Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of ...
More
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.Less
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Develops an account of the motivational strength of the desires most closely associated with intentional actions. The motivational strength of a desire is distinguished from such things as the ...
More
Develops an account of the motivational strength of the desires most closely associated with intentional actions. The motivational strength of a desire is distinguished from such things as the agent's evaluation of what she desires and the affective quality of a desire. The general idea that desires differ in motivational strength is defended against a variety of objections, including the objection that the idea is vacuous because the only measure of motivational strength is what the agent does. It is argued that the position defended on motivational strength does not diminish human agency and is compatible, with practical reasoning playing a major role in producing many actions.Less
Develops an account of the motivational strength of the desires most closely associated with intentional actions. The motivational strength of a desire is distinguished from such things as the agent's evaluation of what she desires and the affective quality of a desire. The general idea that desires differ in motivational strength is defended against a variety of objections, including the objection that the idea is vacuous because the only measure of motivational strength is what the agent does. It is argued that the position defended on motivational strength does not diminish human agency and is compatible, with practical reasoning playing a major role in producing many actions.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150438
- eISBN:
- 9780199869091
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150430.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Offers a resolution of a puzzle about the possibility of exercising self‐control in support of one's doing what one judges best when one's desire for that course of action is weaker than one's desire ...
More
Offers a resolution of a puzzle about the possibility of exercising self‐control in support of one's doing what one judges best when one's desire for that course of action is weaker than one's desire to pursue a tempting alternative. The resolution is based partly on observations about the sources of the motivational strengths of desires and about various ways in which desires compete with one another. Some relevant empirical work on delay of gratification is reviewed.Less
Offers a resolution of a puzzle about the possibility of exercising self‐control in support of one's doing what one judges best when one's desire for that course of action is weaker than one's desire to pursue a tempting alternative. The resolution is based partly on observations about the sources of the motivational strengths of desires and about various ways in which desires compete with one another. Some relevant empirical work on delay of gratification is reviewed.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Provides a preview of the book's four main parts: (1) “Motivation and Action”; (2) “Motivation and Normativity”; (3) “Strength and Control” (more precisely, motivational strength and self‐control); ...
More
Provides a preview of the book's four main parts: (1) “Motivation and Action”; (2) “Motivation and Normativity”; (3) “Strength and Control” (more precisely, motivational strength and self‐control); and (4) “Decision, Agency, and Belief.” The chapter also identifies popular theses in motivational psychology, identifies a central element of the causal theory of agency to be defended, and explains why behavioral flexibility is a mark of motivation.Less
Provides a preview of the book's four main parts: (1) “Motivation and Action”; (2) “Motivation and Normativity”; (3) “Strength and Control” (more precisely, motivational strength and self‐control); and (4) “Decision, Agency, and Belief.” The chapter also identifies popular theses in motivational psychology, identifies a central element of the causal theory of agency to be defended, and explains why behavioral flexibility is a mark of motivation.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The primary purpose of this chapter is to show that data generated in well‐known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet can be used to support the idea that an independently plausible thesis ...
More
The primary purpose of this chapter is to show that data generated in well‐known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet can be used to support the idea that an independently plausible thesis about the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leaves ample room for self‐control. Aspects of Libet's interpretation of his data are criticized, but Libet's work does give us a sense of how much time might elapse between the acquisition of a desire to do something straightaway and the beginning of an overt action motivated by that desire. More important, it gives us a sense of possibilities for practically relevant motivational change during that span and adds to the extant case for the view that a plausible principle of the kind at issue does not place agents at the mercy of their strongest desires.Less
The primary purpose of this chapter is to show that data generated in well‐known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet can be used to support the idea that an independently plausible thesis about the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leaves ample room for self‐control. Aspects of Libet's interpretation of his data are criticized, but Libet's work does give us a sense of how much time might elapse between the acquisition of a desire to do something straightaway and the beginning of an overt action motivated by that desire. More important, it gives us a sense of possibilities for practically relevant motivational change during that span and adds to the extant case for the view that a plausible principle of the kind at issue does not place agents at the mercy of their strongest desires.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter's aim is threefold: to articulate and defend an account of what it is to decide to do something; to defend the thesis that there are genuine instances of deciding so understood; and to ...
More
This chapter's aim is threefold: to articulate and defend an account of what it is to decide to do something; to defend the thesis that there are genuine instances of deciding so understood; and to shed light on how decisions are to be explained. This chapter defends the idea that to decide to do something is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to do it. Actively forming an intention is distinguished from passively acquiring one, and the bearing of reasons and motivational strength on deciding is discussed.Less
This chapter's aim is threefold: to articulate and defend an account of what it is to decide to do something; to defend the thesis that there are genuine instances of deciding so understood; and to shed light on how decisions are to be explained. This chapter defends the idea that to decide to do something is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to do it. Actively forming an intention is distinguished from passively acquiring one, and the bearing of reasons and motivational strength on deciding is discussed.
