah Arendt—that do so.
