Search Results

The introductory chapter 2 takes up the concept of sensitivity and vulnerability in international interdependence to analyse the complex relationship between EU and national governance and to look at the normative implications in terms of efficient and democratic governance in the European system. The achieved high level of interconnectedness between political and societal actors at the European, the national and sub-national levels results in a loss of political control by individual member states, provokes a substantive derogation of national parliamentary democracy, and causes severe irritations as regards the established balance between the economic and political spheres. However, the plurality of state and society actors are sensitive and vulnerable to different degrees and in various ways depending on structural compatibilities, power differentials, and policy styles, which shape conflict management and problem-solving strategies. Their responses to demands for adaptation produce differentiated outcomes and, therefore, contribute to the fragmented and heterogeneous structure of the EU. At the same time, a penetrated system of governance evolves that is extraordinary flexible and generates a multiplicity of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ mechanisms for linking EU and national governance, which smooth the management of multi-level interdependence and assist to overcome democratic derogation.

To sustain a viable social science of law and courts, testable propositions, appropriate research designs for testing those hypotheses, and comparative materials are needed; Ch. 4, and the two papers within it, discuss and use three strategies for building theory through testing and comparing. This second paper, which was originally published in the American Political Science Review in 1998, employs econometric and other modes of statistical analysis as well as qualitative ‘process tracing’ to evaluate specific causal propositions about how European Community (EC) integration and the construction of the European legal system (as enforced by the European Court of Justice) have proceeded. The research design constitutes a mixed means of testing: (1) deductive derivation of hypotheses from materials developed in prior comparative research, (2) collection of data to operationalize the theorized variables, (3) testing of the hypotheses through quantitative data analysis, and (4) cross-checking of these results and exploration of other theorized relationships or dynamics (qualitatively). The research leads Stone Sweet and Brunell to propose a theory of European legal integration (i.e. the process by which Europe has constructed a transnational rule-of-law polity), which integrates three interdependent causal factors: contracting among individuals, third-party dispute resolution, and the production of legal norms. The theory is tested, with reference to the EC, in two stages: first, the construction of the legal system is explained and the relationships between the three key variables are analysed over the life of the EC; second, the impact of the operation of the legal system is examined on governance (i.e. on policy processes and outcomes) at both the national and the supranational levels.

An examination is made of how tensions that develop between supranational and national governance structures are resolved, given the institutionalization taking place at the European level. The focus is on two national policy domains – state aids and regional development – and the author explains how, since the mid-1980s, European Union (EU) officials have succeeded in inducing their French counterparts to alter legislation and administrative practices once assumed to be fundamentally immune to external influence – a process that is increasingly referred to as the ‘Europeanization of the nation state’. The view taken is that Europeanization took place in a series of ‘rounds’ that have followed a common sequence: disagreement about the nature and scope of EU rules in national regimes; open contestation between supranational and national officials; the fixing of a new or clarified rule on the part of EU officials; and, finally, the grudging acceptance of the rule by the French. After each round, new patterns of French resistance emerged, but the rules of the game governing these interactions are fixed by the results of previous rounds, and come to be more or less taken for granted by actors at both levels; it is argued that the overall process tends to favour the expansion and diffusion of EU modes of governance, and the weakening of specifically national modes. The chapter is divided into three main sections: the first provides a summary overview of the development of EU competition policy and its intersections with state aids and regional policy; the second focuses on state aids in two sectors (French regional and industrial policy), which are analysed against the backdrop of the development of European competition law; and the third part discusses conflicts over the meaning of European rules in relation to the process of ‘endogenous’ institutional change.

This chapter examines sovereign creditworthiness as a problem in building sub-national fiscal capacity; why it matters; why it generates controversy about its purpose; and how it relates to historic grand bargains about the basis of national cohesion and exhibits path dependency. It makes a distinction between formal and material sub-national fiscal capacity, emphasizing the importance of structural imbalances, regional balance sheets, ‘stand-alone’ fiscal capacity, and ‘system strength’. The chapter highlights the distinctive characteristics of sub-national fiscal governance. It also shows the growing significance of international credit ratings and EU fiscal surveillance, leading to tightening of hierarchical controls and of market-based discipline. The chapter examines the determinants of sub-national credit ratings. A comparison is made of sub-national fiscal capacity in the United States, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The conclusion considers the reframing of sub-national fiscal governance under EMU and economic and financial crisis.

This chapter analyses Representation. It focuses on people’s evaluations of the EU Parliament and Commission and on the perceived responsiveness of European Union institutions. It is argued that as citizens become more acquainted with the EU, instrumental motivations acquire greater importance vis à vis affective heuristics in evaluating the mechanisms of political representation in the European Union. The chapter explores the roles that egocentric and socio-tropic evaluations, national political cues and political awareness exert on people’s trust in and perceptions of EU institutions. It concludes that trust and perceptions of institutional responsiveness depend primarily on affective support, instrumental sociotropic support, and evaluations of national institutions. However, the distinctive role that these three attitudes play in increasing or decreasing the level of EU institutional trust is conditioned by a series of macro-structural characteristics, including the quality of national governance, the balance of EU fiscal transfers and the level of EU politicization.

