Fiona Cowie
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195159783
- eISBN:
- 9780199849529
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159783.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: “native” to the mind rather than acquired. ...
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This book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: “native” to the mind rather than acquired. The author argues that this view is mistaken, demonstrating that nativism is an unstable amalgam of two quite different—and probably inconsistent—theses about the mind. Unlike empiricists, who postulate domain-neutral learning strategies, nativists insist that some learning tasks require special kinds of skills, and that these skills are hard-wired into our brains at birth. This “faculties hypothesis” finds its modern expression in the views of Noam Chomsky. The author, marshalling recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, computer science, and linguistics, provides a critique of Chomsky's nativism and defends in its place a moderately nativist approach to language acquisition. Also, in contrast to empiricists, who view the mind as simply another natural phenomenon susceptible to scientific explanation, nativists suspect that the mental is inelectably mysterious. The author addresses this second strand in nativist thought, taking on the view articulated by Jerry Fodor and other nativists that learning, particularly concept acquisition, is a fundamentally inexplicable process. She challenges this explanatory pessimism, and argues that concept acquisition is psychologically explicable.Less
This book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: “native” to the mind rather than acquired. The author argues that this view is mistaken, demonstrating that nativism is an unstable amalgam of two quite different—and probably inconsistent—theses about the mind. Unlike empiricists, who postulate domain-neutral learning strategies, nativists insist that some learning tasks require special kinds of skills, and that these skills are hard-wired into our brains at birth. This “faculties hypothesis” finds its modern expression in the views of Noam Chomsky. The author, marshalling recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, computer science, and linguistics, provides a critique of Chomsky's nativism and defends in its place a moderately nativist approach to language acquisition. Also, in contrast to empiricists, who view the mind as simply another natural phenomenon susceptible to scientific explanation, nativists suspect that the mental is inelectably mysterious. The author addresses this second strand in nativist thought, taking on the view articulated by Jerry Fodor and other nativists that learning, particularly concept acquisition, is a fundamentally inexplicable process. She challenges this explanatory pessimism, and argues that concept acquisition is psychologically explicable.
Fiona Cowie
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195159783
- eISBN:
- 9780199849529
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159783.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book has been able to provide a thorough examination of certain aspects of nativism about the mind, such as its development throughout history and the modern advances in psychology and other ...
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This book has been able to provide a thorough examination of certain aspects of nativism about the mind, such as its development throughout history and the modern advances in psychology and other fields that can be attributed to such. Part I was able to investigate historical debates regarding innateness, misconceptions and clarifications about this, and how we have been able to develop a novel explanation as to what nativism is. It explores the several nativist claims that involve psychological processes, as well as certain general views that some nativists may adopt. While Parts II and III accounted for innate ideas set in this context, and the author still asserts that we should still consider and examine empiricists' accounts of learning and not automatically embrace the promises attributed to nativism.Less
This book has been able to provide a thorough examination of certain aspects of nativism about the mind, such as its development throughout history and the modern advances in psychology and other fields that can be attributed to such. Part I was able to investigate historical debates regarding innateness, misconceptions and clarifications about this, and how we have been able to develop a novel explanation as to what nativism is. It explores the several nativist claims that involve psychological processes, as well as certain general views that some nativists may adopt. While Parts II and III accounted for innate ideas set in this context, and the author still asserts that we should still consider and examine empiricists' accounts of learning and not automatically embrace the promises attributed to nativism.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter takes the familiar arguments for nativism to establish the interesting nativist thesis that “the initial state” of linguistic competence is sufficiently rich that humans can naturally ...
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This chapter takes the familiar arguments for nativism to establish the interesting nativist thesis that “the initial state” of linguistic competence is sufficiently rich that humans can naturally learn only languages that conform to the rules specified by “Universal Grammar” (the UG-rules). It rejects Fodor’s “only-theory-in-town” abduction for the very exciting “I-Representational Thesis”, the thesis that the UG-rules are represented in the initial state. It argues that this thesis lacks significant evidence and is implausible. The chapter also argues for some tentative proposals: that the UG-rules are, largely if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought, a proposal resting on the Language-of-Thought Hypothesis (LOTH); that if LOTH is false, then the UG-rules are not, in a robust way, innate in a speaker; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty. The chapter concludes the book-long argument that there is no significant evidence for the Representational Thesis (RT) and that it is implausible.Less
This chapter takes the familiar arguments for nativism to establish the interesting nativist thesis that “the initial state” of linguistic competence is sufficiently rich that humans can naturally learn only languages that conform to the rules specified by “Universal Grammar” (the UG-rules). It rejects Fodor’s “only-theory-in-town” abduction for the very exciting “I-Representational Thesis”, the thesis that the UG-rules are represented in the initial state. It argues that this thesis lacks significant evidence and is implausible. The chapter also argues for some tentative proposals: that the UG-rules are, largely if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought, a proposal resting on the Language-of-Thought Hypothesis (LOTH); that if LOTH is false, then the UG-rules are not, in a robust way, innate in a speaker; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty. The chapter concludes the book-long argument that there is no significant evidence for the Representational Thesis (RT) and that it is implausible.
