Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore ...
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This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including an account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and a view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These chapters stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the chapters develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final chapters explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself.Less
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including an account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and a view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These chapters stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the chapters develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final chapters explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself.
Bernard Green
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199534951
- eISBN:
- 9780191715990
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534951.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This final chapter looks back at the book's intentions and makes some conclusions. The book has attempted to explore Leo the Great's formation and achievement as a theologian. Examining his ...
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This final chapter looks back at the book's intentions and makes some conclusions. The book has attempted to explore Leo the Great's formation and achievement as a theologian. Examining his background it has tried to illuminate his motives as a preacher and writer and the resources available to him. By looking at the society and Church he addressed, it has attempted to shed light on the effect he hoped to achieve which in turn has allowed for the assessment of what he did in fact achieve. By reading his work, the development of his ideas, his growing skill and confidence as a theologian, and the characteristic preoccupations of his thought can be traced.Less
This final chapter looks back at the book's intentions and makes some conclusions. The book has attempted to explore Leo the Great's formation and achievement as a theologian. Examining his background it has tried to illuminate his motives as a preacher and writer and the resources available to him. By looking at the society and Church he addressed, it has attempted to shed light on the effect he hoped to achieve which in turn has allowed for the assessment of what he did in fact achieve. By reading his work, the development of his ideas, his growing skill and confidence as a theologian, and the characteristic preoccupations of his thought can be traced.
Thomas F. Farr
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195179958
- eISBN:
- 9780199869749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179958.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The book ends with a brief story that revisits major themes of the book: the secularistic culture at the Department of State and its aversion to thinking about religion; the threat to the American ...
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The book ends with a brief story that revisits major themes of the book: the secularistic culture at the Department of State and its aversion to thinking about religion; the threat to the American homeland of Islamist terrorism; the promotion of “freedom” in the Middle East without religious freedom; the limited value of set piece face-to-face diplomacy; the need for public pressure on the U.S. foreign policy establishment; enduring skepticism among some in the West about the motives of religious people; the American opportunity in the lands of Islam and in China; and, finally, the potential role of religious actors in civil society, in the pursuit of justice, and in the principle that lies at the very heart of religious freedom: the dignity of the human person.Less
The book ends with a brief story that revisits major themes of the book: the secularistic culture at the Department of State and its aversion to thinking about religion; the threat to the American homeland of Islamist terrorism; the promotion of “freedom” in the Middle East without religious freedom; the limited value of set piece face-to-face diplomacy; the need for public pressure on the U.S. foreign policy establishment; enduring skepticism among some in the West about the motives of religious people; the American opportunity in the lands of Islam and in China; and, finally, the potential role of religious actors in civil society, in the pursuit of justice, and in the principle that lies at the very heart of religious freedom: the dignity of the human person.
Alan M. Dershowitz
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195158076
- eISBN:
- 9780199869848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195158075.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US ...
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Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. The author states that he is convinced that if it had been Bush rather than Gore who needed the Florida recount in order to have any chance of winning the election, that at least some of the five justices who voted to stop the recount would instead have voted to allow it to proceed. The main sections of the chapter are: Judicial Impropriety; Hypothetical Cases Involving a Supreme Court Decision Regarding a Presidential Election; The Difficulty of Proving an Improper Motive; Academic Defenders of the Majority Justices; Ad Hominem Arguments and Analysis of Motive; and Analysing the Justices’ Motives in Bush vs Gore: A Prelude.Less
Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. The author states that he is convinced that if it had been Bush rather than Gore who needed the Florida recount in order to have any chance of winning the election, that at least some of the five justices who voted to stop the recount would instead have voted to allow it to proceed. The main sections of the chapter are: Judicial Impropriety; Hypothetical Cases Involving a Supreme Court Decision Regarding a Presidential Election; The Difficulty of Proving an Improper Motive; Academic Defenders of the Majority Justices; Ad Hominem Arguments and Analysis of Motive; and Analysing the Justices’ Motives in Bush vs Gore: A Prelude.
Anita M. Superson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195376623
- eISBN:
- 9780199871551
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat ...
