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This concluding chapter addresses the main issues raised in the Introduction and presents the general findings that emerge from the country studies. It has three main aims. First, it puts forward three arguments on the basis of the national investigations of policy co-ordination at the European level, and comparisons of permanent representations: the first argument is that that all the member states have responded to the co-ordination need that arises from EU policy-making and most aspire to a careful crafting of policy, but that the nature of their response varies according to the prevailing national attitude to European integration, features of the national political and administrative opportunity structures, policy style, and available resources; the second argument is that, although there are some similarities between national arrangements with respect to some aspects of organization and core functions, there are also several very substantial differences—neither the ‘convergence hypothesis’ nor the ‘continuing divergence hypothesis’ outlined in the Introduction is confirmed by the case studies, but there is evidence that many of the factors identified by each are at work; the third argument is related to effectiveness—each set of national arrangements has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, but one common factor affecting performance is the efficiency of domestic co-ordination procedures. The second aim of the Conclusion is to consider the wider implications of the findings both for the functioning of the European Union as a system and for theorizing about the EU; with respect to the former, national arrangements in Brussels do little to overcome the problem of segmentation that characterizes the EU, but concerning the latter, the case studies suggest that the intergovernmentalist image is at odds with how national policy preferences are actually formed and the nature of the role played by the permanent representations; the alternative image approach outlined above, and described in the Introduction, offers a better guide on both counts. The third and final aim of the chapter is to compare national co-ordination practices at the domestic level with those found at the European level; the contention put forward is that the domestic co-ordination of EU policy is more effective than processes at the European level.

An examination is made of the impact of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the institutional evolution of European Union sex equality policy, following the provision in the Treaty of Rome (Art. 119 EEC, now Art. 141) that men and women would receive equal pay for equal work – a provision aimed at protecting businesses from unfair competition. This same provision now bestows a positive right on individuals throughout the Member States, and is a judicially enforceable right that remains the backbone of an ever-expanding European social-justice policy. Over time, strategic action on the part of litigants and their lawyers and the ECJ’s judicial rule-making capacity has constructed a supranational space in which women can not only demand the right to equal pay but can also receive protection as pregnant workers. This dynamic process is the focus of the analysis presented, and involves an examination of three basic mechanisms of institutional evolution: the process by which self-interested private litigants and their lawyers are able to activate the European Union (EU) legal system through the Art. 177 (now Art. 234) procedure (which allows national individuals to invoke EU law before national courts); the ECJ’s authoritative interpretation of Art. 119 (focusing on how it became directly effective in national legal systems); and the feedback effects of this judicial rule-making in terms of how the litigation environment has been changed, and the EU and national-level policy consequence. In particular, the latter are traced through the development of EU pregnancy and maternity rights.

The chapter discusses the increasing role of sub-national territories as new, distinctive and relatively autonomous “bounded spaces” in certain areas of social protection, notably health care, active labour market policies, social services and assistance. This new development is illustrated by reference not only to within-state trends of social protection regionalization, but also to novel forms of transnational regional groupings. The Italian case is presented in detail as an emblematic example of the shift from welfare state to welfare regions.

The chapter is divided into two main parts, with the first part of the discussion providing the contextual backdrop to the detailed study of the Swedish permanent representation that follows. The argument presented in the first part is twofold: first, it is argued that effective co-ordination of EU policy at both the national and EU levels is regarded as extremely important by the Swedish government for at least two related reasons—the high political salience of EU matters in Sweden, and the Social Democratic government’s determination to be an influential actor in the EU policy arena; second, it is argued that, although Swedish administrative adjustment to EU membership has been relatively unproblematic in the short term, the process of adaptation is not yet complete—the initial belief that EU matters could simply be incorporated into the Swedish system of ministerial consultation has proved problematic, and the volume and pace of EU policy-making has placed considerable strains upon the limited resources of the Swedish ministries, and might yet prove to be incompatible with Swedish policy style. In an attempt to address these problems, the government introduced in 1998 new co-ordinating structures designed to streamline central EU policy co-ordination and strengthen political leadership on EU policy. The second part of the chapter examines how the Swedish permanent representation fits into this wider picture; it discusses the organization, personnel, internal functioning and working methods, and role of the Brussels-based administration, and evaluates its effectiveness and capacity to implement ambitions, bearing in mind the co-ordination needs and policy ambitions of the Swedish administration. The picture that emerges from this study is one of a technically specialized, functionally segmented, and non-hierarchical bureaucracy, which, after five years, is nevertheless still evolving as an administration, and whose effectiveness in delivering national policy ambitions is as much a reflection of its capacity to influence the national administration as of its diplomatic role in Brussels.