John Tooby and H. Clark Barrett
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179675
- eISBN:
- 9780199869794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter addresses the question of why many cognitive and behavioural scientists still fail to recognize the truth of nativism despite the power of poverty of stimulus arguments. It argues that ...
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This chapter addresses the question of why many cognitive and behavioural scientists still fail to recognize the truth of nativism despite the power of poverty of stimulus arguments. It argues that this is primarily because the domains in which these arguments have hitherto been applied, for example, language or naive physics, are all ones in which the knowledge that children acquire is objectively present in their environment. Thus, the possibility always remains open that children could somehow be acquiring this knowledge from the environment through general learning. In the case of motivation, however, this last bastion of resistance is unavailable, since desires do not serve to represent information that is already present in the environment. The closest thing to a knockdown argument for nativism can therefore be developed in respect of innate motivational systems.Less
This chapter addresses the question of why many cognitive and behavioural scientists still fail to recognize the truth of nativism despite the power of poverty of stimulus arguments. It argues that this is primarily because the domains in which these arguments have hitherto been applied, for example, language or naive physics, are all ones in which the knowledge that children acquire is objectively present in their environment. Thus, the possibility always remains open that children could somehow be acquiring this knowledge from the environment through general learning. In the case of motivation, however, this last bastion of resistance is unavailable, since desires do not serve to represent information that is already present in the environment. The closest thing to a knockdown argument for nativism can therefore be developed in respect of innate motivational systems.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179675
- eISBN:
- 9780199869794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the recent attempts to use Chomsky-style arguments in support of innate moral knowledge are uniformly unconvincing. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 sets out the ...
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This chapter argues that the recent attempts to use Chomsky-style arguments in support of innate moral knowledge are uniformly unconvincing. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 sets out the basic form of the central argument in the Chomskian arsenal — the poverty of the stimulus (POS) argument, as well as the conclusions about domain specificity and innate propositional knowledge that are supposed to follow. Section 2 distinguishes three hypotheses about innateness and morality: rule nativism, moral principle nativism, and moral judgment nativism. Sections 3–5 consider each of these hypotheses. It is argued that while there is some reason to favour rule nativism, the arguments that moral principles and moral judgment derive from innate moral knowledge don't work. The capacity for moral judgment is better explained by appeal to innate affective systems rather than innate moral knowledge. In the final section, it is argued that the role of such affective mechanisms in structuring the mind complicates the standard picture about poverty of the stimulus arguments and nativism. For the affective mechanisms that influence cognitive structures can make contributions that are neither domain general nor domain specific.Less
This chapter argues that the recent attempts to use Chomsky-style arguments in support of innate moral knowledge are uniformly unconvincing. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 sets out the basic form of the central argument in the Chomskian arsenal — the poverty of the stimulus (POS) argument, as well as the conclusions about domain specificity and innate propositional knowledge that are supposed to follow. Section 2 distinguishes three hypotheses about innateness and morality: rule nativism, moral principle nativism, and moral judgment nativism. Sections 3–5 consider each of these hypotheses. It is argued that while there is some reason to favour rule nativism, the arguments that moral principles and moral judgment derive from innate moral knowledge don't work. The capacity for moral judgment is better explained by appeal to innate affective systems rather than innate moral knowledge. In the final section, it is argued that the role of such affective mechanisms in structuring the mind complicates the standard picture about poverty of the stimulus arguments and nativism. For the affective mechanisms that influence cognitive structures can make contributions that are neither domain general nor domain specific.
Tom Simpson, Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179675
- eISBN:
- 9780199869794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter reviews some of the debates in philosophy, psychology, anthropology, evolutionary theory, and other cognitive sciences that provide a background for the topics with which ...