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This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege, to include morally unjustified behavior typically directed against disenfranchised social groups. It argues for revising the traditional expected utility model of rationality to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as ones it is not irrational to have. It defends the Interdependency Thesis, which assesses the rationality of moral dispositions and of actions interdependently, and allows us to fine tune the demands of the skeptic by not focusing on acts and dispositions in themselves, but on their interconnection. It defends the view that our rational assessments of agents should reflect the complex connection between the agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, and for having and acting from it, whether these cohere with her reasons for acting and for wanting to be a morally good person, and the justification for the moral theory or principles she endorses. Acts come in degrees of rationality, as measured by how they contribute to the agent's consistent life plan.Less
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege, to include morally unjustified behavior typically directed against disenfranchised social groups. It argues for revising the traditional expected utility model of rationality to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as ones it is not irrational to have. It defends the Interdependency Thesis, which assesses the rationality of moral dispositions and of actions interdependently, and allows us to fine tune the demands of the skeptic by not focusing on acts and dispositions in themselves, but on their interconnection. It defends the view that our rational assessments of agents should reflect the complex connection between the agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, and for having and acting from it, whether these cohere with her reasons for acting and for wanting to be a morally good person, and the justification for the moral theory or principles she endorses. Acts come in degrees of rationality, as measured by how they contribute to the agent's consistent life plan.
Richard McCarty
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567720
- eISBN:
- 9780191721465
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567720.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
The theory of action underlying Immanuel Kant's moral theory is the subject of this book. What “maxims” are, and how we act on maxims, are explained here in light of both the historical context of ...
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The theory of action underlying Immanuel Kant's moral theory is the subject of this book. What “maxims” are, and how we act on maxims, are explained here in light of both the historical context of Kant's thought, and his classroom lectures on psychology and ethics. Arguing against the current of much recent scholarship, a strong case is made for interpreting Kant as having embraced psychological determinism, a version of the “belief-desire model” of human motivation, and a literal, “two-worlds” metaphysics. On this interpretation, actions in the familiar, sensible world are always effects of prior psychological causes. Their explaining causal laws are the maxims of agents' characters. And agents act freely if, acting in an intelligible world, what they do there results in their having the characters they have here, in the sensible world. In this way Kant's theory of action coordinates thoroughgoing causal determinism in the natural world with human freedom and moral responsibility. This line of interpretation is fruitful also for addressing some familiar problems in Kant's moral psychology. It allows explaining actions caused by admirable inclinations as “virtuous”, without requiring the motive of duty behind every morally praiseworthy action.Less
The theory of action underlying Immanuel Kant's moral theory is the subject of this book. What “maxims” are, and how we act on maxims, are explained here in light of both the historical context of Kant's thought, and his classroom lectures on psychology and ethics. Arguing against the current of much recent scholarship, a strong case is made for interpreting Kant as having embraced psychological determinism, a version of the “belief-desire model” of human motivation, and a literal, “two-worlds” metaphysics. On this interpretation, actions in the familiar, sensible world are always effects of prior psychological causes. Their explaining causal laws are the maxims of agents' characters. And agents act freely if, acting in an intelligible world, what they do there results in their having the characters they have here, in the sensible world. In this way Kant's theory of action coordinates thoroughgoing causal determinism in the natural world with human freedom and moral responsibility. This line of interpretation is fruitful also for addressing some familiar problems in Kant's moral psychology. It allows explaining actions caused by admirable inclinations as “virtuous”, without requiring the motive of duty behind every morally praiseworthy action.
Alan M. Dershowitz
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195158076
- eISBN:
- 9780199869848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195158075.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US ...
More
Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. Contrasts the prior decisions and writings of the particular majority justices with the opinions that they joined in this case; the dramatic discrepancies found raise troubling questions. Moves from this concrete evidence to a more speculative consideration of what may have motivated these inconsistencies. The different sections of the chapter look first at the decisions of Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justice Clarence Thomas. The following speculative sections first ask generally why each justice behaved as they did, and then go on to devote separate sections on the motives of each of the five justices.Less
Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. Contrasts the prior decisions and writings of the particular majority justices with the opinions that they joined in this case; the dramatic discrepancies found raise troubling questions. Moves from this concrete evidence to a more speculative consideration of what may have motivated these inconsistencies. The different sections of the chapter look first at the decisions of Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justice Clarence Thomas. The following speculative sections first ask generally why each justice behaved as they did, and then go on to devote separate sections on the motives of each of the five justices.
Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Language, by making possible high beliefs, makes possible some control of belief by the believer: wishful thinking. People can decide to accept or reject testimony. This is faith, the acceptance of ...