The author of this chapter on the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Germany contends that, in order to arrive at a more balanced picture of the efficiency of German EU policy co-ordination, the various aspects of the term ‘Europa-Politik’ need to be distinguished more carefully than experts on the EU usually do; accordingly, the chapter draws on the polity–policy–politics distinction and other policy classifications customary in the field of policy analysis in the pursuit of four objectives. First an analysis is made of the already well documented structural arrangements in Bonn, the Länder and Brussels for co-ordinating various policy types in the multilevel decision-making system; the German co-ordination machinery is described as basically a two-track system consisting of a diplomatic track built and a sectorized expert track. Second, substantive policy interdependencies reflected and articulated within the departmental division of labour (as well as on the other two layers of the European decision-making system) are explored as to their issue salience and their bearing on the politics dimension of Europa-Politik. Third, the place of politics (and politicians) in the apparently diplomat- and bureaucrat-dominated, expert-driven German subsystem of the European political system is considered more systematically, and it is contended that the German pattern of ex post co-ordination is ultimately superior to a practice of ex ante co-ordination of all policy matters regardless of their salience. Fourth, the French and the British co-ordination systems, which emphasise ex ante central co-ordination, are considered and pronounced as less thorough than their image suggests; their emphasis on ex ante central co-ordination is explained by the more defensive nature of the two governments towards European integration in the past and, in the case of Britain, by features of the Westminster system that allow more hierarchical interministerial relations than does a coalition government, or a federal system.

In this third of three chapters on the distinctive policy dynamics of particular areas of social provision, Wood looks at labour market regimes in Germany, Britain, and Sweden. The theoretical starting point of the chapter is an examination of path dependence, perhaps the most popular contemporary approach to explaining the persistence of institutions and policies over time. In principle, this offers an enticing explanation of the resilience of national policy trajectories, although the outcomes it explains have a tendency to be overdetermined, and not all mechanisms generating a bias towards the status quo are path‐dependent ones. The theoretical work of this chapter, therefore, lies in deriving alternative (though not mutually exclusive) micro‐level sources of policy continuity over time, and evaluating their relative contributions to the evolution of labour market policy in Germany, Britain, and Sweden. Divided into four substantive sections: Section 1 discusses the theory of path‐dependent institutional and policy trajectories in politics; Sect. 2 presents three distinct sources of policy continuity (employer‐centred, constitutional, and electoral) that are often bundled together as ‘lock‐in mechanisms’ in path‐dependent accounts; Sect. 3 sketches the changing context of labour market policy in Western Europe by looking at national responses to unemployment from 1980 onwards in each of the three country case studies, and providing accounts of labour market policies, employers’ preferences in relation to labour market policies, and constitutional factors and electoral constraints in relation to labour market reform; Sect. 4 is a conclusion and discusses the thesis offered by the chapter — that the trajectory of labour market policy can be accounted for by an employer‐centred theory of preferences.

One of the challenges of Europeanization as an innovative research agenda is the identification of mechanisms through which domestic public policy is Europeanized. In Chapter 2, Radaelli identified two types of mechanisms, vertical (these include European Commission (EC) directives, European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions, and EC competition decisions) and horizontal (suggestion of best practice through European level policy forums). This chapter elaborates on these mechanisms by considering the case of media market regulation in the European Union (EU), arguing that Europeanization of this policy area can be understood by looking at the interplay between the two mechanisms. An examination is made of vertical mechanisms in the section ‘The Impact of ECJ Decisions on National Regulation’, and of horizontal mechanisms in the section ‘Vertical Europeanization via EC Merger Policy’; together these sections provide an overview of ECJ and competition decisions. The section on ‘The Commission and New Modes of Governance’ overviews how policy ideas travel through European-level forums; last, the ‘Conclusion’ looks at how Europeanization has driven the convergence of national media policies.

An examination is made of how tensions that develop between supranational and national governance structures are resolved, given the institutionalization taking place at the European level. The focus is on two national policy domains – state aids and regional development – and the author explains how, since the mid-1980s, European Union (EU) officials have succeeded in inducing their French counterparts to alter legislation and administrative practices once assumed to be fundamentally immune to external influence – a process that is increasingly referred to as the ‘Europeanization of the nation state’. The view taken is that Europeanization took place in a series of ‘rounds’ that have followed a common sequence: disagreement about the nature and scope of EU rules in national regimes; open contestation between supranational and national officials; the fixing of a new or clarified rule on the part of EU officials; and, finally, the grudging acceptance of the rule by the French. After each round, new patterns of French resistance emerged, but the rules of the game governing these interactions are fixed by the results of previous rounds, and come to be more or less taken for granted by actors at both levels; it is argued that the overall process tends to favour the expansion and diffusion of EU modes of governance, and the weakening of specifically national modes. The chapter is divided into three main sections: the first provides a summary overview of the development of EU competition policy and its intersections with state aids and regional policy; the second focuses on state aids in two sectors (French regional and industrial policy), which are analysed against the backdrop of the development of European competition law; and the third part discusses conflicts over the meaning of European rules in relation to the process of ‘endogenous’ institutional change.

