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The second chapter constructs a theoretical framework to account for the introduced research puzzle. Building on a central line of work on ‘federal dynamics’, it argues that the institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations bear a decisive impact on a multilevel system’s ability to organize openness to international trade. While self-rule systems build on power-hoarding and the delineation of spheres of competence, shared rule systems rely on collaborative power-sharing between central and subcentral executives. In reference to Hirschman’s seminal concepts of exit and voice, the chapter then posits that any multilevel polity endows subcentral executives with a specific amount of voice in the making of trade and procurement policy. This voice it expects to be inversely related to exit: the more voice subcentral executives are equipped with, the less they dispose of an incentive to exit from a system-wide policy or international commitment. As shared-rule systems endow constituent units with more voice in polity-wide trade policy-making, they should organize openness more effectively than self-rule systems. At the same time, the inverse relationship between voice and exit does not unfold in an experimental vacuum. Depending on the specific policy sector, intervening factors can come to affect constituent units’ propensity to seek exit without affecting the amount of their voice. In the specific field of trade and procurement policy, the book expects two such policy-specific factors potentially to affect constituent units’ degree of exit. These are the amount of domestic procurement market integration and the politicization of international procurement liberalization.

This chapter deals with multilevel government as one of the significant themes of Paul Craig’s work. Its focus is multilevel government within the state, defined to include a range of forms of significantly devolved government, of which federation is one. The chapter responds to the apparent paradox that while multilevel government is now widely regarded as a desirable feature of a system of government, for many good reasons that include its potential to deepen democracy, multilevel systems tend to become increasingly centralised over time, detracting from the advantages they offer. The chapter suggests that a partial explanation lies in prevailing conceptions of constitutionalism, almost all of which were developed by reference to the assumptions of a unitary state. It argues instead for a concept of constitutionalism adapted to the objectives and circumstances of multilevel government, in a compound form that might be described as multilevel constitutionalism. Multilevel constitutionalism would not dictate the degree of devolution but it would support its adoption and operation once in place. Implementation of multilevel constitutionalism in turn demands cultural change on the part of the principal actors, to give it practical effect. The chapter explores what this might require of political elites in pursuing intergovernmental arrangements, and of courts, interpreting and applying the governing constitution. It concludes with still tentative suggestions about the extent to which a suitably modified version of multilevel constitutionalism could apply above the level of the state, to regional and international arrangements.

The concluding chapter of Trade Policy in Multilevel Government not only elaborates on the theoretical model’s explanatory power and its limits in the light of the three analysed polities, but also turns to raising questions as to the democratic legitimacy of the multilevel pattern of trade policy described in the book. Questions of democratic legitimacy in multilevel systems are complicated by the fact that a popular and a territorial logic of representation coexist and, at times, compete. Both citizens and constituent units are entitled to input into the system. The ensuing tension between popular and territorial logics of representation also permeates multilevel trade governance. In the EU and the Canadian cases, territorial legitimacy clearly takes precedence over popular representation. Seen from this perspective, the US case appears in a somewhat different light. In the face of adaptational pressures arising from economic and political globalization, popular representation could also be regarded as an additional layer of autonomy in self-rule systems of multilevel government.

This chapter examines the characteristics of party patronage in Spain. Appointments have been extensively used since the transition to democracy by Spanish parties, but the depth of patronage practices is nonetheless limited, mostly due to constitutional constraints and the influence of the bureaucratic corps. Thus, Spain presents a sort of dual system. At the top level, political appointments are made in most policy areas and turnover rates are extremely high when governments change, and at the lower levels a more protective civil service system prevails. Adversarial politics explains why parties clearly use appointments as a tool of party government, as they are concerned that their sympathizers control both the functioning of the public administration and the policy-making process. Finally, although appointments have helped Spanish parties to develop their organization, this has not been a significant feature of electoral mobilization, nor has it entailed clientelistic practices.

Chapter 1 introduces the research questions and outlines the structure of the book. It explains the basic dilemma of multilevel governments. They are confronted by attempts of office holders to extend their power, thus causing “authority migration.” Moreover, they have to cope with varying interdependence between policies made at the different levels. Therefore, these governments are threatened by instability, if they cannot protect the constitution against strategic politics. However, under changing political or societal conditions, strict constitutional law can prevent necessary adjustment and make structures of government too rigid. Highlighting the importance of a flexible and stable balance of power, the chapter links the study presented in the book to important strands of research on federalism and multilevel governance.