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Language, by making possible high beliefs, makes possible some control of belief by the believer: wishful thinking. People can decide to accept or reject testimony. This is faith, the acceptance of another person's testimony without further corroboration and notwithstanding contrary evidence. Faith is transitive, usually a consequence of bonding. In the hunter-gatherer band of 40 it is ‘natural;’ will plays little or no part. Elsewhere it is generated like falling in love, indeed may be the same process. - Marxists and deconstructionists claim that all belief (except theirs) is motivated, hence a species of faith. This is too extreme. - William James's classic discussion is vitiated by confusion with self-confidence.Less
Language, by making possible high beliefs, makes possible some control of belief by the believer: wishful thinking. People can decide to accept or reject testimony. This is faith, the acceptance of another person's testimony without further corroboration and notwithstanding contrary evidence. Faith is transitive, usually a consequence of bonding. In the hunter-gatherer band of 40 it is ‘natural;’ will plays little or no part. Elsewhere it is generated like falling in love, indeed may be the same process. - Marxists and deconstructionists claim that all belief (except theirs) is motivated, hence a species of faith. This is too extreme. - William James's classic discussion is vitiated by confusion with self-confidence.
James Pattison
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199561049
- eISBN:
- 9780191722318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199561049.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Relations and Politics
This chapter considers the claim that an intervener's humanitarian credentials—its reason for intervening—are an important determinant of its legitimacy. It distinguishes between three sorts of ...
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This chapter considers the claim that an intervener's humanitarian credentials—its reason for intervening—are an important determinant of its legitimacy. It distinguishes between three sorts of humanitarian credential: humanitarian intentions, humanitarian motives, and humanitarian outcomes. It largely rejects the importance of all three qualities (although it asserts that an intervener's intentions have definitional and instrumental importance). In doing so, it considers the moral and political relevance of mixed motives and mixed intentions for intervention. The final part of the chapter uses this analysis to consider two more practical issues. First, the chapter asserts that an intervener's selectivity in where it intervenes does not render it an illegitimate intervener. Second, it uses the earlier accounts of motives and intentions to reject the humanitarian credentials of the 2003 war in Iraq.Less
This chapter considers the claim that an intervener's humanitarian credentials—its reason for intervening—are an important determinant of its legitimacy. It distinguishes between three sorts of humanitarian credential: humanitarian intentions, humanitarian motives, and humanitarian outcomes. It largely rejects the importance of all three qualities (although it asserts that an intervener's intentions have definitional and instrumental importance). In doing so, it considers the moral and political relevance of mixed motives and mixed intentions for intervention. The final part of the chapter uses this analysis to consider two more practical issues. First, the chapter asserts that an intervener's selectivity in where it intervenes does not render it an illegitimate intervener. Second, it uses the earlier accounts of motives and intentions to reject the humanitarian credentials of the 2003 war in Iraq.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Thomas Aquinas believed that human actions have kinds or species. He divided human actions into good, evil, or indifferent, and subdivided them into more particular kinds such as almsgiving, murder, ...
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Thomas Aquinas believed that human actions have kinds or species. He divided human actions into good, evil, or indifferent, and subdivided them into more particular kinds such as almsgiving, murder, fraternal correction, or theft. From his earliest consideration of this topic in the Commentary on the Sentences to his latest in the Summa Theologiae, he used five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to identify what gives species to human actions. Some difficulties have been noted with respect to his thinking on this subject. A first such difficulty is that his teaching on a few of these terms seems at times inconsistent. For example, although Aquinas maintains in some texts that circumstances can give species to human actions, he seems to deny that they can in other texts. Further, although on some occasions he holds that a remote end is irrelevant for the specification of human actions, on other occasions, he seems to assert that a remote end is the most important principle for such specification. It is not easy to see at first how these seemingly contradictory statements can be true at the same time. A second difficulty is that it is hard to grasp how end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive could all refer to what specifies human actions. Although certain similarities in meaning can be recognized among them, no term seems to be a strict synonym of any other, ruling out an easy reconciliation. This monograph examines Aquinas’s understanding of these five terms to resolve these difficulties and propose a coherent account of his teaching on the specification of human actions.Less
Thomas Aquinas believed that human actions have kinds or species. He divided human actions into good, evil, or indifferent, and subdivided them into more particular kinds such as almsgiving, murder, fraternal correction, or theft. From his earliest consideration of this topic in the Commentary on the Sentences to his latest in the Summa Theologiae, he used five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to identify what gives species to human actions. Some difficulties have been noted with respect to his thinking on this subject. A first such difficulty is that his teaching on a few of these terms seems at times inconsistent. For example, although Aquinas maintains in some texts that circumstances can give species to human actions, he seems to deny that they can in other texts. Further, although on some occasions he holds that a remote end is irrelevant for the specification of human actions, on other occasions, he seems to assert that a remote end is the most important principle for such specification. It is not easy to see at first how these seemingly contradictory statements can be true at the same time. A second difficulty is that it is hard to grasp how end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive could all refer to what specifies human actions. Although certain similarities in meaning can be recognized among them, no term seems to be a strict synonym of any other, ruling out an easy reconciliation. This monograph examines Aquinas’s understanding of these five terms to resolve these difficulties and propose a coherent account of his teaching on the specification of human actions.
