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The evolution of the European Community (EC) towards a supranational constitution is charted by combining three different perspectives. First, an examination is made of the major features of the integration process since 1959, which argues that the European market and polity developed symbiotically, as the activities of economic actors, organized interests, litigators and judges, and the EC's legislative and regulatory organs became linked, to create a self‐sustaining, dynamic system. Second, the ‘constitutionalization’ of the treaty system is investigated, and the activities of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) surveyed; among other things, constitutionalization secured property rights for transnational market actors, expanded the discretionary powers of national judges, and reduced the EC's intergovernmental character. Third, the relationship between the ECJ and the national courts is considered, focusing on how intra‐judicial conflict and cooperation have shaped the production of specific constitutional doctrines; through these ‘constitutional dialogues’, the supremacy of EC law was gradually achieved, rendering it judicially enforceable. Overall, the chapter situates the development of the European legal system within the overall process of European integration.

This chapter examines the policy of widespread engagement adopted by the two sides in the post‐Cold War era. It shows that since the mid‐1990s, the EU and its member states have adopted a firm policy of engagement with China, while Chinese leaders would come to prioritize the enhancement of relations with Europe. A new discourse on economic security emerged in both Europe and China at the beginning of the 1990s would provide the intellectual underpinning for the development of EU—China relations. This chapter explains how this securitization discourse would tie the protection of the EU's economic security and socio‐economic welfare position with China's steady and sustainable development. At the same time, it is explained how the emergence of new notions of economic security would lead Chinese policy makers to make a linkage between the enhancement of economic and technological relations with Europe and China's modernization and comprehensive national power.

This chapter turns from general structures and processes to consider certain ancillaries to policy making. It charts the development of the British ‘culture of fact’, as that manifested itself in studies of society and economy. It describes the increasingly public character of British debate, and the flowering of forms of enquiry linked to social-policy debates. It also details the gradual separation of two lines of enquiry that had initially been inextricably entangled: enquiries into the bases of national power, and into the nature and extent of social ‘happiness’. Nineteenth-century ‘moral statistics’ did not emerge directly out of the old political arithmetic tradition, but owed much to later 18th-century reorientations in both the mode and the focus of enquiry.

This chapter shows the implications of a spatial perspective for understanding the culture of the state, and demonstrates how the state articulates cultural regions in Mexico. It interprets the racial and class images that are present in the caudillo/cacique typology. It also argues that the historians who formalized the dichotomy between caudillos and caciques have simply adopted the dominant ideology about national power. The kinds of mediating roles that “caciques” play in regional space are determined. Furthermore, it describes the routinization of both cacique and caudillo power. Mexican political development went from bureaucratic forms of power in the colonial period, to charismatic forms in the early and mid-nineteenth century, to traditional forms in the Porfiriato. The distinction between caudillos and caciques turns out to be fundamental only because the former are fetishes of nationality. The relationship between caciques, regional culture and the state is finally covered.

The chapter starts by describing Gloria Richardson’s new life in New York City, but the story quickly moves back to Cambridge, Maryland. There, in the summer of 1967, she facilitated Black Power activist H. Rap Brown’s visit to speak to black residents who were continuing their freedom struggle. A massive fire in the city’s black community on the night of Brown’s visit was caused by arson and not, as is popularly believed, by black people rioting. That summer also saw the first gathering of Black Power advocates from around the country at the National Conference on Black Power in Newark, New Jersey. Richardson attended this event and was excited about Black Power’s potential to push the freedom struggle forward. Finally, the chapter covers her assessment of Black Power, specifically, its emphasis on black consciousness, and Stokely Carmichael’s and other Black Nationalists’ political strategies for achieving black liberation.

This chapter examines two ways that account for the persistence of dual federalism. The first is the critics' belief that the Supreme Court is inclined to revive strict dual federalist limits on national power, even when what the Court actually says and does makes rather clear that it is not. The second has to do with the Supreme Court's rhetoric and doctrine regarding the use of dual federalist notions to limit state power, by defining distinct and exclusive spheres of national regulatory activity. While the chapter acknowledges that the Supreme Court's critics are right to condemn dual federalism, it argues that they are wrong to think that the Court has revived dual federalist limits on national power. It also compares dual federalism with dual sovereignty and considers alternatives to dual federalism, including managerial decentralization or “Marshallian federalism,” cooperative (and uncooperative) federalism, subsidiarity or collective action federalism, process federalism, and immunity federalism. It also comments on the claim that dual federalism is logically self-defeating and concludes with a discussion of the “Frankfurter Constraint”.

This chapter tracks two national figures’ flirtation with and ultimate rejection of the politics of community action. As a pivotal figure in Newark’s ERAP project, Tom Hayden had been involved in the local community action program via his local neighborhood antipoverty board. Reverend Nathan Wright Jr. had come to Newark to lead the Episcopal diocese’s urban affairs office. After the riots, they both became convinced that the Great Society’s community action politics had proven tragically ineffective. The chapter follows both figures as they sought alternatives: Hayden as he (along with many in the New Left) began flirting with the revolutionary potentials of violence and Wright as he embraced market-based urban development and became a darling of the New Right.

