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This chapter argues that the religious doctrine of mutual responsibility propels Haredim to get involved in trying to persuade other Jews to act in pious ways because infractions invoke the wrath of the Almighty. This wrath is not necessarily directed at the perpetrators but can hit innocent others. Violence–verbal and non verbal-is part of these attempts of persuasion. Driving Israel to become a theocratic Halakhic state is what is behind most of this violence. The chapter argues that the concept of Haredi limited violence is inaccurate. Theocratic democracies can, and do, contain such pressures and tensions, but there is a limit beyond which this flexible structure may loose its flexibility and be driven to an extreme. The chapter ends with examining various trends that may press Israeli theocratic democracy towards a Halakhic state. Such trends consist of, for example, theocratic members of Knesset, large sections in the population that want such a state, existence of underground groups that were willing to use violent direct action to turn Israel into a theocracy.

This chapter shows how Douglass's experience as an abolitionist led him to articulate his philosophy of mutual responsibility, and examines the sorts of arguments he offered in defense of the claim that free men have obligations to liberate slaves. Because the liberal language of rights offered only a limited explanation of why individuals ought to feel responsible for one another's well-being, Douglass infused it with a strong case for interconnection and mutual responsibility. His arguments are thus based on his reliance on the idea of human brotherhood, a commitment to natural rights, an appeal to self-interest, and his hope that a stronger sense of sympathy might emerge as a result of respect for virtuous action. From this discussion of the mutual obligation in Douglass's thought, the chapter proceeds to a discussion of the consequences of these ideas for the behavior of individuals and institutions.

Dwelling in dispersion and far from any governmental law enforcement agencies that could provide them security, nomadic desert dwellers needed ways to protect themselves from violations such as murder, assault, insult, and theft. They achieved this security mainly by forming groups based on blood kin, or people of common descent, people whom they believed would honor claims of common loyalty and cooperation when problems with others arose. Each group they organized had a specific security function. The tribal structure of the Israelites as randomly noted in the Bible bears several similarities to that of the Bedouin. This chapter explores these similarities as well as their impact on the status and roles of the genders and on the institution of matrimony in both societies.

A third force at play in the British maritime public sphere, an inadvertent participant neither anti-war nor pro-war, was the ‘Canton system’. More than the physical border of the Thirteen Factories (Canton’s foreign trading quarters), the Canton system was primarily a ‘soft border’ made of a series of rules and regulations that constrained British merchants’ activities in China and restricted their interaction with Qing subjects. Soft borders here were figurative borderlines on the maritime frontier that cut through transnational information and interaction networks. By preventing interactions other than those necessary for trade, the Qing believed they had successfully prevented the possibility of foreigners joining forces with Chinese rebels—the dynasty’s major threat. The security order in Canton was paramount to the Qing ruling class. However, the Warlike party believed it necessary to start a war to abolish the system that confined British trade expansion and insulted the British Empire.

This chapter unfolds the basis of a new social contract that sets out innovative ways of redistributing risks and opportunities. It also discusses how “committed nationalism” — the nationalism of mutual responsibility that places fellow nationals at the top of one's social priorities — may help to rebuild social solidarity. The chapter then turns to talk about the alliance of conservatives and social democrats, rallying around the nation-state and looking to bring the elites back home in the name of both nationalism and social justice. It demonstrates how the political balance tilted in the direction of the nationalism of the vulnerable rather than in the direction of the nationalism of the affluent. As we enter the age of a new and caring nationalism, the chapter explains four moves that must be taken to tame the new nationalism and make it more liberal and tolerant. Finally, the chapter reviews the significance of reviving the sense of social and political optimism and collective pride that allows individuals and societies to envision a better future for themselves and for the coming generations.

This introductory chapter briefly discusses the life and political thought of Frederick Douglass, arguing that Douglass believed his goals could only be accomplished if the classical liberal commitment to individual rights was coupled with a robust conception of mutual responsibility. His life's mission, he said in 1888, was “to hasten the day when the principles of liberty and humanity expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the constitution of the United States shall be the law and the practice of every section, and of all the people of this great country without regard to race, sex, color, or religion.” Two ideas were at the core of his political thought: a belief in universal self-ownership and a commitment to a doctrine he called “true virtue.”

This chapter explores how Douglass drew on the experience of slavery to defend the classical liberal idea of self-ownership. His abhorrence of slavery provides the foundation for the two principles at the core of his political thought: it led him to embrace the liberal idea of self-ownership; and his desire to see the institution abolished led him to an acute appreciation of the ways in which the achievement of universal freedom depends upon the development of a strong ethos of mutual responsibility. A political community is only just, he argued, if each individual's right to control his or her own life is respected.

This chapter discusses economic development for health as a key driver of stronger, more productive States. Many States lack the capacity fully to ensure the conditions in which everyone can be healthy. To guarantee the right to health, it is not only necessary to hold States accountable, but also to provide them with the capacity to meet the needs of their populations. This requires both bilateral and multilateral assistance. It also requires changing the traditional paradigm of ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’, moving to the idea of mutual responsibilities. Higher-income States, and the international community as a whole, should partner with lower-income States to ensure a fair allocation of scarce resources. This requires not just adequate funding, but also ensures that States regain full ‘ownership’ of their national strategies, activities, and programmes.

This concluding chapter reflects on the debates over Douglass's legacy. Most interpreters have oversimplified Douglass's views and all attempts to draw contemporary conclusions from his nineteenth-century arguments should be chastened by a heavy dose of humility. And while it is hard to know what conclusions Douglass would come to in the philosophical and policy debates of today, we can say something about how the spirit of his thought might shape the lens through which we view contemporary political questions. Fundamentally, he directs us to think about the ways in which the liberal goal of securing the conditions necessary for the exercise of personal freedom depends upon the prevalence of a robust sense of mutual responsibility.