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199261185
- eISBN:
- 9780191601507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261180.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Two related historical facts welcomed liberal democracy or the liberal-democratic state. On one hand, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, social contract theory imposed a major setback to ...
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Two related historical facts welcomed liberal democracy or the liberal-democratic state. On one hand, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, social contract theory imposed a major setback to the divine legitimacy of political rulers. On the other hand, the capitalist revolution–embracing the mercantile, the industrial, and the liberal revolutions–changed the basic way of appropriating the economic surplus. This no longer depended on the state’s control but increasingly depended on the realization of profits in the market. For the first time in history, authoritarian regimes ceased to be a necessary condition for the ruling classes’ survival. Democracy turned gradually into synonym of the good state. Eventually, with the acknowledgement of political rights–specifically of universal suffrage––liberal democracy emerged. This process took one century–the time for the bourgeois ruling class to stop fearing expropriation by the poor who democracy entitled to vote.Less
Two related historical facts welcomed liberal democracy or the liberal-democratic state. On one hand, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, social contract theory imposed a major setback to the divine legitimacy of political rulers. On the other hand, the capitalist revolution–embracing the mercantile, the industrial, and the liberal revolutions–changed the basic way of appropriating the economic surplus. This no longer depended on the state’s control but increasingly depended on the realization of profits in the market. For the first time in history, authoritarian regimes ceased to be a necessary condition for the ruling classes’ survival. Democracy turned gradually into synonym of the good state. Eventually, with the acknowledgement of political rights–specifically of universal suffrage––liberal democracy emerged. This process took one century–the time for the bourgeois ruling class to stop fearing expropriation by the poor who democracy entitled to vote.
G. Victor Hallman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199549108
- eISBN:
- 9780191720734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199549108.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Pensions and Pension Management
Managing retirement payouts generally revolves primarily around securing adequate retirement income and assuring the continuity of such income for as long as the retirees live. Many commentators have ...
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Managing retirement payouts generally revolves primarily around securing adequate retirement income and assuring the continuity of such income for as long as the retirees live. Many commentators have suggested that the most efficient strategy to deal with these issues for risk-averse retirees is to annuitize retirement benefits. However, these commentators recognize that relatively few retirees actually choose life annuitization (the so-called ‘annuity puzzle’). One reason for this is the bequest or inheritance motive which involves using income-tax-favored retirement plans to pass wealth to the heirs (probably children) of the retiree or to charity. This chapter discusses the concepts, strategies, and constraints on using tax-favored retirement plans as wealth transfer devices.Less
Managing retirement payouts generally revolves primarily around securing adequate retirement income and assuring the continuity of such income for as long as the retirees live. Many commentators have suggested that the most efficient strategy to deal with these issues for risk-averse retirees is to annuitize retirement benefits. However, these commentators recognize that relatively few retirees actually choose life annuitization (the so-called ‘annuity puzzle’). One reason for this is the bequest or inheritance motive which involves using income-tax-favored retirement plans to pass wealth to the heirs (probably children) of the retiree or to charity. This chapter discusses the concepts, strategies, and constraints on using tax-favored retirement plans as wealth transfer devices.
Henry Shue
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199267217
- eISBN:
- 9780191601118
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199267219.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Employs historical analysis and philosophical reasoning to argue that sovereignty is inherently limited. The writings of classical theorists such as Grotius and Vattel indicate that aspirations to ...