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This introductory chapter reviews some of the debates in philosophy, psychology, anthropology, evolutionary theory, and other cognitive sciences that provide a background for the topics with which this volume is concerned. Topics covered include the history of nativism, the poverty of the stimulus argument, the uniform and structure pattern followed by human cognitive development, evolution biology, and cognitive modularity. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter reviews some of the debates in philosophy, psychology, anthropology, evolutionary theory, and other cognitive sciences that provide a background for the topics with which this volume is concerned. Topics covered include the history of nativism, the poverty of the stimulus argument, the uniform and structure pattern followed by human cognitive development, evolution biology, and cognitive modularity. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Brian J. Scholl
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179675
- eISBN:
- 9780199869794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explores a way in which visual processing may involve innate constraints and attempts to show how such processing overcomes one enduring challenge to nativism. In particular, many ...
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This chapter explores a way in which visual processing may involve innate constraints and attempts to show how such processing overcomes one enduring challenge to nativism. In particular, many challenges to nativist theories in other areas of cognitive psychology (e.g., ‘theory of mind’, infant cognition) have focused on the later development of such abilities, and have argued that such development is in conflict with innate origins (since those origins would have to be somehow changed or overwritten). Innateness, in these contexts, is seen as antidevelopmental, associated instead with static processes and principles. In contrast, certain perceptual models demonstrate how the very same mental processes can both be innately specified and yet develop richly in response to experience with the environment. This process is entirely unmysterious, as shown in certain formal theories of visual perception, including those that appeal to spontaneous endogenous stimulation and those based on Bayesian inference.Less
This chapter explores a way in which visual processing may involve innate constraints and attempts to show how such processing overcomes one enduring challenge to nativism. In particular, many challenges to nativist theories in other areas of cognitive psychology (e.g., ‘theory of mind’, infant cognition) have focused on the later development of such abilities, and have argued that such development is in conflict with innate origins (since those origins would have to be somehow changed or overwritten). Innateness, in these contexts, is seen as antidevelopmental, associated instead with static processes and principles. In contrast, certain perceptual models demonstrate how the very same mental processes can both be innately specified and yet develop richly in response to experience with the environment. This process is entirely unmysterious, as shown in certain formal theories of visual perception, including those that appeal to spontaneous endogenous stimulation and those based on Bayesian inference.
Tom Simpson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179675
- eISBN:
- 9780199869794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sketches the outlines of what a reasonable form of nativism might look like. The neuroconstructivists' challenge indicates that some misunderstanding continues to exist among certain ...
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This chapter sketches the outlines of what a reasonable form of nativism might look like. The neuroconstructivists' challenge indicates that some misunderstanding continues to exist among certain self-titled nonnativists over what it is that practicing nativists actually claim, together with a mistaken belief that current neurodevelopmental data is not or cannot be compatible with the nativist program. Both these issues are addressed by first providing further explication of the claims of practicing nativists, and then showing how these claims provide the basis for a reasonable nativism that is fully cognizant of and consistent with empirical data from all the developmental sciences, neuroconstructivism included.Less
This chapter sketches the outlines of what a reasonable form of nativism might look like. The neuroconstructivists' challenge indicates that some misunderstanding continues to exist among certain self-titled nonnativists over what it is that practicing nativists actually claim, together with a mistaken belief that current neurodevelopmental data is not or cannot be compatible with the nativist program. Both these issues are addressed by first providing further explication of the claims of practicing nativists, and then showing how these claims provide the basis for a reasonable nativism that is fully cognizant of and consistent with empirical data from all the developmental sciences, neuroconstructivism included.
Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332834
- eISBN:
- 9780199868117
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of nativism, empiricism, and the Innate Mind project. It then considers the future of the nativism-empiricism debate. An overview of the chapters in ...
More
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of nativism, empiricism, and the Innate Mind project. It then considers the future of the nativism-empiricism debate. An overview of the chapters in this book is then presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of nativism, empiricism, and the Innate Mind project. It then considers the future of the nativism-empiricism debate. An overview of the chapters in this book is then presented.
Tom Simpson, Stephen Stich, Peter Carruthers, and Stephen Laurence
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter provides a brief history of some of the theoretical strands that form the backdrop to contemporary debates among nativists about the evolutionary and cognitive underpinnings of culture, ...
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This chapter provides a brief history of some of the theoretical strands that form the backdrop to contemporary debates among nativists about the evolutionary and cognitive underpinnings of culture, and the ways that culture shapes the mind. Summaries of the contents of each of the chapters in the volume are also provided.Less
This chapter provides a brief history of some of the theoretical strands that form the backdrop to contemporary debates among nativists about the evolutionary and cognitive underpinnings of culture, and the ways that culture shapes the mind. Summaries of the contents of each of the chapters in the volume are also provided.
