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Offers a resolution of a puzzle about the possibility of exercising self‐control in support of one's doing what one judges best when one's desire for that course of action is weaker than one's desire to pursue a tempting alternative. The resolution is based partly on observations about the sources of the motivational strengths of desires and about various ways in which desires compete with one another. Some relevant empirical work on delay of gratification is reviewed.

Develops an account of the motivational strength of the desires most closely associated with intentional actions. The motivational strength of a desire is distinguished from such things as the agent's evaluation of what she desires and the affective quality of a desire. The general idea that desires differ in motivational strength is defended against a variety of objections, including the objection that the idea is vacuous because the only measure of motivational strength is what the agent does. It is argued that the position defended on motivational strength does not diminish human agency and is compatible, with practical reasoning playing a major role in producing many actions.

Provides a preview of the book's four main parts: (1) “Motivation and Action”; (2) “Motivation and Normativity”; (3) “Strength and Control” (more precisely, motivational strength and self‐control); and (4) “Decision, Agency, and Belief.” The chapter also identifies popular theses in motivational psychology, identifies a central element of the causal theory of agency to be defended, and explains why behavioral flexibility is a mark of motivation.

The primary purpose of this chapter is to show that data generated in well‐known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet can be used to support the idea that an independently plausible thesis about the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leaves ample room for self‐control. Aspects of Libet's interpretation of his data are criticized, but Libet's work does give us a sense of how much time might elapse between the acquisition of a desire to do something straightaway and the beginning of an overt action motivated by that desire. More important, it gives us a sense of possibilities for practically relevant motivational change during that span and adds to the extant case for the view that a plausible principle of the kind at issue does not place agents at the mercy of their strongest desires.

This chapter's aim is threefold: to articulate and defend an account of what it is to decide to do something; to defend the thesis that there are genuine instances of deciding so understood; and to shed light on how decisions are to be explained. This chapter defends the idea that to decide to do something is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to do it. Actively forming an intention is distinguished from passively acquiring one, and the bearing of reasons and motivational strength on deciding is discussed.