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Employs historical analysis and philosophical reasoning to argue that sovereignty is inherently limited. The writings of classical theorists such as Grotius and Vattel indicate that aspirations to sovereignty and non-intervention have always been tempered by considerations above and beyond the state. Philosophically, it must be remembered that sovereignty is a right, and the concept of a right makes no sense in the absence of a corresponding duty. The duties that are constitutive of the rights of sovereignty constrain the behaviour of every sovereign belonging to international society. Two conclusions follow. First, there are limits on how states may treat their own citizens within their own territory. Second, other states face specific limits concerning the ill-treatment of residents within the territory of other states that they are free to ignore. In particular, genocide and massive violations of human rights are a matter of concern for all states in contemporary international society.Less
Employs historical analysis and philosophical reasoning to argue that sovereignty is inherently limited. The writings of classical theorists such as Grotius and Vattel indicate that aspirations to sovereignty and non-intervention have always been tempered by considerations above and beyond the state. Philosophically, it must be remembered that sovereignty is a right, and the concept of a right makes no sense in the absence of a corresponding duty. The duties that are constitutive of the rights of sovereignty constrain the behaviour of every sovereign belonging to international society. Two conclusions follow. First, there are limits on how states may treat their own citizens within their own territory. Second, other states face specific limits concerning the ill-treatment of residents within the territory of other states that they are free to ignore. In particular, genocide and massive violations of human rights are a matter of concern for all states in contemporary international society.
Todd M. Thrash, Scott E. Cassidy, Laura A. Maruskin, and Andrew J. Elliot
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195335156
- eISBN:
- 9780199776955
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335156.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter addresses the relation between implicit and explicit motives and focuses on factors that influence the degree to which an individual exhibits motive congruence (i.e., consistency between ...
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This chapter addresses the relation between implicit and explicit motives and focuses on factors that influence the degree to which an individual exhibits motive congruence (i.e., consistency between corresponding implicit and explicit motives). The chapter begins with a review of the extant empirical literature on motive congruence. A general conceptual framework based on the principles of structural equation modeling is proposed. Various theoretical perspectives on the processes through which congruence may be achieved are organized in terms of the general framework, and important methodological issues that have been overlooked in past research are identified. Finally, the chapter integrates the motive congruence literature with related literatures within psychology and identifies directions for future research.Less
This chapter addresses the relation between implicit and explicit motives and focuses on factors that influence the degree to which an individual exhibits motive congruence (i.e., consistency between corresponding implicit and explicit motives). The chapter begins with a review of the extant empirical literature on motive congruence. A general conceptual framework based on the principles of structural equation modeling is proposed. Various theoretical perspectives on the processes through which congruence may be achieved are organized in terms of the general framework, and important methodological issues that have been overlooked in past research are identified. Finally, the chapter integrates the motive congruence literature with related literatures within psychology and identifies directions for future research.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter shows that end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive can all be understood to contribute to the specification of human actions for Aquinas in a fundamentally consistent way. Although ...
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This chapter shows that end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive can all be understood to contribute to the specification of human actions for Aquinas in a fundamentally consistent way. Although specification by end and by object have characteristic differences, they are at base compatible because both end and object can refer to precisely the same reality in human action. The same goal can be both a human action’s final cause (end), and that good to which the will is directed (object). Specification by matter can be integrated with the first two: Aquinas asserts that matter specifies human action either because it has been willed as an end or possesses a distinctive formal aspect (like an object’s). Specification by circumstance can be fit into the picture through object: Aquinas believes that a ‘circumstance’ essential with respect to right reason takes on a new name, ‘condition’ or ‘difference’, and constitutes in whole or in part something essential to an object’s formal aspect. Although motives may seem more difficult to integrate since they are sometimes presented as causes for appetite, Aquinas says that motives are ‘proper objects of the will’ and asserts that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action.Less
This chapter shows that end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive can all be understood to contribute to the specification of human actions for Aquinas in a fundamentally consistent way. Although specification by end and by object have characteristic differences, they are at base compatible because both end and object can refer to precisely the same reality in human action. The same goal can be both a human action’s final cause (end), and that good to which the will is directed (object). Specification by matter can be integrated with the first two: Aquinas asserts that matter specifies human action either because it has been willed as an end or possesses a distinctive formal aspect (like an object’s). Specification by circumstance can be fit into the picture through object: Aquinas believes that a ‘circumstance’ essential with respect to right reason takes on a new name, ‘condition’ or ‘difference’, and constitutes in whole or in part something essential to an object’s formal aspect. Although motives may seem more difficult to integrate since they are sometimes presented as causes for appetite, Aquinas says that motives are ‘proper objects of the will’ and asserts that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action.
John Ameriks, Andrew Caplin, Steven Laufer, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199549108
- eISBN:
- 9780191720734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199549108.003.0011
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Pensions and Pension Management
Financial security in retirement has traditionally meant having a steady flow of annuity income as long as one lives — a definition enshrined in the Social Security system. Earlier research has ...