Steven K. Green
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195399677
- eISBN:
- 9780199777150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195399677.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity, Religion and Society
This chapter is the first of two to discuss the legal issues surrounding the rise and development of nonsectarian public schooling in America. The controversy, called the “school question,” had two ...
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This chapter is the first of two to discuss the legal issues surrounding the rise and development of nonsectarian public schooling in America. The controversy, called the “school question,” had two interrelated issues: Protestant religious exercises (including Bible reading) and the funding of Catholic parochial schools. The chapter examines the origins and later modifications of nonsectarianism (led by Horace Mann), early Protestant-Catholic conflicts over Bible reading and funding (including the impact of nativism), and several early legal cases involving funding and Bible reading. The chapter ends with a discussion of the most important Bible reading case of the century, which arose in Cincinnati and concluded with the Ohio Supreme Court banning the religious exercises.Less
This chapter is the first of two to discuss the legal issues surrounding the rise and development of nonsectarian public schooling in America. The controversy, called the “school question,” had two interrelated issues: Protestant religious exercises (including Bible reading) and the funding of Catholic parochial schools. The chapter examines the origins and later modifications of nonsectarianism (led by Horace Mann), early Protestant-Catholic conflicts over Bible reading and funding (including the impact of nativism), and several early legal cases involving funding and Bible reading. The chapter ends with a discussion of the most important Bible reading case of the century, which arose in Cincinnati and concluded with the Ohio Supreme Court banning the religious exercises.
Lorna Hardwick
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199288076
- eISBN:
- 9780191713439
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288076.003.0016
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter explores the paradox that translations of classical texts are necessary both because the texts are valuable and because they are inadequate and that therefore the translations ensure ...
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This chapter explores the paradox that translations of classical texts are necessary both because the texts are valuable and because they are inadequate and that therefore the translations ensure that the notion of ‘the classic’ is constantly being both reasserted and subverted. The discussion considers examples of overt and covert translation in the work of creative writers and scholarly translators, and demonstrates how translations can become hybrid texts that occupy new sites within and between cultures, transforming temporal and aesthetic relationships as well as provoking resistance and conflict. The impact of recent classical translations in poetry and theatre shows there is a continuing central and catalytic role for Greek and Roman texts. However, this activity challenges some traditional formulations of classical genealogies and values, and requires models of translation theory that conceptualise dialogue and exchange rather than emphasising invasion and violence.Less
This chapter explores the paradox that translations of classical texts are necessary both because the texts are valuable and because they are inadequate and that therefore the translations ensure that the notion of ‘the classic’ is constantly being both reasserted and subverted. The discussion considers examples of overt and covert translation in the work of creative writers and scholarly translators, and demonstrates how translations can become hybrid texts that occupy new sites within and between cultures, transforming temporal and aesthetic relationships as well as provoking resistance and conflict. The impact of recent classical translations in poetry and theatre shows there is a continuing central and catalytic role for Greek and Roman texts. However, this activity challenges some traditional formulations of classical genealogies and values, and requires models of translation theory that conceptualise dialogue and exchange rather than emphasising invasion and violence.
Arthur S. Reber
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195106589
- eISBN:
- 9780199871698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195106589.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This introductory chapter provides an overall introduction to the issue of unconscious cognitive functions. It reviews the literature on a host of topics that are intimately related to the core issue ...
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This introductory chapter provides an overall introduction to the issue of unconscious cognitive functions. It reviews the literature on a host of topics that are intimately related to the core issue including a short history of work on learning, a discussion of nativism and its relations to empiricism, an overview of the notion of consciousness, how to study it and its mental contents, and the links between these topics and basic principles of evolutionary biology.Less
This introductory chapter provides an overall introduction to the issue of unconscious cognitive functions. It reviews the literature on a host of topics that are intimately related to the core issue including a short history of work on learning, a discussion of nativism and its relations to empiricism, an overview of the notion of consciousness, how to study it and its mental contents, and the links between these topics and basic principles of evolutionary biology.
Arthur S. Reber
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195106589
- eISBN:
- 9780199871698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195106589.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter draws links with a variety of related topics in cognitive psychology. Implicit memory is reviewed and compared with the products of implicit learning. The question of the abstractness of ...