This account of the Greek permanent representation at Brussels starts by describing the Greek administrative system as characterized by sectorization and fragmentation, low co-ordination, centralization and hierarchical structure, importance of informal networks and personal strategies, and weak institutionalization of horizontal and staff functions. Deficient steering at the top and lack of clearly set priorities are deeper reasons for co-ordination deficiencies at the national and sectoral level. In that sense, the co-ordination scheme for Greek EU policy can be seen as a ‘truncated pyramid’, even though, more recently, major national priorities represent an exception to the rule. This chapter argues that the EU environment and its functional imperatives put pressure on the Greek permanent representation to compensate for defensive attitudes and domestic administrative weaknesses, while at the same time being affected by them. It discusses the organization of the Greek permanent representation, and its tasks and functions (including communication with the centre, internal functioning and working methods, transmission of national positions and instructions, presentation and negotiation of national positions, and networking), and finally gives a brief assessment of the situation.

This chapter examines the co-ordination of UK policy in Brussels, starting by putting the institutions, procedures, and policies that the UK has put in place at the European level in the context of the UK’s strategic or ‘positive’ co-ordination ambition. It then focuses on the role of the UK permanent representation (UKREP) in the system. After briefly outlining its history, the internal organization of UKREP is described, with accounts of its policies relating to personnel (composition, recruitment), its internal processes and working methods, and its responsibilities, roles, and functions. An assessment is then made of the capacity and effectiveness both of UKREP specifically and of the UK co-ordination arrangements more generally. Two arguments are advanced: the first is that the factors that account for the UK’s exacting co-ordination ambition—principally, the centralized nature of its political system, scepticism towards the European project, and a preference for intergovernmentalism over supranationalism—also largely explain why it has been administratively efficient, but not politically effective, at the European level; the second argument relates to devolution, and makes the point that, on the present evidence, the creation of devolved governments in Scotland and Wales does not threaten the co-ordination strategy pursued by the UK since its accession to the European Communities, since despite institutional adjustments made by the devolved authorities, in Brussels UKREP retains its primacy.

The Portuguese permanent representation is regarded as an important part of the national system for EU policy co-ordination, and the Portuguese administration tends to send its best officials to the mission in Brussels. The permanent representation was created after Portugal became a member of the European Union in 1986, and from the very beginning it was influenced by the missions of other member states, the main models being the permanent representations of France and the UK. The special relationship of Portugal to these countries shaped the organization and operation of the Portuguese permanent representation. The lessons learnt were not so much related to the structure of the permanent representation, which is similar to those of other member states, but more to the skills and the way the members of permanent representation do their jobs, which is related to the experience of those civil servants in the French and British administrations before they were sent to the permanent representation. The different sections of the chapter discuss: the organization of the Portuguese permanent representation, its personnel, its internal functioning and working methods, its role, its capacity to implement ambitions, its success, and the simplicity and efficiency of national EU policy co-ordination structures in Portugal.

The Italian permanent representation at Brussels has received very little academic or political attention, and there has been no explicit debate as to how this body should be shaped. Even when the central government decided that it should control all aspects of the formulation of EC policies though delegating to regions their implementation in a number of cases, the permanent representation was not even mentioned in the legislation. It is argued that this neglect is problematic for several reasons, which are discussed. An explanation is advanced for this neglect in terms of the high politics of Italian membership of the European Community. The chapter is organized in five sections: first, a brief examination is made of the broader problem determined by the lack of a central authority to co-ordinate of EU policies in Italy; second and third, the functions and powers of the permanent representation, and its organization and internal functioning are considered; fourth, the division of labour between the central authorities (the Italian government) and the permanent representation is examined; finally, other policy networks that influence Italian European policies are discussed.