This concluding chapter illustrates how Guyana, in its three eras of governance (matured colonialism, internal self-government, post-colonial era), has faced a range of persistent problems which demanded the active engagement of the state. It has been suggested that what was needed was a Napoleon type of leader to resolve these persistent problems. In addition, the musical demands of an active state exerted substantial influence on musical life in the society. This influence came from the state's demand for music's ceremonial, mobilization, propaganda, and strategic-communication roles, including the provision of entertainment through “bread and circuses.” Ultimately, those sectors of society that were excluded from the process of national governance have drawn upon their musical assets to call for accountability, to shine spotlights on corruption and inefficiency, and to express their frustrations and aspirations.

This chapter examines the navalist project as an exercise in social imperialism, relating naval expansion to matters of governance and reform and aiming at the forging of a cohesive nation in the crucible of world power. In both Germany and the United States, makers of navalism offered social-imperial formulations that related the pursuit of global power and maritime force to matters of national governance, reform, and societal order. Transcending the two navies' pursuit of institutional power, societal resources, and public prominence, these formulations centered on the (re)making of both countries as integral nation-states. This chapter provides an overview of German visions of the state, along with the navy's pursuit of maritime force and global power in relation to the notion of Germany as an industrial nation and the strategy of national integration. It also discusses U.S. articulation of a social–imperialist politics and how navalists linked the pursuit of maritime force and global power to the cause of moral reform and national regeneration that entailed the promise of a newly reinvigorated militant nationalism.

This chapter explains this book's contribution to the study of the interactions between the national governance practices and musical communities in the Caribbean. Specifically, it examines these interactions in Guyana during the three political eras of its transition from being a British colony to an independent nation state. The term musical communities here refers to discrete musical traditions, instruments, and repertoire found in Guyana's urban, rural, and hinterland regions and reflects the nation's multi-ethnic heritage. To contextualize the phases of twentieth-century governance practices in Guyana, the book outlines some key aspects of the state's political, economic, social, and cultural life. These include the peopling of Guyana; governance of the society, specifically the urban-based ruling elite and the plantocracy; residential patterns and cultural life; and patterns of resistance to the colonial order.

This chapter first describes geographic and temporal trends in the frequency of attacks in Nigeria and Somalia. It then reviews the development of piracy in both countries, paying particular attention to local governance capacity. Similarly to the analyses of Indonesia in Chapter 6, this chapter notes a clear curvilinear association between nighttime light emissions and sophisticated pirate attacks against steaming ships on the open water. The findings are stronger in Nigeria than in Somalia, but this is to be expected given low variance in local capacity across the Somali state. Significantly, the empirical evidence presented on Nigeria and Somalia supports the findings from Chapter 6. Pirates locate in spaces characterized by intermediate state capacity, places with some infrastructural development and elites who can be bribed to look the other way. The evidence presented in this chapter shows considerably less piracy in areas with very weak or very strong governance.

This chapter discusses the importance of comparing national governance systems. It explains that comparative structural analysis of macroinstitutions has a difficult time in determining why countries do not just converge into one system because institutions are rooted in norms and social rules. It highlights the need to develop models based on micro-to-macro generative social science and highlights the slow emergence of a transnational global order whose structure is the product of the wide variety of social rules found across countries.

This chapter observes that the emergence of a substantive concern with what became known as ‘community safety’ policy marked a significant shift in forms of local and national governance. It notes that this shift had far-reaching implications for local authorities, for crime and disorder management, for the politics of community, for social policy, and for the variety of agencies (the police, local authorities, probation, Drug Action Teams, witness support services, and so on) that following the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, came to form the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRPs), charged with the responsibility of delivering local crime and disorder reduction strategy.

This chapter examines why Yemen’s constitutional transition during the period 2011–15 failed. In 2011 a popular uprising forced Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign. Neighboring Arab countries soon got involved in steering the constitutional process, which included a National Dialogue to address the design of a new constitution. The dialogue recommended a new federal regime, but failed to resolve the critical issue of the number and boundaries of states. The document presented in January 2015 by the Constitutional Drafting Committee tasked to draft a new constitution was deeply flawed and became the trigger for civil war. The chapter first considers the context leading up to the National Dialogue before discussing the outcomes of the constitutional process and three lessons that can be drawn from it: the role and design of sub-national governance arrangements; political legitimacy and process in a constitutional transition; and a more integrated approach to transitions.