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Financial security in retirement has traditionally meant having a steady flow of annuity income as long as one lives — a definition enshrined in the Social Security system. Earlier research has stressed a more holistic approach, which focuses on the match between resources and spending needs. Using this formulation this chapter estimates annuity values given long-term care concerns and bequest motives, where these estimated values are consistent with low observed demand for standard annuities. The chapter extends this model to value non-standard annuities with various security-enhancing features that may be of value to retirees.Less
Financial security in retirement has traditionally meant having a steady flow of annuity income as long as one lives — a definition enshrined in the Social Security system. Earlier research has stressed a more holistic approach, which focuses on the match between resources and spending needs. Using this formulation this chapter estimates annuity values given long-term care concerns and bequest motives, where these estimated values are consistent with low observed demand for standard annuities. The chapter extends this model to value non-standard annuities with various security-enhancing features that may be of value to retirees.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
A crucial task for any moral theory is to determine what makes a human action to be of a certain kind. For instance, what makes almsgiving to be in its own species rather than in the species of theft ...
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A crucial task for any moral theory is to determine what makes a human action to be of a certain kind. For instance, what makes almsgiving to be in its own species rather than in the species of theft or selling? Aquinas addresses this issue in a few of his works, most notably Commentary on the Sentences, De Malo, and the Summa Theologiae. However, a puzzle arises when his writings are examined carefully. Aquinas uses five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to signify what gives species to human actions. Although similarities in meaning can be discerned among certain of these terms, it is difficult to grasp how all five could refer to what specifies human actions. In this monograph, the five terms used by Aquinas are examined and compared to propose a more comprehensive account of his teaching on specification of human action.Less
A crucial task for any moral theory is to determine what makes a human action to be of a certain kind. For instance, what makes almsgiving to be in its own species rather than in the species of theft or selling? Aquinas addresses this issue in a few of his works, most notably Commentary on the Sentences, De Malo, and the Summa Theologiae. However, a puzzle arises when his writings are examined carefully. Aquinas uses five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to signify what gives species to human actions. Although similarities in meaning can be discerned among certain of these terms, it is difficult to grasp how all five could refer to what specifies human actions. In this monograph, the five terms used by Aquinas are examined and compared to propose a more comprehensive account of his teaching on specification of human action.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context ...
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Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context of the voluntary. First, one sees ‘motive’ referring to what attracts a person to action. In this context, Aquinas calls motives ‘proper objects of the will’ and insists that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action. Second, one sees motives referring to causes related to appetite. For example, Aquinas differentiates gluttony into five species (named by circumstances) because each species is associated with a distinctive motive, as when rapid digestion (motive) incites concupiscence and defines the species of gluttony called ‘too soon’. Since Aquinas holds that a passion is morally relevant only to the extent that it is voluntary, motives regarding appetite must be willed somehow for them to determine a species of sin.Less
Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context of the voluntary. First, one sees ‘motive’ referring to what attracts a person to action. In this context, Aquinas calls motives ‘proper objects of the will’ and insists that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action. Second, one sees motives referring to causes related to appetite. For example, Aquinas differentiates gluttony into five species (named by circumstances) because each species is associated with a distinctive motive, as when rapid digestion (motive) incites concupiscence and defines the species of gluttony called ‘too soon’. Since Aquinas holds that a passion is morally relevant only to the extent that it is voluntary, motives regarding appetite must be willed somehow for them to determine a species of sin.
David Ross
Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a ...
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The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.Less
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.
Robert Merrihew Adams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207510
- eISBN:
- 9780191708824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The principal current alternative to defining virtue in terms of its intrinsic excellence is defining it in terms of its benefits. This chapter argues that a trait's being generally beneficial is not ...
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The principal current alternative to defining virtue in terms of its intrinsic excellence is defining it in terms of its benefits. This chapter argues that a trait's being generally beneficial is not sufficient for it to be a virtue, and that its being more beneficial than any alternative may not even be necessary for a trait to be a virtue. In response to the question whether virtue ‘pays’, reliably benefiting its possessor, it is suggested that virtue may offer a great benefit that is inseparable from having a strong motive for conscientious and generous action.Less
The principal current alternative to defining virtue in terms of its intrinsic excellence is defining it in terms of its benefits. This chapter argues that a trait's being generally beneficial is not sufficient for it to be a virtue, and that its being more beneficial than any alternative may not even be necessary for a trait to be a virtue. In response to the question whether virtue ‘pays’, reliably benefiting its possessor, it is suggested that virtue may offer a great benefit that is inseparable from having a strong motive for conscientious and generous action.