France has traditionally aspired to play a leading role in shaping the development of European integration, and implicit in this approach has been a vision of integration as a process within which the member states predominate. Debates within the EU are carried out, as far as the traditional French conception has it, on the basis of competing and conflicting national interests, and the effectiveness with which individual member states can shape outputs at the EU level is intrinsically related to their success in presenting coherent positions within such debates; this emphasis on coherence has led to the creation in Paris of a centralized and institutionalized system of interministerial co-ordination. Although often overlooked, 1 the French administration in Brussels also plays a key role in ensuring the coherence of national positions and in defending French interests within the EU; this is most true of the French permanent representation, whose staff represent France in most meetings of the Council of Ministers, and which is responsible for keeping Paris appraised of developments in Brussels. Paris has increasingly, however, also come to recognize the need to exert influence over the supranational institutions of the EU, and over the Commission in particular, so the French have developed strategies both for ensuring the presence of French officials within these institutions and for maintaining close contact with them. This chapter is divided into three sections: the first examines the composition, organization, internal workings, and role of the French permanent representation to the European Union; the second investigates French strategies designed to ensure both a sufficient and an effective French presence within the supranational institutions—notably the Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament; and the final section critically evaluates the performance of the French administration in Brussels, considering first its capacity to carry out its allotted tasks, and second its effectiveness, particularly in terms of its ability to further France’s EU policy objectives.

This study of the German permanent representation at Brussels unravels the complexities of co-ordination in a domestic political system characterized by vertical and horizontal pluralism, administrative fragmentation, and parallel competition from the ‘foreign relations systems’ of the Länder. Success in high politics at the European level contrasts with the ‘diplomacy of improvisation’ that is the outcome of ‘autonomy, polyphony, and organized anarchy in routine policy-making. The first section of the chapter conceptualizes the ‘Janus-like character of permanent representations at Brussels and discusses various theoretical approaches to these bodies. The following sections look at the history, growth and differentiation of the German permanent representation, its tasks, the German Länder system as a complicating factor, and the co-ordination and communication activities of the German permanent representation, which orients its European policy-making activities in six directions—between Bonn/Berlin and Brussels, within Brussels, within Bonn/Berlin, with the Länder, with the European Commission and the European Parliament, and with Brussels-based interest groups.

This final country study describes how limited material resources impose severe constraints on the coverage of action and the type of activities that can be pursued by Ireland at the European level. At the same time, however, it shows that policy co-ordination can be effectively achieved when relations within an administrative élite are close and there is a political consensus in favour of Europe. Ireland’s permanent representation was established at Brussels in 1967 as an EU mission, and was part of a long-term strategy to ensure that Ireland would be successful in its application for membership of the European Union. This was finally achieved in 1973. The chapter describes the size and development of the Irish permanent representation from 1967 onwards, its current working methods, its role, and its effectiveness and capacity to implement ambitions.

This chapter argues that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), whether fortuitously or otherwise, hit upon a strategy for the computer industry, which called for coordination between appropriate administrative guidance and intervention on the one hand, and allowed autonomy and self-determination for private companies on the other. By heeding the advice of industry and cooperating positively with private companies, MITI adopted either a ‘planned coordination’ approach or a ‘market coordination’ approach according to industry function. The intervention by function approach worked well for the computer industry.

Although this chapter touches on the long-term development of the Austrian permanent representation at Brussels (which dates back to the mid-1950s, when Austria had a mission for handling relations with the European Coal and Steel Community), it concentrates on the time since Austria has been a member of the European Union (1995). The first two sections deal with the organization and personnel of the permanent representation. The following section locates the permanent representation in the policy co-ordination process. A discussion follows of the limits to co-ordination that are inherent in the set-up of the Austrian institutions, and there is also a brief discussion of activities and strategies. The conclusion attempts to situate the empirical findings in the context of models of government.

This chapter on the Dutch permanent representation at Brussels sets out to test the claim that national idiosyncrasies are the key to understanding the functioning of the permanent representations of the European Union. The authors find, contrary to this contention, that the features of the Dutch political and administrative system—fragmentation, segmentation, and a lack of central authority—do not produce national arrangements at the European level that are similarly fractured. Indeed, in this important area of policy co-ordination, the machinery put in place by the Netherlands is considerably less idiosyncratic than might have been expected. The different sections of the chapter discuss the organization of the Dutch permanent representation, its personnel, its internal functioning and working methods, its role, its capacity to implement ambitions, and its effectiveness.

This account of institutional change and positional differentiation of senior officials in Germany's Federal administration is presented in five sections. Section I, ‘Senior Officials and the Reassertion of Political Authority’, is introductory and discusses the causes and implications of change in the organization and in the political and administrative roles of the senior civil service; changes identified include party politicization, parliamentarization and federalization of the national policy process, modernization initiatives, European integration, and unification. Section II gives a brief survey of the Federal senior ministerial personnel (looking at pay grade and rank, and centrality), and section III considers paths to the top, paying particular attention to the procedures for recruitment and promotion and the consequences of weak formal structures for personnel planning and development. Following on from the definition of political craft as a defining attribute of effective top officials, section IV highlights the central position of political coordination units as training grounds in the Federal administration and comments on the informal positional differentiation that they encourage. The discussion concludes in section V with an assessment of the implications of the partition of the ministerial bureaucracy between Bonn and Berlin.