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This chapter draws links with a variety of related topics in cognitive psychology. Implicit memory is reviewed and compared with the products of implicit learning. The question of the abstractness of these implicit memorial representations is discussed and related to questions of consciousness. The roles of implicit systems in tasks such as predicting future outcomes, making choices, and solving problems are reviewed and the relationships to nativism and empiricism are discussed once more. Finally, several possible extensions and applications to topics such as Zen Buddhism, aesthetics, and pedagogy are discussed.Less
This chapter draws links with a variety of related topics in cognitive psychology. Implicit memory is reviewed and compared with the products of implicit learning. The question of the abstractness of these implicit memorial representations is discussed and related to questions of consciousness. The roles of implicit systems in tasks such as predicting future outcomes, making choices, and solving problems are reviewed and the relationships to nativism and empiricism are discussed once more. Finally, several possible extensions and applications to topics such as Zen Buddhism, aesthetics, and pedagogy are discussed.
Stephen Stich
Peter Carruthers and Stephen Laurence (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332834
- eISBN:
- 9780199868117
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested ...
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This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how innateness is related to such things as heritability, genetic information, and theories of cognitive development; the status of arguments both for and against nativism; and how best to understand the role of genes in development and inheritance. These issues are all explored in one way or another in this book. But the book also looks to the future. Alongside state-of-the-art discussions of such established nativist concerns as language, number, spatial cognition, and social cognition, this book examines nativist work in a variety of areas where detailed nativist exploration is relatively new, including cultural learning, creativity, economic choice, culture, and morality. The expansion of nativist theorizing into all these new areas shows both the power and the promise of nativist approaches, and points the way to the future.Less
This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how innateness is related to such things as heritability, genetic information, and theories of cognitive development; the status of arguments both for and against nativism; and how best to understand the role of genes in development and inheritance. These issues are all explored in one way or another in this book. But the book also looks to the future. Alongside state-of-the-art discussions of such established nativist concerns as language, number, spatial cognition, and social cognition, this book examines nativist work in a variety of areas where detailed nativist exploration is relatively new, including cultural learning, creativity, economic choice, culture, and morality. The expansion of nativist theorizing into all these new areas shows both the power and the promise of nativist approaches, and points the way to the future.
Richard Samuels
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332834
- eISBN:
- 9780199868117
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that cognitive science's concept of innateness is not confused. It begins by setting out the Argument for Confusion, which seeks to show that the concept of innateness is confused ...
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This chapter argues that cognitive science's concept of innateness is not confused. It begins by setting out the Argument for Confusion, which seeks to show that the concept of innateness is confused because it confounds several independent properties. This argument is shown to be inconclusive by highlighting two ways in which innateness might be associated with a range of distinct properties without confounding them. Although this perhaps shows that the Argument for Confusion is inconclusive, it leaves an important challenge unaddressed: how to explain in detail the relationship between the various properties associated with innateness and innateness itself. It is shown that the concept of innateness, at least as it figures in cognitive science, is not a confused one. This leaves a residual puzzle: if the concept of innateness is not confused, then why are debates over innateness in cognitive science often accompanied by confusion? The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of this matter.Less
This chapter argues that cognitive science's concept of innateness is not confused. It begins by setting out the Argument for Confusion, which seeks to show that the concept of innateness is confused because it confounds several independent properties. This argument is shown to be inconclusive by highlighting two ways in which innateness might be associated with a range of distinct properties without confounding them. Although this perhaps shows that the Argument for Confusion is inconclusive, it leaves an important challenge unaddressed: how to explain in detail the relationship between the various properties associated with innateness and innateness itself. It is shown that the concept of innateness, at least as it figures in cognitive science, is not a confused one. This leaves a residual puzzle: if the concept of innateness is not confused, then why are debates over innateness in cognitive science often accompanied by confusion? The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of this matter.
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332834
- eISBN:
- 9780199868117
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines Gordon's study and its implications for theories of numerical concepts. Gordon's data was collected among the Pirahã tribe of the Brazilian Amazon, who have no words for precise ...
