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This chapter offers an account of political or citizenship education. It argues that a central feature of citizenship education in a liberal society is the development of a sense of justice, and the virtues of civility and reciprocity that are constitutive of that sense. The discussion begins with the analysis of Brighouse’s consent-based objections to the shaping of political motivations. An alternative political motivation model is defended, which draws on Rawls’s account of the natural duty of justice. The aims of political education, with respect to the skills, attitudes and values of liberal citizens, are briefly discussed. Education for justice rejects the view that political education should seek to cultivate a sense of nationality. The aims of political education in the context of questions about global justice are considered. Certain educational issues that arise in the non-ideal world from the point of view of developing a sense of justice are addressed.

This chapter traces the historical origins and early developments of European welfare states up to the Second World War in terms of external and internal boundary building. It highlights the role of cleavage and centre periphery structures in moulding institutional choices, in particular, the choice between a universal and an occupational approach to social insurance — the former prevailing in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries, and the latter prevailing in Continental and South European countries.

The Soviet Union's ‘nationalities problem’ was one of the fundamental hurdles that Mikhail Gorbachev failed to clear in his attempt at systemic transformation of the USSR. Less understood, and far less studied, was Gorbachev's ‘federalism problem’. The institutional weaknesses of Soviet ‘federalism’ presented serious obstacles to would‐be reformers of the political system as well as to opponents of reform. After 70 years of Soviet rhetoric, there was deep confusion over just what terms like ‘federal’ or ‘sovereignty’ really meant. Efforts to construct a ‘renewed’ USSR and a new Russian Federation were deeply constrained by Soviet institutions and concepts.

The concepts of nation and state must be separated conceptually. Nation should be understood as a normative concept based on a claim to self‐determination. This does not mean the creation of a state, but rather the right to negotiate one's status within the state and constitutional order. State sovereignty, always a difficult concept, is being transformed by changes in the state and transnational integration. This opens up the possibility of shared and divided sovereignty as a way of reconciling nationality claims.

Asymmetrical government is one way to manage nationality questions. It raises a number of problems in principle, but these appear less serious in practice. A wide range of asymmetrical arrangements presently exist in the UK, Spain, Canada, and Belgium.

European integration provides a number of ways in which the nationalities question can be accommodated. It undermines the doctrine of unitary state sovereignty, detaches citizenship from rights, and provides a number of opportunities for stateless nations to project themselves beyond state borders. The practical opportunities this gives are, perhaps, less impressive than the symbolic ones.

The chapters have demonstrated an emerging conception of plurinational states embedded in supranational and international systems, which could serve to manage the nationalities question. This is an inchoate order and does not provide a blueprint for solving nationality questions. It depends on the will to resolve issues through political mechanisms. This must therefore be seen as a form of politics rather than a prescription to be applied to situations of national conflict where politics has broken down.

Begins with a brief reference to the constitutional and institutional frameworks of allegiances, identification, and citizenship rights, and goes on to argue that there are grounds for questioning the customary conceptual and political overlap between nationality and citizenship. Some decoupling has taken place in the EU, opening, according to some commentators, the possibility of a new paradigm in citizenship praxis. Thus, the chapter explores Carlos Closa's idea that supranational citizenship has more potential than national citizenship to be democratic, and draws on Joseph Weiler's ideas, which in some respects are similar to those of Closa but differ in respect of the significance of nationality and national identity; Weiler's acknowledgement of national forces is, however, consistent with Closa's suggestion that civil society in the EU is too weak to take advantage of the more democratic potential of supranational citizenship. Both ideas can be used to infer that difficulties in European citizenship may be reinforced by enlargement, not because of the introduction of a further set of nationalities per se into a supranational citizenship system, but because of a new complexity in the principled norms that Closa says have to be present in a site of democratic citizenship. In view of this, there are lessons to be learned from American theories of republican federalism, which, as expounded by S. H. Beer (1993), have much in common with a modern interest among radical democrats in deliberative or dialogic democracy; in this respect, Weiler's ideas about a European public space must be taken seriously

Ümit Cizre rethinks the connections between the metaphor of boundaries as containers of democracy and the evolution of Turkish and Kurdish identities since the founding of the modern Turkey in 1919–23. The author identifies the dual nature of Turkish nationality: equal citizenship without regard to ethnicity and ethnic singularity of Turkishness. Cizre then examines Kurdish contestation of this hegemonic discourse of nationality and its link to the state's territory. The author also places the chapter's conclusions in the context of the arrest and trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).

This chapter presents findings on control and integration policies between parent and subsidiary that were adopted following acquisition. It draws on both quantitative and qualitative research which shows that strategic and operational control are independent concepts. There is an overall trend towards integration of subsidiaries. Parent companies exercised a large degree of control by reserving many key decisions. Degrees of integration and strategic and operational control differed noticeably by nationality. The relationship between integration and performance can also involve some important national differences. The data suggest that cross-cultural integration is likely to be, if anything, counter-productive compared to integration of companies of similar nationality. Two case studies are presented that contrast policies of high and low post-acquisition integration. Acquiring companies not only had generally differing approaches to the relationship between strategic and operational control and integration, but achieved differing results from their implementation.

This chapter takes a closer look at post-acquisition integration, focusing on how the ways of integrating acquisitions with parent companies relate to control policies. Drawing upon detailed information available from forty case studies, the chapter first considers the methods of communication used, and the strategy and philosophy adopted by the new parent in relation to the subsidiary. It then takes a closer look at the level of integration of the subsidiary into the parent, and the methods and systems adopted by the parent to control its new acquisition. There are several key dimensions to the relationship between acquiring and acquired companies concerning subsidiary integration and control, communication, and parent strategy and philosophy toward subsidiaries. Each of these dimensions differed according to acquirer nationality.

This chapter traces the evolution of the SER as the baseline of international labour regulation in the interwar and post‐World War II periods. It reviews the SER's central pillars—the bilateral employment relationship, standardized working time, and continuous employment—and analyses their construction in ILO regulations. This discussion highlights the significance of exclusions in the creation of this employment norm. It also shows how even as the SER materialized for many working‐class men, the gender contract with which it was intertwined began to deteriorate. Regulations adopted in response to this crumbling gender contract starting in the 1950s sought to strip the SER of its formal exclusions. With the notable exception of those based on nationality, formal equality was the objective of interventions, but, by neglecting processes of social reproduction, ILO regulations retained an employment norm geared to male citizens as a baseline.