This book examines how China uses economics as a tool of national power in the twenty-first century. More specifically, it assesses the conditions under which China is more successful or less successful in its pursuit of economic statecraft. It explores economic statecraft in the context of contemporary Chinese grand strategy to show how China uses firms to pursue its foreign policy and other strategic goals. It also considers economics as it relates to national security as well as China's global search for strategic raw materials such as oil, China's use of economic statecraft in its relations with Taiwan, and China's sovereign wealth funds as an avenue of state control. Finally, it explains why the Chinese state can or cannot control the behavior of commercial actors that play important roles in economic statecraft.

This chapter looks at how Chinese attitudes and perceptions of the United States changed in 2008 due to the financial crisis, the election of Barack Obama, and the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. China’s perception of America’s decline made party leaders worry that the U.S. financial model would fail like the USSR and Japan, leaving China without a foreign role model. Taoist nationalism became less popular as China found itself in a position of relative power, and thanks to the Olympics being held in Beijing, a position to demonstrate that comprehensive national power to the rest of the world.

This chapter explores the psychological perception of power by focusing on R. Yehuda Ha-Levi Leib Ashlag's circle. It explains that Ashlag assigned importance to the political dimension of power, though he tended to overlook the national dimension of power that was so significant for members of the R. Avraham Yizhak Ha-Kohen Kook circle and other Kabbalists. Ashlag's appeal to the psychological dimension of power won acclaim across the world, even reaching North America, while Kook's circle on the other hand, focused on the national dimension of power, which gained popularity with Jews and Israelis.

This chapter provides a critical review and analysis of how contemporary Chinese analysts, scholars and policy-makers perceive and evaluate China’s international influence. It outlines the main goals and aspirations that Chinese policy actors have on the global and regional stage, and finds that they perceive a significant gap to date between China’s growing power resources and its international influence. China’s ability to attain its key goals abroad falls short of domestic expectations relative to both its latent capabilities and to the influence of other great powers, principally the United States. The chapter also analyses Chinese explanations for this ‘under-achievement’.

This chapter examines the link between air balloon technology and national ambitions—economic, political, and martial. Enthusiasm for the new technology brought large crowds to view launches, and inspired poetry, fiction, and consumer items. More than simply novelty, air balloons became a necessary component of fairs, parades, and other celebrations as an icon of progress. The most significant interactions with aerial technology occurred in the antebellum era when balloons became a form of commercialized leisure as well as an expression of national power. By the 1860s, they were weapons of war. And as mascots of imperialism, balloons demonstrated sovereignty over Native Americans.

This chapter lays out five patterns of governance that have prevailed since the founding of America. These are (i) resistance to a visible, centralized, national administration; (ii) support for a more energetic, even bureaucratically empowered state; (iii) the tendency to endorse unmediated national power when it was geographically removed from the locus of established authority; (iv) resistance to visible forms of taxation; and (v) the use of judge-made law to shape the political economy. The chapter also explains why Americans need to govern in such an indirect fashion and discusses the advancement of interaction between state and society during the twentieth century.

Despite the hype of Asia rising, Asian powers are yet to meet the expectations of their contribution to global governance. The argument here is that Asian powers are largely of a status-quo rather than revisionist orientation in that they are more interested in ‘rising’—that is, fulfilling their national power ambitions—than in contributing to global governance. One answer to the deficient role in global governance is to have more committed regional engagement. Regionalism can be a useful launching pad for their role in global governance. This challenge is especially crucial for India, which, after decades of isolation and estrangement, has a major opportunity to re-embrace Asia. In addressing their leadership deficit, both Asian powers can learn from Southeast Asia, specifically ASEAN’s approach of mutual restraint and accommodation through regional cooperation and legitimation.

This chapter examines the FBI’s spectacular raids on Japanese communities in the wake of Pearl Harbor. The FBI spectacles anxiously asserted the duplicity of Japanese American suspects by attempting to pacify the American public with polished, choreographed containment of “the enemy” at home. These raids were very much the stage upon which the FBI sought the American public’s approval for consolidating its national power. But the mimicry between the spectacularity of the FBI’s highly constructed raids and the theatricalized identity of the Japanese American suspects met with dissatisfaction from domestic anti-Japanese factions, who pushed past the FBI’s partial containment of roughly one thousand Japanese Americans by agitating for the wholesale removal of all those of Japanese descent.

This chapter examines whether Lin Manuel Miranda's Hamilton: An American Musical will increase the impact of Hamiltonian thinking on and the deployment of Hamiltonian words by the Supreme Court justices. There was, just a few years ago, reason to think that would be the case. Although in recent decades it had been conservative Supreme Court justices who tended to invoke the framers as support for narrow views of national government power, the success of the musical could give more liberal justices a newly powerful framer to follow. Alexander Hamilton had been, as Justice Antonin Scalia noted in a 1997 Court opinion, “the most expansive expositor of federal power.” In the Supreme Court as an institution, however, Hamilton is not playing. The 2018–19 Court term featured little Hamilton and little Hamilton.

This chapter analyzes the politics of cultural heritage and gastrodiplomacy, or official efforts at “edible nation branding” designed to increase trade, tourism, and national soft power. It explains how and why most Japanese conceive of washoku as a conceptual category in contrast with yōshoku, or Euro-American cuisine. Tracing Japan's pursuit of a UNESCO designation for washoku as an intangible cultural treasure, the chapter details how officials sought the award for both foreign recognition and to encourage the domestic public to consume more traditional foodstuffs. It also describes how a failed earlier effort to strictly regulate Japanese restaurants abroad, ridiculed as “the sushi police,” has led state agencies to adopt softer and more inclusive campaigns to promote washoku.