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This chapter examines Gordon's study and its implications for theories of numerical concepts. Gordon's data was collected among the Pirahã tribe of the Brazilian Amazon, who have no words for precise numerical quantities. The data appear to show that the Pirahã are also incapable of precise numerical thought, and this has been widely taken to undermine strong nativism and support the claim that exact numerical thought is dependent upon natural language. It is argued that there are many important flaws in Gordon's study which prevent us from drawing any inferences at all regarding the numerical abilities of the Pirahã or the dependence of thought on language. Hence, there is nothing in Gordon's study that could undermine strong nativism or support linguistic determinism.Less
This chapter examines Gordon's study and its implications for theories of numerical concepts. Gordon's data was collected among the Pirahã tribe of the Brazilian Amazon, who have no words for precise numerical quantities. The data appear to show that the Pirahã are also incapable of precise numerical thought, and this has been widely taken to undermine strong nativism and support the claim that exact numerical thought is dependent upon natural language. It is argued that there are many important flaws in Gordon's study which prevent us from drawing any inferences at all regarding the numerical abilities of the Pirahã or the dependence of thought on language. Hence, there is nothing in Gordon's study that could undermine strong nativism or support linguistic determinism.
Fei Xu
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332834
- eISBN:
- 9780199868117
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter advocates a view that is a substantive middle ground between the extreme versions of nativism and empiricism — a view dubbed ‘rational constructivism’. This is a view that commits us to ...
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This chapter advocates a view that is a substantive middle ground between the extreme versions of nativism and empiricism — a view dubbed ‘rational constructivism’. This is a view that commits us to some innate (or acquired) constraints and a set of powerful learning and inference mechanisms that may be critical for development. The mechanisms of statistical inference are used as a means to bridge the gap between discussions of innate knowledge and discussions of learning and conceptual change. In particular, the general framework of Bayesian inference is adopted and some recent research providing empirical evidence for the psychological reality of these inference mechanisms are presented.Less
This chapter advocates a view that is a substantive middle ground between the extreme versions of nativism and empiricism — a view dubbed ‘rational constructivism’. This is a view that commits us to some innate (or acquired) constraints and a set of powerful learning and inference mechanisms that may be critical for development. The mechanisms of statistical inference are used as a means to bridge the gap between discussions of innate knowledge and discussions of learning and conceptual change. In particular, the general framework of Bayesian inference is adopted and some recent research providing empirical evidence for the psychological reality of these inference mechanisms are presented.
Mark C. Baker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332834
- eISBN:
- 9780199868117
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on one particular component of the human capacity for language, which Chomsky calls the ‘creative aspect of language use’ (CALU). It argues that the CALU is a distinct module of ...
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This chapter focuses on one particular component of the human capacity for language, which Chomsky calls the ‘creative aspect of language use’ (CALU). It argues that the CALU is a distinct module of the mind, and that it is innate in humans. It shows that the biological paradigm adds nothing to our understanding of it. On the contrary, there is a striking lack of evidence that this part of the language faculty is neurally embodied, genetically encoded, or an evolved adaptation. It seems to be characterized by a kind of abductive reasoning that does not even fit within the computational theory of the mind. The chapter concludes that this may be an instance of a sort of nativism that falls outside the purview of evolutionary psychology and would fit better within a different explanatory paradigm.Less
This chapter focuses on one particular component of the human capacity for language, which Chomsky calls the ‘creative aspect of language use’ (CALU). It argues that the CALU is a distinct module of the mind, and that it is innate in humans. It shows that the biological paradigm adds nothing to our understanding of it. On the contrary, there is a striking lack of evidence that this part of the language faculty is neurally embodied, genetically encoded, or an evolved adaptation. It seems to be characterized by a kind of abductive reasoning that does not even fit within the computational theory of the mind. The chapter concludes that this may be an instance of a sort of nativism that falls outside the purview of evolutionary psychology and would fit better within a different explanatory paradigm.
Andy Clark and Jennifer B. Misyak
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195305432
- eISBN:
- 9780199866953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305432.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures
Using the preceding chapter as a point of departure, this chapter offers a critical perspective on the notion of innate universals. It presents a “minimal nativism” view, according to which a brain ...
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Using the preceding chapter as a point of departure, this chapter offers a critical perspective on the notion of innate universals. It presents a “minimal nativism” view, according to which a brain area should be seen as embodying a kind of language universal if it is genetically predisposed toward fulfilling a certain sufficiently general linguistic function, for example by virtue of its strategic connectivity. On this view, Broca's area could still count as the brain locus of a linguistic universal, even if it supports other functions beside language.Less
Using the preceding chapter as a point of departure, this chapter offers a critical perspective on the notion of innate universals. It presents a “minimal nativism” view, according to which a brain area should be seen as embodying a kind of language universal if it is genetically predisposed toward fulfilling a certain sufficiently general linguistic function, for example by virtue of its strategic connectivity. On this view, Broca's area could still count as the brain locus of a linguistic universal, even if it supports other functions beside language.
